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(Brief 2025-32) A Review of the Fourth Plenum of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Focusing on the 15th Five-Year Plan and China Standards 2035

Date 2025-12-02 View 17 Writer CHUNG Jae-hung

File Brief 2025-32 Writer Jae-Hung Chung

A Review of the Fourth Plenum of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Focusing on the 15th Five-Year Plan and China Standards 2035



Jae-Hung Chung

jameschung@sejong.org

Senior Research Fellow

Sejong Institute

 

 

The Fourth Plenum of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (October 2023, 2025) is widely regarded as a watershed meeting that (1) reviewed the achievements of the 14th Five-Year Plan (20212025), (2) adopted the “Recommendations on Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan (20262030),” and (3) set the strategic direction for “China Standards 2035,” thereby laying out a blueprint for China’s economic and technological development over the next five to ten years and beyond. In particular, during the 14th Five-Year Plan period, China’s GDP expanded from 103 trillion yuan in 2020 to 140 trillion yuan in 2025, while R&D expenditure rose to 2.68 percent of GDP, roughly the OECD average, and more than 90 percent of the quantitative targets of “Made in China 2025” were reportedly achieved. At the same time, however, the prolonged RussiaUkraine war, the intensification of U.S.China strategic competition, the downturn in the real estate sector and weak consumption, youth unemployment, and widening urbanrural disparities have deepened structural challenges, underscoring the need for a new economic and technological strategy. Against this backdrop, the Fourth Plenum placed particular emphasis on the 15th Five-Year Plan and China Standards 2035, and identified “high-quality development, technological self-reliance and self-strengthening, and the expansion of domestic demand” as three core priorities, while setting the construction of a self-reliant technological ecosystem in response to U.S. technology restrictions as a top strategic objective.

 

Amid the intensification of U.S.China strategic competition and the United States’ strategy to revive its manufacturing sector, China’s long-standing export-oriented approach centered on the U.S. market is facing mounting constraints. In response, through the 15th Five-Year Plan, China has articulated a strategy to sustain an annual growth rate of around 5 percent and address both domestic and external challenges by revitalizing the sluggish domestic market, expanding investment in advanced technologies and securing technological leadership, and diversifying export markets. In particular, in its competition with the United States for leadership in advanced technologies, China has emphasized the acquisition of foundational technologies and leadership in technical standards in cutting-edge fields such as artificial intelligence (AI), semiconductors, quantum technologies, and 5G6G, and has announced plans to raise R&D expenditure to more than 3.8 percent of GDP by 2030.

 

Moreover, in the Central Committee communiqué released after the Fourth Plenum of the 20th Central Committee, China presented seven major goals for the 15th Five-Year Plan period (20262030): (1) clear achievements in high-quality economic and technological development, (2) a substantial strengthening of scientific and technological self-reliance and self-strengthening, (3) new progress in further comprehensively deepening reform, (4) marked improvement in social and cultural development, (5) continuous improvement in living standards, (6) major progress in building a “Beautiful China,” and (7) strengthened guarantees for national security.

 

Through the announcement of the 15th Five-Year Plan, China has also set out a vision to significantly enhance its scientific and technological capabilities and national defense strength by 2035. From a medium- to long-term economic and technological strategy perspective, it seeks to promote digitalization, green transformation, and the integration of advanced technologies, and to build China into a strong country in innovation talent, manufacturing technologies, aerospace, and transportation and infrastructure. This vision aims not only to advance high-end manufacturing but also to establish a modernized technological and industrial infrastructure.

 

At the same time, China has reaffirmed its governance principle of wen zhong qiu jin (seeking progress while maintaining stability), and has set high-quality development as the central theme, reform and innovation as the fundamental driving force, and the people’s growing aspirations for a better life as the fundamental objective. Through the pursuit of both qualitative and quantitative growth, China has presented the realization of “common prosperity” as a core policy goal.

