Potential Changes in China's and Russia's Middle East Strategies as Seen Through the Iran War

Jae-hung CHUNG

jameschung@sejong.org

Senior Research Fellow

Sejong Institute

1. The Outbreak of the Iran War and Geopolitical Changes in the Middle East

This brief proceeds from the recognition that the international order in 2026 has entered a period of structural transformation in which the U.S.-centered "rules-based international order" established after World War II faces unprecedented challenges. The Middle East, in particular, has emerged as a critical arena where multiple crises converge: the protracted Russia–Ukraine war, intensifying U.S.–China strategic competition, the rise of the Global South, and the deepening strategic alignment between China and Russia.

The Iran War is understood not as a simple Iran–Israel military clash or a temporary regional conflict, but as a geopolitical and geoeconomic event in which the existing Middle East order, centered on the United States and Israel, collides with a non-Western multipolar order anchored by China, Russia, and Iran. This brief assesses that the Middle East order has entered a phase of wholesale restructuring, driven by the Iran War's escalation in earnest in the second half of 2025, large-scale U.S.–Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear and missile facilities in late February 2026, the death of Supreme Leader Khamenei, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and the strategic intervention of China and Russia.

The Iran War is significant on three levels. First, in military and security terms, Iran's nuclear and missile development programs, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the “Axis of Resistance” network, comprising Hezbollah, the Houthis, Hamas, and Iraqi Shia militias, have reemerged as core threats to the United States, Israel, and the Gulf monarchies. Second, in economic and energy terms, the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has directly disrupted global oil prices, LNG markets, shipping rates, and semiconductor and IT supply chains. Third, in terms of international order, China and Russia view the Iran War as an opportunity to weaken the U.S.-centered Middle East order and advance a multipolar international system. Accordingly, this brief argues that, following the Iran War, the Middle East order can no longer be sustained as a U.S.-led order, but is instead shifting toward a complex multipolar order in which U.S. security influence, China’s economic and energy influence, Russia’s military and energy role, and the expanding strategic autonomy of the Gulf states coexist.

The fundamental conflict structure of the Middle East order originated in the Arab–Israeli confrontation. However, the Arab world's unified front against Israel weakened following the 1978 Camp David Accords and the 1979 Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty. By contrast, after the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the U.S. Embassy hostage crisis, relations among the United States, Israel, and Iran shifted toward sustained hostility, with Iran characterizing the United States, Israel, and pro-American Gulf monarchies as anti-Islamic and pro-Western forces. In the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution, the United States and the Gulf monarchies came to view Iran not merely as a regional power, but as a systemic threat and a driver of revolutionary export. In particular, the United States, Israel, and Sunni monarchies have regarded Iran's nuclear program, ballistic missile capabilities, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and its network of aligned proxy forces as a shared strategic threat. The 2020 Abraham Accords strengthened security and technological cooperation among the United States, Israel, and several Gulf states within this broader effort to contain Iran. At the same time, key regional actors such as Saudi Arabia have pursued a dual-track approach, restoring relations with Iran under Chinese mediation even as they deepened ties with Israel and the United States.

Since the second half of 2025, the Iran–Israel conflict has escalated into full-scale war, driven by a sequence of developments, including the protracted conflict in the Gaza Strip, clashes between Hezbollah in Lebanon and Israel, and Israel’s direct strikes on Iranian territory. A decisive turning point came in late February 2026, when the United States and Israel carried out large-scale strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities, ballistic missile bases, air defense networks, and key Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps installations. This brief assesses that the death of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei during this operation triggered both a crisis within the Iranian regime and a simultaneous rallying of support against the United States and Israel. The demands of the United States and Israel can be summarized in five key points: first, the immediate removal of enriched uranium from Iran; second, the complete dismantlement of nuclear enrichment facilities and infrastructure; third, restrictions on ballistic missile ranges and the closure of related facilities; fourth, the cessation of support for proxy forces such as Hezbollah, the Houthis, Hamas, and Shia militias; and fifth, the prevention of Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons through sanctions and military operations. Iran, however, strongly rejected these demands, characterizing them as violations of its nuclear sovereignty and right to national defense, as well as interference in its internal affairs and the weaponization of sanctions.

