Debating South Korea's SSNs: Strategic Utility and Roles in National Security / Jeeyong Kim and Daehan Lee
South Korea has considered the introduction of SSNs for more than three decades, yet the program has not materialized due to various constraints. The se- curity environment on the Korean Peninsula has recently shifted as North Korea has begun deploying nuclear-capable systems at sea, including a nuclear-armed unmanned underwater vehicle, a tactical nuclear attack submarine, and the re- ported construction of a strategic nuclear submarine. Amid growing security con- cerns, the United States approved South Korea’s development of SSNs following a bilateral summit associated with the APEC meeting. This development reflects a broader balancing dynamic in response to changes in the international dis- tribution of power. Nevertheless, domestic debates questioning the utility of SSNs continue to shape public opinion and may constrain policy implementation. This study classifies the major critiques of South Korea’s SSN program into three cate- gories and evaluates their insights and limitations. It then proposes three strategic roles for SSNs within South Korea’s national security strategy.
Keywords: North Korea’s SSBN, South Korea’s SSN, SSN Utility Debates, Nuclear-powered Submarine
Submerged Strategy: South Korea's SSN Pursuit and Lessons from India / Yoon Jung Choi
This study analyzes India’s experience in developing sea-based nuclear forces centered on SSBNs through the lenses of nuclear deterrence, maritime strategy, and strategic stability, and draws implications for South Korea’s SSN debate. It argues that the strategic value of sea-based nuclear forces does not arise from platform acquisition alone, but from the long-term integration of doctrine, techno- logical autonomy, command and control, and maritime operational concepts. India’s SSBN force has strengthened the credibility of NFU and CMD by enhanc- ing the survivability of retaliatory capability and expanding strategic autonomy in the Indian Ocean. At the same time, it exposes persistent constraints, including limited platform numbers, SLBM range limitations, anti-submarine warfare com- petition, NC3 vulnerabilities, and crisis-management burdens at sea. These find- ings suggest that South Korea’s SSN debate should not be framed as a pursuit of sea-based nuclear retaliation. Rather, it should focus on how a conventional nu- clear-powered undersea capability can be coherently integrated with maritime strategy, alliance coordination, non-proliferation norms, and crisis-management mechanisms.
Keywords: SSBN, SSN, Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrence, Maritime Strategy, Korea-India Maritime Cooperation
The Status and Role of the Secretariat Party Central Committee of the WPK in the Kim Jong-un Era: Focusing on Elites and Institutional Operation / Junhee Lee
This study analyzes the composition, status, and operational mechanisms of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea following Kim Jong Un’s rise to power, in order to assess whether the prevailing “Secretariat as the locus of real power” thesis remains valid in the Kim Jong Un era. It also evaluates the contemporary status and role of the Secretariat under his rule.
To this end, the study examines the historical context in which party secre- tariats emerged and developed within Marxist-Leninist party systems, and com- paratively analyzes the functions and transformations of the Secretariat under Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. In particular, it provides a comprehensive analysis of developments following the 8th Party Congress, with particular attention to the downsizing of the Secretariat, the concentration of authority, the reorganization of functional specializations, and patterns in meeting frequency and agenda-setting. The findings indicate that the Secretariat of the Workers’ Party of Korea has been significantly strengthened as a core executive and coordinating body respon- sible for policy coordination, cadre control, and disciplinary oversight. At the same time, Kim Jong Un has maintained firm control over the Secretariat through discretionary appointments and organizational adjustments. As a result, the Secretariat today functions in a manner that systematically supports and enhances the efficiency of governance centered on Kim Jong Un.
Keywords: Kim Jong Un, WPK (Workers’ Party of Korea), WPK Secretariat, 8th WPK Congress, 9th WPK Congress, Cadre Policy, Party Institutions, Marxist-Leninist Party
North Korea's Military Intervention in the Russia–Ukraine War: Beyond Transactional Logic and Toward Strategic State-Building / Inseok Yoo
This study conceptualizes North Korea’s large-scale troop deployment in the course of the Russia–Ukraine War as an instance of active military intervention and examines its strategic motivations. Existing studies have explained North Korea’s involvement in terms of economic compensation, the acquisition of mili- tary technology, and strategic transactions. However, such approaches face limi- tations in adequately accounting for the high-risk decision to deploy combat troops. In response, this study interprets North Korea’s military intervention not as a mere extension of transactional exchanges, but as the implementation of a broader strategy of “strategic state” construction. From this perspective, the de- ployment can be understood as an act that simultaneously seeks to expand North Korea’s role in wartime operations and to deepen strategic ties with Russia. In particular, given that North Korea has set the completion of its nuclear force as a core objective of strategic state-building, military and technological support from Russia carries a certain strategic significance. However, the analytical focus should not be confined to the value of such support per se, but rather be directed toward how policy choices—including troop deployment—are positioned and oper- ate within the overarching strategy of strategic state construction. In this context, the deployment is better understood not as a transactional choice aimed at short-term gains, but as a component of a long-term national strategy designed to expand strategic status and bargaining power. This study contributes academically by extending existing great power–centric theories of military intervention to pres- ent an analytical framework that explains North Korea’s intervention behavior, and it offers policy implications by projecting its future patterns and suggesting appropriate response strategies.
