North Korea’s Major Military Trends: Assessment for 2024 and Outlook for 2025

 Jang-Won Jo

 Visiting Research Fellow, Sejong Institute

Summary

​

In 2025, North Korea is expected to gradually showcase its strategic weapons development capabilities through a series of actions, including the launch of reconnaissance satellites, ballistic missiles, and strategic cruise missiles, as well as the public disclosure of nuclear and missile facilities. These moves will likely be aimed at carefully testing the waters for U.S.–North Korea dialogue under Pyongyang’s initiative, using a strategy of calibrated provocations and tactical engagement.

This report aims to assess North Korea’s major military developments in 2024—specifically, the launches of military reconnaissance satellites, hypersonic missiles, and strategic cruise missiles, along with the strengthening of military cooperation with Russia. Based on this assessment, the report offers an outlook on North Korea’s anticipated WMD and military activities in 2025 and explores the policy implications of these trends.

1. Assessment and Outlook on Missile and Nuclear Provocations

A. Reconnaissance Satellite Launches

North Korea launched what it claimed to be the "Malligyong-1" military reconnaissance satellite using the "Chollima-1" carrier rocket (launch vehicle) from the Sohae (west-sea) Satellite Launching Station (site) on May 31 (first launch) and August 24 (second launch) of 2023; however, both launches ended in failure. In its third attempt on November 21, North Korea reportedly succeeded in placing the satellite into orbit. Footage released by North Korea during the first and second launches showed two combustion nozzles on the first-stage rocket, suggesting the use of a Hwasong-15-class first stage. In contrast, the third launch showed significantly larger exhaust flames, indicating that a Hwasong-17-class first stage was used.

In the first launch, ignition of the second stage after separation failed, and in the second launch, a malfunction occurred in the emergency detonation system of the third stage according to North Korea’s announcement. These repeated failures point to chronic issues in North Korea’s missile manufacturing process, particularly in quality control—especially with regard to the second-stage ignition system and third-stage detonation mechanism. The issue in transitioning from the first to second stage combustion also suggests suboptimal launch programming design, such as thrust-acceleration calculation based on burning times for each stage. In the third launch, it appears that the first-stage rocket was upgraded from a Hwasong-15 to a Hwasong-17, and that burning times and thrust outputs were optimized accordingly.

On May 24, 2024, North Korea conducted another reconnaissance-satellite launch, which failed mid-flight. The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported that the rocket exploded during the first-stage flight due to a suspected reliability issue with the liquid oxygen and petroleum-based propulsion system. This admission indicates technical difficulties in the development of a new launcher using a novel propellant system. Previous launches used nitrogen tetroxide (N₂O₄) as the oxidizer and unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) as fuel. However, N₂O₄/UDMH is highly toxic and corrosive, making it unsuitable for space launch vehicles. The recent attempt instead employed liquid oxygen as the oxidizer and kerosene as the fuel—an effort to increase the specific impulse (Isp) and thus the satellite payload capacity. However, the failure is likely attributable to insufficient design and manufacturing technologies.

The use of liquid oxygen, which must be stored at cryogenic temperatures near –180°C, requires advanced ground support infrastructure, including cooling systems for fuel lines and launch vehicle tanks. During the fueling and ignition process, extreme temperature fluctuations cause expansion and contraction of fuel lines, increasing the risk of leaks or ruptures. Therefore, high-grade material engineering, precise manufacturing of propulsion systems, and rigorous leak-prevention technology are essential. These require extensive testing and validation. If North Korea is to successfully incorporate liquid oxygen into its launch vehicles, numerous trial-and-error cycles will be necessary. Technical assistance from experienced Russian scientists could significantly shorten the development timeline.

Looking ahead, North Korea’s continued development of reconnaissance satellites will require three core capabilities: (1) satellite fabrication technology for reconnaissance missions; (2) development of space-launch rocket engines; and (3) precision guidance and control systems to place satellites into designated orbits. To improve the maturity and reliability of these technologies, North Korea is likely to seek continued technological support from Russia.

B. Hypersonic Missile Launches

Between 2021 and 2023, North Korea conducted three test launches using liquid-fueled missiles to accumulate flight data for hypersonic weapons development. Building on these efforts, on January 14, 2024, it conducted a fourth test involving a solid-rocket, medium-to-intermediate-range ballistic missile equipped with a maneuverable hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV). According to North Korean media, the test aimed to verify the glide and maneuvering capabilities of HGV as well as the reliability of newly developed multi-stage, high-thrust solid rocket.

