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2025 NATO Summit in The Hague Outcomes, Challenges, and Policy Implications |
| July 21, 2025 |
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Eunsook ChungEmeritus Senior Fellow, Sejong Institute | chunges@sejong.org
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This year’s NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Summit was held on June 24–25 (Tuesday and Wednesday) in The Hague, the capital of the Netherlands. President Trump, who has emphasized “America First” even in relations with allies, attended the meeting for the first time since the launch of his second term, together with the leaders of the other 31 member states (Europe and Canada).
Despite concerns, President Trump and the allied leaders succeeded in adopting a “Summit Declaration” consisting of five paragraphs at this summit. Although brief, the joint statement had a clear core. It was achieved through President Trump and the European allies understanding and coordinating each other’s positions: reaffirmation of the collective defense commitment under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty; a pledge to allocate 5% of GDP to defense spending within the next ten years (by 2035); identification of Russia as a long-term threat to Euro-Atlantic security; independent and direct contributions to the defense of Ukraine and to its defense industry; and agreement on accelerating transatlantic defense industrial cooperation to facilitate collective defense. 1) President Trump, who had directly and indirectly presented the 5% defense spending target as a guideline, as well as the majority of European leaders, are evaluating the outcome of The Hague Summit highly, in that it has restored transatlantic relations, which had faced significant uncertainty in recent months, and has raised expectations for the strengthening of NATO’s deterrence and defense capabilities.
In what follows, the contents of the agreement will be examined in greater detail, together with their respective backgrounds, with the aim of identifying future challenges and tasks as well as policy implications. -
Most notably, the 2025 The Hague Summit Declaration (June 25, 2025) is concise compared to previous years: one page consisting of five paragraphs. In contrast, the 2023 Vilnius (Lithuania) Summit produced 90 paragraphs, and the 2024 Washington Summit 38 paragraphs, marking a notable change. The Washington Summit, hosted by the previous Biden administration last year, addressed a wide range of topics, including force modernization, support for Ukraine, policy toward Russia, China, Iran, and the challenges posed by North Korea. By contrast, this year’s declaration made no mention of China, Iran, or North Korea, reflecting the changed security perspective of the Trump administration in its second term, which places little emphasis on the interlinkages among different theaters. Even Russia was mentioned only once as a long-term threat to Euro-Atlantic security, without any presentation of specific policy directions toward Russia. Although Russia’s assault on Ukraine is currently being waged with intensity, the declaration contained no reference to it. With respect to Ukraine, it merely included brief mentions of individual allied commitments to defense support and their accounting within allied defense expenditures. In contrast, the agreement on the target of allocating 5 percent of GDP to defense by 2035 stands out within the otherwise brief declaration as its most visible and distinctive achievement. It was an agreement in which President Trump’s catalytic role was prominent, marking the first time in eleven years since 2014 that NATO leaders reached consensus on raising the defense spending benchmark. On this point, albeit briefly, the declaration even specified concrete measures.
The conciseness itself cannot be evaluated in purely positive or purely negative terms. If a declaration is excessively lengthy and comprehensive, it may suggest that priorities were either not determined or not addressed. In this respect, the conciseness of The Hague Declaration constitutes a welcome change. It conveys a clear focus, and in light of the concerns of the past several months, the outcome of the 2025 Summit has yielded at least the following major achievements.
First, the leaders reaffirmed that NATO is the strongest alliance in history and reiterated their commitment to collective defense under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (1949) as well as to transatlantic cohesion. In other words, they reconfirmed that “an attack against one Ally shall be considered an attack against all,” thereby affirming that President Trump raised no objection to Article 5, which had been overshadowed by ambiguity in his earlier remarks. The leaders also firmly resolved to defend a population of one billion and the territories of the Alliance, and to guarantee “freedom and democracy.” In this regard, the character of NATO as a values-based alliance was once again recognized.
Second, the most notable agreement reached at The Hague was the decision to allocate 5% of annual GDP to defense expenditures by 2035. This decision was made against the backdrop of long-term threats from Russia and persistent terrorism, among other Euro-Atlantic security challenges. The goal set at the NATO Wales Summit in 2014 had been to raise Allies’ defense spending to 2% of GDP within ten years (at that time, the average was 1.4%). At The Hague, Allied leaders went considerably further, pledging to achieve 5% within ten years (by 2035), up from the current average of 2.02%. In accordance with Article 3 of the Washington Treaty (1949), which stipulates individual and collective responsibility, such investments are to be aligned with the Alliance’s three core tasks: deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security. At The Hague, the leaders also agreed on joint directions of implementation to ensure the achievement of the goal: of the annual GDP 5% defense expenditure, (i) “at least 3.5%” shall be devoted to supporting NATO Capability Targets as defined under previously agreed NATO definitions, while (ii) “up to 1.5%” shall be allocated to defense- and security-related elements such as the protection of critical infrastructure, network defense, civilian preparedness and resilience, pursuit of innovation, and strengthening of the defense industrial base. Allies are also required to submit credible plans annually, and a review will be conducted in four years (2029) on spending direction and balance, based on changes in the strategic environment and updates to the targets.
