​80 Years of Division: Shifts in the International Order and the Evolution of South Korea's Policy Toward North Korea 

Seong Whun Cheon

 Visiting Research Fellow, Sejong Institute

Summary

2025 marks the 80th year of division on the Korean Peninsula. In 1945, with liberation from colonial rule, the 38th parallel was drawn as a temporary measure, without the Korean people's consent. This line later became the Military Demarcation Line following the Korean War, dividing the Korean people for eight decades. Over the past 80 years, the two Koreas have experienced both conflict and cooperation, shaped by the changing tides of the international order.The Korean Peninsula has historically been a strategic hotspot of great power rivalry. However, lacking the power to shape the international order themselves, both South and North Korea have had to respond to the broader currents of global geopolitics. During these eight decades of division, the world has moved from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era and now into what is increasingly described as a new Cold War. South Korean policy on North Korea has evolved accordingly through these phases.

This article aims to provide an overview of the transformations in the international order over the past 80 years and to examine South Korea’s inter-Korean policy in each corresponding era. It will analyze the historical significance of the New Cold War, characterized by the resurgence of great power competition. The paper will then explore the features of the first-generation North Korea policy during the Cold War, the second-generation policy in the post–Cold War era, and propose a new, third-generation policy framework aligned with the realities of the New Cold War era.

The Cold War Era and First-Generation Policy Towards North Korea: Confrontational Policy

The Cold War era generally refers to the period from the end of World War II in 1945 until the unification of Germany and the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1989. During this time, the world was divided between the ideologies of communism and liberal democracy, locked in a state of de facto war short of full-scale confrontation. In this global standoff, East and West Germany in Europe, and North and South Korea in Asia, stood at the front lines of military opposition.

South Korea’s first-generation policy towards North Korea during this time was primarily a confrontational policy grounded in Cold War mentality. In the aftermath of the Korean War and under the persistent shadow of military tension on the peninsula, South Korea focused on deterring provocations from the North while achieving rapid economic development. This first-generation policy is generally evaluated as a success—it managed to withstand North Korea’s continual provocations, prevent another full-scale war like the Korean War, and lead the country toward prosperity and growth. However, by treating the North Korean regime and its people as a single identity—“North Korea”—and regarding all as adversaries, the policy failed to overcome the “dual-identity dilemma” in inter-Korean relations: the contradiction of North Korea being both an enemy and compatriot. At the same time, the first-generation policy was oriented toward eventual unification, in line with the Constitution (enacted on December 27, 1972), which stipulates peaceful reunification as the ultimate national goal for all Koreans.

<Table 1>: First-Generation Policy Towards North Korea: Confrontational Policy

The Post–Cold War Era and the Second-Generation North Korea Policy: Engagement Policy

The 30 years of the post–Cold War era, which began with the fall of the Berlin Wall, were filled with rosy hopes and optimism that liberal democracy—having triumphed in the ideological struggle—would spread globally, ushering in an era of peace and prosperity for the international community. The liberal democratic bloc believed that former communist states would undergo political transformation and eventually adopt liberal democracy through economic development. On that basis, they extended substantial support and cooperation.

In particular, efforts were made to build a peaceful global village by engaging Russia and China as partners. Russia joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace in 1994 and became a member of the G8 in 1998, thus being recognized as a partner in the new era. China joined the WTO in 2001 and emerged as a key player in the international community and a central pillar of the G2 era. In Northeast Asia, South Korea established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in September 1990 and with China in August 1992, breaking down the Cold War-era confrontation between the blocs of North Korea–China–Russia and South Korea–United States–Japan.

The second-generation North Korea policy, spanning roughly 30 years from 1990 to 2016, was an engagement policy that aligned with the post–Cold War trend. It encompasses the policies from the Roh Tae-woo administration to the Moon Jae-in administration. Just as the Western world placed hope in Russia and China, South Korea hoped that by providing economic assistance to North Korea, the regime would abandon its nuclear ambitions and undergo political change. While the pace, scope, and depth of policies differed across administrations, the overarching framework of reconciliation and cooperation remained consistent.

The 1991 Inter-Korean Basic Agreement and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula are symbolic documents of this engagement policy. However, they were rendered null and void due to North Korea’s rejection and violations, and the second-generation policy is now widely considered a failure. It failed to realize its original goals: promoting North Korea’s economic development, inducing political and social transformation, and achieving denuclearization. The earlier optimism that the two Koreas could reunify peacefully, like East and West Germany, has since disappeared.

