Sejong Policy Briefs

(Brief 2026-27) The U.S. Demand for Deployment to the Iran War and South Korea’s Options

Date 2026-10-12 View 57 Writer Taewon HA

File Brief 2026-27 Writer Taewon HA

 

 

The U.S. Demand for Deployment to the Iran War and South Korea’s Options

 

 

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Taewon HA

Visiting Research Fellow

Sejong Institute

 

 

 

 

1. Problem Statement

At a press conference at the Yeongbingwan Guest House of Cheong Wa Dae on September 18, 2026, President Lee Jae-myung formally laid out the government’s basic principles in response to the U.S. demand that South Korea join the Iran war and deploy forces to a military operation in the Strait of Hormuz. Lee made clear that there would be no deployment of any kind that would involve South Korea in the war or amount to intervention in it, and that Seoul would never take part in offensive operations that place its troops under a U.S.-led coalition command structure. At the same time, he stressed that minimal defensive activity to protect South Korean merchant ships, crude oil shipping lanes, and the safety of its citizens is unavoidable, and said the government is considering temporarily strengthening and expanding the area of operations of the Cheonghae Unit, which is deployed in the Gulf of Aden. The unproductive debate over whether to deploy has thus been put to rest for now, and the policy question is now one of implementation design: with what specific means and safeguards the declared principles will be carried out.

The external background to this security crisis is the preemptive military operation that re-elected U.S. President Donald Trump launched against Iran in the name of stopping its nuclear development. The U.S. attack failed to deliver a quick victory and bogged down in a protracted war of attrition. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) blockaded the Strait of Hormuz and threatened merchant ships, which led to the South Korean-flagged freighter HMM Namu being struck by a missile in early May. President Trump has persistently pressed traditional allies to send naval vessels, branding those that decline as ingrates and vowing to present them with enormous security bills in the future. The structure of pressure from a conservative Republican administration, a dilemma for a progressive South Korean government, a split within the ruling camp over direction, and backlash from progressive civil society closely resembles the 2003 episode of additional troop deployments to Iraq under the Roh Moo-hyun government. This case, however, is a question of multidimensional strategic choice, in which six overlapping national interests have to be balanced at the same time under the transactional linkage of security and economics that marks Trump’s second term.

 

2.  The U.S. Demand for Military Support and Trump’s “Transactional Pressure”

Beginning in April 2026, the United States put the Maritime Freedom Initiative (MFC) into operation and, with Secretary of War Pete Hegseth at the forefront, declared an end to the era of security free-riding by allies while pressing them to send warships. The 2026 operation, however, carries a fatal flaw in its legitimacy under international law. UN Security Council Resolution 2817 stopped at a declaratory condemnation of Iran’s interference with navigation. It lacks the “all necessary measures” clause through which Resolution 1511 explicitly authorized the multinational force to use force during the 2003 Iraq war. Moreover, unlike 2003, when the issue was taken up in the postwar reconstruction phase after the fall of Baghdad, the Strait of Hormuz today is an “active war zone,” where U.S. and Iranian missiles and drones crisscross in real time.

Accordingly, European Union (EU) High Representative Kaja Kallas declared that this is not Europe’s war and formally announced that the EU would not take part, and Germany and Italy also refused to deploy forces. The United Kingdom and France refused to place their forces under U.S. command but explored independent defensive frameworks, such as air patrols and mine-clearing drone support. Japan held to its principle of not sending forces to combat zones, yet earned Trump’s praise with pragmatic offers: a pledge to clear mines after the war and the release of 80 million barrels from its strategic petroleum reserve. South Korea, by contrast, depends entirely on U.S. Forces Korea to deter North Korea’s nuclear threat within an asymmetric one-to-one bilateral alliance, one that lacks the distributed protection a multilateral collective security system such as NATO provides. This structural vulnerability makes it impossible for South Korea to simply copy Europe’s collective refusal. Trump thus singled out South Korea, playing the punitive linkage card by unilaterally scaling down the annual August combined exercise, Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS).

The essence of Trump’s diplomacy is a thoroughly “transactional alliance” outlook. Whereas the Bush administration in 2003 craved the multinational banner of a “coalition of the willing” and moral legitimacy, Trump in 2026 demands that allies cover the cost of America’s war with tangible assets. The September 18 foreign ministers’ meeting bears this out: investment in the United States, nuclear power and nuclear-submarine fuel under the ROK-U.S. summit agreement (JFS), the transition of wartime operational control, and a Hormuz contribution were all discussed at a single table. The South Korean government presented a $22.3 billion Texas power plant investment as its first project, creating a buffer by temporarily separating the Hormuz agenda at the summit. Investment in the United States has not, however, permanently exempted South Korea from military demands, and Seoul must remain wary that Trump’s military bill could resurface at any time, depending on how the war unfolds.