Subsequently, on March 19, 2024, North Korea announced that it had conducted a static fire test of a new solid rocket motor intended for hypersonic medium-range missiles. This appears to have been an upgrade test of the solid rocket motor used in the January launch. On April 2, 2024, the North proceeded with its fifth hypersonic missile launch, again using the updated rocket system. The state media stated that the objective of the test was to confirm the overall design and technical specifications of the system and to verify the reliability of the weapon platform.

※ On April 3, the North Korean state's newspaper, ‘Rodong Sinmun’, reported that the hypersonic glide vehicle, after separation from the launcher, followed its planned trajectory, reaching a first apogee of 101.1 km and a second apogee of 72.3 km before flying approximately 1,000 km and striking a designated target in the East Sea.

Hypersonic missiles require advanced technologies such as the design of HGV and precision guidance systems that can ensure accurate terminal strikes after executing pull-up maneuvers and lateral turns (level-turn) along pre-programmed flight paths. The first to third tests appear to have been basic performance evaluations of the glide vehicle's flight behavior and trajectory data collection, using liquid-fueled launch systems. The fourth test, however, marked a key transition to solid-fuel propulsion, utilizing a two-stage solid rocket prototype instead of liquid fuel, which is generally less suited for military applications. The primary objective was to observe the glide and trajectory characteristics of the reentry vehicle over a programmed flight duration.

The fifth test built upon the fourth by employing an improved version of the two-stage solid-fuel rocket, suggesting that North Korea continued focusing on collecting glide flight data. Most recently, on January 6, 2025, North Korea conducted its sixth hypersonic missile test, stating that the missile incorporated a newly designed HGV-airframe made of carbon fiber composite materials and introduced new mechanisms in its flight and guidance control systems.

An analysis of the HGV-airframe used in the sixth test indicates the most advanced design configuration to date, with refined aerodynamic shaping and wing structures for the glide vehicle. The use of carbon fiber composites likely enhanced heat resistance and reduced airframe weight. These developments suggest that North Korea has made measurable progress in two key areas based on insights gained from the previous five tests: (1) improved rocket engine performance and (2) improved HGV design. Furthermore, Pyongyang’s claim that a new guidance control system was introduced in the sixth test implies that it has begun integrating precision guidance technologies tailored to the specific flight characteristics observed during prior tests.

While North Korea has achieved some technical progress through these six test launches, the ability to precisely guide a hypersonic glide vehicle—especially one that performs irregular maneuvers—requires highly advanced terminal guidance technology. Current indications suggest that North Korea is at the stage of integrating initial guidance control capabilities based on acquired glide behavior data, but will likely need considerable time before fully mastering this technology.

C. Strategic Cruise Missile Launches

In 2024, North Korea carried out a series of strategic cruise missile activities as follows: (1) On January 24, it conducted the first test launch of the “Fire Arrow-3-31” strategic cruise missile, firing two missiles; (2) On January 28, it conducted a second launch of two Fire Arrow-3-31 missiles, which reportedly flew for approximately 124 minutes; (3) On January 30, it carried out a training launch of the Arrow-2 missile, with an estimated range of 1,800–2,000 km;

(4) On April 19, it tested a high-yield warhead using the Arrow-1 missile, which has a range of approximately 1,500 km.

※ The Arrow-1 and Arrow-2 missiles—part of the KN-27 cruise missile family currently under development—are assessed to be designed for anti-ship or land-attack missions targeting large naval vessels such as aircraft carriers, with operational ranges of 1,500–2,000 km. Since the initial test of the Arrow-1 in September 2021 (range: 1,500 km), North Korea has conducted more than ten test launches, including upgraded versions such as the Arrow-2.

The newly developed “Fire Arrow” missile is believed to be an extended-range version exceeding 2,000 km, and is assessed as a modified cruise missile based on the Arrow series, adapted for submarine launch. While North Korea revealed ground-launched images of the Fire Arrow-3-31 during the January 24 test, no launch platform imagery was released for the January 28 test, making it unclear whether the missile was launched from an underwater platform or a submarine.

On January 25, 2025, North Korea conducted an additional test of the Fire Arrow strategic cruise missile. The test indicates that the missile itself has reached a high level of technical maturity and appears to be nearing completion. However, the key issue going forward is whether North Korea can successfully develop a vertical launch system for submarine-launched land-attack cruise missiles (SLCMs). It is expected that Pyongyang will now focus on integrating vertical launch capabilities into submarines and formulating operational strategies for deploying such weapons at sea.