Several strategic considerations appear to have driven the Trump administration's decision to use military force. First, the success of the operation against the Maduro regime in Venezuela strengthened confidence that anti-American regimes could be coerced through military means. Second, the administration sought to repudiate the JCPOA, a key diplomatic legacy of the Obama administration, and to resolve the Iran nuclear issue through military coercion and maximum pressure. Third, a transactional logic aimed at enhancing U.S. bargaining power shaped policy, particularly through control over the Middle East energy order, the Strait of Hormuz, and Iran's oil exports. Fourth, intense pressure from Israel and pro-Israel lobbying groups also constituted a significant factor.

However, the U.S.-Israeli airstrikes did not compel Iranian capitulation but instead triggered a powerful retaliation. Following Khamenei’s death, Iran’s interim leadership emphasized regime unity and launched a retaliatory operation dubbed “Promise of Truth 4.” Iran employed hypersonic ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones to strike major Israeli cities and U.S. military bases in the Gulf, while Iran-aligned forces—including the Houthis, Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iraqi Shia militias—simultaneously joined the attacks in a coordinated manner. Consequently, the Iran War has evolved beyond a direct Iran–Israel confrontation into a multi-actor, multi-domain conflict involving Israel, Iran, the United States, Gulf states, Iran-backed proxy forces, and the diplomatic and security engagement of China and Russia.

2. The Closure of the Strait of Hormuz and Its Impact on the Global Economy and Energy Markets

Following the U.S.-Israeli airstrikes, Iran imposed a blockade on the Strait of Hormuz as its most potent non-military retaliatory measure. The Strait of Hormuz is the world's most critical energy chokepoint, through which approximately 20–30% of global crude oil exports and around 30% of LNG shipments transit, making it a vital maritime corridor for Middle Eastern energy flows. Iran's blockade marked a decisive turning point, transforming the Iran War from a geopolitical military conflict into a global economic and energy crisis. The immediate economic repercussions were severe. International oil prices, particularly Brent crude, surged sharply, surpassing $150 per barrel and reaching their highest levels since the 2008 global financial crisis. LNG prices and international shipping rates also rose significantly, directly impacting energy-dependent economies, including South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Southeast Asia, and Europe. While most international shipping companies suspended transit through the region or explored alternative routes via the Red Sea or around the Cape of Good Hope, these options became increasingly unviable as Houthi forces extended threats to key maritime access points in the Red Sea.

Meanwhile, the impact of a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz on the semiconductor industry can be understood not simply as a matter of crude oil shortages, but as a cascading transmission mechanism: rising energy prices lead to higher electricity and utility costs, which in turn disrupt the supply of high-purity chemical materials, industrial gases, and maritime logistics, ultimately resulting in increased production costs and delivery delays.

South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan are key hubs of global semiconductor and IT manufacturing, yet they remain highly dependent on energy imports. Consequently, increases in electricity prices, steam and cooling costs, industrial gas supply costs, and overall factory operating expenses are likely to translate into higher costs across memory, foundry, and backend semiconductor processes.

While some NATO member states and major Western nations, including Japan, oppose a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, they have refrained from direct participation in U.S.-led military operations against Iran. This highlights a strategic dilemma within the Western alliance: while supporting freedom of navigation and energy security, these countries remain reluctant to escalate the conflict with Iran. Although alternative transport routes exist—such as Saudi Arabia’s East–West pipeline and the UAE’s Habshan–Fujairah pipeline—they remain insufficient to fully replace the Strait of Hormuz. South Korea, which depends on the Middle East for approximately 70–80% of its crude oil imports, is among the most exposed economies. A sharp rise in oil prices is likely to drive increases in domestic fuel prices and inflation, while also raising manufacturing costs, export logistics expenses, and input costs in the petrochemical and refining sectors. Over the medium to long term, these pressures may lead to reduced consumption and a broader economic slowdown. Accordingly, a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz constitutes not merely a diplomatic issue for South Korea, but a multidimensional crisis encompassing energy security, industrial stability, economic resilience, and supply chain security.

