Accountability for North Korean Human Rights Abuses​

 Peter Ward

  Research Fellow, Sejong Institute

   Summary

1. The Issue

North Korea’s human rights violations are unprecedented in the region, with systematic and widespread abuses taking place. The UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) on Human Rights in North Korea concluded in 2014 that these violations are systematic and institutionalized, amounting to crimes against humanity, and recommended an international response, including judicial measures against those responsible.

Since the 1990s, South Korean civil society organizations have documented cases of human rights abuses in North Korea. Various organizations, including the Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR), the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB), and the Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG), have continuously called for accountability and provided crucial support for current and future efforts in this regard.

Since 2016, the Ministry of Unification (MOU) of the Republic of Korea has been responsible for documenting North Korea’s human rights violations and collecting evidence for future trials. Following the COI report, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) established a field office in Seoul, where it gathers testimonies from North Korean defectors in South Korea and supports ongoing and future accountability efforts.

The North Korean regime and its leadership maintain power through extensive human rights violations, backed by a vast security apparatus and a system of political prison camps. It is estimated that around 200,000 North Koreans are detained in extremely harsh conditions in political prison camps (such as kwanliso and kyohwaso).

The regime routinely carries out torture, and sexual violence is also widespread. Public executions remain a form of punishment for both political and non-political crimes.

Recently, the passage of the Reactionary Thought and Culture Rejection Act and the Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act by the Supreme People’s Assembly has established severe penalties, including the death penalty, for acts related to the distribution of South Korean culture.

Various judicial accountability mechanisms have been attempted to address the North Korean regime’s human rights violations, with differing levels of success. Cases involving war crimes and crimes against humanity have been brought before the International Criminal Court (ICC), but were dismissed due to a lack of evidence or failure to meet legal requirements. In countries such as the United States, South Korea, and Japan, domestic lawsuits based on extra-territorial jurisdiction have been filed under civil law. In some cases, guilty verdicts have been issued, and compensation orders have been granted.

Additional measures for judicial accountability have been discussed and may be pursued in the future. In particular, further actions could be taken based on existing accountability support mechanisms, such as the Seoul Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Approaches to judicial accountability may include bringing additional cases before the International Criminal Court (ICC), referring cases to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), or pursuing domestic lawsuits in countries such as South Korea, the United States, and Japan. Other possibilities include establishing ad hoc international tribunals for prosecuting perpetrators, as well as conducting trials in absentia (trials held without the defendant being present).

Quasi-judicial and non-judicial accountability mechanisms have been widely discussed and are being implemented in various forms. Public hearings and trial-like proceedings continue to be held, where victims and experts come together to condemn human rights violations. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have published numerous reports documenting human rights abuses, raising awareness while also serving as a voice for victims. Efforts to preserve historical memory include the establishment and operation of museums, memorial sites, and commemorative ceremonies.

This brief aims to review existing responses to North Korea’s human rights violations, analyze policy proposals from the UN, NGOs, and academia, and explore policy options for the South Korean government. South Korea could support the strengthening of OHCHR’s accountability efforts, drawing on the examples of the International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) for Syria and the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM). Possible approaches include utilizing the UN General Assembly or filing additional cases before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) based on human rights treaties to which North Korea is a party. To enhance the enforcement of domestic rulings, South Korea could consider revising domestic laws related to North Korean assets or establishing a fund to support victims. However, judicial accountability mechanisms could have unintended consequences, potentially worsening the human rights situation by provoking North Korean elites. Therefore, the scope of transitional justice efforts should be carefully evaluated. Additionally, non-judicial approaches—such as establishing permanent memorial sites for North Korean defectors and increasing support for NGOs engaged in accountability efforts— would also be valuable areas for further support.

2. Accountability: Need and Types

At this point, it is imperative to discuss and pursue accountability, as the issue of impunity for the North Korean leadership remains persistent while the scope of human rights abuses has escalated to include involvement in war crimes. The North Korean leadership continues to perpetrate human rights violations without facing punishment, and by supplying military equipment to the Russian war effort—and even dispatching troops to Ukraine—it has actively participated in war crimes related to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, leading to new forms of human rights abuses. It is therefore necessary to assess the current state of accountability for North Korean human rights violations and to consider and implement new approaches.

