Security Strategy of the Trump Administration and the Korean Peninsula: Emphasis on Offensive Nuclear Strategy and “America First”

Jeong-kyu Lee

jklee87@mofa.or.kr​

Visiting Research Fellow

Sejong Institute

1. Issue Overview

ㅇ North Korea has advanced its nuclear capabilities through six nuclear tests since its first test in 2006, while also diversifying its delivery systems and strengthening its nuclear arsenal both quantitatively and qualitatively.

- North Korea is pushing ahead with the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) aimed at striking the U.S. mainland, as well as nuclear-powered submarines to enhance concealment. It has actively engaged in the legalization of nuclear weapons use, the development of an offensive nuclear doctrine, and has openly carried out nuclear threats and intimidation against South Korea.

- North Korea has reportedly supplied Russia, which is at war with Ukraine, with munitions, shells, and even over 14,000 troops. In return, it has allegedly received food, energy, and advanced military technologies necessary for ICBM and nuclear submarine development. This indicates that North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats are becoming increasingly severe.

- On June 16, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) released the SIPRI Yearbook 2025, which estimated North Korea’s nuclear warhead inventory at 50. This represents a 2.5-fold increase in just three years compared to the estimate of 20 warheads in the 2022 yearbook.

ㅇ In response to North Korea’s aggressive nuclear threats, South Korea has relied entirely on the U.S. nuclear strategy and the nuclear umbrella, namely extended deterrence, based on the U.S.-ROK alliance.

- At the April 2023 U.S.-ROK summit, the two countries adopted the Washington Declaration and agreed to establish the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), a standing consultative body for continuous discussions on strengthening extended deterrence. Four meetings have been held to date. At the fourth NCG meeting in Washington on January 10 of this year, both sides reaffirmed the importance of extended deterrence and discussed nuclear planning, information sharing, and strategic communication procedures in times of crisis.

ㅇ The Trump administration, upon taking office for a second term, launched what became known as the opening round of a tariff war and clearly revealed its “America First” policy not only in tariffs and the economic sphere but also in foreign and security affairs.

- President Trump brought negotiations for ending the war in Ukraine, which had placed Europe in a state of extreme tension for the past three years, into a bilateral framework between the United States and Russia, emphasizing a great-power-centric approach. This realist orientation heightened security anxieties among European states.

- The issue of “security free-riding” raised by the Trump administration became an awakening for NATO’s European allies, highlighting the urgent task of developing independent defense capabilities that could deter Russia “without U.S. support.”

- When Secretary of Defense Hegseth hinted that U.S. forces might not remain stationed in Europe indefinitely, NATO’s European allies began devising plans to reduce their dependence on the U.S. and enhance autonomous defense capabilities. In February, the European Union discussed major measures to strengthen its defense posture, with the goals of “deterring Russian aggression” and “reducing dependence on U.S. security.”

ㅇ Thus, U.S. European allies have been preoccupied with establishing autonomous defense systems, and the ripple effects of Trump’s “America First” policy have spread widely across diplomacy, security, and the economy.

ㅇ The “America First” policy has exerted strong pressure not only on Europe but also on Asia.

- In his speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on May 31, Secretary of Defense Hegseth defined China’s military threat as an “imminent threat” and declared that “security in the Indo-Pacific is a top priority.” He strongly urged allies, including South Korea, to raise their defense spending “up to 5% of GDP” and warned against the so-called “Anmi-gyeongjung” (security reliance on the U.S. and economic reliance on China) approach. This was intended to restrain the practice of “balanced diplomacy” among Indo-Pacific allies.

ㅇ In short, the Trump administration’s “America First” policy is placing strong demands on allies for additional security burdens.

ㅇ The Korean Peninsula is one of the most densely concentrated security crisis regions in the world, where military tensions, including the North Korean nuclear issue, are ever-present. The U.S. nuclear umbrella, provided through extended deterrence, has been central to deterring North Korea.

-However, with the emergence of the Trump administration’s new foreign and security policy framework of “America First,” conflicts have begun to arise with traditional alliance policies.

ㅇ Against this backdrop, South Korea faces a fundamental question: Will it continue to rely solely on extended deterrence provided by the U.S. in response to North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, or will it seek alternative options such as an independent nuclear capability?

