Assessing Changes in the Ruling Elite at the 9th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea and South Korea’s Strategic Response

Seong-Chang CHEONG

Vice President

Sejong Institute

1. Historical Significance of the Congress and the Opening of the “Kim Jong Un 2.0 Era”

The 9th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea was held from February 19 to 25, 2026, for seven days at the April 25 House of Culture in Pyongyang. Convened five years after the 8th Party Congress in January 2021, the congress served to comprehensively review party work over the previous five years and to present domestic and external policy objectives for the next five years. In North Korea, a party congress constitutes the supreme leadership body that determines the fundamental issues of the party’s line, policy, strategy, and tactics, and elects central leadership organs such as the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee, the Secretariat, and the Central Military Commission. The scale and direction of changes in the ruling elite therefore provide a critical indicator for interpreting the regime’s strategic intent.

The most notable symbolic feature of the 9th Party Congress was the change in badge protocol. During the congress, North Korean officials uniformly wore “Kim Jong Un badges,” while Kim Jong Un himself appeared wearing only the “Kim Il Sung–Kim Jong Il badge.” This reflects a dual structure in which he claims to inherit the revolutionary legitimacy of preceding leaders while simultaneously demanding direct loyalty from the elite, thereby further consolidating the system of sole leadership. In addition, with this congress, the second generation of the anti-Japanese partisan group exited the leadership entirely, marking a substantive break with the “Kim Jong Il era.” Accordingly, this brief assesses that the 9th Party Congress marks the full-scale opening of a “Kim Jong Un 2.0 era,” distinct from the earlier phase of his rule.

The personnel changes at this congress were unprecedented in scale. On the fourth day, 139 full members and 111 alternate members of the Party Central Committee were elected. Of the total 250 positions, 139 were replaced, resulting in a replacement rate of 56 percent compared with the 8th Party Congress. Within the Political Bureau, 43 percent of members were replaced, while 59 percent of department director-level posts changed hands, indicating a comprehensive generational turnover across the leadership.

A particularly important feature of these changes is the simultaneous exit of three core elite groups. First, the second generation of the anti-Japanese partisan group. Choe Ryong-hae, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly (born in 1950), and O Il-jong, former Minister of Civil Defense (born in 1954), were excluded from both the full and alternate membership lists of the Party Central Committee. Choe Ryong-hae had concurrently served as a member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau by virtue of his position, but the loss of his Central Committee membership effectively precludes his continuation in that role.

Second, the senior military elite. Veteran figures, including Pak Jong-chon, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Ri Pyong-chol (born in 1948), formerly the party’s General Adviser on Munitions Policy, were excluded from the new leadership composition, marking the effective exit of the senior military group that had guided the Korean People’s Army under Kim Jong Un.

Third, the inter-Korean negotiation elite. Kim Yong-chol (born in 1945) and former United Front Department Director Ri Son-gwon were not selected as full or alternate members of the Party Central Committee, signaling the effective dissolution of the negotiation line toward South Korea. Although Ri Son-gwon was subsequently appointed Chairman of the Central Committee of the Korean Social Democratic Party, that party functions as a satellite organization subordinate to the Workers’ Party of Korea. Given North Korea’s current ban on contact with South Korean nationals abroad, the likelihood of his reemergence in inter-Korean negotiations appears minimal.

The simultaneous departure of these three groups carries significant policy implications beyond a simple generational shift. In particular, the complete exit of the inter-Korean negotiation elite strongly suggests that North Korea’s policy toward South Korea will maintain a hardline orientation based on the “hostile two states” framework over the medium to long term. This provides important evidence that the current personnel changes are intended not to signal a shift in policy direction, but to ensure more efficient implementation of an existing strategic line.

2. Reorganization of the Party’s Supreme Leadership Institutions

A. Five-Member Presidium of the Political Bureau

The Presidium of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee was composed of five members: Kim Jong Un, Pak Thae-song, Jo Yong-won, Kim Jae-ryong, and Ri Il-hwan. Two changes are particularly noteworthy. First, the propaganda and agitation secretary (Ri Il-hwan) was elected to the Presidium for the first time. This suggests that, over the next five years, propaganda targeting both cadres and the general population to reinforce loyalty to Kim Jong Un and his designated successor will become a particularly important task. Second, military figures were entirely excluded from the Presidium. In the past, one or two members typically represented the military, but this time no such representation was included. This indicates an intention to weaken the military’s relative status while further strengthening the Workers’ Party’s control over it.

