An Assessment of the Trump Administration’s Foreign Policy in the Early Phase of Its Second Term and Its Policy Implications
Beomchul Shin
Principal Research Fellow, Sejong Institute
Summary
A. The International Order Envisioned by President Trump
President Trump envisions a return to the "golden days" of the United States as the world’s undisputed superpower. Economically, he aims to enhance domestic productivity based on America’s superiority in advanced technologies, ultimately striving to make the United States the wealthiest nation, unmatched by any other. Militarily, he envisions a United States that overwhelms China and maintains a network of allies who voluntarily share the regional security burden. Diplomatically, he seeks a United States with the power to engage in great-power diplomacy through leader-to-leader communication—like the “Yalta Conference” at the end of World War II.
President Trump is working to deter China’s geopolitical and geoeconomic threats. In this process, he takes into account the realistic limits of American national power and pursues the reduction of trade and fiscal deficits as well as the buildup of strong military capabilities. At the same time, he perceives that America’s allies and partners are not sufficiently cooperating with the United States and are not providing support proportional to what the U.S. contributes. As a result, he demands greater contributions from allied nations.
Considering these factors, the international order desired by President Trump can be described as a U.S.-centered multipolar order. First, the United States maintains its status as a superpower; second, its rival China is positioned as a great power subordinate to the United States; and third, cooperative partners such as Europe, Russia, and allies in the Indo-Pacific maintain relationships aligned with American interests.
B. Challenges Facing the Second Trump Administration
President Trump is facing numerous domestic and international challenges. For a policy to be effective, it must have a clear direction, make full use of available instruments, and elicit cooperation from surrounding actors. However, the environment in which President Trump finds himself is far from favorable.
First, the direction of foreign policy remains unclear. Messages reflecting isolationist tendencies are mixed with expansionist overtones, leading to expectations that the systematic and consistent implementation of foreign strategy will be limited. In the realm of peace, while President Trump claimed that he could bring an early resolution to the war in Ukraine and the Gaza conflict, various complications have emerged, delaying the conclusion of negotiations. In the economic domain, his aggressive push for tariff policies has caused negative side effects not only with China but also in relations with Europe, Canada, and other partners.
Second, the United States is failing to employ its capabilities systematically. As a result, a whole-of-government approach is not being realized. While some achievements have come from President Trump’s personal initiative, it is highly likely that U.S. government agencies will not act preemptively and will instead wait for his instructions.
Third, international support is uncertain. From the beginning of his term to the present, President Trump has mainly used “sticks” rather than “carrots,” putting pressure on all countries. If America’s allies and partner countries do not respond positively, the success of U.S. foreign policy cannot be expected. Nevertheless, President Trump tends not to place much importance on cooperation with allies, suggesting that many challenges lie ahead.
Fourth, time is limited. President Trump has 3 years and 10 months remaining in his term. Especially after the 2026 midterm elections begin, there is a possibility that he will enter a lame-duck period. If many countries feel that negotiations with the Trump administration are not proceeding as desired, they are likely to try to delay talks as much as possible. In that case, the number of issues President Trump will be able to resolve within his remaining term will be limited.
C. Opportunities Posed by the Trump Administration’s Foreign Policy
Despite the uncertainties surrounding the Trump administration, the United States must still be recognized as an allied partner. An assessment of the challenges posed by the Trump administration should not lead to the conclusion that engagement with the administration must be avoided. Rather than being excessively fearful or evasive, we should adopt an approach that seeks to advance our national interest through active cooperation. It is important to note that once targeted by the Trump administration, one must be prepared to endure significant disadvantages.
It is necessary to wisely reduce U.S. pressure by maintaining a good relationship with President Trump, and in cases of conflict, seek to minimize damage. Even amidst the various challenges posed by the Trump administration’s foreign policy—such as tariffs, export controls, and the shifting of defense burdens onto allies—there exist opportunity factors that must be recognized and proactively utilized.
Due to President Trump’s dislike of multilateral frameworks, the United States is inevitably engaged in numerous bilateral negotiations. In such cases, with U.S. attention focused on resolving issues like Ukraine, the Middle East, and China, other matters are likely to receive relatively less attention. This presents an opportunity for us. South Korea is not currently a top priority for President Trump, and this fact should be leveraged to the fullest. Although South Korea is facing pressure from the United States in terms of taxation and trade issues, President Trump has refrained from commenting on South Korea’s domestic political situation. This indicates an awareness of the circumstances of its ally, and suggests that, for the time being, high-level pressure directly targeting South Korea is likely to be limited. We should use this time to prepare various forms of cooperation.