ㅇ This paper aims to analyze the implications of the Trump administration’s nuclear strategy and “America First” policy for security on the Korean Peninsula and to consider how these should be strategically interpreted and addressed.

2. Prospects for U.S. Nuclear Strategy and Security on the Korean Peninsula

ㅇ The U.S. nuclear strategy began with the Massive Retaliatory Strategy in the early Cold War, shifted to the Flexible Response Strategy during the Kennedy administration in the 1960s, and has now reached the present day with the Biden administration’s adoption of Integrated Deterrence Strategy. Based on this, the U.S. has adopted the Extended Deterrence Strategy as its allied defense approach.

ㅇ The Extended Deterrence Strategy provided by the U.S. to South Korea in response to North Korea’s nuclear threat is a strategic commitment by the U.S. to deter attacks not only against itself but also against allies and partners by providing its full range of military capabilities, including nuclear and conventional forces.

ㅇ Extended deterrence serves as a direct response to North Korea’s nuclear threat and constitutes the foundation of security on the Korean Peninsula. For example, when provocations such as North Korean missile tests occur, the deployment of U.S. B-52 strategic bombers or nuclear-powered submarines (SSGNs) to the Korean Peninsula demonstrates the visible deterrence effect of extended deterrence.

ㅇ Since the Cold War, U.S. nuclear policy and posture have continually evolved and persisted depending on the characteristics of each administration and the president’s perception. Generally, while holding on to Oppenheimer’s vision of a nuclear-free world, every administration has nonetheless recognized the harsh reality of nuclear persistence and attempted in various ways to overcome anticipated risks and dilemmas.

ㅇ Although the Trump administration’s nuclear strategy has yet to be fully disclosed through key strategy documents such as the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), its general direction can be anticipated based on the nuclear strategies of past Republican administrations, Trump’s first-term nuclear strategy, and today’s international security environment. On June 11, Secretary of Defense Hegseth appeared before the Senate Appropriations Committee and hinted that the interim NDS would emphasize countering the rising threat from China and sharing security burdens with allies.

ㅇ Republican and Democratic administrations in the U.S. have shown distinct trends and continuities in nuclear strategy. Republican administrations explicitly renounce the principle of “No First Use (NFU)” and instead adopt a posture that keeps open the option of nuclear first use, pursuing unilateral and coercive nuclear policies grounded in military capabilities. They have lowered the threshold for nuclear use and broadened its scope, indicating a willingness to use nuclear weapons if necessary, even in response to non-nuclear strategic attacks.

- The Bush administration, in its 2002 NPR, officially articulated the possibility of nuclear preemption for the first time and designated potential targets not only as traditional nuclear powers like Russia and China but also as North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. Similarly, the Trump administration in its first term emphasized the role of nuclear weapons in deterring both nuclear and non-nuclear attacks, formulated plans to modernize the aging nuclear triad, and pursued an aggressive nuclear strategy.

- In contrast, Democratic administrations placed greater emphasis on multilateral and cooperative approaches through international cooperation, restrained nuclear use as much as possible, and focused on arms reduction and non-proliferation efforts rather than arms races, while still upholding the vision of a nuclear-free world.

ㅇ The Trump administration’s 2018 NPR stressed “strengthening deployment of low-yield nuclear weapons, emphasizing the actual usability of nuclear weapons, and modernizing nuclear infrastructure.” This meant expanding the operational scope of tactical nuclear weapons to restore credibility in deterrence, leaving open the possibility of both strategic and tactical use of nuclear weapons, advancing modernization of the nuclear triad, and highlighting the development and potential use of small nuclear weapons.

ㅇ Taken together, while the specifics of the Trump administration’s second-term NSS, NDS, and NPR remain to be seen, it is highly likely that it will, like past Republican administrations, emphasize the role of nuclear weapons, pursue an offensive nuclear strategy, and reinforce both strategic and tactical nuclear forces under the logic of “Peace through Strength.”

- On January 27, 2025, President Trump signed an executive order to build a next-generation missile defense system similar to Israel’s Iron Dome, and on May 20 he declared his goal of deploying the U.S. version, dubbed the “Golden Dome,” during his term. North Korea, in response, expressed significant concern in Rodong Sinmun, revealing its anxiety.

