U.S. Midterm Election Trends and the Possibility of Changes in Foreign Policy
Beomchul SHIN
bcshin@sejong.org
Principal Research Fellow
Sejong Institute
1. Trends and Outlook for the U.S. November Midterm Elections
A. Electoral Landscape and Polling Trends
The structural features of the congressional elections are as follows. In the House, all 435 seats are up for election. House members serve two-year terms, so the chamber responds immediately to shifts in public sentiment and to the president’s approval rating, and the election takes on a strong character of a midterm assessment of the president’s first two years. In the Senate, by contrast, 35 of the 100 seats are up for election in this midterm. Senators serve six-year terms, with one-third replaced every two years, so beyond national sentiment, the traditional party leaning of each state (Red/Blue State) tends to determine the outcome.
The current composition of the federal Congress is as follows. In the Senate, Republicans hold 53 seats versus 47 for the Democratic bloc (including 2 independents). In the House, Republicans hold 220 seats versus 212 for Democrats, with 3 vacancies.
The trend in polling to date is as follows. Above all, President Trump’s approval rating is weak. An AP-NORC poll (July 30) put his approval at 33%, the lowest of his second term. The Silver Bulletin, which measures net approval, shows -20.6 percentage points, also among the lowest levels of the second term. Considering that, historically, when presidential approval is in the 30s, the governing party has lost an average of 26 to 28 House seats in midterm elections, this can only be regarded as a crisis for President Trump.
Party support and House support (generic ballot) in July and August show a similar picture. A Pew Research Center survey of congressional voting preferences found Democrats at 43% versus Republicans at 37%, a 6 percentage point Democratic lead. A CNN poll likewise shows Democrats ahead by 8 percentage points in House election support, and among highly motivated voters the Democratic lead is 20 percentage points. Even the conservative Fox News Poll shows Democrats at 53% versus Republicans at 46% in House election support, the largest Democratic advantage since 1996.
B. Key Battlegrounds
In the House battleground districts, Democrats can retake the majority with a net gain of 5 seats. Moreover, the competitive districts are concentrated in Democratic-leaning states, which makes the landscape favorable to Democrats. The details are as follows.
- New York (5 districts: Long Island, Westchester, Hudson Valley, etc.)
- California (4 to 5 districts: Central Valley, San Diego, Orange County, etc.)
- Pennsylvania (2 to 3 districts), Virginia (2 districts)
There are 6 key battleground states in the Senate. For Democrats to win the majority (requiring a net gain of 4 seats), they must win in Alaska (AK), Maine (ME), Iowa (IA), North Carolina (NC), Ohio (OH), and Texas (TX). There are, however, geographic limitations. 53% of voters in these six states consider the Democratic Party “too progressive,” and Republicans hold a 6 percentage point advantage in party preference (generic ballot). At the same time, a warning signal is sounding in Michigan. Even in Michigan, which has not sent a Republican to the Senate since 1994, Republican Mike Rogers (51%) leads Democrat Abdul El-Sayed (47%) by 4 percentage points, showing that the Republican defensive wall for holding the Senate remains sturdy. However, because of its interaction with President Trump’s approval rating and the House elections, the overall picture is hard to read, and if public opinion favoring Democrats persists overall, Republican retention of the Senate also cannot be taken for granted.
C. Major Election Issues
The major issues of this midterm election are shown in the table below.
Category | Key Issue | Partisan Advantage | Rationale and Electoral Impact |
Livelihood Issues | Economy and Cost of Living | Democratic attack framing has the upper hand | Prices are rising sharply across housing, groceries, and insurance premiums. Democrats attack the oil price increase stemming from the Iran war as “Trumpflation.” |
Livelihood Issues | Affordable Care Act(ACA) and Health Care Costs | Favors Democrats | The expiration of the ACA premium subsidies at the end of 2025 caused premiums to surge in January 2026. 56% of ACA enrollees live in Republican-held House districts and 76% in Red States, so the damage is concentrated in the Republican base. |
Livelihood Issues | Tariffs | Toss-up or favors Democrats | Broad, high tariffs are being passed through to consumer prices, adding to cost-of-living burdens. |
Institutions and Election Environment | Election Integrity SAVE Act | Toss-up (both parties mobilize) | Republicans demand passage of the “SAVE America Act,” which would require voter ID and proof of citizenship when voting. Democrats oppose it, calling it a conspiracy theory. |
Foreign Affairs and Security | Iran War | Favors Democrats if prolonged | Soaring oil prices, controversy over war powers, and the stirring of divisions within MAGA. Directly tied to livelihood issues. |
Foreign Affairs and Security | China and Taiwan | Bipartisan hawkish stance | Both parties are hawkish on technology, trade, and security issues, and voters feel the effects indirectly through economic repercussions. |
Foreign Affairs and Security | Ukraine Greenland | Favors Democrats and Republican internationalists | Assessment of alliance reliability. Accelerates the divergence of lines within the Republican Party (isolationism vs. internationalism). |
D. Overall Assessment of the Electoral Landscape
The most likely scenario is a “Split Congress.” Decision Desk HQ (DDHQ) projected a Democratic win in the House, 226 seats to 209 for Republicans, and a 50-50 tie in the Senate (with Republicans retaining the majority through the vice president’s tiebreaking vote). Considering the sector-by-sector public sentiment shown in the Fox News Poll (income inequality Democrats +22 points, health care Democrats +21 points, inflation Democrats +10 points, versus crime response Republicans +7 points) and the Democratic preference among highly motivated voters, however, a Democratic sweep of both the Senate and the House cannot be ruled out. At the same time, primary conflict between the traditional Democratic base and supporters of the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA), which raises the issue of the DSA’s limited general-election competitiveness, is increasing the fluidity of the landscape, and if President Trump’s approval rating falls further in the remaining period, it is expected to become a liability for Republicans.