 

3. The Lee Jae-myung Government’s Dilemma and Strategic Options

To overcome the dilemma it faces, the Lee Jae-myung government must move beyond a defensive posture of avoidance and establish a hierarchy of national interests and three non-negotiable red lines. This brief sets as its top priority (non-negotiable) two interests on which the nation’s survival depends: “maintaining security on the Korean Peninsula and deterrence against North Korea” and “preventing military escalation.” Next, it ranks the reliability of the ROK-U.S. alliance and the safeguarding of Hormuz transit routes second (preserve as far as possible), and diplomatic relations and trade stability with Iran third (damage control). The three red lines that follow are: (1) no participation, under any circumstances, in offensive combat operations between the United States and Iran; (2) no incorporation into a U.S.-led coalition command from which South Korean command authority is excluded; and (3) no tolerance for the diversion of U.S. Forces Korea or the dispersal of South Korean forces that would leave a gap in deterrence against North Korea.

South Korea must also shed the illusion that the mere fact of not having deployed forces amounts to protecting the national interest. In real-world international politics, the punitive consequences of not contributing, the Cost of Inaction, are no less devastating than the risks of contributing, the Cost of Action. Under Trump, declaratory support is not recognized as a contribution, and the minimum bar the United States accepts lies in “substantive measures” that visibly lighten its military and financial burdens. A strategy of non-contribution that fails to clear this bar runs a high risk of ending in heavy security and trade retaliation, including further suspension of combined exercises, threats to redeploy U.S. Forces Korea, and crushing tariffs on South Korea’s key export products.

The detailed alternatives under government review also need to be rigorously reassessed. Expanding the Cheonghae Unit’s area of operations, the top option under review, has an inherent limitation: a destroyer is a regular warship. If the unit returns fire in waters where combat is unfolding in real time, South Korea would immediately become a belligerent party. A peripheral deployment can therefore accomplish only the distant escort of merchant ships outside the narrow strait, and Residual Risk, such as mistaken-identity drone attacks, cannot be fully eliminated. The P-8A patrol aircraft, meanwhile, poses a high risk of violating the principle against foreign command if the targeting information it collects is linked to U.S. strike assets, and the multilateral “Constructive Contributors Coalition” (CCC) is no more than a normative justification that cannot replace Trump’s real bill.

 

4. Lessons for 2026 from the 2003 Iraq Deployment

The 2003 Iraq deployment and the 2026 Hormuz discussions share a policy decision-making cycle: a request, an on-site assessment, an eruption of conflict, and a compromise reached through presidential intervention. Compared with 23 years ago, however, the differences in circumstances are far greater: the lack of legitimacy, an active war zone, the early exit of allies, and trade linkage. Above all, what the United States wants at its core is different. In 2003, the Bush administration was desperate for a multinational banner to support the justification for the war on terror and expressed deep gratitude even for the deployment of the non-combat Zaytun Division alone, whereas Trump in 2026 is indifferent to justification and approaches the matter strictly from the perspective of billing for costs. The key to negotiation in 2026 therefore lies less in the military deployment itself than in identifying alternative contributions (energy investment, strategic petroleum reserves, air defense assets) that satisfy Trump’s transactional demand for cost compensation.

According to two-level game theory, domestic opposition (a reduced win-set) can serve as leverage for rebuffing the other side’s unreasonable demands by tying the negotiator’s hands. In 2003, President Roh Moo-hyun successfully used antiwar public opinion to scale down the U.S. demand for a 10,000-troop combat division to a 3,000-troop non-combat Zaytun Division. In dealing with Trump in 2026, however, it is extremely dangerous to hide behind domestic public opinion and National Assembly opposition alone. This is because tying hands works only when the other side also bears a cost if an agreement collapses, whereas, given the asymmetry in national power, Trump imposes immediate punitive retaliation without regard for his counterpart’s predicament. Domestic constraints must therefore be converted from an excuse for refusal into a basis for presenting the range of burdens South Korea can shoulder, along with substantive alternatives.

In this regard, the precedent of the Dongui (medical) and Dasan (engineering) units in Afghanistan from 2002 to 2007 carries decisive implications. At the time, South Korean troops devoted themselves to runway repair and medical care for local civilians within the safe protective perimeter of Bagram, a U.S. air base. This minimized the risk to service members while still delivering the contribution the U.S. military needed most, and it earned glowing praise. It demonstrates that deployment should not be treated as an unconditional taboo, and that a carefully designed contribution can achieve the safety of service members, the defense of the national interest, and alliance trust at the same time.

 

5. Ten-Point Policy Recommendations

Phase 1: Immediate Implementation and Defensive Risk Management

Recommendation 1: Institutionalizing the “Three Safeguards” for Using the Cheonghae Unit and Managing Residual Risk

Prohibit entry into the Strait of Hormuz and strictly confine the area of operations to the outer areas of the Gulf of Oman and the northern Arabian Sea, limiting the unit to distant escort. Restrict the rules of engagement (ROE) to strict self-defense, and notify Tehran in advance, through diplomatic channels, that the unit is carrying out a policing activity to protect South Korea’s own merchant ships. In addition, establish emergency avoidance routes and a damage compensation fund to prepare for Residual Risk, such as mistaken-identity drone attacks.