3. The Strategic Responses of China and Russia and the Strengthening of Their United Front

Following the Iran War, China and Russia strongly condemned U.S. and Israeli military actions against Iran and strengthened their political and diplomatic support for Tehran. Both countries criticized the operations at the UN Security Council, vetoed Western-led resolutions regarding the Strait of Hormuz, and emphasized the need for an immediate ceasefire and a diplomatic resolution. China’s response is characterized by a combination of strategic restraint and geopolitical positioning: avoiding direct military confrontation, emphasizing the principles of sovereignty and non-interference, projecting itself as a mediator, and expanding cooperation in energy and infrastructure. In particular, China has deepened cooperation with Iran in energy, infrastructure, ports, railways, telecommunications, and technology investment based on the 25-year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement signed in 2021. In strategic terms, Iran serves as a key hub linking West Asia and the Middle East within China’s Belt and Road Initiative and is a critical partner in China’s broader energy security strategy.

China has strongly opposed a potential U.S. counter-blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and rejected U.S. pressure to halt its imports of Iranian crude oil. While criticizing U.S. unilateralism and hegemonic behavior, China is simultaneously seeking to expand its influence across the broader Middle East through economic cooperation with Middle Eastern states, particularly in the Gulf, as well as through the China–Arab States Summit and the promotion of free trade agreements. This approach underscores that China is not merely supporting Iran, but is pursuing a balanced and pragmatic strategy by expanding economic, energy, and infrastructure cooperation with key Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait.

Russia adopted a more direct and assertive stance than China. It characterized U.S. and Israeli military actions against Iran as violations of international law and the UN Charter, and emphasized that it could serve as a mediator in resolving the Iranian nuclear issue. Russia proposed taking custody of and managing Iran's enriched uranium, but the United States and Israel declined, and the proposal did not advance into substantive negotiations. The table below shows that while China and Russia have responded to the Iran War through different approaches across diplomatic, military, strategic, and economic dimensions, they ultimately converge toward a shared objective: weakening the U.S.-led international order and expanding a non-Western multipolar order. Furthermore, China, Russia, and Iran are strengthening their joint maritime operational capabilities in response to potential U.S.-led maritime containment through exercises such as "Maritime Security Belt 2026." These are not merely symbolic exercises but represent substantive military cooperation encompassing anti-submarine operations, air defense, maritime rescue, logistical support, and electronic warfare. With Iran's accession to the SCO in 2023 and BRICS in 2024, the strategic alignment among China, Russia, and Iran has gained a stronger institutional foundation.

4. The Potential for a New Middle East Order Led by China and Russia and the Strategic Dilemma Facing Gulf States

This brief identifies three axes along which the Middle East order has undergone significant change following the Iran War: first, the relative weakening of the U.S.-led security order; second, the fragmentation of alliance networks and the expanding strategic autonomy of Gulf states; and third, challenges to the petrodollar-based energy and financial order.

This does not, however, signify the immediate collapse of the U.S.-centered order. The United States remains the primary provider of military and security capabilities in the Gulf region, and the dollar continues to hold a dominant position in oil price denomination, insurance, shipping finance, international banking networks, and payment systems. The changes currently underway are therefore better understood not as the imminent collapse of the U.S.-led order, but as the emergence of a hybrid multipolar order in which China’s economic influence and Russia’s energy and security role are layered onto the existing U.S. security framework.

Ultimately, China and Russia are actively leveraging the Iran War as an opportunity to reshape the Middle East order through multilateral frameworks such as BRICS, the SCO, and the EAEU. BRICS and the SCO in particular are functioning as platforms for political, economic, and security coordination in response to the existing Western-centered order, and Iran’s accession has served as a key catalyst for the expansion of a China–Russia–aligned multilateral order in the Middle East.