D. Hwasongpho-19 ICBM Launch

On October 31, 2024, North Korea test-launched a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the Hwasongpho-19, which reportedly reached a maximum altitude of 7,687 km and traveled a distance of 1,001 km over a flight time of 5,156 seconds (1 hour, 25 minutes, and 56 seconds), as announced by Rodong Sinmun on November 1. Based on the test data, the missile demonstrates improved performance compared to its predecessor, the solid-fueled Hwasongpho-18. The performance enhancement is assessed to result from a combination of factors: increased propellant mass, improved oxidizer-to-fuel mixture ratios, more efficient propellant characteristics, and airframe weight reduction. These advancements appear to have been achieved independently by North Korea, without direct foreign technical assistance—particularly from Russia.

The warhead of the Hwasongpho-19 features a blunt, ogive-shaped reentry vehicle, in contrast to the more slender, aerodynamic design of the Hwasongpho-18 warhead. The Hwasongpho-19 also appears to support a larger payload capacity due to its increased thrust-acceleration, potentially enabling it to carry a greater number of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) than its predecessor. However, North Korea is still believed to be in the early stages of developing MIRV technology, facing key technical hurdles such as atmospheric reentry survivability and individual precision guidance for each reentry vehicle—capabilities that are technologically demanding. It is assessed that China and Russia are unlikely to provide North Korea with direct assistance in these sensitive areas.

Notably, 2025 marks the final year of the five-year strategic weapons development plan announced during the 8th Party Congress in 2021. Of the systems included in the plan, solid-fueled ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and strategic cruise missiles appear to have reached near-completion or successful development phases. In contrast, military reconnaissance satellites, MIRV technology, and hypersonic missile systems remain in the development phase. The development of nuclear-powered submarines, meanwhile, is still a distant objective.

North Korea has also claimed, through the public unveiling of the “Hwasan-31” tactical nuclear warhead in March 2023, that it has completed development of tactical nuclear weapons. However, this assertion remains unverified and is subject to further scrutiny by the international community.

E. Disclosure of Uranium Enrichment Facilities

On September 13, 2024, Rodong Sinmun reported that Kim Jong Un had conducted an on-site supervision of what was described as a “production base for weapon-grade nuclear material”, publicly revealing a highly enriched uranium (HEU) facility in Kangson. During the visit, Kim emphasized the need to “increase the number of centrifuges in order to exponentially expand the nuclear arsenal.” This public statement reaffirmed North Korea’s commitment to its goal, declared at the 2023 Supreme People’s Assembly, to exponentially increase its nuclear weapons production capability. It appears intended to signal to the international community that the North’s ambition to dramatically expand its warhead stockpile is not mere rhetoric, but an operational objective grounded in corresponding increases in fissile material production.

Notably, North Korea had long maintained the position that it operated no uranium enrichment facility other than the one at Yongbyon. The decision to publicly reveal the Kangson site is therefore unprecedented, and underscores Pyongyang’s intent to demonstrate its enhanced nuclear capabilities. At the same time, it is likely aimed at increasing North Korea’s leverage in any future negotiations with the United States—potentially positioning Kangson as a bargaining chip.

On January 29, 2025, North Korea escalated its low-intensity provocations by revealing both the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center and its associated uranium enrichment facilities. Going forward, Pyongyang is expected to closely monitor the direction of U.S. policy toward the North, calibrating the level of its nuclear-related provocations accordingly. While North Korea continues to maintain a degree of strategic ambiguity regarding the full scope of its nuclear capabilities, it will likely feel compelled to showcase more tangible and verifiable nuclear assets if it seeks recognition and meaningful outcomes from potential nuclear negotiations with the United States.

If progress toward U.S.–North Korea dialogue remains stalled, Pyongyang may ultimately resort to conducting a seventh nuclear test as a means of forcing the issue and demonstrating its nuclear advancement.

2. Assessment and Outlook on Russia–North Korea Military Cooperation

Following the full-scale commencement of arms transactions between Russia and North Korea in 2023, North Korea reportedly dispatched military personnel to Russia around the end of October 2024. In exchange, Russia provided increased support to North Korea, which led to (1) the heightened operation of North Korean munitions factories and improved production conditions, and (2) an opportunity for North Korea to advance its weapons development and military tactics. After Russia initially offloaded outdated military supplies to North Korea to clear inventory and facilitate support, it is assessed that North Korea's munitions factories are now operating at full capacity. For North Korea, which has long struggled to maintain conventional military power, Russia’s provision of food, fuel, and raw materials has contributed to a partial improvement in the production capacity of conventional weapons and military logistics.

