Discussions on North Korea Nuclear Talks in 2025 and Policy Implications

Jang Won Jo

jjo@sejong.org

Visiting Research Fellow

Sejong Institute

1. Issue 

Public statements, speeches, and official commentaries issued by Kim Jong Un and Kim Yo Jong in 2025 reflect several consistent positions advanced by North Korea. These include: △ refusal to relinquish nuclear weapons and assertion that denuclearization is not feasible, △ recognition of North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, △ U.S.–North Korea dialogue would be possible only if the objective of “North Korea’s denuclearization” is abandoned, △ a call for the withdrawal of what Pyongyang characterizes as hostile policy toward North Korea. In particular, North Korea has continued to register strong objections to any reference to “denuclearization.” North Korea maintains that its status as a nuclear weapons state constitutes sovereign authority codified in its constitution. Each time the international community raises the issue of “North Korea’s denuclearization,” Pyongyang has issued multiple statements and commentaries asserting that △ denuclearization is an unrealistic illusion, △ denuclearization will never occur, △ and dialogue with the United States would be possible only if demands for denuclearization and hostile policy measures are withdrawn.

The international community has referenced “North Korea’s denuclearization” in various multilateral settings, including the Trilateral Foreign Ministers’ Meeting among the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, and NATO meetings. In some instances, however, the term “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” has been used. Such inconsistency in terminology has contributed to conceptual ambiguity and has functioned as an impediment to effective problem solving. For policy clarity and strategic coherence, consistent use of the term “North Korea’s denuclearization” is warranted.

In response to the Joint Fact Sheet released following the November 14 ROK-U.S. summit, North Korea issued a lengthy commentary rebutting the document in detail according to its stated positions and logic. Going forward, Pyongyang is expected to adopt more forceful and specific military and diplomatic countermeasures toward South Korea. With respect to the United States and South Korea maintaining the principle of denuclearization and strengthening deterrence measures against North Korea, as well as Seoul’s pursuit of nuclear powered submarines, North Korea is likely to raise objections framed in terms of nuclear nonproliferation concerns and alleged violations of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. At the same time, Pyongyang is expected to continue rejecting denuclearization and demanding recognition as a nuclear weapons state. Under these conditions, prospects for the near term resumption of dialogue appear limited.

Until the 9th Party Congress scheduled for early 2026, North Korea is likely to focus on recalibrating its domestic and external national strategy, preparing a large scale military parade, and formulating strategic countermeasures toward the United States and South Korea. The window for renewed dialogue is therefore projected to open after a prospective U.S.–China summit in April of next year and to extend until prior to the U.S. midterm elections in November.

This policy brief provides a comprehensive assessment of the discourse surrounding North Korea nuclear talks and North Korea’s denuclearization in 2025. It examines the implications of South Korea’s pursuit of nuclear-powered submarines for the denuclearization debate, assesses future prospects for nuclear dialogue with North Korea, and offers policy recommendations for the government.

2. Nuclear and Missile Related Developments in North Korea in 2025

North Korea convened the Enlarged Plenary Meeting of the 11th Session of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea from December 23 to 27, 2024, during which it reviewed developments in 2024 and presented policy tasks for 2025. At the meeting, North Korea declared a “strongest hard line strategy toward the United States to be implemented for national interest and security guarantees.” In addition, on January 26 the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement regarding U.S.–Republic of Korea and U.S.–Republic of Korea–Japan joint exercises conducted earlier in the year, emphasizing that “so long as the United States denies North Korea’s sovereignty and security interests, a thoroughly hard line response toward the United States is required, and this alone constitutes the optimal choice in dealing with the United States.”

However, compared with the active nuclear and missile related activities conducted annually from 2022 to 2024, North Korea in 2025 appears to have carried out such activities at a noticeably lower level.

For example, in 2022 North Korea: △ conducted tunnel restoration work at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site between March and June, △ announced adoption of the Nuclear Forces Policy Law in September, △ conducted military exercises of tactical nuclear operation units between September 25 and October 9, △ stated at the 6th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee in December that it would exponentially increase nuclear warhead stockpiles, and carried out more than 70 missile launches.

In 2023 North Korea: △ reported on March 20 the “nuclear trigger” national nuclear weapons integrated management system, △ unveiled ten Hwasan-31 tactical nuclear warheads on March 28, △ constitutionally codified Nuclear Forces Policy at the Supreme People’s Assembly on September 27, △ launched the solid fuel ICBM Hwasong-18 on December 18, and conducted more than 36 missile launches.