- The Trump administration’s offensive nuclear strategy is expected to follow the same pattern as in its first term—modernizing missile defense systems, rejecting the NFU principle, leaving open the option of nuclear use if necessary, and allowing for nuclear retaliation not only against nuclear but also non-nuclear strategic attacks.

- This offensive nuclear strategy can also be seen in the administration’s pursuit of the Sentinel ICBM program, designed to replace the Minuteman III ICBM with cutting-edge technologies.

- From the perspective of the scope of nuclear use, with Russia modernizing its nuclear arsenal and China expanding both its nuclear forces and conventional capabilities, the Trump administration is highly likely to once again expand the scope of nuclear use during its second term.

ㅇ From another perspective, analyzing the future direction of U.S. nuclear strategy through three factors—changes in the threat environment, technological advances, and economic resource constraints—indicates that the U.S. is likely to pursue nuclear arms competition, increase reliance on nuclear weapons, and aim for “maximum deterrence.”

- First, in terms of the threat environment, Russia’s nuclear modernization and China’s rapid military rise are pushing both countries to pursue expansionist policies based on strengthened nuclear capabilities, which in turn will push the U.S. toward maximum deterrence.

- Russia has already threatened since its 2022 invasion of Ukraine that it could retaliate with nuclear weapons if its core interests were attacked, while China has shifted away from its previous NFU-based minimum deterrence policy toward a strategy that actively contemplates nuclear use.

- Second, in terms of technological advances, emerging technologies such as hypersonic missiles, reconnaissance and surveillance, cyber capabilities, and artificial intelligence are increasingly being integrated into nuclear systems. These advances are expected to significantly enhance the effectiveness of nuclear weapons, particularly by improving missile defense effectiveness, enabling real-time target identification, ensuring accurate strikes, and minimizing collateral damage. Consequently, U.S. nuclear strategy is likely to emphasize maximum deterrence and adopt a counterforce orientation focused on destroying adversary nuclear forces.

- Third, in terms of economic constraints, U.S. fiscal deficits have ballooned due to expansionary fiscal policy, and rising interest rates have pushed debt service costs beyond the scale of the defense budget. In this context, high-cost conventional weapons programs have been canceled, and modern warfare is increasingly shaped by low-cost asymmetric systems like drones. These factors limit the U.S.’s ability to expand and maintain large-scale conventional forces, pushing it toward greater reliance on nuclear weapons.

ㅇ The U.S.’s offensive nuclear strategy provides strong deterrence against North Korea but simultaneously stimulates Pyongyang to further enhance its nuclear capabilities, which in turn could trigger an arms buildup among neighboring states, thereby destabilizing security in East Asia, including the Korean Peninsula.

- Specifically, the U.S.’s offensive nuclear strategy could provoke North Korea’s nuclear advancement, fuel debates within South Korea about nuclear sharing or independent nuclear armament, and prompt Japan and Taiwan to strengthen their own deterrence capabilities. This could accelerate an arms race across East Asia.

ㅇ In conclusion, it is expected that the Trump administration’s second term, like previous Republican administrations, will pursue an offensive nuclear strategy. This is highly likely to further destabilize security in East Asia, underscoring the need for South Korea to develop proactive countermeasures.

3. The Trump Administration’s “America First” Policy and Security on the Korean Peninsula

ㅇ The Trump administration’s second-term “America First” policy is expected to emphasize choices aligned with America’s direct interests rather than unconditional commitments to the defense of allies. It will stress U.S. sovereignty and expand autonomy in foreign and security policy.

- The Trump administration has declared that the United States will no longer play the traditional role of leading the global order but will instead pursue solely its own economic and geopolitical interests.

ㅇ This perspective and approach were clearly revealed during the process of negotiations over ending the war in Ukraine. Unlike liberal approaches rooted in values and norms, the Trump administration openly displayed a realist approach grounded in balance-of-power logic, aiming for great powers to manage world order together with Russia.

- This realist approach of pursuing an “international order through power” was vividly shown when President Trump invited Ukrainian President Zelensky to the White House on March 1. During the meeting, broadcast publicly, Trump pressed him by stating, “You have no cards,” and strongly urged him to reach a swift compromise to end the war.