Pak Thae-song, born in 1961, retained his position as Premier while remaining in the Presidium. As an early associate of Kim Jong Un with a background in party organizational affairs—including roles in the Organization and Guidance Department, as Chief Secretary of South Pyongan Province, and as Secretary for Propaganda and Agitation—he was ranked second in the congress executive body. This is interpreted as signaling that economic construction will be the top priority over the next five years. Jo Yong-won, born in 1957, remained in the Presidium but stepped down from his posts in the Secretariat and specialized departments, and is expected to succeed Choe Ryong-hae as Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly at the March 2026 SPA session. Kim Jae-ryong, born in 1959, was promoted from Political Bureau member to Presidium member and concurrently appointed Director of the Organization and Guidance Department, thereby assuming overall responsibility for party organizational control.

B. Significant Expansion of the Secretariat

The most notable change in the Secretariat is its substantial expansion. The number of members increased from eight at the 8th Party Congress to twelve at the 9th Party Congress. Historical precedent suggests that, following Kim Jong Il’s internal designation as successor in 1974, the center of power shifted from the Political Bureau to the Secretariat and the Organization and Guidance Department. Similarly, at the 3rd Party Conference in 2010, which marked the formal launch of Kim Jong Un’s succession structure, the Secretariat expanded to eleven members. In light of these precedents, it is difficult to rule out the possibility that the current expansion of the Secretariat is linked to the process of establishing Kim Ju-ae’s succession structure.

Among newly elevated figures in the Political Bureau, two individuals warrant particular attention: Jeong Kyong-taek and Kim Song-nam. Jeong Kyong-taek, a former Minister of State Security and former Director of the General Political Department , was appointed Secretary of the Party Central Committee, Director of the Military Political Guidance Department, and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission. The appointment of a figure from the security apparatus and the General Political Department , rather than from the operational command structure, to such a powerful position suggests that party control over the military will be further strengthened. Meanwhile, the promotion of Kim Song-nam, Director of the International Department of the Party Central Committee, to a secretary-level position effectively restored the post of International Secretary, which is interpreted as signaling North Korea’s intention to improve relations with China.

Kim Yo-jong returned as an alternate member of the Political Bureau five years after being excluded at the 8th Party Congress in 2021. She was appointed Director of the General Affairs Department, thereby being promoted from a deputy director-level to a director-level position within the Party Central Committee. The General Affairs Department is a core administrative unit responsible for internal party management, including documents, finances, materials, event operations, and support for the supreme leader’s office. When she was first elected as an alternate member in 2017, she was listed toward the end of the roster, but this time she was called first among the alternate members, indicating a significant elevation in her status compared to eight or nine years ago.

C. Reorganization of the Central Military Commission and Advancement of Nuclear and Missile Capabilities

The most significant change in the Central Military Commission is the replacement of its vice chairman. Jeong Kyong-taek, formerly Director of the General Political Department, succeeded Pak Jong-chon, a former Chief of the General Staff. As a result, the military control structure has been reoriented to prioritize the party’s political and ideological control over operational and command expertise. This suggests a strategic choice to restrain military adventurism while strengthening a framework of party supremacy over the military.

Another notable development is the inclusion of Jo Chun-ryong, born in 1960, as Secretary for Munitions Industry and a first-time member of the Central Military Commission. His career trajectory—from member of the National Defense Commission in 2014, to Chairman of the Second Economic Committee in 2019, to Director of the Munitions Industry Department in June 2022, and Secretary for Munitions Industry in December 2023—indicates that he is a key figure overseeing and directing the development of new weapons systems, including nuclear and missile capabilities. The fact that his name was called immediately after Vice Chairman Jeong Kyong-taek and before Minister of National Defense No Kwang-chol in the Central Military Commission lineup underscores Kim Jong Un’s continued emphasis on nuclear weapons, missiles, and advanced weapons development.

In fact, in his report to the 9th Party Congress, Kim Jong Un outlined detailed nuclear and military objectives for the next five years. These include the annual strengthening of national nuclear forces; expansion in both the number of nuclear weapons and the means and operational domains of their use; maintaining a constant state of readiness; activation and testing of an integrated nuclear crisis response system (“nuclear trigger”); nuclear armament of naval surface and underwater forces; development of submarine-launched ICBMs, AI-based unmanned strike systems, specialized satellite attack assets, electronic warfare systems, and advanced reconnaissance satellites; and the phased deployment of 600mm multiple rocket launchers, new 240mm systems, and operational-tactical missiles over the next five years. The specificity of these tasks indicates that North Korea’s nuclear force development program has moved beyond rhetorical signaling and entered an implementation phase.