Keywords: North Korea, Russia–Ukraine War, Military Intervention, Troop Deployment, North Korea–Russia Alliance
Political Economy of North Korea's Dollarization: Rise of the Donju and the 2009 Currency Reform / Jieyoung Kim
This study examines the paradox of deepening dollarization in North Korea— a state that officially champions juche (self-reliance) and economic autonomy— and seeks to answer the question: “Why and how did dollarization occur in North Korea?” Drawing on authoritarian survival theory, structural theory of action, and institutional change theory, this study argues that the emergence of Donju and the resulting transformation of North Korea's power structure constitute the funda- mental cause of dollarization. To substantiate this claim, the study proposes and verifies a four-stage diachronic causal mechanism: (1) Donju-elite collusion gives rise to a market force; (2) the regime perceives this coalition as an existential threat; (3) in response, it implements a currency reform aimed at purging this emerging force; (4) however, the reform undermines trust in both the currency and the regime, thereby accelerating the spread of dollarization. Through this analysis, the study proposes an alternative analytical framework that moves beyond mac- ro-structural economic explanations by foregrounding the political-economic dy- namics of Donju ascendance and shifting power structures to account for North Korean dollarization.
Keywords: Dollarization, Donju, North Korea, Currency Reform, Authoritarian Survival Theory
The Political-Military Dynamics of OPCON Transfer: Structural Limitations of the Conditions-Based Paradigm and a Pathways to Substantive Transfer through COTP Revision and Implementation TOR Establishment / Ki-tae Park
The transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) to the Republic of Korea Armed Forces has been under discussion since 1978, repeatedly delayed over the course of 47 years. In 2014, the two nations agreed to the Conditions-based OPCON Transition Plan (COTP), premising transfer on the fulfillment of three conditions. With the Full Operational Capability (FOC) verification now approach- ing completion in 2026, a new phase appears imminent. However, this study ar- gues that the current framework fails to guarantee a substantive transfer. Four core theses are advanced. First, while the COTP conditions are eval- uated through a joint ROK-U.S. assessment mechanism, the U.S. military holds structural dominance in setting and interpreting evaluation criteria, effectively ren- dering the COTP a managed deferral mechanism. Second, historical evidence demonstrates that transfer decisions have consistently been driven by political judgment rather than condition fulfillment. Third, the current design of the Future Combined Forces Command risks what this study terms “Command Authority Renaming”—a state in which nominal command authority is transferred to ROK forces while substantive control over strategic assets, intelligence access, and com- mand post operations remains with U.S. forces. Fourth, realizing a substantive transfer in 2028 requires that COTP revisions and the establishment of five Terms of Reference (TOR)—currently nonexistent—enter into force simultaneously with the transfer itself, not as preconditions that could justify further delay. This study presents concrete proposals for COTP revision and TOR establishment across five domains: command structure, strategic asset employment, intelligence sharing, combined command post sovereignty, and decision-making mechanisms for Taiwan contingencies. The year 2028 represents the only realistic window co- inciding with the Trump administration's second term (January 2025–January 2029), and proactive agenda-setting by the ROK government is urgently required.
Keywords: OPCON Transfer, Conditions-based OPCON Transition Plan (COTP), Command Authority Renaming, Future Combined Forces Command, TOR Establishment, Alliance Security Dilemma
The Evolution of NATO's 'Continuum of Competition' and Its Implications for the Transfer of Wartime Operational Control in Korea: Focusing on the Standardization Document AJP-01 / Sung Kyoo Ahn
NATO’s military posture toward Russia has recently been reinforced through doctrinal revision. In particular, attention has focused on the concept of the con- tinuum of competition (CoC) reflected in the revised edition of AJP-01, NATO’s capstone doctrine. This concept understands military activities for deterrence not through a peacetime-wartime dichotomy, but within a continuous competitive environment. In the past, below-threshold military activities and grey-zone or hy- brid activities were often not clearly incorporated into the category of traditional military operations, making effective responses difficult and providing advantages to the aggressor. However, following the adoption of the CoC concept, such activ- ities are increasingly recognized as part of the competitive environment. NATO has consequently responded to them through a campaign-oriented approach that does not strictly distinguish between peacetime and wartime, while strengthening structures for the persistent functional integration of allied military capabilities from peacetime onward. This suggests that South Korea, which has already en- tered a CoC environment, may also need to reconsider its “conditions-based OPCON transition” framework and move toward a “function-based transition” approach.
Keywords: Continuum of Competition, Campaign, Sub-threshold Military Activities, AJP-01, OPCON Transfer
Managed Fluctuation in DPRK-China Relations from the Cold War to the New Cold War: Asymmetric Alliance Politics, Asymmetric Interdependence, and Critical Junctures / Sung-Chul Kang
This article develops an analytical framework combining the alliance di- lemma and asymmetric interdependence to explain long-term change in DPRK- China relations from the Cold War to the new Cold War. It treats China’s entrap- ment costs and loss/abandonment costs as independent variables, the possession and constrained use of leverage as a conditioning factor, and the observable mix of sanctions implementation, border and logistics control, high-level exchanges, and diplomatic buffering as the dependent variable of policy distance. The article compares six critical turning points and conducts focused process tracing on two periods: 2006-2017, when the North Korean nuclear crisis and multilateral sanc- tions intensified, and 2018 onward, when summit diplomacy unfolded amid sharp- ening U.S.-China strategic competition. It argues that China responds to rising en- trapment costs by strengthening limited pressure on North Korea, but does not move toward full coercion because loss/abandonment costs - regime collapse, bor- der instability, and erosion of a strategic buffer - remain high, while the full use of leverage carries substantial spillover costs. North Korea, for its part, seeks to reshape China’s cost calculations through crisis escalation, alternative patron sig- nals, diplomatic shifts, and high-level political channels. As a result, DPRK-China relations are better understood as managed fluctuation, in which pressure and sup- port are repeatedly recombined under changing structural conditions.
Keywords: DPRK-China Relations, Asymmetric Alliance Politics, Asymmetric Interdependence, Managed Fluctuation, New Cold War