2. The Impact of the Midterm Election Results on U.S. Foreign Policy
A. Mechanisms of Checks on Foreign Policy within the Congressional Political Landscape
The U.S. Senate exercises confirmation power over appointments such as the secretaries of state and defense, heads of intelligence agencies, and ambassadors. It can also impose constraints through its treaty ratification power (which requires the consent of two-thirds of the members present). As a result, securing the Senate increases reliance on executive agreements as a means. The House, for its part, can apply political pressure by restricting the use of funds through budget formulation, issuing subpoenas and holding hearings through the Appropriations, Foreign Affairs, Armed Services, and Intelligence Committees, and exercising its power of impeachment. If Democrats take control of both the Senate and the House in the midterm elections, enormous difficulties are foreseen for the second half of the second Trump administration. The difficulties that administrations have faced following past midterm results, and the outcomes of the subsequent presidential elections, can be referenced as follows.
[Past Midterm Elections and Changes in Congressional Configuration]
2002 (Bush, Republican): Republicans sweep both chambers → lays the groundwork for Bush’s reelection
2006 (Bush, Republican): Democrats retake both chambers → Bush’s lame duck status deepens (Obama wins the next election)
2010 (Obama, Democrat): Split Congress (House Republican/Senate Democratic) → Obama retains governing momentum
2014 (Obama, Democrat): Republicans retake both chambers → Obama becomes a lame duck (pursues independent diplomacy such as the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action(JCPOA))
2018 (Trump, Republican): Split Congress (House Democratic/Senate Republican) → Trump retains governing momentum
2022 (Biden, Democrat): Split Congress (House Republican/Senate Democratic) → Biden retains governing momentum
B. The Possibility of a Recurrence of the Trump First-Term Experience (After the 2018 Midterm Elections)
After Democrats took control of the House in the 2018 midterm elections during the first Trump administration, Congress used the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to put the brakes on President Trump’s demands for unilateral U.S. troop withdrawals and reductions and for increased defense cost-sharing. At the same time, provisions of laws related to labor, the environment, and pharmaceuticals were amended at the Democrats’ request. On the other hand, issues with bipartisan consensus, such as high tariffs on China and technology regulations, were maintained, and executive orders and various summit diplomacy initiatives (top-down diplomacy such as the 2019 Hanoi U.S.-North Korea summit and the Abraham Accords) were pursued independently. If the second Trump administration likewise faces lame duck status, this concentration on top-down diplomacy is expected to be repeated.
C. Midterm Election Scenarios
Three midterm election scenarios can be identified. First, Republicans hold both the Senate and the House, but the likelihood is low. Second, Democrats secure both the Senate and the House, which is more likely than the first. Third, a split Congress [Democratic House / Republican Senate], which as of August is the most likely. As a result, a split is the most probable outcome at present, and an “unstable Congress” may form in which policy votes are shaken by the defection of a small number of centrist or isolationist members. In addition, if recounts and litigation in battleground races delay the determination of the majority party, the administration’s foreign policy momentum could be paralyzed between November 2026 and January 2027.
3. Assessment of the Impact on ROK-U.S. Relations and Directions for Response
A. Major Spillover Effects by Sector
First, tariffs and trade. President Trump’s pressure to execute investment in the United States will continue regardless of the election results. If Democrats secure the House, investigations into trade policy will increase, but high tariffs are not expected to be withdrawn immediately given the president’s veto and delegated authority. An increase in bipartisan legislation related to economic security, such as semiconductors and AI, is expected.
Second, security issues such as the Iran war. If Republicans fail to control both chambers, the U.S. administration’s military discretion is expected to be reduced through budgetary controls such as the War Powers Resolution. On Ukraine and NATO, by contrast, a bipartisan coalition between a Democratic Congress and internationalists within the Republican Party makes it highly likely that legislation providing continued support and provisions restricting reductions of U.S. forces in Europe will be established.