Since the inauguration of his first term in 2017, President Trump has strongly objected to what he has termed “free-riding,” criticizing NATO Allies for shifting burdens onto American taxpayers. In his second term, President Trump has, both directly and indirectly, put forward the target of 5% of GDP. Meanwhile, European countries themselves had already recognized the necessity of self-strengthening following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Factors like the need to replenish and reinforce their own arsenals as a result of military support to Ukraine, the requirements for capabilities and readiness demanded by the “NATO Operational Plans” adopted at the 2023 Vilnius Summit, and the Trump administration’s indication of a reduction in its conventional role in Europe form the background of their consideration. To fill the deterrence and defense gap in NATO in the event of a reduced U.S. role, far greater military capabilities have become necessary. That being said, there may be debate as to whether the target necessarily had to be 5%. While some explanations point to consideration of Russia’s or China’s defense spending—estimated at 6–7% of GDP—the most logical reason is President Trump’s demand. Although some Allies proposed 3.5%, in the end, they agreed to align with 5%. The White House, for its part, has evaluated this as a remarkable achievement of President Trump. 2)
“In a defining moment for global security, President Donald J. Trump achieved a monumental victory for the United States and its allies...marking a new era of shared responsibility and strength against global threats.”
The agreement on the defense spending target of 5% of GDP, once considered either impossible or even unrealistic both within and outside NATO, has been realized. If implemented, it is expected that by 2035 the military capabilities of the Alliance, particularly those of the European member states, will be significantly enhanced, which will be essential for deterring aggression from Russia and for the operation of NATO’s new regional defense plans.
Third, the leaders regarded transatlantic defense industrial cooperation as one of the key elements for achieving the defense spending target of 5% of GDP, and they reached an agreement on this as well. The Hague agreement is distinctive compared to previous years in that it also committed to meaningful cooperation in areas such as consolidating industrial resilience, driving innovation, and removing trade barriers. Industrial cooperation aimed at NATO’s new capability targets has become increasingly important. Furthermore, the agreement on trade among the 32 member states is also significant. This refers, for example, to the easing of complicated procedures or restrictions regarding the export and import of specific items. In particular, the European member states have long considered such barriers not beneficial to the collective defense of the Alliance.
Fourth, although mentioned only once, Russia was identified in the declaration as a representative threat to European-Atlantic security, and the allies’ ongoing commitments to provide independent support for Ukraine were reaffirmed. This agreement was also difficult to anticipate until shortly before The Hague Summit. Furthermore, under the logic that Ukraine’s security contributes to the security of NATO allies, direct contributions to Ukraine’s defense and defense industry were to be counted within the Alliance’s defense spending. European allies had significant concerns that, following the start of Trump’s second term, a rapid ceasefire or even an end to the Ukraine war might occur during a possible U.S.-Russia “honeymoon” period. The troubled White House meeting between President Zelensky of Ukraine and President Trump in February symbolically illustrated the first sharp shift in U.S. policy toward Ukraine since the outbreak of the war in 2022. U.S. Secretary of Defense Hegseth had previously stated at the Brussels Defense Ministers’ Meeting in February that, following a ceasefire, U.S. forces would be excluded if European and non-European troops were deployed as peacekeepers. However, on the first evening of the Summit (June 24), Foreign Minister Kuleba of Ukraine attended a working dinner of the “NATO-Ukraine Council” with NATO foreign ministers, and President Trump held a side meeting with President Zelensky the following day (June 25), which appeared mutually cordial. At a press conference after the Summit, President Trump positively evaluated the meeting with Zelensky and, in response to a question about providing Patriot interceptor missiles to Ukraine, expressed an open stance, indicating that it would be considered if possible. This represents considerable change over a short period. Initially, President Trump had claimed that he could end the Russo-Ukrainian war within 24 hours of taking office; however, he later expressed skepticism about President Putin’s willingness to negotiate, and in light of recent intensified Russian offensives on the battlefield, he gradually showed signs of frustration.