Even assuming the Russia-Ukraine war ends in 2025, both Russia and North Korea are expected to face weapons and military supply shortages, necessitating continued production. It is therefore anticipated that the defense industrial cooperation network between the two countries—whereby North Korea operates its munitions factories with Russian support and supplies arms back to Russia—will continue. Furthermore, with North Korean troops gaining combat experience through deployment to Russia, the country is likely to begin upgrading its (1) weapons operation systems and military tactics to match modern warfare, and (2) its overall logistical support, command, and communications systems for real-world combat operations.

3. Outlook for U.S.–North Korea Negotiations

Compared to the Hanoi Summit in February 2019, North Korea’s negotiating position has strengthened as a result of increased support from Russia following the war in Ukraine. However, two major constraints suggest that significant progress in U.S.–North Korea talks is unlikely in the short term: (1) Former President Donald Trump is currently preoccupied with higher-priority domestic and international issues, and (2) Kim Jong Un is likely to approach any renewed engagement with Trump as a form of strategic rematch, involving posturing and psychological games rather than immediate compromise. Nonetheless, Kim Jong Un appears to have taken interest in resuming negotiations with a future Trump administration. His low-intensity provocations, including the launch of strategic cruise missiles and the public disclosure of uranium enrichment facilities, seem designed to attract attention and increase bargaining leverage in response to Trump’s message that he may “reach out to Kim.” As long as Trump continues to send signals of willingness to re-engage, North Korea is expected to refrain from high-profile actions such as ICBM launches or nuclear tests, opting instead to await a more serious diplomatic overture.

While Kim Jong Un may hope for renewed negotiations with Trump, he is also aware that Russia cannot be North Korea’s only strategic partner in the long term. However, it is unlikely that Kim will return to the negotiating table with the same posture as in 2018–2019. The Hanoi no-deal experience—where Trump abruptly walked away from the summit—was a humiliating diplomatic defeat for Kim. Although this was a failure, it likely served as a strategic lesson, changing his approach to future summits. Key lessons from Hanoi may include the following: Unless North Korea enters negotiations with a high level of military and nuclear capability already in place, the other side will not treat it as a serious counterpart. If North Korea appears desperate for a deal or conveys urgency to achieve quick results, it risks losing the upper hand in negotiations.

At the Hanoi Summit, North Korea offered to dismantle the Yongbyon nuclear complex in exchange for the lifting of U.S. sanctions, but that deal fell apart. Five years later, North Korea, now in a closer relationship with Russia, is likely to present a much more complex and demanding bargaining formula to the United States. Given Trump’s current posture—applying pressure on Ukraine while showing favor toward Russia in an effort to end the war—it is conceivable that once Trump’s higher-priority issues are resolved in the coming months, he could make a dramatic proposal to Kim Jong Un as part of a renewed diplomatic initiative.

In 2025, North Korea is expected to continue demonstrating its strategic weapons development capabilities through the launch of reconnaissance satellites, ballistic and strategic cruise missiles, and the public disclosure of nuclear and missile-related facilities. At the same time, Pyongyang is likely to cautiously explore U.S.–North Korea dialogue on its own terms, while factoring in its evolving relationships with China and Russia. Within the broader North Korea–China–Russia versus South Korea–U.S.–Japan dynamic, China is anticipated to pursue greater alignment with North Korea as a strategic counterweight to the anti-China pressure expected from a future Trump administration. Beijing is likely to seek deeper cooperation with Moscow and attempt to dilute or undermine trilateral coordination among Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington—particularly any rapprochement between the U.S. and North Korea.

From South Korea’s perspective, it is essential to prepare for the possibility that a Trump administration might consider negotiating with North Korea on issues such as managing the nuclear threat, nuclear non-proliferation conditions, sanctions relief, and suspension of U.S.–ROK joint military exercises. To ensure that South Korea’s policy stance is not marginalized in such discussions, proactive outreach to the United States must be pursued. At the same time, facing the prospect of enhanced strategic alignment among North Korea, China, and Russia, it is imperative for Seoul to further strengthen trilateral security cooperation with the United States and Japan.