ㅇ Ultimately, the Trump administration perceives that during the period when the U.S. excessively intervened in the name of promoting universal values such as democracy and human rights—without direct benefit to American interests—Europe free-rode on U.S. security, China emerged as the greatest challenger to U.S. hegemony, and the U.S. was left with massive trade deficits, fiscal deficits, and job losses. Accordingly, the administration insists that henceforth U.S. foreign policy must be pursued strictly from the perspective of American interests, while European security against Russia should be managed by European states themselves through defense spending increases (up to 5% of GDP).

ㅇ With respect to China, which is regarded as the greatest threat, the administration aims to reclaim the economic advantage unfairly taken by China. The main instrument is imposing tariffs on China at levels unparalleled by those against any other country, thereby improving trade balance and restoring jobs. In security terms, the U.S. places highest priority on deterring and containing China, and demands that Indo-Pacific allies, including South Korea, increase their defense budgets and expand their military contributions and roles.

- Among allies hosting U.S. forces, the Trump administration is pursuing adjustments in force posture and increased burden-sharing to reinforce allied responsibility. Within this context, the possibility of posture adjustments for U.S. Forces Korea has also been implied.

ㅇ This policy orientation of the Trump administration’s second term is also reflected in the composition of its foreign and security team. Key figures include restrainers such as Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Marco Rubio and U.S. Ambassador to the UN (and former National Security Advisor) Mike Waltz, who argue that America must acknowledge military and resource constraints stemming from relative decline and minimize global interventions and use of force. At the same time, prioritizers such as Elbridge Colby, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, emphasize containment of China, recognized as the greatest threat, and play central roles in policy decision-making.

ㅇ Secretary of State Rubio, in his first media interview on January 30, 2025, stated: “The unipolar moment in which America alone assumed moral responsibility for maintaining international order and led it is neither desirable nor possible anymore; the world has already shifted to a multipolar order.” This statement reflected Rubio’s determination to reorient U.S. foreign strategy from a hegemonic approach to a realist one, prioritizing national interests over idealistic values and norms, and seeking strategic balance within the international order rather than assuming the role of world policeman.

ㅇ On May 31 at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Secretary of Defense Hegseth declared that deterring China would be the top priority for U.S. military deployment and announced plans for Indo-Pacific allies, including South Korea, to drastically increase defense spending. He also called on Asian allies to “play their part,” just as Europe is gradually taking more responsibility for security.

ㅇ At the NATO Defense Ministers’ Meeting in Brussels on June 5, Hegseth further announced that all allies and partner nations worldwide would be required to increase “burden sharing.” He emphasized, “We will appropriately shift our focus to the Indo-Pacific region, rebuild deterrence there, and expand burden sharing globally.”

ㅇ The Trump administration is pressing European allies to raise defense spending to 5% of GDP, and this is expected to significantly affect defense spending policies of key Indo-Pacific allies, including South Korea.

- As of 2023, South Korea’s defense spending stood at about 2.8% of GDP, which remains below the NATO-recommended 5%. It is therefore likely that the U.S. will demand further increases from South Korea as well.

ㅇ These international trends suggest that the Trump administration’s second term will more strongly demand increased defense spending and higher burden sharing for hosting U.S. forces under the banner of “allied responsibility sharing.” As a result, South Korea, despite already maintaining a high defense spending ratio, may face further pressure to increase spending or expand cost-sharing for the operation of strategic assets. This trend could lead not only to changes in the security landscape on the Korean Peninsula but also to a reconsideration of how the U.S.-ROK alliance functions itself.

- On May 28, General Xavier Brunson, Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, stressed the importance of strategic flexibility for U.S. forces in Korea to counter Chinese and Russian activities near the Korean Peninsula at an online seminar hosted by the Institute for Corean-American Studies (ICAS). Additionally, senior officials at the U.S. Department of Defense have suggested possible posture adjustments for U.S. Forces Korea to strengthen its role in deterring China.

- Thus, the U.S. is devoting all efforts to countering China, its greatest perceived threat, and is preparing for U.S. Forces Korea to assume more flexible and active roles beyond simply deterring North Korea.