In 2024 North Korea: △ referenced the “exponential expansion of nuclear weapons” on September 9 △ revealed the Kangson uranium enrichment facility on September 12, △ launched the solid fuel ICBM Hwasong-19 on October 31, and conducted at least seven missile launches.

By contrast, in 2025 activities were markedly limited. Kim Jong Un visited nuclear-related facilities in January, inspected a nuclear-powered submarine construction facility in March, and conducted two hypersonic glide vehicle tests. This relative reduction appears attributable to several factors: △ prior demonstration of nuclear capability advancement △ improved economic conditions and political standing following Russian support to North Korea after the Russia–Ukraine war, △ strengthened trilateral cooperation among North Korea, China, and Russia, △ the inauguration of a new government in South Korea, △ and messaging from former President Trump expressing a desire for contact with Kim Jong Un.

However, following the October 28 U.S.–Japan summit reaffirming commitment to the complete denuclearization of North Korea, the October 29 ROK-U.S. summit reaffirming the principle of North Korea’s denuclearization, and the announcement of ROK-U.S. cooperation on nuclear-powered submarine construction, North Korea appears likely to strengthen its military posture again. In this context, in 2026 the termination of the Russia–Ukraine war and a resulting decline in cooperation with Russia, a hypothetical award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Trump reducing attention toward Kim Jong Un, or declining expectations by Kim Jong Un toward Trump could significantly increase North Korean nuclear and missile provocations. If a Nobel Peace Prize award to Trump and a U.S. midterm election defeat were to reduce attention toward Kim Jong Un, high intensity responses such as a Hwasong-20 launch could be anticipated. In 2027 it will also be necessary to monitor the possibility of a seventh North Korean nuclear test.

3. Current Discussions on Renewing Nuclear Talks with North Korea

A. North Korea’s Position on the “Denuclearization Issue”

Statements, speeches, and official commentaries by Kim Jong Un and Kim Yo Jong reflect several consistent positions advanced by North Korea. These include refusal to abandon nuclear weapons, the assertion that denuclearization is not feasible, insistence on recognition of North Korea’s status as a nuclear weapons state, the position that U.S.–North Korea dialogue would be possible only if the objective of “North Korea’s denuclearization” is abandoned, and the demand that hostile policy toward North Korea be withdrawn. North Korea has repeatedly expressed strong opposition to any reference to “denuclearization.” In particular, Pyongyang asserts that its status as a nuclear weapons state constitutes sovereign authority codified in its constitution. Each time the international community raises the issue of “North Korea’s denuclearization,” North Korea has issued multiple statements and commentaries characterizing denuclearization as an unrealistic illusion and arguing that U.S.–North Korea dialogue would be possible only if demands for denuclearization and hostile policy measures are withdrawn.

With respect to the November 14 ROK-U.S. Summit Fact Sheet and ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting joint statement, the Korean Central News Agency published on November 18 a lengthy commentary of approximately 3,800 characters under the title “A Declaration of Confrontation by the ROK-U.S. Alliance Determined to Remain Hostile.” In that commentary, North Korea argued that replacing the expression “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” with “complete denuclearization of North Korea” constituted a denial of the substance and existence of its state. It further defined demands for “North Korea’s denuclearization” as an unconstitutional act that denies its constitution.

At the same time, North Korea’s response to former President Trump’s message expressing a desire for dialogue and contact warrants attention. Kim Yo Jong stated that the personal relationship between the head of North Korea and the U.S. President is not bad, and Kim Jong Un indicated that if the United States genuinely seeks peaceful coexistence there is no reason not to engage face to face. These remarks suggest that the possibility of contact remains open. The failure of a potential Trump–Kim meeting on the margins of the Gyeongju APEC summit appears to have been influenced primarily by broader regional dynamics shaped by strengthened North Korea–China–Russia trilateral cooperation. However, reaffirmation by U.S., South Korea, and Japan leaders of their commitment to North Korea’s denuclearization, as well as the announcement of ROK-U.S. cooperation on nuclear-powered submarines, are also assessed to have contributed to this outcome.

With respect to South Korea, North Korea has clearly expressed rejection. Kim Jong Un stated that there will be no occasion to sit face to face with South and that it will not be treated as a counterpart. Kim Yo Jong stated that South Korea is not a diplomatic partner and is not a figure capable of altering the course of history. In addition, an official commentary referred to South Korea as a “poor but aggressive neighbor,” underscoring a posture of categorical refusal.

