Trump 2.0: Prospects for the Resumption of U.S.-North Korea Summit and South Korea's Policy Challenges toward the U.S. 

Seong-Chang Cheong

Director of Center for Korean Peninsula Strategy, Sejong Institute

Summary 

Ⅰ. The Issue

Since Kim Jong Un came to power, North Korea’s foreign policy has followed a pattern of switching between hardline and conciliatory approaches. The regime tends to pursue a hardline policy, but when it deems necessary, abruptly shifts to a more conciliatory stance. If that conciliatory approach fails to produce the desired outcomes, it then reverts back to a hardline position. Therefore, while North Korea currently appears negative toward summit diplomacy between President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, it is expected that Pyongyang could shift its stance at any time and actively engage in summit diplomacy again, if it determines that doing so aligns with its interests.

At present, North Korea is benefiting from the “special situation” created by the war in Ukraine and sees significant gains from its cooperation with Russia. As a result, it does not currently have strong interest in resuming summit diplomacy with the United States. However, if Trump pressures Russia and Ukraine into a ceasefire or an end to the war—thus eliminating North Korea’s advantage from the Ukraine conflict—and if the United States recognizes North Korea as a “de facto nuclear state” while pursuing a “small deal” with Pyongyang that includes halting ROK-U.S. joint military exercises and partially easing international sanctions, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un may return to the negotiating table with Trump.

The problem is that a resumption of summit diplomacy between Trump and Kim is unlikely to lead to reduced tensions or peace on the Korean Peninsula. Rather, it could result in ‘Korea passing,’ weakening U.S. extended deterrence, and loosening ROK-U.S. alliance. During Trump’s first term, there were many senior officials in his administration who could challenge his decisions. In the second Trump administration, however, there would likely be few figures capable of restraining him—even if he were to make decisions that undermine the ROK-U.S. alliance. In this context, this brief aims to examine the potential agenda items in a resumed U.S.–North Korea summit and explore how the South Korean government should respond.

Ⅱ. Position of Trump and Kim Jong Un on the Resumption of U.S.-North Korea Summit Diplomacy

1. Trump’s Position

Since his 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump expressed a positive stance on holding a summit with Kim Jong Un, displaying confidence that he could “handle” Kim effectively. On November 22 of last year, shortly after winning re-election, Trump demonstrated his intention to resume U.S.–North Korea summit diplomacy by appointing Alex Wong, former Deputy Special Representative for North Korea during Trump’s first term, as Deputy National Security Advisor in the incoming White House. He also nominated one of his closest allies, former Ambassador to Germany Richard Grenell, as Special Presidential Envoy to handle North Korea-related affairs.

If a communication channel is reestablished between Trump and Kim Jong Un, it is expected that Deputy National Security Advisor Wong and Special Envoy Grenell will play more central roles than the traditional State Department channel. At his confirmation hearing this January, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio referred to North Korea as a “rogue state” and labeled Kim Jong Un a “dictator,” identifying him as a serious threat. In his opening remarks before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Rubio criticized Kim, saying he “uses nuclear weapons as insurance for regime survival.” In response, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement on February 3, denouncing Rubio’s comments as “reckless remarks” and “vulgar and irrational nonsense.” Given Secretary Rubio’s hardline view of Kim Jong Un and North Korea’s strong backlash, the establishment of a dialogue channel between the U.S. State Department and the North Korean Foreign Ministry appears unlikely in the near future.

On January 23 of this year, President Trump appeared in an interview on Fox News, where he called North Korean leader Kim Jong Un “smart guy.” When asked whether he would try to contact Kim again, Trump responded, “I would,” fueling speculation that summit diplomacy between the U.S. and North Korea could resume sooner than expected.

Trump, who was initially critical of ROK–U.S. joint military exercises, expressed to Kim his willingness to halt them during the previous U.S.–North Korea summits. However, the exercises resumed due to opposition from the U.S. Department of Defense and others. During his first term, Trump was surrounded by officials who opposed his “America First” foreign and security policies, making it difficult for him to enforce his will unilaterally. At the Hanoi summit, Trump reportedly supported easing sanctions on North Korea under the condition of a “snapback” mechanism—which would reinstate sanctions if violations occurred—but no agreement was reached due to opposition from Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and National Security Advisor John Bolton. North Korea assessed that this internal resistance within the U.S. administration was the main reason for the summit’s failure. Now, however, Trump has filled the White House and executive branch with loyalists who are likely to support his decisions unconditionally. As a result, if another summit with Kim Jong Un takes place during Trump’s second term, Trump will likely be able to negotiate more freely than he could during his first term.