The Iran War raises the serious prospect that trends such as de-dollarization may accelerate in earnest, including the emergence of a “petroyuan,” the expansion of non-dollar settlement mechanisms, the establishment of an SCO Development Bank, and the growing shift toward non-dollar transactions in energy spot markets. However, China and Russia are unlikely to fully displace the United States in the Middle East. While both countries view Iran as a key pillar of an anti-U.S. and anti-Western order, they cannot afford to forgo their relationships with Gulf monarchies such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Kuwait, which wield substantial influence across energy markets, investment, finance, logistics, OPEC+, and diplomacy. China continues to expand cooperation with Gulf states in energy, infrastructure, and the digital economy while maintaining its 25-year strategic partnership with Iran. Russia, meanwhile, is deepening military cooperation with Iran while coordinating oil prices and production levels with Saudi Arabia through the OPEC+ framework.

Within this framework, three principal scenarios for the post-Iran War Middle East order can be identified. The first is a managed multipolar order, an unstable yet governable arrangement in which U.S. security architecture remains largely intact even as China, Russia, and the Gulf states expand their strategic autonomy. The second is the expansion of a China-centered economic order, characterized by the emergence of a dual structure in which the United States retains primacy in military and security affairs while China extends its dominance in the economic sphere, leveraging energy, infrastructure, payment networks, and its growing role as a regional mediator. The third is the persistence of unmanaged conflict, a scenario defined by recurring clashes across the Strait of Hormuz, U.S. military installations in the Gulf, the Red Sea, Israel, and various proxy theaters, prolonging regional instability while delivering intensifying shocks to global energy markets and the broader world economy. Of these three, a managed multipolar order represents the most probable near-term trajectory. Nevertheless, should the Iran War fail to reach a definitive resolution, giving way to recurring cycles of low- to medium-intensity conflict, the prospect of sustained unmanaged conflict cannot be ruled out.

In the aftermath of the Iran War, Gulf states including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain have found themselves confronting an exceptionally complex set of strategic dilemmas. These states have long regarded Iran's military capabilities, revolutionary exportation, and nuclear and missile threats as core security concerns, and have accordingly relied on military cooperation with the United States as their primary security guarantee. During the course of the war, however, U.S. military bases on their soil became targets of Iranian retaliatory strikes, generating growing apprehension that the American security umbrella, far from functioning as a pure deterrent, may itself serve as a liability that invites risk. While the Gulf states have been unsparing in their condemnation of Iranian attacks, they have shown equal reluctance to align themselves with the U.S.-Israeli war effort or endorse its escalation. Meaningful divergences have emerged even within the GCC: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman have consistently emphasized opposition to escalation and the primacy of diplomatic resolution, whereas the UAE and Bahrain have been considerably more forthcoming in articulating their perception of Iran as an acute and pressing threat.

Ultimately, the strategic posture adopted by the Gulf states in the aftermath of the Iran War does not amount to a simple geopolitical pivot away from the United States. Rather, these states are actively pursuing a diversification strategy that seeks to preserve the American security umbrella while simultaneously broadening their engagement with China, Russia, Turkey, India, and Europe. Since Beijing's mediation of the Saudi-Iranian diplomatic normalization, China has emerged among Gulf states as a diplomatic counterweight, a major energy consumer, and a partner for economic investment. Russia, meanwhile, continues to maintain strategic points of convergence with the Gulf states through OPEC+ and energy diplomacy. The Gulf states, in short, are neither abandoning the United States nor prepared to rely on it exclusively. This trajectory reflects a broader structural transformation of the Middle Eastern order, one moving away from a U.S.-centered unipolar arrangement toward a plural balancing order in which American security provision, Chinese economic influence, Russian energy and security engagement, and the expanding autonomy of regional states are held in complex and ongoing equilibrium.

5. Strategic Implications for South Korea and Policy Recommendations

The Iran War carries direct and multifaceted implications for South Korea. First, it presents an energy security crisis. South Korea relies on the Middle East for over 70 percent of its crude oil imports, and a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz would generate immediate shocks to oil and LNG supply chains, domestic fuel prices, electricity tariffs, inflation, manufacturing costs, and export logistics. Energy-intensive industries in particular, including refining, petrochemicals, semiconductors, automobiles, shipbuilding, and maritime shipping, are acutely vulnerable to sharp spikes in oil and LNG prices.

Second, the war generates significant risks for semiconductor and advanced industry supply chains. The report argues that a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz would extend far beyond disruptions to oil imports, affecting electricity supply, cooling systems, industrial gases, high-purity chemical materials, and maritime logistics. Such disruptions could drive up semiconductor production costs and cause delays in delivery schedules, directly impacting South Korea's core export industries.

Third, the war contributes to a deterioration of the security environment on the Korean Peninsula. It may provide North Korea with additional justification for maintaining its nuclear arsenal. Pyongyang is likely to invoke the case of Iran, a non-nuclear state subjected to military strikes by the United States and Israel, to reinforce its narrative on the necessity of nuclear deterrence. Moreover, if the United States redeploys strategic assets and air defense capabilities to the Middle East, concerns may arise regarding the robustness of the defense posture on the Korean Peninsula. Fourth, the war accelerates the consolidation of opposing geopolitical blocs, strengthening alignment among North Korea, China, and Russia, while reinforcing trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the United States, and Japan. In the aftermath of both the Russia–Ukraine War and the Iran War, strategic coordination between China and Russia has intensified, while North Korea has sought to deepen its alignment with China, Russia, and Iran as part of a broader anti-Western axis. This dynamic could increasingly harden the regional order into a South Korea–U.S.–Japan versus North Korea–China–Russia configuration, thereby narrowing South Korea's diplomatic maneuvering room. Fifth, the war necessitates a fundamental recalibration of South Korea's Middle East strategy. Historically, Seoul's engagement with the region has centered on energy imports, construction and plant contracts, and defense and infrastructure cooperation. However, as the Middle East emerges as a central arena of U.S.–China–Russia strategic competition, South Korea must reconceptualize the region not merely as a site of economic engagement, but as a strategic space where energy security, supply chains, maritime routes, the protection of overseas nationals, and broader security risks are increasingly intertwined.

In light of these challenges, the following policy responses are recommended for South Korea.

① Institutionalization of a permanent whole-of-government Middle East crisis response task force. A permanent crisis management mechanism should be established with the participation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, and the Ministry of Economy and Finance. Crises originating in the Middle East must be treated not merely as diplomatic matters, but as compound crises in which energy security, logistics, national defense, the protection of Korean nationals abroad, and industrial supply chains are deeply intertwined.

② Development of concrete energy contingency plans for Strait of Hormuz risk scenarios. South Korea should establish in advance clear criteria for the release of strategic petroleum reserves, alternative LNG procurement arrangements, the diversification of supply sources to include Australia, the United States, the Caspian region, and Southeast Asia, refinery inventory management protocols, and sector-specific priority supply standards.

③ Expansion of economic security partnership cooperation with GCC states. South Korea should pursue comprehensive cooperation packages with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and other Gulf states that extend well beyond crude oil imports and construction contracts to encompass nuclear energy and small modular reactors, defense industries, maritime security, cybersecurity, smart cities, desalination, and power grid stabilization.

④ Preserving the U.S. alliance framework while maintaining working-level communication channels with non-Western states. South Korea should uphold the foundational framework of the ROK-U.S. alliance and broader international coordination, while simultaneously sustaining limited communication channels with China, Russia, and Iran focused on practical issues such as energy supply, maritime route safety, the protection of Korean nationals abroad, corporate security, and crisis management. This constitutes a core imperative of national interest-driven pragmatic diplomacy.

⑤ Managing the Korean Peninsula spillover effects of Middle East crises. A strategic early warning system is needed that comprehensively monitors and analyzes the reinforcement of North Korea's nuclear justification narratives, the expansion of DPRK-China-Russia alignment, the potential redeployment of U.S. Forces Korea assets, and Chinese and Russian pushback against the strengthening of ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation.

In conclusion, the Iran War represents far more than a regional Middle East crisis for South Korea. It constitutes a compound crisis in which energy security, advanced industrial supply chains, Korean Peninsula security, U.S.–China–Russia strategic competition, and the restructuring of the global multipolar order converge. South Korea must therefore move beyond its historically energy- and construction-centered Middle East policy and reposition the region as a central pillar of its economic security and strategic diplomacy. At the same time, South Korea must adopt a balanced and pragmatic diplomatic approach that preserves the foundational framework of the U.S. alliance while securing working-level crisis management channels with non-Western states, including China, Russia, and Iran.