This paper analyzes Japan's "history war" (歴史戦) not as a mere dispute over the past, but as a structural phenomenon that has emerged from the broader realignment of the East Asian international order and the reconstruction of Japan's national strategy. In particular, it focuses on the way the history war took shape and expanded through the convergence of three developments: the incomplete postwar settlement left by the San Francisco System, the deepening of U.S.-China strategic competition since the end of the Cold War, and the resurgence of conservative nationalism within Japan. On this basis, the study's central aim is to provide an integrated account of the interconnections among the history issue, foreign and security policy, domestic politics, and the international order.

The paper first examines the background to the emergence of Japan's history war in relation to the structural limitations of the postwar order. While the San Francisco System contributed to Japan's reintegration and to the stabilization of the Cold War order, it left the structural foundations of East Asian historical conflict in place by deferring a comprehensive reckoning with colonial rule and wartime responsibility. It was on this unresolved foundation that conservative nationalism in Japan reemerged from the 1980s onward, and the prolonged economic stagnation and social anxiety of the post-1990s period reinforced calls to "break free from the masochistic view of history" and to reconstruct national identity. China, for its part, functioned as an external factor heightening the perceived need within Japan for an "offensive history war," as it strategically deployed a historical framework centered on the narrative of the War of Resistance against Japan to challenge the legitimacy of the postwar order.

Under these conditions, the history war was elevated to the level of national strategy in earnest during the administration of Abe Shinzo (安倍晋三). Within the hardline faction of the LDP, two currents, "security realism" and "historical revisionism," combined while remaining in tension with one another. Security realism is the pragmatic line that prioritizes strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance and containing China, whereas historical revisionism is the ideological line that prioritizes reconstructing the discourse of postwar responsibility and consolidating the domestic conservative base. The Abe government strategically combined these two currents, pursuing a shift in security policy through the expansion of the right of collective self-defense, the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC), and the promotion of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), while at the same time waging the history war through textbook screening, visits to Yasukuni Shrine, adjustments to the language of official statements, and international public relations activities.

Notably, the 2015 Abe Statement, issued on the seventieth anniversary of the end of the war, formally inherited the language of previous statements while narrowing the scope and duration of Japan's acknowledged responsibility, thereby attempting to bring the historical issue to a "close" while simultaneously constructing a narrative that redefined Japan as a "guardian of the rules-based order." In this process, the history war functioned as a legitimacy-producing device that softened international criticism of Japan's shift in security policy. Japan's history war has had a structural impact on Korea-Japan relations. The history issue has functioned as a variable constraining not merely diplomatic agenda items but the very conditions for cooperation, entrenching a vicious cycle of "historical conflict, deteriorating public opinion, policy rigidity, and shrinking cooperation." In the security domain in particular, even as the need for Korea-U.S.-Japan cooperation has grown, historical distrust has acted as a factor limiting the scope and pace of that cooperation. Moreover, as the 2019 export control case illustrates, historical conflict has spread into the economic and security domains, forming a compound structure of conflict.

The repercussions of the history war are equally pronounced in the economic, social, and cultural domains. Reciprocal boycotts, the reorganization of supply chains, and intensifying identity conflict have worked to weaken the structure of interdependence between the two countries. At the same time, a dual structure in which cooperation and conflict coexist can also be observed, as seen in the growing separation between culture and politics among the younger generation. At the level of East Asia as a whole, the history war functions, amid U.S.-China competition, as a symbolic struggle over the legitimacy of the international order, leaving Korea-Japan relations caught in a dilemma between security cooperation and strategic autonomy.

Building on this analysis, the study proposes three directions for Korea's policy response. First, Korea should construct a refined response framework that distinguishes between "security realism" and "historical revisionism" within Japan, while making use of multilayered networks with a diverse range of actors inside Japan. Second, it should build a mechanism that manages the history issue by reframing it as a multilateral, norm-based agenda at the East Asian level, thereby preventing historical conflict from being subordinated as a tool of U.S.-China competition and instead strengthening Korea's normative leadership. Third, in the bilateral relationship with Japan, a strategy is needed that combines the structural management of historical conflict with the institutionalization of functional cooperation in the security, economic, and technological fields.

In conclusion, Japan's history war is a core variable that mediates between the reconstruction of national identity and the conduct of foreign and security strategy, extending well beyond the issue of the past, and it constitutes a structural phenomenon that will continue to shape the ongoing realignment of the East Asian order. Korea, accordingly, needs to look beyond short-term responses and, through a medium- to long-term strategy grounded in structural understanding,​work to bring historical conflict down to a manageable level while securing strategic autonomy and normative leadership amid a changing regional order.