B. The Distinction Between “North Korea’s Denuclearization” and “Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula”

North Korea has addressed the international community’s use of the term “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” in the context of demands that it halt its nuclear development. In a December 20, 2018 commentary issued by the Korean Central News Agency, Pyongyang provided a detailed explanation of how it defines the concept of “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” North Korea stated that “the tragic starting point lies in the self serving misinterpretation of key language in important agreements that constitute the legal foundation of international relations.” It argued that “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” refers not only to the removal of nuclear weapons within the territories of North and South Korea, but also to the elimination of all sources of nuclear threat directed at the Korean Peninsula from surrounding areas. North Korea further asserted that the United States, by deploying nuclear strategic assets and conducting nuclear war exercises that continuously threaten North Korea, compelled it to possess a nuclear war deterrent. It added that the complete removal of U.S. nuclear threats against North Korea constitutes the proper definition of “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”

China has likewise tended to use the term “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” consistently when necessary, on the grounds that the term “North Korea’s denuclearization” targets North Korea unilaterally. Beijing has employed the broader formulation as a means of counterbalancing the United States, emphasizing that nuclear threats must be eliminated across the entire Korean Peninsula, including measures related to U.S. extended deterrence provided to the Republic of Korea.

The United States has officially framed “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” as referring to the objective of halting North Korea’s nuclear development. At the same time, the term can be understood as implicitly encompassing management of South Korea’s latent nuclear capability. In particular, during the Biden Administration, when the issue of an indigenous nuclear armament option was raised in South Korea, the term “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” was frequently used. If the objective of the international community is to prevent North Korea’s nuclear development, there is a need to consistently employ the term “North Korea’s denuclearization.” The concept of “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” fundamentally includes the absence of all nuclear weapons on the Peninsula. As such, it may be interpreted as encompassing not only North Korea’s nuclear program but also potential issues related to nuclear development in South Korea.

C. Implications of South Korea’s Nuclear-Powered Submarine Program for the “Denuclearization” Debate

In response to the November 14 ROK-U.S. Summit Fact Sheet and the ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting joint statement, North Korea issued a November 18 Korean Central News Agency commentary rebutting the documents point by point according to its stated positions and logic. North Korea may therefore pursue more forceful and specific military and diplomatic countermeasures than before. Within its asserted “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” framework, Pyongyang is likely to advance the argument that U.S. nuclear threats must be eliminated and to claim that recent developments violate the principle of “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” At the same time, it is assessed that North Korea may gradually escalate the level of military provocations.

With respect to former President Trump’s announcement approving South Korea’s nuclear-powered submarine construction, China initially stated through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson at a regular press briefing on November 1 that both South Korea and the United States should faithfully fulfill their nuclear nonproliferation obligations. During the November 1 ROK–China summit, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reportedly remarked regarding the North Korean nuclear issue that circumstances have changed over time and that diverse approaches are therefore required. Given China’s prior expressions of concern regarding ROK-U.S. joint exercises and the expansion of U.S. influence around the Korean Peninsula, Beijing is likely assessing the potential repercussions of South Korea’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines. These include possible shifts in the regional security structure and adverse implications for China’s strategic interests.

At the same time, the announcement that South Korea will pursue nuclear-powered submarine construction with U.S. nuclear fuel supply may provide China and North Korea with grounds to shift from a previously defensive posture on the “North Korea (the Korean Peninsula) denuclearization” issue to a more assertive one. Both are likely to argue that the construction of nuclear powered submarines capable of carrying strategic missiles and the operational deployment of submarines fueled by enriched uranium supplied by the United States constitute actions that raise questions regarding nuclear nonproliferation principles and conflict with “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”

If China and North Korea assert that the United States and South Korea have taken actions inconsistent with “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” and further argue that demands for “North Korea’s denuclearization” amount to an improper denial of North Korea’s constitution, denuclearization discussions may remain stalled for an extended period.

North Korea’s continued development of nuclear and missile capabilities, coupled with its own pursuit of nuclear powered submarine capabilities, has contributed to increases in South Korea’s conventional weapons development capacity and its move toward acquiring nuclear-powered submarines. It has also heightened the possibility of expanded U.S. influence around the Korean Peninsula. In this sense, evolving dynamics on the Peninsula have generated a strategic dilemma for China. This dynamic may provide a basis for persuading China that stabilizing regional security requires encouraging North Korea to refrain from arms racing behavior or actions that escalate military tensions.