ㅇ In conclusion, the Trump administration’s “America First” policy prioritizes containing China as its foremost goal while demanding expanded security responsibilities and roles from allies.

ㅇ The nuclear umbrella commitment, by nature a promise, loses credibility once belief in the promise weakens. The Trump administration’s unilateral diplomacy—dismissing allies in favor of prioritizing U.S. interests and domestic political gains—has fueled allied anxieties about security and strengthened perceptions that they must defend themselves rather than depend on the U.S.

- In Europe, there are even calls for creating a European Union Army, while in South Korea voices calling for strengthening independent nuclear capabilities are growing louder.

- According to an Asan Institute survey, public trust in extended deterrence declined from 43.1% in November 2022 to 39.35% in December 2023. This indicates that even after the Washington Declaration and the creation of the U.S.-ROK Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), South Korean confidence in extended deterrence weakened. A 2024 survey by the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) showed 49.7% expressing trust in the nuclear umbrella and 42.6% expressing distrust—suggesting that only about half of the public are optimistic about U.S. nuclear commitments. In a February 2025 KIDA survey on Korean Peninsula security and responses to North Korea’s nuclear threat, 41.2% supported extended deterrence, while 39% supported independent nuclear armament, showing that support for independent armament is nearly on par with support for extended deterrence.

ㅇ The clear fact shown by these surveys is that while trust in extended deterrence remains relatively high, it is not overwhelming, and support for independent nuclear armament approaches half of the population. Although some argue that when costs such as the collapse of the U.S.-ROK alliance or international sanctions are factored in, support for independent nuclearization would drop significantly, the data nonetheless reflect strong underlying concerns.

ㅇ These survey results indicate that amid an unstable security environment, South Koreans feel uneasy about complete reliance on U.S. extended deterrence and believe it is necessary to develop stronger autonomous nuclear capabilities in response to North Korea’s advancing nuclear threat.

- Specific options for strengthening nuclear autonomy include redeploying tactical nuclear weapons, NATO-style nuclear sharing, securing nuclear latency (enrichment and reprocessing capabilities), or full-scale independent nuclear armament. However, redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons and NATO-style nuclear sharing are considered measures to strengthen extended deterrence, not true nuclear sovereignty.

- Independent nuclear armament, of course, would raise issues of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) violation, potential weakening of the U.S.-ROK alliance, and exposure to international sanctions, thus requiring a highly strategic approach.

- Moreover, South Korea should not limit its choices to nuclear options alone but also pursue non-nuclear capability enhancements such as advanced missile defense and institutionalization of U.S.-ROK combined exercises. The U.S.-ROK alliance is a typical hub-and-spokes system centered on the U.S. providing extended deterrence through the nuclear umbrella, but this structure leaves South Korea structurally dependent on U.S. policy changes. Therefore, alongside nuclear and non-nuclear capability strengthening, South Korea should also pursue participation in and development of minilateral security frameworks such as QUAD Plus and AUKUS, reinforcing cooperation with the U.S., Japan, India, Australia, and other like-minded partners.

4. Policy Response

ㅇ Like previous Republican administrations, the Trump administration is expected to pursue an offensive nuclear strategy, which will likely exacerbate security instability in East Asia, including the Korean Peninsula.

ㅇ The Trump administration’s “America First” policy regards China as the greatest threat and is expected to devote all available resources to containing and deterring China, while also likely demanding greater security responsibilities and roles from its allies.

ㅇ Ultimately, the United States will not act entirely separate from its allies but will pursue a global strategy together with them. Within this U.S. global strategy, South Korea must seek ways to maximize its national interests.

- Fred Fleitz, Deputy Director of the America First Policy Institute (AFPI) and known as a close aide to President Trump as well as a participant in the Trump transition team, stated at the Sejong National Strategy Forum on April 3: “America First does not mean America alone.” This underscores that the U.S. will need cooperation from allies in advancing its global strategy.