Third, China and Taiwan. Although there is a difference in perspective between Republican decoupling and Democratic de-risking, countering China is an area in which bipartisan consensus has formed.
Fourth, ROK-U.S. alliance issues. Alliance modernization, defense cost-sharing, purchases of U.S. weapons, and the substantive strengthening of extended deterrence (NCG) are expected to continue regardless of the midterm results.
B. Detailed Countermeasures by Key Issue
Nuclear-Powered Submarine Cooperation
If Democrats take control of the House, or if a Democratic administration comes to power in the future, the pace of progress could be significantly delayed by the opposition of nonproliferation advocates. A written agreement (such as an MOU) should therefore be concluded promptly, before the midterm elections. For securing a reactor, a “two-track” approach that uses the AUKUS model (a combination of legislation and agreements), rather than independent development using low-enriched uranium, appears advantageous in terms of speed. To prepare for delays in the event of independent development, a structure should be put in place from the submarine design stage that allows future warfare capabilities such as stealth, unmanned underwater vehicle operations, AI systems, and the mounting of additional weapons systems to be flexibly reinforced.
U.S.-North Korea Contact and North Korea Policy
The possibility of a U.S.-North Korea summit, as President Trump seeks a breakthrough, cannot be ruled out. If President Trump is constrained by Congress on tariffs or the Iran issue after the midterm elections, he is highly likely to try to create a breakthrough on the North Korea issue in order to produce results. In a social media post on August 17, President Trump emphasized “the reduction of ROK-U.S. combined military exercises and a very good relationship with Chairman Kim Jong Un.” At the same time, Kim Yo Jong’s statement on August 19 to 20 likewise referred to the friendly relationship between the U.S. and North Korean leaders and urged American concessions. As a result, there is a possibility of pursuing a U.S.-North Korea leaders’ meeting on the occasion of the APEC summit in China in November 2026. South Korea should therefore maintain an approach framework of “the U.S. first, China next, North Korea last,” and build a system of advance coordination so that South Korea’s security position is reflected if U.S.-North Korea dialogue moves forward. The four-party talks initiative proposed by the Ministry of Unification should also be supported diplomatically.
4. Policy Recommendations
A. Achieving Results on the First Round of Investment in the United States and on a Nuclear Submarine Cooperation Agreement before the Midterm Elections
Strategic execution of investment in the United States is needed. To help President Trump promote his achievements for the midterm elections and to eliminate the risk of retaliatory measures after the elections, the first round of investment should be launched before the elections. In addition to economic viability and supply chains, it is necessary to select as targets the key battleground states that are important in U.S. domestic politics (Pennsylvania, Georgia, Michigan, Ohio, and Texas) and the districts of influential congressional committee and subcommittee chairs. At the same time, a justification of supply chain cooperation capable of drawing bipartisan support should be maintained so that this does not appear to be support for a particular candidate.
Documenting nuclear submarine cooperation is also an important task. South Korea should secure a written agreement promptly, before nonproliferation arguments spread among Democrats, and strengthen tailored public diplomacy to persuade the U.S. Congress. Sustainable institutionalization models, such as the “ROK-U.S. Shipbuilding Cooperation Center” launched in July, should continue to be expanded.
B. Flexible Policy Adjustment by Scenario after the Midterm Elections
If Democrats win both chambers, South Korea should make concluding nuclear cooperation within the Trump administration’s term its top priority, in preparation for an early lame duck period and the strengthening of nonproliferation arguments. If Republicans win both chambers, South Korea should strengthen its response on tariffs, trade, and the Iran issue, and focus on faithful implementation of the existing joint summit agreement last November(November 2025). If a split Congress occurs, South Korea should anticipate delays in implementing agreements and realistically readjust the priority tasks between the two countries that must be secured within President Trump’s term.
C. ROK-U.S. Policy Coordination in Preparation for Increased Attention to the North Korea Issue
In preparation for the possible resumption of U.S.-North Korea dialogue linked to developments such as an end to the war in Ukraine, South Korea and the United States should set an “appropriate level of negotiating objectives” in advance. In line with the “the U.S. first, China next, North Korea last” strategy, South Korea should draw out China’s cooperation during the U.S.-North Korea negotiation phase and, domestically, gather bipartisan public opinion to take the initiative in creating conditions for improved inter-Korean relations.
D. Substantially Strengthening Capitol Hill Diplomacy toward the United States
Capabilities that have leaned toward diplomacy with the administration should be substantially shifted toward congressional diplomacy. The congressional liaison staff of the Korean Embassy in Washington should be increased and the related budget substantially expanded. Rather than one-off events, South Korea should form small issue-specific groups with members of the U.S. Congress and key staff to build a long-term, bipartisan pro-Korea trust network. The local lobbying capacity and community influence of South Korean companies that have invested in the United States should be actively linked to and utilized as diplomatic assets for the ROK-U.S. alliance.
File