North Korea’s human rights violations have been a persistent topic of discussion at the United Nations, with annual North Korea human rights resolutions being passed every year since the first resolution was adopted in 2003. Since 2004 (Resolution 2004/13), the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in North Korea has been appointed annually to investigate and report on the human rights situation in the country.

In response to the severity of North Korea’s human rights situation, the UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) on Human Rights in North Korea was established in 2013. Its 2014 report contained extensive and strong criticisms, stating that "the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has committed and continues to commit systematic, widespread, and gross human rights violations." The report documented violations of freedom of thought, expression, and religion, as well as violations of the right to movement and residence, the right to food, arbitrary detention, torture, executions, the operation of political prison camps, abductions, enforced disappearances, and crimes against humanity. These human rights violations affect not only North Korean citizens but also foreign nationals, including South Koreans and Japanese abductees. 

Discussions on accountability for North Korea’s human rights violations are becoming more diverse in the international community, with increasing attention not only on criminal prosecution but also on non-criminal measures and sanctions. Criminal prosecution efforts have primarily focused on the International Criminal Court (ICC), while discussions on the establishment of a special tribunal and the use of universal jurisdiction in national courts are also ongoing. As non-criminal accountability measures, various approaches—such as civil lawsuits, sanctions, and truth-seeking efforts—are being proposed and implemented through national courts in different countries.

3. Current efforts

The International Criminal Court (ICC) has reviewed allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by North Korea on two occasions in the past. The UN-backed ICC can exercise jurisdiction only in the following three cases: (1) When the crime is committed by a state party to the Rome Statute, (2) When a non-state party voluntarily accepts the court’s jurisdiction, or (3) When the UN Security Council (UNSC) refers a case to the ICC. Additionally, the ICC can only prosecute crimes committed after July 1, 2002. However, continuing crimes—those that began before this date but persist to the present—may still fall under its jurisdiction. Despite these provisions, the ICC does not allow trials in absentia (in the absence of the accused), making it highly unlikely that North Korean senior officials would be prosecuted through this mechanism.

The ICC decided not to open an investigation into war crimes related to the 2010 Yeonpyeong Island shelling and the attack on the ROK naval vessel Cheonan. According to the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), these incidents occurred within internationally recognized South Korean territory, meaning the ICC had jurisdiction. However, the OTP concluded that the attack on the Cheonan targeted a military vessel and therefore did not constitute a war crime under Article 8 of the Rome Statute. Regarding the Yeonpyeong Island shelling, the OTP determined that the available evidence was insufficient to conclude that civilians or civilian objects were intentionally targeted.

In 2016 and 2017, additional cases were submitted to the ICC, including those related to Kim Jong-un’s nationality and the treatment of North Korean overseas laborers. In the 2016 case, the ICC ruled that it lacked jurisdiction. The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) determined that, under South Korean law, North Korean residents are only "entitled" to South Korean nationality but are not automatically considered South Korean nationals, including Kim Jong-un. As a result, the ICC concluded that Kim Jong-un could not be classified as a South Korean national subject to its jurisdiction. In the 2017 case, the ICC ruled that there was insufficient evidence to determine that the treatment of North Korean overseas workers in ICC member states constituted "enslavement," which would qualify as a crime against humanity.

Interest in invoking universal jurisdiction to prosecute North Korea’s human rights violations remains ongoing. However, several challenges have been identified, and such efforts have not yet been pursued. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has expressed interest and willingness to cooperate on matters related to universal jurisdiction. However, enforcing arrest warrants under universal jurisdiction is expected to be highly difficult, as high-ranking perpetrators (particularly from security and intelligence agencies) rarely travel abroad. Additionally, in most cases, prosecution under universal jurisdiction requires that either the accused individual resides in the country pursuing the case or that the victims have a direct connection to that jurisdiction.

Several countries, including South Korea, the United States, and Japan, have incorporated elements of international human rights law into their domestic legal systems. This allows for civil lawsuits, prosecution of foreign nationals, and asset seizures within their respective jurisdictions. In South Korea, the Constitution defines North Korea as part of its national territory, meaning that acts committed in North Korea can fall under South Korean legal jurisdiction. However, in many countries, standing requirements limit who can file lawsuits, and legal actions against the North Korean regime or its officials may be restricted. Additionally, many jurisdictions impose limits on the extraterritorial application of their laws, restricting the types of offenses that can be prosecuted under universal jurisdiction.

Under South Korean law, the North Korean regime is considered either an association without rights (bibeopin sadan, 비법인사단) or an anti-state organization (ban-gukga danche, 반국가단체). As a result, South Korean courts claim jurisdiction over North Korea’s actions and have issued multiple rulings against the regime. In 2021, the family of a victim abducted by North Korean forces during the Korean War won a civil lawsuit against the North Korean regime. In 2022, the Seoul Central District Court ordered Kim Jong-un to compensate the families of South Korean soldiers killed in the Second Battle of Yeonpyeong (2002). In 2023, the Seoul Central District Court ruled against North Korea for its role in detaining and forcing South Korean prisoners of war (POWs) into labor after the Korean War. The case involved POWs who escaped North Korea and returned to South Korea between 2000 and 2001. In 2024, Zainichi Koreans who migrated to North Korea through the "Repatriation Project" (1959 onward) won a lawsuit against the North Korean regime. The plaintiffs argued that they had been deceived about life in North Korea and later subjected to severe human rights abuses.

These rulings demonstrate that South Korean courts have taken a favorable stance toward plaintiffs who suffered harm due to the North Korean regime. However, enforcing these rulings remains a significant challenge. Subsequent rulings indicate that North Korea does not possess readily seizable assets within South Korea. The South-North Economic and Cultural Cooperation Foundation (경문협) has been discussed as a potential source for compensation. However, legal debates persist over whether the funds received by the Foundation can be used to compensate victims of North Korean human rights abuses. While some courts have ruled that these funds cannot be used for compensation, others have ruled that they can. Nevertheless, the Foundation’s total assets amount to only approximately 2.8 billion KRW (about $2 million), making it an insufficient source of compensation for victims in the long term.

Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) of the United States, sovereign states are generally immune from being sued in foreign courts. However, specific exceptions allow for legal claims against North Korea for human rights abuses and other violations. FSIA grants legal immunity to most sovereign states, but exceptions apply for cases involving torture, extrajudicial killings, hostage-taking, and aircraft sabotage. To qualify under FSIA, the state in question must be designated as a "State Sponsor of Terrorism" (SST) by the U.S. government, and only U.S. citizens can file lawsuits under these provisions. One of the most notable FSIA cases involving North Korea was filed by the family of Otto Warmbier, who successfully sued the North Korean regime for human rights violations. The case set a precedent for legal actions against North Korea under FSIA. In November 2023, the U.S. government awarded $2.2 million in frozen North Korean assets as compensation to the Warmbier family. Looking ahead, North Korean defectors residing in the U.S. may file additional lawsuits against the North Korean regime. However, a key limitation of FSIA-based lawsuits is that they are only applicable to U.S. citizens and do not extend to non-U.S. victims of North Korean human rights violations.

Given North Korea’s abduction of Japanese citizens and the "repatriation" of Zainichi Koreans, Japanese courts also have potential jurisdiction over lawsuits against the North Korean regime. Since the Japanese government does not officially recognize North Korea as a state, Japanese courts have ruled that they can exercise jurisdiction over North Korea-related cases. However, in past damages claims filed by Zainichi Koreans, Japanese courts initially dismissed cases on the grounds of the statute of limitations. Later, a higher court ruled that violations such as restrictions on freedom of movement and the right to food are ongoing ("continuing crimes"), thereby establishing that Japanese courts could retain jurisdiction over such cases. There is also the possibility that the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryon), which supports North Korea, may hold assets that could be used for compensation on behalf of the North Korean regime. However, the exact size and availability of such assets remain unclear.