Recommendation 2: Applying “Command-Coordination Separation” to the P-8A and Other Non-Combat Assets and Blocking Linkage to Targeting

Applying the 2020 precedent with the necessary modifications, exclude incorporation into U.S. command and maintain an information-sharing arrangement through the dispatch of liaison officers. In particular, conclude in advance a “limited MOU for protecting South Korea’s own merchant ships” to ensure that information detected by the P-8A is not used to select targets for U.S. attacks on Iran.

Phase 2: Conditional Commitment and Identifying Transactional Alternative Contributions

Recommendation 3: Securing Strategic Time through a “Conditional Commitment”

Earmark and organize mine-clearing vessels and patrol forces in advance and prepare for National Assembly consent. Present this as a conditional commitment: actual deployment will begin immediately once a “permissive” environment is established, in which a ceasefire agreement has been concluded or transit safety has been secured. This would cushion the pressure for immediate participation in the war.

Recommendation 4: Providing an Air Defense “Backfill” Contribution for U.S. Forces Korea Bases, Compatible with Readiness on the Korean Peninsula

Provide backfill support for the air defense gap created by the diversion of U.S. Forces Korea’s THAAD and Patriot assets to the Middle East, using South Korea’s Cheongung-II and Patriot systems, while strictly observing three conditions: (1) no diversion of forces from the Seoul metropolitan area or the front line, with the contribution limited to rear-area reserve forces; (2) integrated operation of the ROK-U.S. combined air defense zone; and (3) a written assurance guaranteeing top-priority deployment of strategic assets from the U.S. homeland.

Recommendation 5: Maximizing Non-Military and Energy Contributions

Drawing on Japan’s Takaichi model, provide an economic package with benefits Trump can concretely feel: a contribution to oil price stability through the coordinated release of strategic petroleum reserves (SPRO), the creation of a multilateral maritime insurance guarantee fund, and an advance pledge of postwar reconstruction funds.

Phase 3: Negotiations with the United States and Securing Domestic and External Legitimacy

Recommendation 6: Pursuing a Security-Economy “Preemptive Reverse-Linkage Package Deal”

Use the $350 billion investment in the United States and cooperation on naval ship MRO as leverage to settle, as a single package, the assurance of uranium fuel supply for nuclear-powered submarines, the implementation of tariff reductions, an early transition of wartime operational control, and the safeguarding of sovereignty over platform regulation, while confirming the results of the agreement in documented form, such as a joint fact sheet.

Recommendation 7: Obtaining Prior National Assembly Consent under Article 60(2) of the Constitution and Maintaining a Unified Front within the Government

Given the wartime situation, pursue bipartisan National Assembly approval of a precisely drafted consent motion that specifies “outer-area limitation and defensive protection of merchant ships,” and unify messaging within the government around the National Security Council (NSC) to prevent policy confusion.

Recommendation 8: Unifying External Communication and Operationalizing the Constructive Contributors Coalition (CCC)

Release Korean- and English-language fact sheets simultaneously to block foreign media’s “refusal” framing, and launch a multilateral working-level group with major user states of the strait to institutionalize a South Korea-led normative umbrella.

Phase 4: Criteria for Emergency Suspension of Operations and Final Withdrawal

Recommendation 9: Resolving the Conflict between Deployment and Withdrawal Conditions by Specifying the Conditional Commitment Roadmap

Establish a staged and differentiated roadmap under which the wartime defense mission (outer-area escort) is complete, and the unit withdraws, once a ceasefire is concluded, while the mine-clearing and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) missions begin in a permissive environment after the ceasefire and the units withdraw upon completing them.

Recommendation 10: Establishing a Clear Exit Strategy and Mission-Specific Sunset Clauses

Specify concrete sunset conditions in the National Assembly consent motion, under which wartime defense ends upon a ceasefire and mine clearing ends upon handover to a multilateral arrangement, and strictly limit the deployment period to six-month increments to block automatic extension.

The second Trump administration’s demand for military support in the Iran war poses the most complex and multidimensional test of alliance management in the more than 70 years of the ROK-U.S. alliance. The principles the Lee Jae-myung government has declared (no involvement in the war, no foreign command, and protection of its own vessels) represent an agonizing decision aimed at reconciling constitutional values with practical national interests. Declaring principles alone, however, will not safeguard the national interest. A defensive posture of avoidance invites punishment and isolation within the alliance, while blind compliance puts the state and its people in harm’s way on the battlefield. In the end, the solution lies in strategic pragmatism that combines firmness of principle with flexibility of means. South Korea should meet Trump’s demands with a transactional package of alternatives, consisting of an outer-area deployment of the Cheonghae Unit with the Three Safeguards, a conditional mine-clearing commitment, air defense backfill for U.S. Forces Korea bases, and the release of strategic petroleum reserves, and use its investment in the United States as leverage to achieve long-standing goals: nuclear power, nuclear-submarine fuel, and the transition of wartime operational control. As the 2003 Iraq deployment demonstrated, carefully calculated, limited contributions and pragmatic negotiation are the only path by which a dignified sovereign state can preserve its autonomy while strengthening the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance.