North Korea’s Domestic and Foreign Policy Orientation in 2026 and South Korea’s Response Strategy
Eunju CHOI
ej0717@sejong.org
Director of Center for Korean Peninsula Strategy
Sejong Institute
1. Problem Statement
The year 2026 represents a major transition period for North Korea, marked both by the conclusion of the previous Five-Year Plan for National Economic Development and the launch of a new five-year plan, alongside the full-scale reorganization of the state governance system responsible for its implementation. Through the 9th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea in February 2026 and the 1st Session of the 15th Supreme People’s Assembly in March 2026, the new Five-Year Economic Development Plan (2026–2030) was formally presented and institutionalized. The two meetings were held consecutively with a clear division of roles: the Party Congress focused on presenting strategic policy directions, while the Supreme People’s Assembly concretized these directions through legislation, budget allocations, and personnel appointments.
At the same time, 2026 is also the starting point of a new plan burdened by the structural constraints accumulated during the 8th Party Congress period (2021–2025). Although North Korea has highly praised the economic achievements of the 8th Congress period, persistent problems remain, including unstable supplies of electricity and coal, aging industrial facilities, inflationary pressure in market prices, and resource constraints arising from the simultaneous pursuit of defense priorities. Accordingly, the analytical focus for 2026 should be placed not merely on the stated goals of the new plan itself, but rather on identifying North Korea’s actual priorities and structural limitations through examination of its implementation mechanisms, budget allocations, personnel logic, and initial policy measures.
In addition, 2026 is also the year in which the Lee Jae Myung administration in South Korea will begin concretely shaping its North Korea policy through actual responses and diplomatic strategy. The U.S.-China summit scheduled for May and the APEC Summit in Shenzhen in November are major events likely to affect inter-Korean relations, U.S.-North Korea relations, and the broader diplomatic environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula. It is therefore necessary to analyze North Korea’s domestic and foreign policy orientation during the early implementation stage and to proactively incorporate these assessments into South Korea’s strategic response.
2. North Korea’s Domestic Policy Direction and Implementation Conditions
A. Policy Direction and Operational Approach
Kim Jong Un’s public activities in 2026 demonstrate how the policy directions presented at the 9th Party Congress and the Supreme People’s Assembly are being translated into concrete implementation on the ground. The overall pattern of these activities suggests that policy priorities can largely be categorized into five areas: (1) strengthening the production base; (2) regional development and improvement of living standards; (3) generating visible achievements through construction projects; (4) mobilization of youth; and (5) parallel advancement of national defense capabilities. This indicates that policy implementation in 2026 is unfolding through the simultaneous management of economic recovery, improvement of public livelihoods, regional development, capital-city construction, youth mobilization, and security affairs.
More specifically, the completion of the first-stage modernization of the Ryongsong Machine Complex, along with visits to the Chonsong Youth Coal Mine and the Sangwon Cement Complex, demonstrates that the machinery, coal, and construction-materials sectors are being treated as core production bases supporting economic development and construction projects. The completion of the Sinuiju Greenhouse Farm Complex, the groundbreaking of local development projects in Unryul County, and the launch of the Samgwang Livestock Farm indicate an effort to produce tangible results that residents can directly experience by combining food production, vegetable cultivation, livestock farming, healthcare, and service facilities at the local level. Kim Jong Un’s on-site guidance at the fourth-stage construction site of the Hwasong District in Pyongyang suggests that even as regional development expands, construction projects in Pyongyang continue to function as symbolic showcases of regime achievements and as benchmarks for nationwide construction efforts.
The 9th Party Congress characterized the economic achievements of the 8th Congress period as “the most significant and meaningful achievements of the past thirty years.” Specific results cited included a 3.2-fold increase in Juche iron production, a 5.1-fold increase in machine-tool production, a 1.9-fold increase in seafood production, the completion of more than 356,900 housing units, the achievement of 105.1 percent of planned budget revenues, and a 1.58-fold increase in gross domestic product. However, these achievements appear less indicative of structural breakthroughs in productivity or technological advancement than of efforts to restore key industries, expand construction, revive trade, and expand state-led projects in order to rebuild production and supply foundations during a period of crisis.
Viewed in this context, the economic line of the 9th Congress appears to place greater emphasis on “stabilization and consolidation” and “gradual, qualitative development” than on rapid economic growth. This should be interpreted not simply as a moderation of growth targets, but as an adjustment reflecting the limitations and constraints of previous growth strategies. In particular, the Party Congress identified defeatism, irresponsibility, conservatism, formalism, and deficiencies in leadership capability as major internal obstacles. This indicates that “stabilization and consolidation” does not merely signify cautious management, but rather a policy line aimed simultaneously at maintaining achievements and reorganizing implementation capacity.
The core orientation of the new Five-Year Economic Development Plan is the “establishment of a stable and sustainable foundation for economic development and the substantial improvement of people’s living standards.” North Korea presented a structure centered on heavy industry, agriculture, and construction while integrating science and technology, informatization, renewable energy, light industry, and fisheries. This suggests that the coming five years will focus on strengthening production foundations, expanding supply systems that directly affect everyday life, reorganizing economic space, and improving management efficiency.
The 2026 budget provides a concrete example of this policy orientation. Based on the fact that state budget revenues for 2025 exceeded targets by reaching 105.1 percent of plan, North Korea conservatively set the 2026 budget revenue growth rate at only 0.5 percent while simultaneously expanding expenditures by 5.8 percent. This reflects both a certain degree of confidence in economic recovery and a cautious judgment that future revenue conditions cannot be viewed optimistically. Since transaction revenues and profits from state-owned enterprises continue to account for the overwhelming majority of state budget revenues, the stability of public finances remains heavily dependent on the recovery of production in the state sector and the continuity of external trade conditions.
Construction has been institutionalized as a key means of generating visible achievements throughout the 9th Congress period. Major projects include the construction of 370,000 housing units nationwide, the development of economic and living infrastructure in 100 cities and counties, and the construction of 80,000 housing units in mining communities. Construction is also directly connected to heavy industry because it simultaneously stimulates demand in sectors such as steel, cement, machinery, electricity, and transportation. However, the effectiveness of this construction-centered strategy depends less on completion figures themselves than on the ability to maintain normal operation after completion. Without sufficient follow-up conditions—including materials, electricity, medical personnel, operating funds, and distribution networks—a gap may emerge between expanded construction and actual improvements in living standards.
Meanwhile, the “Regional Development 20×10 Policy” has entered its third year in 2026 and is increasingly being elevated into a core political and economic project through which the state directly assumes responsibility for improving local residents’ living standards and welfare. In 2026, the scope of the policy expanded beyond the construction of local industrial factories to include local hospitals, integrated convenience and service facilities, grain management stations, and aquaculture centers, thereby transforming it from a production-oriented initiative into a comprehensive regional development program encompassing living infrastructure.
The convening of the Third Workshop for City and County Party Secretaries in April 2026, immediately following the Party Congress and the Supreme People’s Assembly, demonstrates that the Regional Development 20×10 Policy has once again been reaffirmed as a core implementation task for local Party organizations during its third year. The workshop’s emphasis on principled and methodological issues as well as practical implementation measures suggests that the focus of the policy is shifting beyond simple groundbreaking and completion figures toward strengthening implementation responsibility and operational capacity.
In addition, North Korea is expanding the focus of state governance beyond macro-level production and construction achievements to encompass the detailed conditions of everyday life. Kim Jong Un’s policy speech directly addressed issues such as encouraging higher birth rates, reducing infant mortality, eliminating extra-budgetary burdens, guaranteeing regular vacations, narrowing educational disparities between urban and rural areas, expanding health insurance funds, and improving the treatment of neighborhood-unit leaders (inminbanjang).
A notable characteristic of social and livelihood policy in 2026 is the combination of welfare expansion with strengthened social control. Policies encouraging childbirth, reducing infant mortality, expanding health insurance funds, and reducing educational disparities all express the state’s intention to take direct responsibility for improving living standards. At the same time, however, they also constitute responses to labor shortages, weakening local communities, and the accumulation of social dissatisfaction. Because the expansion of healthcare, education, childcare, and livelihood guarantees is being accompanied by tighter regulation of moral discipline, lifestyles, and grassroots organizations such as neighborhood units, North Korea’s social policy in 2026 can be understood less as simple welfare expansion than as a form of “managed welfare” through which state control is extended across the entire sphere of everyday life.
B. Implementation Conditions and Structural Constraints
The holding of both the Party Congress and the Supreme People’s Assembly in the same year signifies that over the next five years the Party’s leadership organs and the state’s executive institutions will operate under a unified structure of responsibility. The strengthening of the cabinet-responsibility and cabinet-centered system is also being concretized through the retention of Premier Pak Thae Song, the appointment of Kim Tok Hun as First Vice Premier, and the large-scale reshuffling of vice premiers and heads of ministries and central agencies. The establishment of a Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry under the Second Economic Committee of the Cabinet may be interpreted as an effort to expand the institutional linkage between the management of the defense industry and the state economic implementation system.
The structural constraints of North Korea’s fiscal system can largely be summarized in three areas. First, the defense budget ratio has remained at 15.8 percent for an extended period, indicating the continuation of a system in which economic and livelihood priorities coexist alongside defense expenditures. Second, 84.4 percent of fiscal revenue is concentrated in the state sector, meaning that public finances remain heavily dependent on the production and transaction performance of state-owned enterprises. Third, with central budget revenues accounting for 72.3 percent of total revenues, fiscal management remains highly centralized. This means that even while regional development policies are being broadly promoted, autonomous budget management and locally tailored resource allocation at the regional level continue to depend heavily on central allocation and approval.
The success or failure of North Korea’s economy in 2026 will depend not only on internal mobilization of human and material resources, but also to some extent on phased border reopening and the recovery of external economic relations. Following increases of 21.9 percent in exports to China and 25.4 percent in imports from China in 2025, trade flows continued to rise during the first quarter of 2026. This suggests that the recovery of production and fiscal expansion cannot be explained solely through internal mobilization, but also reflects the importance of recovering external economic ties through resumed trade with China and expanded transactions with Russia.
One notable feature of the North Korean economy in recent years is the coexistence of improved macroeconomic indicators—such as GDP growth, excess budget revenue achievement, and the recovery of trade with China—with instability in everyday living indicators reflected in sharp increases in exchange rates and prices. The exchange rate rose dramatically from an average of 8,495 won in the first quarter of 2024 to 42,838 won in the first quarter of 2026, while rice prices, after surging in the second half of 2025, remained elevated during the first quarter of 2026. This suggests that the current economic recovery remains limited in nature, concentrated in the state sector, construction, fiscal mobilization, and external trade recovery, while its benefits have not been evenly distributed across the broader population.
North Korea is attempting to channel the flow of food and foreign currency into areas under state management through institutions such as grain management stations, state foreign-exchange service centers, and cooperative currency exchange offices. However, this should not be understood simply as a restoration of the former state distribution system. Rather, it appears to represent a hybrid structure combining state control with market elements. The operation of everyday-life facilities such as grain stations, pharmacies, and integrated service centers is likely being reorganized in a way that preserves state authority while incorporating fee-based operations and market-pricing mechanisms. If rapid increases in rice prices and exchange rates continue, incentives for market supply and secondary circulation could expand further, potentially creating burdens not only for livelihood stability but also for the sustainability of policy achievements themselves.
3. North Korea’s External Policy Orientation and the Selective Utilization of External Economic Relations
A. Direction of External Policy
North Korea’s external policy in 2026 is being reorganized in a direction that maintains the principle of self-reliance while seeking to utilize diplomacy and external economic relations more strategically. The 9th Party Congress and the Supreme People’s Assembly openly emphasized the expansion of external economic activities, the revitalization of tourism and foreign trade, the improvement and strengthening of relations with traditional friendly states, and external activities centered on national interests.
Particular attention should be paid to the explicit statement that the Party Central Committee will directly oversee all external activities. North Korea declared that every aspect of the country’s external engagement must be carried out under the direct guidance and involvement of the Party Center. This can be interpreted as an effort to centralize external strategy under the authority of the Party Central Committee, rather than leaving it fragmented among the Foreign Ministry, the United Front Department, military-industrial sectors, and other institutions, while also signaling a willingness to directly activate summit diplomacy and high-level political diplomacy when necessary.
North Korea’s external economic policy in 2026 identifies foreign trade and tourism as key drivers of economic growth. While maintaining the principle of self-reliance, Pyongyang is strengthening a pragmatic approach under which sectors capable of generating foreign currency earnings, securing raw materials and equipment, and producing limited opening effects are selectively utilized.
In particular, developments in the tourism sector indicate efforts to establish regionally integrated tourism-industrial zones that combine accommodation, transportation, and service infrastructure. Major tourism hubs such as the Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Zone, Samjiyon, the Yangdok Hot Springs Resort, and the Onpho Workers’ Holiday Camp have continued to undergo development and refurbishment. Plans for an eastern coastal tourism belt linking Mount Kumgang and Wonsan, mountain and long-stay tourism centered on Samjiyon and Mount Paektu, and wellness tourism based around Yangdok all suggest that North Korea views tourism not merely as a source of foreign currency, but as a strategic industry connected to regional development, external engagement, and the cultivation of the service sector. Nevertheless, sanctions, payment restrictions, mobility controls, and limitations in service-management capacity are likely to constrain the practical expansion of the tourism industry.
B. Relations with Major Powers and the Development of External Economic Relations
Relations with China remain the most realistic foundation of North Korea’s external economy in 2026. The expansion of trade between North Korea and China indicates that Pyongyang’s demand for construction materials, equipment, and intermediate goods is being met primarily through bilateral trade with Beijing. The resumption in March 2026 of international passenger rail service and flights between Pyongyang and Beijing can also be interpreted as a measure enabling the movement of diplomats, technicians, and senior officials, thereby broadening the foundation for renewed people-to-people exchanges and external economic networks between the two countries.
The April 2026 visit to North Korea by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi represented one of the most significant recent high-level contacts in China–North Korea relations. Wang Yi held talks with Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui and met Kim Jong Un, and both sides agreed to strengthen strategic communication and mutual support and cooperation between their diplomatic authorities on the occasion of the sixty-fifth anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between China and North Korea. This suggests that bilateral relations are growing in importance not only in terms of trade and transportation reopening, but also in the area of diplomatic and security policy coordination.
North Korea–Russia relations in 2026 continue to maintain a strategic cooperative structure combining military-security cooperation with economic exchange. Against the backdrop of the prolonged Russia–Ukraine war, bilateral ties have sustained a pattern of exchanging military supplies, energy, food, and foreign currency while also expanding cooperation into areas such as construction, education, and science and technology. Notably, Russia issued 36,413 visas to North Korean nationals in 2025—approximately four times the number issued in 2024—and most were categorized as education visas. This indicates that people-to-people exchanges between North Korea and Russia are expanding beyond symbolic interactions toward movements involving students, trainees, and technical personnel.
At the same time, the scope and practical benefits of North Korea–Russia cooperation will likely continue to depend on the trajectory of the Russia–Ukraine war and the broader sanctions environment against Moscow. If the war continues for a prolonged period, bilateral relations are likely to remain a substantive cooperative partnership in areas such as military supplies, energy, food, and human exchanges. Even if the conflict transitions toward a ceasefire or postwar phase, cooperation in nonmilitary sectors—such as North Korean labor dispatches and technological cooperation—may continue or be reorganized into new forms, even if the character of military cooperation changes to some degree.
In diplomacy with neighboring countries, North Korea signed a friendship treaty and cooperation documents in the fields of diplomacy, agriculture, education, and healthcare following a summit with Belarus in March 2026. This can be viewed as part of Pyongyang’s effort to broaden its diplomatic space and avenues for cooperation within an emerging multipolar order by strengthening ties with states that maintain close relations with Russia.
C. The Distinctive Characteristics of Strategy Toward the United States and South Korea
North Korea’s strategy toward the United States in 2026 displays a dual character. On the one hand, it continues to uphold the principle of “responding to strength with strength.” On the other hand, it leaves open the possibility of limited relationship management if the United States were to effectively recognize North Korea as a de facto nuclear weapons state and accept its demands for regime security. Pyongyang continues to reject negotiations premised on denuclearization, while emphasizing that the future direction of bilateral relations depends on Washington’s attitude. At the Supreme People’s Assembly, North Korea also delivered a conditional message that there would be no reason the two sides could not coexist peacefully if the United States respected North Korea’s constitutionally defined status as a nuclear state and abandoned its hostile policy.
The recent pattern of maintaining criticism of the United States while refraining from directly naming U.S. leaders can be interpreted as an effort to preserve a hardline stance toward Washington while simultaneously calibrating the level of messaging so as not to unnecessarily damage the possibility of future contact with the United States.
The core of North Korea’s strategy toward South Korea lies in institutionalizing the concept of “two hostile states,” first announced in December 2023, and embedding it as a formal norm at both the Party and state levels. At the 9th Party Congress, Pyongyang characterized the shift in inter-Korean policy not as a temporary tactical adjustment, but as a historic choice necessary for safeguarding the present and future security of the state and the people. The fact that phrases such as “the northern half of the Republic” and “united front” have already been removed from the Rules of the Workers’ Party of Korea further demonstrates that the “two hostile states” framework is being institutionally codified.
These changes are not confined solely to military and political dimensions, but are also expanding into the sociocultural sphere. North Korea increasingly perceives inter-Korean exchange and cooperation not simply as political or economic interaction, but as channels through which South Korean culture and external influences could penetrate and potentially destabilize the regime. Consequently, future South Korean policy toward the North will need to be designed with the understanding that North Korea’s conception of regime security now extends beyond military and economic matters to encompass cultural, informational, and social domains as well.
The institutionalization of the new South Korea policy is also reflected in organizational restructuring. The fact that Jang Kum Chol, formerly head of the United Front Department, is now serving as First Vice Foreign Minister and director of the Foreign Ministry’s Bureau 10 indicates that issues related to South Korea are no longer treated as a specialized “united front” domain, but are instead being reframed as matters of diplomacy and security. Similarly, the reassignment of Ri Son Gwon to the position of chairman of the Korean Social Democratic Party appears to represent the relocation of a prominent inter-Korean affairs figure into a more peripheral and symbolic channel. However, these personnel changes should not be interpreted as signaling an immediate softening of North Korea’s hardline policy toward Seoul. Rather, they appear aimed at maintaining the current confrontational approach while allowing Pyongyang to flexibly manage its messaging and modes of engagement in response to changes in the external environment.
4. Continuity and Change: Policy Implementation Structure and Adjustment
The continuity and change characterizing North Korea in 2026 are revealed most concretely through personnel appointments. The 2026 reshuffle appears to have been aimed less at introducing entirely new objectives than at reorganizing the actors and responsibility structures tasked with implementing existing strategies. Appointments involving figures such as Jo Yong Won, Pak Thae Song, Pak Jong Gun, and An Kum Chol demonstrate efforts to ensure coherence between Party and state governance, strengthen Cabinet-centered implementation responsibility, and maintain continuity in heavy industry and planned administration. By contrast, the elevation of Kim Jong Gwan, Kim Tok Hun, and Kim Song Nam suggests an effort to place construction at the forefront as a key sector for producing visible achievements while linking the domestic economy, fiscal management, external economic relations, and diplomacy more closely together. Personnel changes involving Kim Yo Jong, Jang Kum Chol, and Ri Son Gwon also indicate the possibility of a reorganization of the systems responsible for South Korea-related affairs and external message coordination.
Taken together, 2026 can be characterized as a year in which North Korea maintained its existing priorities—emphasis on heavy industry, the “Regional Development 20×10 Policy,” livelihood-oriented agendas, and parallel advancement of defense capabilities—while strengthening implementation responsibility, administrative management systems, the utilization of external economic relations, and the specificity of livelihood-related policy agendas. Rather than creating an entirely new strategy, 2026 may be understood as the first year of a readjustment phase in which existing objectives are pursued under more explicit chains of responsibility and increasingly segmented management systems.
5. South Korea’s Direction of Response
A. Opportunities and Constraints Facing South Korea
The continuity and changes visible in North Korea in 2026 simultaneously present both opportunities and constraints for South Korea. Opportunities refer not necessarily to areas where cooperation is immediately possible, but rather to conditions under which Seoul can secure medium- to long-term policy options or prepare for future cooperation. Constraints refer to structural conditions that narrow South Korea’s room for maneuver. These two categories should not be viewed as mutually exclusive, but rather as conditions that coexist simultaneously.
With regard to inter-Korean relations, the South Korean government may utilize principles such as respect for the North Korean system, rejection of absorption unification, and opposition to hostile acts in both its messaging toward Pyongyang and its broader external diplomacy. However, the institutionalization of North Korea’s “two hostile states” doctrine has significantly reduced the conditions for direct inter-Korean cooperation. In the context of U.S.–North Korea and broader external negotiations, Seoul needs to prepare contingency plans for the possibility of renewed U.S.–North Korea engagement. Yet North Korea’s insistence on recognition as a nuclear weapons state fundamentally constrains South Korea’s policy space.
In terms of crisis management, the need to prevent accidental clashes could provide room for cooperation among South Korea, the United States, and China in the broader context of maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula. From the perspective of strategic leverage, North Korea’s efforts to diversify its diplomacy may create opportunities for indirect engagement through third countries and multilateral channels. In the external economic sphere, expanding China–North Korea trade and the resumption of international events could help South Korea monitor North Korea’s external economic activities and calibrate both its response measures and timing. Nevertheless, sanctions continue to impose significant limitations on investment and financial cooperation.
In the fields of livelihoods, healthcare, and regional development, there remains some possibility of securing international legitimacy for cooperation through international organizations and third-party actors. The fact that North Korea itself is revealing demand in areas such as healthcare, education, demographics, regional development, disaster response, environmental management, and logistics provides at least limited space for identifying future areas of cooperation. At the same time, however, North Korea’s hostile posture toward the South, the sanctions environment, and uncertainty regarding operational capacity are likely to make short-term progress in cooperation difficult.
B. Major Scenarios for 2026 and Directions of Response
South Korea’s response strategy should be prepared on the basis of several possible diplomatic and security scenarios that could emerge in 2026. Major variables—including the May U.S.–China summit, the November Shenzhen APEC summit, the trajectory of the Russia–Ukraine war, developments in the Middle East, North Korea’s limited expansion of external economic activity, and the continuation of its hostile posture toward South Korea—are all likely to shape either the expansion or contraction of diplomatic space on the Korean Peninsula.
The first scenario is one in which diplomatic space surrounding the Korean Peninsula expands. If even limited opportunities for U.S.–North Korea contact emerge in the aftermath of the U.S.–China summit or related diplomatic developments, South Korea will need to coordinate closely with the United States in advance regarding initial agendas and procedural frameworks. In relations with China, Seoul should move to concretize follow-up measures based on principles such as respect for systems, opposition to absorption unification, and avoidance of hostile acts, while also developing consultations with Beijing on functional stability-management issues, including creating conditions for U.S.–North Korea contact, reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, developing border regions between China and North Korea, and expanding multilateral space for humanitarian and livelihood-related cooperation with North Korea.
The second scenario is one in which limited management continues without direct U.S.–North Korea engagement. In such circumstances, South Korea’s priorities should focus on maintaining military and security-management capabilities aimed at preventing accidental clashes, managing conditions for possible U.S.–North Korea engagement through continued diplomacy with both Washington and Beijing, and preparing cooperation options involving international organizations and third parties. Even if North Korea’s hostile line toward South Korea remains unchanged, some adjustment of messaging aimed at managing military tensions may still be possible. Pyongyang’s immediate response to South Korea’s expression of regret and commitment to preventing a recurrence regarding the drone issue suggests that even under the “two hostile states” framework, concrete actions by Seoul can still influence North Korean calculations to some extent.
The third scenario involves changes in North Korea’s strategic environment caused by external geopolitical variables. The Russia factor and the Middle East factor should not simply be treated as subordinate to U.S. policy, but rather as independent variables capable of influencing North Korea’s strategic calculations in their own right. If the Russia–Ukraine war continues for an extended period, North Korea–Russia relations are likely to remain substantive partnerships in areas such as military supplies, energy, food, and human exchanges, thereby weakening South Korea’s direct leverage. Conversely, if the war enters a ceasefire or postwar phase, Seoul will need to prepare for the possibility that military cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow may partially adjust while nonmilitary cooperation becomes relatively more prominent.
Developments in the Middle East should also be understood as a dual-edged variable. On the one hand, they could strengthen North Korea’s justification for retaining nuclear weapons. On the other hand, they could influence the level of Pyongyang’s messaging toward the United States and the possibility of limited engagement. Accordingly, South Korea needs to ensure that developments in the Middle East are not utilized solely to reinforce North Korea’s hardline anti-U.S. narratives. At the same time, if signals emerge that North Korea seeks to leave open the possibility of engagement with the United States, Seoul should be prepared with strategies for linking and utilizing such developments in ways conducive to easing inter-Korean tensions and rebuilding limited trust.
C. Common Responses: Parallel Pursuit of Risk Management and Preparation for Cooperation
Across all scenarios, what is required is an approach that simultaneously pursues short-term risk management and preparations for building foundations for future cooperation. Under conditions in which North Korea’s hardline policy toward South Korea persists, priority should be given to proactively managing factors that could unintentionally escalate the risk of military confrontation. At the same time, South Korea should prepare cooperation plans through international organizations and third-party channels in areas that North Korea itself has identified as important policy priorities, including healthcare, education, livelihoods, and regional development.
The key point is that broad declarations of principle alone are insufficient. They must be supported through the concretization of follow-up measures and the gradual implementation of limited trust-building steps. The directions confirmed during the January 2026 South Korea–China summit—including reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, resuming dialogue, and building peace—as well as the proposal for four major inter-Korean and international cooperation projects, could serve as starting points for such efforts. However, under current conditions, trust-building should focus less on broad approaches premised on comprehensive improvements in relations and more on limited and functional measures aimed at reducing military tensions and restoring practical communication channels.
South Korea’s response strategy should therefore be designed to pursue short-, medium-, and long-term tasks simultaneously. Short-term tasks involve practical responses aimed at preventing accidental clashes and suppressing escalatory tensions. These include message management, restraint of mutually provocative actions, military situation management, strengthening crisis-management capabilities in border regions, and reviewing humanitarian and livelihood-related consultation channels with international organizations and partner countries. Medium-term tasks involve establishing the institutional and practical foundations for livelihood-related cooperation projects mediated through international organizations and third parties. This will require specifying project agendas, setting priorities among cooperation sectors, designing implementation methods suited to varying conditions, reviewing financing and execution mechanisms, and identifying domestic and international partners. Long-term tasks involve preparing a broader strategic framework that includes the restoration of inter-Korean relations, the gradual resumption of cooperation, linkages with multilateral cooperation, and concepts for economic and infrastructure cooperation in anticipation of future developments in U.S.–North Korea relations and changes in the order on the Korean Peninsula. At the same time, even these long-term tasks should not remain merely conceptual future goals. Beginning in 2026, Seoul should already prepare policy roadmaps for different scenarios, lists of priority cooperation sectors, and linkages between trust-building measures and cooperation projects in advance.
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