 

The Xi Jinping leadership used the Fourth Plenum of the 20th Central Committee to institutionalize the regime’s long-term 2035 objectives, namely the basic realization of “Chinese-style modernization,” by packaging together the implementation framework of the 15th Five-Year Plan, built around three pillars of high-quality growth, scientific and technological self-reliance and self-strengthening, and the expansion of domestic demand, with “China Standards 2035,” which aims to secure Chinese leadership in competition over advanced technology standards. The meeting also reaffirmed the Party’s rule of holding a plenary session once a year and, through personnel adjustments within the military and among key Party and government officials, is widely assessed to have further consolidated a system of long-term rule centered on Xi Jinping.

 

Domestically and internationally, the issue that drew the greatest attention ahead of the Fourth Plenum was the question of succession to Xi Jinping. Unlike previous fourth plenums, however, no clear succession lineup emerged. Instead, the meeting emphasized only the medium to long term objective of basically achieving socialist modernization by 2035. Some experts had regarded this plenum as the last major opportunity to gauge the likelihood of a fourth term for Xi Jinping, who has already been in power for roughly thirteen years. Yet rather than signaling any concrete personnel changes, the meeting underscored the implementation of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era and emphasized unity of the Party and the people around Xi Jinping personally, thereby reinforcing a stable power base.

 

To sustain long-term economic development, China has defined the 15th Five-Year Plan period as both a “decisive five years” for the basic realization of socialist modernization by 2035 and a strategic phase for laying the foundations of Chinese-style modernization. In this context, it has emphasized: (1) innovation-driven growth based on scientific and technological self-reliance and self-strengthening, (2) the expansion of domestic demand and the upgrading of the “dual circulation” framework, and (3) sustainable development through a green and low-carbon transition. At the level of strengthening “new quality productive forces,” China has announced plans to focus on cultivating next-generation growth industries such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors, electric vehicles, batteries, advanced materials, and green technologies, and to shift its manufacturing structure away from a growth model centered on quantitative expansion toward one focused on qualitative development.

 

In particular, the 15th Five-Year Plan presents innovation-driven economic growth through scientific and technological self-reliance and self-strengthening as the first priority. It calls for increasing research and development investment to more than 3.8 percent of GDP and for achieving breakthroughs in core technologies in key areas such as computing infrastructure, semiconductors, artificial intelligence, smart manufacturing, intelligent driving, the metaverse, quantum information, precision machine tools, and advanced measurement instruments.

 

The second priority is to improve the structure of economic circulation through the continued expansion of domestic demand. This includes sustained efforts to promote consumption, a balanced expansion of investment, and the building of a unified domestic market. From the perspective of preparing for economic, tariff, and technological competition with the United States and Western countries, China emphasizes the gradual reduction of external dependence and the strengthening of an internal economic and technological circulation system.

 

The third priority is to promote high-quality economic development through a green and low-carbon transition. In order to achieve the goals of peaking carbon emissions by 2030 and reaching carbon neutrality by 2060, China has set out plans to build a new clean energy system and to transform manufacturing toward low-carbon and green production methods.

 

During the 15th Five-Year Plan period, China will place emphasis on original scientific and technological innovation and the strengthening of core technologies, seek to complete a new technological and industrial system, and aim to take the lead in key future industries such as advanced machinery and equipment, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, hydrogen energy, quantum computing, semiconductors, and smart manufacturing. Through these efforts, China intends to enhance research outcomes and manufacturing capabilities, strengthen global competitiveness, and promote high-quality economic development, while adopting the concept of “new quality productive forces” as a core strategic guideline and actively fostering next-generation growth industries including artificial intelligence, semiconductors, electric vehicles, batteries, advanced materials, and green technologies.

 

The “China Standards 2035” initiative recently emphasized by the Xi Jinping leadership is defined as the follow-up to and an upgraded version of “Made in China 2025.” It is positioned as a medium- to long-term strategy aimed at expanding China’s influence beyond mere industrial promotion into the realm of international norms and standard-setting. By 2035, it seeks to significantly enhance national standardization and the competitiveness of advanced industries, and to position China to lead global competition over technology standards.