Finally, through the first meeting at The Hague under Trump’s second term, a somewhat amicable atmosphere appears to have developed between President Trump and European leaders. Based on the content of President Trump’s post-summit press conference, his demeanor had changed significantly compared to the previously cold stance. Of course, Spain was the only country that did not commit to the 5% defense spending target, prompting President Trump to state that it would have to pay twice as much through tariffs or other means for being unfair; nevertheless, the summit itself did not encounter major obstacles. As mentioned, the side meeting between President Trump and President Zelensky of Ukraine also marked a stark contrast, particularly when recalling the White House incident in February. -
Compared to the worst-case scenarios that had been feared, The Hague agreement, as seen above, constitutes an achievement and victory for the 32 allied nations. Nevertheless, uncertainties and challenges remain ahead, and there are concerns regarding aspects that this summit did not address or could not address.
First, the question is whether the allies are truly prepared to allocate 5% of GDP to defense spending by 2035. Prior to the summit, it appears that a somewhat easier agreement was made possible by the ingenuity of dividing expenditures into at least 3.5% of GDP for so-called hard power costs, including the United States, and up to 1.5% for “defense- and security-related” costs under a more comprehensive definition. In the short term, the more urgent investments within Europe concern the former (3.5%). Furthermore, in the case of the latter (1.5%), there is the difficulty of establishing a clear standard between defense-related demands and civilian demands. If interpreted too broadly, the newly established defense spending target may, in the long run, fail to alleviate U.S. concerns about burden-sharing, fail to provide security assurances to allied populations, and fail to enhance deterrence against Russia. Therefore, existing NATO and non-NATO institutions, or newly established institutions, need to set clearer standards and priorities in this regard.
Spain’s future course is receiving attention. At The Hague Summit, Prime Minister Sánchez (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party, PSOE) was the only one among the allies who did not compromise on the 2035 target of 5%, asserting that a goal of 2.1% of GDP would suffice to fulfill commitments. This was perceived as reluctance to assume the collective burden of security, and it appears not to have gained the support of most allies, including President Trump, and especially the Eastern European allies. At the 2029 review, Spain will be subject to evaluation by the other allies regarding what progress has been made.
Second, no clearer or more short-term policy statement regarding the United States’ security commitments was expressed by President Trump. In other words, there appears to have been no opportunity to communicate concerning the future course or posture of U.S. forces stationed in Europe. Since his inauguration in January, the Trump administration has repeatedly suggested the reduction of U.S. forces in Europe for the purpose of safeguarding American interests in the Indo-Pacific and the Western Hemisphere. At present, however, the core of NATO’s nuclear and conventional deterrence against Russia still resides with the United States. Accordingly, the EU’s pursuit of self-reliance since 2022 has not yet aimed at independent strategic autonomy outside the NATO framework. Nevertheless, in the longer term, if the transatlantic gap in threat perceptions expands and the reduction of U.S. conventional force deployments proceeds, the possibility of a transformation in character cannot be excluded.
Third, according to the summit declaration at least, the leaders at The Hague reaffirmed the collective defense commitment, while as in previous years also resolving anew their firm guarantees for freedom and democracy. In other words, President Trump did not deny the elements of a values based alliance. However, unlike in previous years, by not including a shared allied perception regarding China, North Korea, and Iran, the importance of global solidarity or at least the security linkage between Europe and the Indo-Pacific appears diminished compared to the Biden administration. Also unlike in previous years, the declaration did not include the importance of cooperation with NATO’s global partner states in the Indo Pacific region (IP4: South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand). At this point of considerable fluidity in the international order, it remains to be seen how the solidarity and cohesion of a democratic alliance will be realized under Trump’s second term.
Fourth, no new concrete action concerning Russia has been determined. The 2024 Washington Summit had decided to formulate the alliance’s strategy and policy regarding the risks posed by Russia, and thus it is unlikely that European leaders could have overlooked this. It seems possible that the matter was confined merely to “security threats” in order to avoid a rupture with President Trump. Currently, Russia’s offensive on the battlefield remains intense.
Finally, in relation to the above, there was an absence of urgency and immediacy in supporting Ukraine. Following the sideline meeting with President Zelensky, President Trump left open the possibility of providing the Patriot system, but no clearer and firmer solution was presented beyond that. For example, there was no unconditional 30 day ceasefire, no indication of additional sanctions should President Putin refuse, and no firm presentation of U.S. weapons transfers to Ukraine. Moreover, unlike the declarations of previous years that repeatedly referred to Ukraine’s “irreversible path” to NATO membership, The Hague declaration contained no such reference. If, as some fear, Ukraine endures without external military equipment support only to face a catastrophic defeat toward the end of this year, there is considerable concern that despite the various achievements outlined above, The Hague summit may be overshadowed. -
A brief and tentative presentation of policy implications of 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague for ROK government will be made largely in two dimensions.
