This report examines how North Korea’s bilateral relations with four major European states – Sweden, Switzerland, Germany, and the United Kingdom – have diverged since the COVID-19 pandemic. It draws upon fourteen interviews with European observers and former North and South Korean officials, as well as government documents, aid data, memoirs, and other records. It investigates why diplomatic representation and engagement have recovered and proceeded differently in these bilateral relationships since 2020.

Its findings suggest that North Korea’s approach to each of these states reflects significant long-run differences in engagement,humanitarian assistance, diplomatic roles, and sanction policies. Both Sweden and Switzerland have restored a level of representation to Pyongyang, whereas Germany has thus far declined an invitation to reopen its embassy there, and the UK has faced resistance as it has sought to return.

Participation in both sanctions enforcement and the imposition of new sanctions against North Korea appears to have seemingly contributed to tensions, but this alone does not explain the differences observable between the four cases. The recent history of relations and the benefits that Pyongyang associates with some of its partners appear to matter. Yet, despite the restoration of some representation to Pyongyang, humanitarian assistance and capacity building activities in North Korea remain largely frozen.

The report concludes that Stockholm and Bern offer potential channels through which South Korea might engage North Korea, including for humanitarian cooperation, capacity building, and diplomatic communication.​​