2. Kim Jong Un’s Position 

Since the collapse of the Hanoi summit and working-level talks between the U.S. and North Korea in 2019, North Korea has consistently refused to engage in dialogue with the United States. Even after Donald Trump was re-elected in the 2024 U.S. presidential election, Pyongyang’s position has shown no significant change. In October 2024, just before the U.S. election, North Korea test-launched the Hwasong-19 solid-fuel ICBM, after which Kim Jong Un declared that he would “never, under any circumstances,” change the path of strengthening North Korea’s nuclear force. On November 21, 2024—shortly after the U.S. presidential election—Kim Jong Un delivered a speech at the opening ceremony of the “National Defense Development–2024” exhibition in Pyongyang, asserting, “We have already explored the full extent of the negotiation path with the U.S., and what we have come to realize is not a will to coexist from a superpower, but a thoroughly force-based position and an unchanging, hostile, and aggressive policy toward the DPRK.” Given Kim Jong Un’s deeply negative perception of U.S. policy toward North Korea, a significant shift in the international environment would likely be required to resume summit diplomacy between Trump and Kim.

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, North Korea has devoted its full efforts to expanding military and economic cooperation with Russia. In September 2023, Kim Jong Un publicly declared at a summit with President Vladimir Putin that North Korea now considers its relationship with Russia of the “highest priority.” This marked the first time since taking power that Kim explicitly stated he values ties with Russia more than those with China. In June 2024, at a summit in Pyongyang, North Korea and Russia signed a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty,” effectively restoring their military alliance.

For North Korea, this partnership provides opportunities to earn foreign currency by exporting weapons and ammunition, dispatching troops and laborers, and potentially acquiring advanced military technology from Russia. According to the Ukrainian outlet Euromaidan Press on January 26 of this year, military expert and former Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Igor Romanenko stated on NV Radio that North Korea was supplying up to 60% of the ammunition used by Russian forces on the front lines. He added that North Korea is receiving technology, financial support, and food from Russia in return, which explains why Pyongyang continues to cooperate despite military losses and other risks. At present, the benefits North Korea gains from strengthening ties with Russia far outweigh any potential gains from improving relations with the United States.

However, if the Trump administration applies pressure that leads to a ceasefire agreement between Russia and Ukraine, some loosening of the North Korea–Russia relationship may be inevitable. In that case, if President Trump dispatches a special envoy to North Korea and conveys his willingness to improve bilateral relations, Kim Jong Un would likely be compelled to at least consider the resumption of dialogue.

At the end of 2024, North Korea held a full meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party—attended by Kim Jong Un—to outline the national policy direction for the new year. At the meeting, North Korea declared a “maximum hardline strategy” against the United States. However, possibly with the upcoming Trump administration in mind, Pyongyang noticeably toned down its criticism of Washington compared to previous years.

When President Biden took office in January 2021, North Korea reported the event through its external propaganda outlet DPRK Today, rather than the Rodong Sinmun, which is widely read by the general public. In contrast, as it did in 2017, North Korea reported Trump’s inauguration in January of this year via the Rodong Sinmun. This suggests that Pyongyang holds a more favorable view of Trump than of Biden.

For Kim Jong Un, the advancement of nuclear and missile capabilities is his regime’s most significant achievement, making it highly unlikely that he would enter into negotiations aimed at denuclearization. However, as some of Trump’s close aides have argued, if the new administration chooses to leave North Korea’s existing nuclear arsenal intact and instead seeks to negotiate limits on ICBM range and a freeze on further nuclear development—in exchange for halting ROK–U.S. joint military exercises and easing international sanctions—North Korea may positively consider such arms control negotiations.

Ⅲ. Agenda for the 4th U.S.-North Korea Summit and Negotiation  Outlook 

On January 14 of this year, Pete Hegseth, nominee for U.S. Secretary of Defense, effectively recognized North Korea as a nuclear-armed state in a written statement submitted in advance to the Senate Armed Services Committee for his confirmation hearing. He stated, “North Korea’s status as a nuclear power, its intense focus on extending the range of its missile systems capable of delivering nuclear warheads, and its growing cyber capabilities all pose threats to the stability of the Korean Peninsula, the Indo-Pacific, and the world.” Hegseth further emphasized that these threats are particularly concerning given North Korea’s proximity to U.S. allies where American troops are stationed.

On January 20, during a meeting with reporters in the Oval Office on his inauguration day, President Trump also referred to North Korea as a “nuclear power.” The term “nuclear-weapon States” refers to the five countries— the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France—legally permitted under international law to develop and possess nuclear weapons. In contrast, the term “nuclear power,” which Trump used, is commonly applied to countries such as Israel, India, and Pakistan—states that have acquired nuclear weapons outside the NPT framework. In the case of these so-called “unrecognized nuclear powers,” there are few calls in the international community for their denuclearization. Therefore, Trump’s reference to North Korea as a “nuclear power” suggests that the future U.S. administration may pivot from pursuing “complete denuclearization” to instead seeking arms control negotiations aimed at freezing North Korea’s nuclear capabilities.