ㅇ At the core of the Trump administration’s priority security strategy is the containment of China. This represents an effort to curb China’s military and economic rise as an aspiring hegemon. South Korea should use this U.S. security strategy as an opportunity to pursue nuclear self-reliance. In other words, South Korea can address regional instability caused by the U.S.’s offensive nuclear strategy, while at the same time meeting the Trump administration’s demands for expanded allied security responsibilities, by actively accepting U.S. burden-sharing demands and leveraging them to pursue nuclear self-reliance.

ㅇ In particular, since the U.S. is expected to shift the focus of its security strategy to China containment and reorient its strategic weight toward Asia, South Korea should actively emphasize to Washington that a U.S. ally with nuclear self-reliance could contribute meaningfully to America’s global security strategy. However, since developing nuclear weapons would require at least 5 to 10 years, South Korea should first focus on securing nuclear latency—rights to reprocessing and enrichment. This would ensure the capacity to develop nuclear weapons on short notice if necessary. Therefore, the urgent task now is to amend the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with the U.S. to establish a legal foundation for nuclear latency.

ㅇ Pursuing nuclear self-reliance without U.S. support or cooperation is neither feasible nor desirable. Any plan to strengthen nuclear autonomy must be pursued while maintaining the U.S.-ROK alliance.

- This is because nuclear latency can only be secured through revising the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with the U.S., which requires U.S. consent. Furthermore, if South Korea attempted full-scale nuclear armament without U.S. cooperation, support, or at least acquiescence, it could lead to the collapse of the U.S.-ROK alliance and unbearable international sanctions, resulting in economic ruin. Therefore, consultation, cooperation, support, or at least acquiescence from the U.S. is a prerequisite for pursuing nuclear self-reliance.

ㅇ Can the U.S., which has long upheld non-proliferation as a national policy, support or cooperate with South Korea’s pursuit of nuclear self-reliance? This cannot be ruled out entirely.

- The U.S. needs South Korea as a strong ally both in security and economic terms while pursuing its global strategy. South Korea holds strategic value and advantages for the U.S. in this context.

- Economically, South Korea is an indispensable partner in key advanced industries such as shipbuilding, energy, nuclear power, and semiconductors. In security terms, South Korea, as a strong ally with nuclear self-reliance, would contribute to the U.S. global strategy of containing China and maintaining stable peace in the Indo-Pacific.

- Therefore, if South Korea actively consults with the U.S. based on the fact that it is both an essential economic partner in advanced technologies and a potential security contributor with nuclear self-reliance, it could secure U.S. cooperation.

ㅇ In conclusion, South Korea’s pursuit of nuclear self-reliance should be undertaken in consultation with the U.S., framed as part of South Korea’s expanded security responsibility and role that contributes to the U.S. security strategy.

- Although such a pursuit may provoke North Korea, China, or Russia, the primary cause of instability lies in North Korea’s illegal nuclear development. Thus, the international community should first hold China and Russia accountable for failing to stop, and in some cases indirectly supporting, North Korea’s nuclear program.

ㅇ Should South Korea achieve nuclear self-reliance, the nature of the U.S.-ROK alliance will inevitably change. However, this would represent a win-win solution serving both nations’ interests, constituting a “strategic upgrade of the U.S.-ROK alliance.”

ㅇ The pursuit of nuclear latency or nuclear armament by South Korea is intended to prevent nuclear war through nuclear balance. It is, therefore, nuclear self-reliance for peace, not for war. As the 4th-century Roman strategist Flavius Vegetius Renatus observed: “If you want peace, prepare for war.”

ㅇ In conclusion, South Korea should actively seize the opportunity created by the Trump administration’s demands for greater allied responsibility and, through consultation with the U.S., secure nuclear latency or nuclear armament as part of its expanded security responsibility and role.

- At the same time, South Korea should pursue multiple complementary measures, including strengthening extended deterrence through the advancement and institutionalization of the Extended Deterrence Strategy Consultative Group (EDECG), expanding NATO-style joint planning and training with the U.S., enhancing its own deterrence capabilities such as missile defense, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare, and reinforcing strategic cooperation with the U.S. and Japan while developing multilateral security linkages with ASEAN and others.

ㅇ The security reality before us may seem daunting, like an overwhelming wave, but history shows that the Korean people have always overcome adversity wisely in difficult times. Although the path ahead has not yet been taken, if it is the path we must walk, then we must prepare thoroughly in advance.​