4. Prospects for North Korea Nuclear Talks and Policy Recommendation

A. Outlook for North Korea Nuclear Talks

With respect to the United States and South Korea maintaining the principle of denuclearization, strengthening deterrence measures against North Korea, and pursuing the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines, North Korea is expected to respond by raising concerns framed around nuclear nonproliferation and alleged violations of “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” At the same time, Pyongyang is likely to continue rejecting denuclearization and demanding recognition as a nuclear weapons state, thereby sustaining a confrontational dynamic. In response to what it characterizes as hard line policies by the United States and South Korea, North Korea is assessed to gradually escalate military provocations, including increased exposure of nuclear and missile related facilities and a higher frequency of missile launches. Concurrently, through official statements and commentaries, Pyongyang is likely to intensify its criticism of both Washington and Seoul. China is also expected to criticize the expansion of U.S. influence around the Korean Peninsula and may be disinclined to cooperate in advancing North Korea nuclear dialogue.

Until the 9th Party Congress scheduled for early 2026, North Korea is likely to focus on recalibrating its domestic and external national strategy, preparing a large scale military parade to showcase military achievements, formulating strategic countermeasures toward the United States and South Korea, and enhancing Kim Jong Un’s diplomatic leverage. During this period, prospects for substantive progress in nuclear dialogue appear limited. A potential window for renewed engagement is assessed to open after a prospective U.S.–China summit in April 2026 and to remain open until prior to the U.S. midterm elections in October.

From Kim Jong Un’s perspective, several favorable conditions may incentivize engagement during this period. These include his elevated diplomatic standing following recognition from Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, the presence of a U.S. president who has expressed interest in dialogue with him, and a South Korean government seeking improved inter Korean relations. Under these circumstances, Kim Jong Un may ultimately enter negotiations with President Trump between April and October 2026. President Trump has previously identified preventing North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats as the primary objective of U.S.–North Korea dialogue. In seeking to frame resolution of the North Korea nuclear issue as a signature achievement of a second term, he would likely prioritize negotiations over the unresolved issues that remained following the February 2019 Hanoi summit if dialogue were to resume.

B. Policy Recommendations

In the near term, reopening dialogue appears difficult. Until potential changes in circumstances emerge following a prospective U.S.–China summit in April 2026, North Korea is unlikely to respond positively to conciliatory measures proposed by South Korea. Accordingly, approaches that signal impatience or seek to induce an immediate response from Pyongyang should be avoided. At the same time, diplomatic and military efforts to build justification and conditions for dialogue should continue, on the premise that an immediate North Korean response is not expected.

If the leaders of the United States and South Korea place priority on resuming dialogue with North Korea, consideration should be given to adjusting public messaging. Although the ultimate objective of “North Korea’s denuclearization” should be maintained, frequent public reiteration of denuclearization demands may be counterproductive given Pyongyang’s categorical rejection of the term. In practical terms, while preserving the end state objective, it may be necessary to keep the entry point for negotiations open.

Based on the South Korean government’s pragmatic and phased approach to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, namely freeze, reduction, and dismantlement leading to denuclearization, it is advisable to prepare in advance for the freeze phase as the most likely entry point for negotiations if dialogue resumes. Preparatory steps should include a technical assessment at the National Security Office level of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, an evaluation of major nuclear facilities that would be subject to a freeze, and consideration of a compensation package tied to a freeze, taking into account President Trump’s transactional approach to negotiations. In addition, contingency planning should be undertaken for proposals that could be presented to North Korea in the event that dialogue resumes. These may include a phased economic cooperation package as well as support programs in areas such as tourism, railways, electricity, and hospital and medical infrastructure.

With respect to China, it is necessary to prepare for the possibility of calibrated responses to South Korea’s pursuit of nuclear-powered submarines. Such responses could include expanded activity in the West Sea, political and diplomatic pressure, and informal economic measures. In anticipation of such developments, it is important to reinforce the defensive logic and framing that acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines does not violate international norms or nonproliferation principles. Given current tensions between China and Japan related to statements by Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi concerning Taiwan, there is a possibility that once those tensions subside, Beijing may redirect diplomatic and security pressure toward South Korea.

Finally, there is a need to closely monitor the possibility that North Korea could use South Korea’s pursuit of nuclear-powered submarines as justification to request from China or Russia the transfer of key technologies necessary for nuclear-powered submarine development or advanced strategic weapons capabilities. Preventive and multi-dimensional measures should be considered in advance. North Korea may seek to frame such requests in the context of countering perceived regional bloc formation under the ROK-U.S. alliance or responding to U.S. led concepts such as an “Asian NATO,” thereby highlighting the need for enhanced submarine and strategic weapons capabilities.