3. Outlook for North Korea: Succession Issues and Policy Orientation toward the United States and South Korea

A. Quiet Progress in Building a Succession Structure around Kim Ju-ae

At the 9th Party Congress, no official position was formally assigned to Kim Ju-ae, Kim Jong Un’s eldest daughter. Nevertheless, North Korea has been moving in the direction of carefully and quietly strengthening her image as successor, even without stating this explicitly in official language. On January 1, 2026, Kim Ju-ae was positioned at the very center of the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun memorial visit, the place where Kim Jong Un himself would normally stand. This may be interpreted as symbolically reporting to the “preceding leaders” that Kim Jong Un intends to put Kim Ju-ae forward as his successor. In February 2026, the National Intelligence Service also reported to the National Assembly Intelligence Committee that “Kim Ju-ae appears to have entered the stage of internal designation as successor.”

Shortly after the congress, on February 28, North Korean media released images of Kim Ju-ae standing beside Kim Jong Un while he distributed gifts to cadres, along with photographs and video footage showing her firing a weapon at a shooting range. This marked the first time that North Korean media had shown Kim Ju-ae alone in a close-up, without Kim Jong Un or any other figure present. Such a close-up in a military-related setting may be interpreted as symbolizing the construction of her authority over, and command of, the military.It is important to note that the key features of this personnel reorganization, including the significant expansion of the Secretariat, the elevation of the propaganda and agitation secretary to the Presidium, and the strengthening of control over the General Political Department, are all connected to the process of building a succession structure.

B. Policy toward the United States: Coexistence of a Maximum Hardline Stance and Conditional Dialogue

At the 9th Party Congress, Kim Jong Un stated that North Korea would “continue to remain fully prepared for confrontation with the United States and firmly maintain the strongest hardline posture as the unchanging orientation of its U.S. policy.” At the same time, he also remarked that “if the United States respects the current status of our state as stipulated in the DPRK constitution and withdraws its hostile policy toward the DPRK, there is no reason why the two countries cannot get along.” However, this statement should not be overstated. North Korea regards U.S.–ROK joint military exercises as the most blatant expression of Washington’s hostile policy toward Pyongyang. If Trump were to maintain good relations with Kim Jong Un, this would require the complete suspension of U.S.–ROK joint exercises, a demand that South Korea would find difficult to accept under current conditions of severe nuclear asymmetry.

At present, Kim Yo-jong, rather than Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui, is leading North Korea’s policy toward the United States, which means that the influence of traditional diplomatic elites remains highly limited. Having witnessed the downfall of diplomatic elites after the collapse of the Hanoi U.S.–North Korea summit in 2019, Choe Son-hui is likely to remain cautious about another summit between Kim Jong Un and Trump. Accordingly, while a largely symbolic meeting between Kim Jong Un and Trump may take place at some point, it is unlikely to lead to a meaningful agreement or a “big deal.”

C. Policy toward South Korea: Entrenchment of the “Hostile Two States” Doctrine

At the 9th Party Congress, Kim Jong Un stressed that he had made a “final and momentous decision” to define relations with South Korea as “the most hostile state-to-state relationship.” This reaffirmed that the “hostile two states” doctrine is not a temporary tactic but a permanent line in North Korea’s policy toward South Korea. Kim Jong Un further stated that “now that all considerations regarding South Korea have been erased, the use of all physical force applicable to an enemy state, including the preemptive strike mission of deterrent forces as stipulated by national law, has been made fully complete in both doctrinal and technical terms.” He also declared that “the possibility of the complete collapse of South Korea cannot be ruled out.”

In terms of the South Korea-related elite, Kim Yong-chol and Ri Son-gwon, who had previously led negotiations with South Korea, were fully removed from the political stage, while Jang Kum-chol, former head of the United Front Department and a hardliner on South Korea, was elected as a member of the Party Central Committee. At present, Kim Yo-jong is the figure who effectively leads North Korea’s policy toward South Korea. Given that she has driven hardline policies toward the South, including the demolition of the inter-Korean joint liaison office in Kaesong, it is difficult to expect a resumption of inter-Korean dialogue for a considerable period to come.

4. South Korea’s Strategic Response

A. Seeking a Long-Term Strategic Dialogue with North Korea

Taken together, the characteristics of the power reconfiguration revealed at the 9th Party Congress suggest that the South Korean government should lower expectations for an early resumption of dialogue and instead formulate its strategy from a long-term perspective. First, it should establish a bipartisan policy mechanism on North Korea that includes the government, the ruling and opposition parties, and influential experts from both progressive and conservative camps so that the broad orientation of North Korea policy can be sustained even when administrations change. Only then will North Korea begin to take South Korea’s North Korea policy more seriously.

In addition, given the low likelihood that North Korea will realistically abandon its nuclear weapons, the existing policy framework centered on the goal of the “complete denuclearization of North Korea” should be fundamentally reconsidered. Rather than pursuing the “complete denuclearization of North Korea,” the South Korean government should seek to secure effective deterrence against North Korea’s nuclear capabilities while, in close coordination with the United States, Japan, and China, actively considering a broader strategy for establishing a new order of peace and cooperation on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia through the normalization of U.S.–North Korea and Japan–North Korea relations and the conclusion of a peace treaty on the Korean Peninsula. If Seoul approaches Pyongyang in concert with Washington, Tokyo, and Beijing, backed by a broader strategic vision [revised from: on the basis of a larger strategic vision] that could facilitate North Korea’s integration into the international community, Pyongyang may begin to look again toward Seoul.