Furthermore, as President Trump works to contain China, its economic growth may stall, and it may fall into the middle-income trap. While attention is being paid to when President Trump and President Xi Jinping might reach a compromise, separate from that, China is already facing multiple problems in its economic growth. Under these circumstances, President Trump’s tariffs and diplomatic pressure are likely to become even greater obstacles to China’s development. This situation can act as an opportunity factor for South Korea, which is competing with China in advanced industries within the global market, and preparations must be made accordingly.
D. Approach to Cooperation with the Trump Administration
It is essential that South Korea prioritize its national interest in foreign policy and pursue self-reliance for its survival. This must be the foundation for strengthening alliances and improving relations with neighboring countries. As shown in the public response to the sensitive country designation issue in early March, South Korea must not be overly swayed by U.S. actions. The consequences of any policy direction must be thoroughly considered before it is finalized. Once a direction is set, partial conflict with the United States should not be feared. A bold approach should be taken to pursue negotiated compromise with the United States. It is necessary to consider how South Korea’s policy choices and the U.S. response can be used to advance South Korea’s security and interests.
First, a negotiation strategy that matches President Trump’s style must be developed. After clearly defining what should be gained, South Korea should accept a certain level of loss for a win-win outcome. The Trump administration is expected to apply pressure on a range of issues. A positive approach should be taken by accepting what can be accepted and firmly requesting what must be gained, rather than rejecting U.S. proposals outright.
Second, a comprehensive big deal should be pursued instead of dealing with each issue on a transactional basis. Economic and security issues must be addressed together. A broader discussion should be conducted to give what must be given and secure what must be secured. Excessive demands should be avoided. South Korea should focus on one or two core priorities. These include resolving key security concerns and securing a firm position in cooperation with the United States on advanced technologies and stable supply chains. Cooperation must also be strengthened with key actors in the United States, including Congress, local governments, global corporations, and labor unions.
Third, South Korea must focus its efforts on priority security issues to secure essential interests. In addition to discussions on extended deterrence and wartime operational control transfer, the future of U.S. Forces Korea must be addressed. A new vision for the ROK-U.S. alliance must be discussed with the Trump administration. South Korea’s position on North Korea and the nuclear issue must be clearly stated. A comprehensive response plan must be prepared in case of a U.S.–North Korea nuclear freeze agreement. The North Korean nuclear issue must be actively included in ROK-U.S. dialogue. South Korea’s contributions to the United States and U.S. support for South Korea’s security concerns must be discussed together. The concept of North Korea’s denuclearization should be maintained as much as possible. To do so, South Korea and the international community must convey their concerns before any dialogue between President Trump and Kim Jong-un takes place.
Fourth, South Korea must prepare for economic shocks from early negotiations with the Trump administration and identify areas of opportunity. The 26 percent reciprocal tariffs announced on April 2 have been postponed for 90 days, but efforts must be made to resolve the issue during that period. Concessions should be made on issues that can help strengthen President Trump’s political support at home in order to minimize the impact on the Korean economy. Measures such as increasing investment in the United States, raising defense cost sharing, promoting shipbuilding cooperation, and renegotiating the FTA should be utilized. The U.S. strategy to contain China should be closely analyzed and used as a basis for strengthening South Korea’s industrial competitiveness. In advanced technology sectors where South Korea holds an advantage, strategic investments should be made to widen the gap with China. In areas of weakness, competitiveness should be enhanced through technological cooperation with the United States. In addition, cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners such as Australia and Japan, as well as with key European countries, should be strengthened to build and leverage diplomatic and economic buffers.
Fifth, South Korea must respond proactively to the U.S.-led reorganization of the regional order. A clear position must be established on the level of participation in U.S. efforts to contain China. During the presidential election, both conservative and progressive parties will present their respective positions on the level of cooperation, and the next administration must determine its stance accordingly and build public consensus. It is important to recognize that uncertainty can undermine alliance trust. The fundamental direction should be to strengthen the ROK-U.S. alliance while also maintaining cooperation with neighboring countries. If friction arises with China, it should be treated as a matter of prioritization, and the alliance must come first. As seen during the THAAD deployment, South Korea–China relations can be constrained by China’s own actions under U.S.–China strategic competition. For this reason, preventive diplomacy must be actively pursued on potential sources of conflict such as the Taiwan issue. Meanwhile, cooperation is expected to outweigh competition in South Korea–Japan relations. This is due to increasing needs for coordination on North Korea’s denuclearization, negotiations on defense cost sharing with the United States, and trilateral security cooperation. To that end, intergovernmental shuttle diplomacy should be used to expand the scope of cooperation in preparation for the Trump 2.0 era.