In fact, Trump has previously made several remarks that implicitly acknowledged North Korea’s nuclear status. In his acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention in July 2024, Trump stated, “It’s a good thing to get along with someone who has a lot of nuclear weapons,” adding that “when we return to power, I will get along well with him (Kim Jong Un).” In an interview broadcast on October 13, 2024, on Fox News’s “Sunday Morning Futures,” Trump claimed that he had gotten along “very well” with Kim Jong Un during his presidency, and that without his leadership, a nuclear war between the U.S. and North Korea might have occurred. Taken together, these statements do not reflect a firm intention to force Kim Jong Un to give up his nuclear weapons but instead suggest an approach centered on managing the North Korean nuclear issue in a stable manner.

However, on January 28, in response to a query from Yonhap News Agency, White House National Security Council (NSC) spokesperson Brian Hughes stated that, as he did during his first term, President Trump would pursue the “complete denuclearization of North Korea.” This goal was reaffirmed during both the U.S.–Japan summit and the ROK–U.S.–Japan trilateral foreign ministers’ meeting.

Nevertheless, in a reality where North Korea’s abandonment of its nuclear weapons is virtually impossible, repeating the mantra of “complete denuclearization of North Korea” may result in the Trump administration doing just as little on the North Korean nuclear issue as the Biden administration did. For this reason, some current and former Trump administration officials—such as former Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller and Elbridge Colby, nominee for Under Secretary of Defense for Policy—appear to favor arms control negotiations over efforts aimed at complete denuclearization.

In a March 2024 interview with the Dong-A Ilbo, Christopher Miller expressed a favorable view of negotiating arms control with North Korea. While acknowledging concerns about implicitly accepting North Korea’s nuclear status, he argued that arms control negotiations could be a realistic option for managing the North Korean threat.

In a May 2024 interview with Yonhap News, Elbridge Colby emphasized that complete denuclearization of North Korea is not a realistic goal. He argued that the U.S. should instead focus its North Korea policy on something akin to arms control, particularly by limiting the range of North Korea’s intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). He justified the need for arms control by stating that “North Korea’s capability to strike the U.S. mainland on a large scale is changing the strategic landscape and weakening trust in America’s extended deterrence.”

Given North Korea’s uncompromising stance on unlimited nuclear development, if President Trump proposes restarting negotiations with Kim Jong Un on the premise of complete denuclearization, Kim is highly unlikely to accept. Therefore, if the second Trump administration wants to engage in negotiations with North Korea, it must candidly acknowledge that achieving “complete denuclearization” within a four-year term is unrealistic and instead propose a “small deal”—such as an arms reduction agreement focused on partial rollback of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities.

The Moon Jae-in administration previously pursued the idealistic but unachievable goal of “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” yet ultimately settled for an agreement with Kim Jong Un that involved only the dismantling of the Yongbyon nuclear facility—a limited step. Such a “small deal” leaves North Korea’s nuclear arsenal intact while restricting only certain capabilities, and there is no guarantee that it will lead to full denuclearization. Therefore, a small deal that lacks a clear roadmap toward “complete denuclearization” is inherently contradictory to that very goal.

Recognizing North Korea as a de facto nuclear power alone is unlikely to draw Pyongyang to the negotiating table. North Korea regards ROK–U.S. joint military exercises as the most direct manifestation of what it calls “America’s hostile policy toward the DPRK.” President Trump has also expressed a negative view of these exercises, labeling them a massive waste of money. Thus, if Kim Jong Un agrees to resume summit diplomacy, and Trump conveys a willingness to suspend ROK–U.S. joint drills, Kim may be persuaded to reengage. As with President Richard Nixon’s visit to China, Trump might consider traveling to Pyongyang to lend legitimacy to Kim domestically and pursue a diplomatic breakthrough.

Given Trump’s view that the ROK–U.S. joint drills are a financial drain, a renewed summit with Kim Jong Un could again lead to the suspension of these exercises. Furthermore, in the second Trump administration, there are unlikely to be any “adults in the room” within the foreign policy and national security establishment to oppose such a decision. This raises the likelihood that a suspension of joint exercises could continue throughout Trump’s term.

In early June 2018, Trump told Kim Yong Chol, Vice Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, during a visit to the White House, that the U.S. and South Korea were open to reducing joint military exercises. He criticized the drills as costly and provocative. Later that month, during the Singapore summit, when Kim Jong Un said that the exercises made North Koreans feel unsafe, Trump agreed, calling them “provocative” and a “waste of time and money.”