 

The initiative presents a roadmap to establish a China-led standards system in three stages, 2025, 2030, and 2035, and to disseminate Chinese-style technological and industrial standards to the Global South and developing countries. A core objective of the China Standards 2035 strategy is for China to actively set and lead global standards in emerging and future industries such as 5G and 6G, the Internet of Things (IoT), artificial intelligence (AI), quantum technologies, semiconductors, biotechnology, and renewable energy.

 

China has already moved beyond simple technological development and manufacturing expansion. Building on the confidence gained from the success of Made in China 2025, it is now pursuing a medium- to long-term plan to shape and lead international norms and standards, while further increasing manufacturing output and consolidating its position in global technology standards within global supply chains.

 

Looking ahead, China plans to concentrate investment on eight major emerging industries, including next-generation information technology, new and renewable energy, new materials, high-value-added equipment, new energy vehicles, green environmental protection, civil aviation, and shipbuilding and marine engineering equipment, as well as nine future industries, including the metaverse, brainmachine interfaces, quantum computing, humanoid robots, generative AI, biotechnology, future displays, future networks, and new energy storage technologies such as batteries.

 

The specific rationale behind the Xi Jinping leadership’s drive to implement the China Standards 2035 strategy can be summarized as follows: first, ensuring technological interoperability; second, promoting technological innovation and efficiency; third, generating economic benefits; and fourth, securing market and technological dominance. Ultimately, this represents a medium- to long-term vision aimed at leading the development of technologies and the production of products across a wide range of sectors.

 

Meanwhile, an examination of China’s industrial standardization strategy reveals a vision to expand into future-oriented sectors, including new energy, next-generation information technology, virtual reality, integrated circuit (IC) design, smart healthcare, core components for 5G and 6G, the Internet of Things (IoT), photovoltaics, biotechnology, artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, and the metaverse.

 

Specifically, the eight major emerging industries identified by China are: (1) next-generation information technology, including 5G communications and big data; (2) new energy, including solar, wind, and other renewable sources; (3) new materials, including advanced and nano-materials; (4) high-end equipment, including semiconductor manufacturing equipment and machine tools; (5) new-energy vehicles, including electric vehicles and autonomous driving technologies; (6) eco-friendly environmental protection industries; (7) civil aviation; and (8) shipbuilding and marine engineering equipment.

 

Furthermore, the nine future industries represent strategic sectors targeted for medium-to-long-term investment and development: (1) the metaverse, including virtual reality platforms; (2) brainmachine interfaces, including applications of neuroscience; (3) quantum information, including quantum computing and communications; (4) humanoid robots; (5) generative artificial intelligence; (6) bio-manufacturing; (7) future display technologies; (8) future networks; and (9) new-energy storage systems. This roadmap is intended to position China as a leading actor in the future growth engines of the global economy.

 

A pivotal element of the China Standards 2035 strategy is the global dissemination of these standards through frameworks such as BRICS, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the Global South. This reflects a sophisticated national strategy: first, establishing indigenous technologyindustry standards by leveraging China’s massive domestic market, and subsequently promoting their adoption through a range of economic, political, diplomatic, and security channels to consolidate China’s global influence.

 

Through the 4th Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee, the institutionalization of Xi Jinping’s centralized authority and long-term rule appears to have reached a definitive stage. In the absence of any specific high-level reshuffles indicating a succession framework, it is highly probable that Xi will remain in power at least until the 22nd Party Congress in 2032.

 

Notably, the session marked the most significant personnel reshuffle since 2017, with the replacement of eleven Central Committee members who were reported to have held views diverging from the leadership. This move has effectively cemented the “Two Establishes,” namely, solidifying Xi’s core status and the guiding authority of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.