B. Strengthening the U.S.–ROK Alliance while Advancing Self-Reliant Defense Capabilities

At a time when North Korea is emphasizing submarine-launched ICBMs and the nuclear armament of its navy, strengthening South Korea’s undersea deterrent has become an urgent task. Nuclear-powered submarines far surpass conventional submarines in stealth and sustained operational capability and constitute the most effective means of responding to North Korea’s undersea nuclear forces. The South Korean government should continue to emphasize to the United States the urgency of acquiring nuclear-powered submarines and seek active U.S. cooperation for South Korea’s nuclear-powered submarine program. To this end, Seoul should deepen bilateral cooperation by contributing to the modernization of the U.S. shipbuilding industry and expanding cooperation in the construction of nuclear-powered submarines as well as in enrichment and reprocessing.

At the same time, South Korea should actively explore cooperation with France, the only Western country that uses low-enriched uranium (LEU) in nuclear-powered submarines. France possesses one of the world’s most advanced nuclear fuel cycle capabilities. Taking advantage of the Korea–France summit that will be held during President Macron’s visit to South Korea, the two sides should begin consultations on reviewing and revising the Korea–France Nuclear Cooperation Agreement and establish a long-term cooperation roadmap for securing enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. It would be desirable for the South Korean government to explain clearly to the United States that Korea–U.S. and Korea–France cooperation are complementary rather than competing tracks and to seek prior understanding from Washington.

C. Establishing a Middle Power Security Consultative Framework

As the United States omitted any reference to “extended deterrence” in both its 2025 National Security Strategy and 2026 National Defense Strategy, confidence in U.S. extended deterrence is declining. In particular, the 2026 NDS states that “South Korea must bear the primary responsibility for deterring North Korea, while the United States will provide only critical but more limited support,” thereby deepening South Korea’s sense of insecurity.

Although South Korea is a genuine middle power, ranking 12th in the world in GDP and among the top five in conventional military capability, it remains excluded from the G7 and outside the Quad, and is not incorporated into any of the major existing multilateral security frameworks. Accordingly, the South Korean government should actively pursue the establishment of a “Middle Power 5 (MP5) Security Consultative Framework” with Japan, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany. This would serve as an important means of diversifying South Korea’s security network in response to declining confidence in U.S. extended deterrence.

D. Strengthening Management of Border Areas and Linking Succession Developments around Kim Ju-ae to North Korea Policy

At the 9th Party Congress, Kim Jong Un stated that the “southern border line” should be fortified within the shortest possible period and that both the surveillance system and firepower posture should be reinforced. This raises the likelihood that North Korea will increase its firepower deployment in border areas, which would pose a serious risk to South Korea’s security. In response, South Korea should more strictly cprevent balloons or drones used to send anti-North Korea leaflets from crossing into the North, while substantially strengthening its own defense and response posture toward North Korea.

Finally, the South Korean government should strategically link succession developments surrounding Kim Ju-ae to its North Korea policy. The timing and manner in which Kim Ju-ae is granted an official position will serve as an important signal of changes in North Korea’s internal power dynamics, and the National Intelligence Service and relevant research institutions should strengthen systematic monitoring of these developments. In addition, if the succession structure around Kim Ju-ae is completed, the government should begin preparing medium- to long-term scenario analyses now regarding how North Korea’s policy orientation toward South Korea and the outside world may change.

5. Conclusion

The 9th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea was not merely a routine political event held on a five-year cycle. The simultaneous exit of three major groups—the second generation of the anti-Japanese partisan group, senior military elites, and inter-Korean negotiation elites—along with the formation of a new leadership centered on non-military economic elites, the significant expansion of the Secretariat, the elevation of the propaganda and agitation secretary to the Presidium, and the appointment of a specialist in political and ideological control to head the military political guidance apparatus, collectively signal the full-scale opening of the “Kim Jong Un 2.0 era.”

Over the next five years, North Korea is likely to govern along three principal axes: economic construction, advancement of nuclear capabilities, and a hardline policy toward South Korea, while simultaneously and discreetly advancing the succession structure centered on Kim Ju-ae. For South Korea, this marks a critical period in which priority should be placed not on the near-term resumption of inter-Korean dialogue, but on strengthening nuclear deterrence capabilities, building a multilayered security network, establishing a bipartisan institutional framework for North Korea policy, and redesigning its long-term strategic approach toward the North.