Trump’s stance goes beyond suspending drills—he has expressed a desire to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea altogether. Therefore, if another summit takes place with Kim Jong Un, the reduction or partial withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula becomes a real possibility. Should the summit yield progress in arms control negotiations with North Korea, the likelihood of such a decision would only increase.

There is considerable testimony supporting the claim that Trump wanted to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea during his first term. In his memoir A Sacred Oath and in an interview with The Washington Post, Trump’s final Secretary of Defense, Mark Esper, revealed that Trump frequently disparaged South Korea—a key U.S. ally in Asia—and repeatedly threatened to pull out all 28,500 U.S. troops stationed there. Esper and other senior officials worked to delay or dissuade Trump from issuing a formal withdrawal order. Although Trump never gave the order, he never abandoned the idea. According to Esper, then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo once told Trump, “Let’s make troop withdrawal a priority for your second term,” to which Trump smiled and replied, “Right, that’s it—the second term.”

Several of Trump’s close aides also support the reduction of U.S. forces in South Korea. In a March 2024 interview with The Dong-A Ilbo, former Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller said, “You may recall that there was discussion about reducing U.S. forces in Korea during the first Trump administration. The ROK–U.S. relationship has now reached a point where it can become more balanced. It’s time for an honest discussion about whether South Korea still needs all 28,500 U.S. troops stationed there, or whether changes are necessary.” His remarks strongly suggest that a Trump reelection would bring renewed consideration of troop reductions.

Ⅳ. South Korean Government’s Policy Challenges toward the U.S.

Until now, the South Korean government has maintained the position that it can “never recognize North Korea as a nuclear state.” This means that Seoul does not even consider North Korea a ‘de facto nuclear state’ like the five officially recognized nuclear-weapon states or the unofficial ones—India, Pakistan, and Israel. However, since former U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and President Trump have made remarks implying they view North Korea as a ‘de facto nuclear state,’ the South Korean government must now conduct a comprehensive review of its stance on the recognition of North Korea’s nuclear status.

The South Korean government should now distinguish between long-term and short- to mid-term objectives in its North Korea policy. While setting the complete denuclearization of North Korea as a long-term goal, it would be more appropriate for a five-year presidential administration to adopt “effective deterrence of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and nuclear balance on the Korean Peninsula” as its policy goal during its term. A nuclear balance on the Korean Peninsula could be pursued in three ways: relying on stronger U.S. extended deterrence, redeploying U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, or acquiring South Korea’s own nuclear weapons.

However, extended deterrence, redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons, and NATO-style nuclear sharing all share the same fundamental limitation: in all cases, the final authority to use nuclear weapons rests with the U.S. president. Given that North Korea now possesses intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of striking the U.S. mainland, it is unlikely that a U.S. president would retaliate with nuclear weapons against North Korea if Pyongyang were to attack South Korea with a nuclear weapon—due to the risk of triggering a U.S.–North Korea nuclear war. Therefore, although it may take time, the South Korean government should pursue nuclear balance with North Korea by eventually acquiring its own nuclear weapons, beginning with securing latent nuclear capabilities on par with Japan’s.

When the second Trump administration demands a substantial increase in South Korea’s share of defense costs, the South Korean government should actively accept this in return for an early revision of the ROK-U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, allowing South Korea to secure nuclear potential equivalent to Japan’s in areas such as spent fuel reprocessing and uranium enrichment. If the United States agrees to revise the agreement, the South Korean public would likely be more willing to accept a significant increase in defense cost sharing.

If the Trump administration recognizes North Korea as a ‘de facto nuclear state’ and proceeds with arms control negotiations with Pyongyang, the South Korean government must strongly demand—through behind-the-scenes high-level talks—that the United States also recognize South Korea’s right to possess nuclear weapons. Furthermore, if President Trump decides to completely suspend ROK-U.S. joint military exercises or reduce the U.S. troop presence in Korea following a U.S.–North Korea summit, South Korea should also move toward developing its own nuclear arsenal.

To prevent South Korea’s nuclear armament from leading to the weakening or erosion of the ROK-U.S. alliance, South Korea should, in return for U.S. tacit acceptance of its nuclear weapons program, pledge active cooperation in areas such as the modernization of U.S. naval power, maintenance and construction of U.S. warships, and robust rear-area support in the event of a Taiwan contingency. The United States, whose shipbuilding industry is nearly collapsed, seeks close cooperation with South Korea in the fields of ship construction, maintenance, and repair as part of its strategy to counter China and prevent a shift in naval power. South Korea, too, needs to construct nuclear-powered submarines in response to North Korea’s development of strategic nuclear submarines, and for this, technical support and operational know-how from the U.S. would be highly beneficial. Therefore, in the Trump 2.0 era, the South Korean government should upgrade the alliance into a “ROK-U.S. Alliance 2.0” that seeks deeper strategic cooperation in nuclear capabilities, naval power, and the defense industry.