 

The strategic appointment of Zhang Shengmin, a native of Xi’s home province, as Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, combined with the removal of approximately nine senior generals, suggests that the prolonged anti-corruption campaign within the military has reached a conclusive stage. The result is a firmly entrenched command structure centered exclusively on Xi Jinping. Furthermore, the 4th Plenum identified the “modernization of the national governance system” as a pivotal task. Far from being a mere political slogan, this initiative represents a strategic drive to modernize state governance capacity, serving as a foundation for building China into a “great modern socialist power” by 2035.

 

Accordingly, the 4th Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee, the 15th Five-Year Plan, and China Standards 2035 should be viewed not as isolated policies, but as a unified national strategy comprising three elements, first, Xi Jinping’s long-term leadership system, second, high-quality growth and technological self-reliance, and third, competition over international technological standards and norms. China is simultaneously strengthening its diplomatic and defense capabilities alongside its economic and technological competitiveness, with the explicit medium-to-long-term goal of propelling all these sectors to a new level by 2035.

 

In particular, amid the deepening structural rivalry between the United States and China, China’s strategy of fostering emerging and future industrial clusters in advanced manufacturing, digital, and green sectors is set to enter into full-scale competition with the United States’ semiconductor alliance and Western de-risking policies. The next five years are highly likely to witness a phase in which competition over supply chains, standards, and norms intensifies, progressing from market, to platform, and ultimately to rules, in other words, a shift from marketplatformrules competition.

 

To this end, China envisions maintaining a high level of economic openness through sustained external engagement and advanced technological development. By pioneering new economic and technological frontiers through mutually beneficial cooperation and safeguarding the multilateral trading system, China aims to significantly expand its political and economic influence. The Xi Jinping leadership is already rapidly expanding projects, research and development, and industryacademia collaboration related to the China Standards 2035 strategy, centered on the Belt and Road Initiative, BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the Global South, thereby accelerating the establishment of an alternative advanced technology ecosystem that challenges the United StatesWestern-centered order.

 

Meanwhile, following the 15th Five-Year Plan and China Standards 2035, China is moving to strengthen its self-reliant supply chains and standards systems in areas such as electric vehicles, batteries, semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and renewable energy. As China’s largest trading partner and a key partner in industrial cooperation, South Korea faces a dual reality. On the one hand, China’s industrial upgrading offers opportunities for cooperation, including joint ventures, the supply of parts and materials, and collaboration in green and digital transitions. On the other hand, South Korea also confronts persistent pressures such as market encroachment and low-price competition. This makes it crucial for South Korea to secure core technologies in fields such as semiconductors, batteries, and telecommunications equipment.

 

Given that the simplified framework of “security with the United States, economy with China” no longer functions, South Korea needs to pursue differentiated supply chain strategies and new standards strategies by advanced technology sector and by region. To be sure, major discourses in South Korean society are marked by strong anti-China sentiment, the “Peak China” thesis, arguments about a crisis in Xi Jinping’s leadership, and calls for U.S.China decoupling. However, assessments of advanced technologies, the realities of U.S.China supply chains, and South Korea’s strategic choices require a far more nuanced perspective.

 

At the same time, China’s domestic and external strategic direction for roughly the next five to ten years has now been largely set. As a result, all-out competition between the United States and China is likely to intensify and expand, presenting South Korea with serious dilemmas and strategic challenges. Indeed, as the 15th Five-Year Plan and China Standards 2035 gain full momentum, U.S.China strategic competition is rapidly extending into the economic and technological domains. South Korea therefore needs to adopt a new economic and technology strategy built around three pillars: crisis management, internalization, and diversification. To this end, sustained communication and cooperation with both the United States and China will be essential.

 

Furthermore, this summit could mark an important turning point in the development of South KoreaChina relations, coming roughly eleven years after President Xi Jinping’s last official visit to South Korea. It is imperative to make full use of a favorable atmosphere for restoring bilateral relations and to actively pursue expanded economic and technological cooperation, as well as the revitalization of people-to-people exchanges. This will be crucial for achieving substantive progress in the South KoreaChina FTA negotiations agreed upon at the summit and in emerging future industries, including biotechnology, green industries, and the silver economy.