First, since the early 1950s, the United States, as Seoul’s only ally, has served as the crucial pillar of ROK security in its process of consolidating liberal democracy and the economy. Under the second Trump administration in 2025, as with NATO member states, South Korea likewise faces demands from the U.S. for increased defense spending. European allies agreed in The Hague this time to the target of 5 percent of GDP within ten years, and in return reconfirmed the sharing threat perceptions and the pledge of collective security. In this process, the resourcefulness and affinity of NATO Secretary General Rutte played a significant role. In the case of South Korea, a ROK-U.S. summit has not yet been held under Trump’s second term. Careful countermeasures by the new Korean administration are therefore necessary.
Along with burden sharing, “threat perception” sharing is of critical importance for the cohesion of the alliance, and measures in this regard must also be prepared. For Seoul, it is fundamentally necessary to secure the reaffirmation of the Trump administration’s commitment to extended deterrence against North Korea (nuclear and conventional) and the sharing of threat perceptions from North Korea, while the United States is likely to place greater emphasis on deterring challenges from “China” within the Indo-Pacific region. For ROK–U.S. negotiations, it will be necessary for a high-level figure capable of earning the trust of the Trump administration to take the lead. While some argue that in Trump’s second term U.S. diplomacy no longer rests on values but is subsumed solely under “America First,” it is worth noting that within NATO’s framework of collective defense agreed upon at The Hague, the leaders’ firm will to guarantee freedom and democracy was included.
Next are the policy implications for ROK government in its relations with NATO. Since the Roh Moo-hyun administration in 2006, South Korea has advanced cooperative relations with NATO as one of NATO’s global partner countries through the convening of policy consultations and exchanges of high-level officials. Subsequently in 2012, South Korea signed the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP), and in 2023 concluded the updated Individually Tailored Partnership Programme (ITPP), which specified cooperation in eleven areas. These include dialogue and consultation, counterterrorism cooperation, disarmament and non-proliferation, new technologies, cyber security, and public diplomacy. From 2022 for three consecutive years, former President Yoon Suk-yeol, as the leader of a NATO global partner country, was invited to and attended the annual summit meetings. Alongside South Korea, the leaders of NATO’s other Indo-Pacific partner countries— Japan, Australia, and New Zealand (the IP4)—were likewise consecutively invited and participated. In the first year of the Trump second term, at The Hague Summit, all four Indo-Pacific partner country leaders were invited, but three countries, except New Zealand, were unable to attend due to respective domestic and external circumstances. Yet in the case of Australia, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence Richard Marles attended in place of the Prime Minister and announced that joint air force exercises with NATO forces would be conducted in the latter half of this year. It is necessary for the new Korean administration to articulate a coherent policy toward NATO. It should not be overlooked that NATO has served as a key platform for deepening and advancing political and military-security networks with European allied countries. In addition, although indirect, it retains potential as a platform to enhance mutual understanding and regional cooperation in political, military, and security matters with the other three NATO partner countries in the Indo-Pacific.
Since 2022, European countries have actively pursued and strengthened cooperation with Korean defense companies across multiple and diverse dimensions, in line with military support for Ukraine and their own rearmament plans. Furthermore, with NATO leaders at The Hague Summit incorporating the 2035 GDP 5% defense spending target, interest in and demand for cooperation with South Korea in weapons systems, investment, and technology are expected to increase further. The new administration should, taking into account European countries’ rearmament plans and the recent decision to accelerate defense industrial cooperation between the United States and European allies, act as a driving force in pursuing South Korea’s long-term national interests in the defense market. Careful attention is required regarding NATO and EU-level rearmament plans, the implementation directions of individual member states, and institutional changes in defense industrial cooperation between the United States and European allies.
| Preface
1) Hague Summit Declaration, The Hague, June 25, 2025. (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_236705.htm)
| Characteristics and Outcomes of The Hague Summit
2) The White House, President Trump’s Leadership: Vision Drives NATO Breakthrough. June 26, 2025.
(https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2025/06/president-trumps-leadership-vision-drives-nato-breakthrough/)
| Challenges and Tasks Ahead
| Policy Implications
※ The contents published on 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institue