This second-generation policy regarded both the North Korean regime and its people—collectively as “North Korea”—as partners for cooperation and reunification. As a result, it failed to overcome the “dual-identity dilemma” in inter-Korean relations: the contradiction of North Korea being both kin and an adversary. Likewise, the engagement policy of the post–Cold War era was also a unification-oriented policy, grounded in the Constitution (enacted on February 25, 1988), which defines peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula as the ultimate national goal.

The primary reason the engagement policy failed lies in the nature of North Korea’s dictatorship. Aid intended for the North Korean people was not properly delivered, and instead of fostering change, the support was misused to further entrench the regime’s authoritarian rule. The sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan in 2010 served as clear evidence of the policy’s failure. Yet, the inability to immediately shift course in response was likely due to the lingering inertia of the post–Cold War era.

<Table 2>: Second-Generation Policy Towards North Korea: Engagement Policy

Third-Generation Policy Proposal Towards North Korea in the New Cold War Era: A Dual-Track Strategy

After 30 years dominated by pacifism and rosy optimism in the post-Cold War era, the world has entered a new era of great power competition—an “age of geopolitics” that is historically familiar to humanity. The liberal democratic bloc, led by the United States and NATO, has come to recognize the failure of engagement policies and now confronts revisionist powers head-on. Importantly, however, this confrontation is directed at the ruling regimes of these states, not their citizens. There is a clear distinction being made between the Putin regime and the Russian people, just as there is a distinction between the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people.

The advent of the Trump administration in 2017 marked the official beginning of the new Cold War era. The event that firmly entrenched this new era was Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (Ukraine War) in 2022. This can be seen as a historical repetition of the Korean War of 1950, which played a foundational role in cementing the East-West Cold War.

In response to this war, a powerful set of international sanctions was imposed on Russia. Western Europe, which had been highly dependent on Russian energy, shifted its Russia policy from a primarily economic focus to one centered on military and strategic considerations. Finland's accession to NATO on April 4, 2023, and Sweden’s on February 11, 2024—both countries having maintained neutrality during the Cold War—are clear evidence of the onset of the new Cold War era. At present, European countries are actively strengthening their own national defense capabilities in anticipation of a potential second or third Russian invasion.

In this article, a third-generation policy toward North Korea in the New Cold War er is centered on a dual-track strategy which treats the North Korean regime and its people as two separate entities, each requiring its own tailored approach. Under this strategy, the regime is subject to appropriate regulation within the framework of international sanctions, while full-scale support and cooperation are extended to the North Korean people—a customized, target-specific policy. It upholds the perspective of a “dual-track approach separating the regime and the people,” in which the North Korean regime is regarded as a hostile force that threatens us, whereas the North Korean people are considered partners with whom we seek to coexist. In line with this view, the concept of the North Korean military as the main enemy is also maintained.

At the same time, the strategy seeks to contain the dictatorship through pressure, preventing provocations and oppression, while actively empowering the North Korean people to bring about fundamental social change. In doing so, it aims to resolve the “dual-identity dilemma” that has long plagued inter-Korean relations. The third-generation policy places the South Korean public and the North Korean compatriots at the center of aid and engagement, ultimately pursuing the realization of a peaceful unified nation through transformation and progress in North Korean society. Like the engagement policies of the post-Cold War era, the third-generation approach is also grounded in the South Korean Constitution (effective since February 25, 1988), which designates peaceful reunification as the ultimate objective of North-South relations. In this respect, it also shares continuity with the first and second generation North Korea policies. This approach is rooted in the fundamental spirit of an evolving North Korea strategy—one that inherits the strengths of past policies while supplementing and advancing areas that were lacking.

The dual-track strategy gains significant relevance and effectiveness in the context of the New Cold War era and the anticipated intra-North Korean (“North-North”) conflict, which may arise as a result of Kim Jong-un’s efforts to erase the idea of unification. By clearly distinguishing between the North Korean regime that threatens us and the North Korean people whom we must support, this approach offers a way to resolve the “dual-identity dilemma” in inter-Korean relations. Moreover, it is a strategic synthesis grounded in the dialectical progression that not only retains the strengths of the first-generation confrontational policy and the second-generation engagement policy, but also overcomes their limitations. At the same time, it is a unification-oriented policy that can boldly open the door to free and peaceful unification.

<Table 3>: Third-Generation Policy Towards North Korea: A Dual-Track Strategy