Another pathway pursued is sanctions. At the national level, the United States has two primary legal frameworks for imposing human rights-related sanctions on North Korea. The first is the 2016 Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Global Magnitsky Act), which provides a broad legal framework for sanctioning individuals and entities responsible for serious human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings and torture. However, the U.S. has not yet applied this law to North Korea. Separately, the 2016 North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act (NKSPEA) is a North Korea-specific sanctions law. It requires the U.S. president to designate individuals and entities involved in sanctionable activities, including human rights violations and North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. Under the NKSPEA, the U.S. has sanctioned various individuals and entities, including the Minister of State Security, the Director of the Organization and Guidance Department of the Workers’ Party of Korea, and the Minister of People’s Armed Forces.

The European Union (EU) also operates its own Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime, which allows for targeted sanctions against individuals and entities involved in serious human rights violations. All EU member states are required to enforce agreed-upon sanctions under this framework. This sanctions regime applies to cases involving genocide, crimes against humanity, and other serious human rights abuses. To date, the EU has sanctioned North Korea’s Minister of State Security, Minister of Social Security, and the Central Public Prosecutors’ Office for their involvement in torture, inhumane treatment in prisons, and extrajudicial executions. Since leaving the EU, the United Kingdom has established its own independent sanctions regime, which also includes human rights-related sanctions. So far, the UK has designated two North Korean entities—the Corrections Bureau of the Ministry of People’s Security and the 7th Bureau of the Ministry of State Security—as targets of its sanctions.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been conducting extensive investigations and advocacy efforts to hold North Korea accountable for its human rights record. Since the 1990s, organizations such as the Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR) have published numerous reports on human rights violations in North Korea, raising international awareness and pushing for accountability.

NGOs also organize truth-seeking initiatives, such as the unofficial tribunal held in March 2022 by the International Bar Association (IBA) and the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK). In addition, they regularly hold events, exhibitions, and demonstrations to increase awareness of North Korea’s human rights issues and demand accountability from the regime.

Many NGOs are adopting innovative approaches to document human rights abuses. The Transitional Justice Working Group has developed human rights mapping projects and databases related to radioactive contamination, state-led killings, and burial sites. Similarly, Korea Future collects testimonies and conducts visual investigations as part of its North Korean Prison Database . The NGO PSCORE (People for Successful COrean Reunification) enhances testimony-based documentation by mapping human rights violation sites on Google Maps.

NGOs are also actively engaged in UN human rights mechanisms, including the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), which serves as the only official platform where NGOs can directly question the North Korean government and advocate for improvements in the lives of North Korean citizens.

Governments, particularly South Korea and the United States, regularly publish reports on North Korea’s human rights situation and engage in advocacy efforts on the international stage to promote improvements. The U.S. Department of State releases an annual report on North Korea’s human rights conditions, supports various NGOs in their accountability efforts, and actively raises human rights concerns at the UN. In South Korea, the North Korean Human Rights Records Center, under the Ministry of Unification, conducts ongoing investigations into human rights violations in North Korea. The findings are transferred to the Ministry of Justice, ensuring that they can be utilized in future judicial accountability processes. Additionally, the South Korean government publishes regular reports on North Korean human rights issues and provides financial support to some NGOs engaged in accountability efforts.

The United Nations continues its efforts to hold North Korea accountable for human rights violations through the establishment of new mechanisms, the use of existing special procedures, discussions at the UN Human Rights Council (HRC), and the adoption of resolutions. The Seoul Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) was established in June 2015 and has since published reports on various types of human rights violations while supporting quasi-judicial and non-judicial accountability efforts. The UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in North Korea continues to address accountability issues, publishing annual reports and engaging in international advocacy to protect the human rights of North Korean citizens. In 2017, the Group of Independent Experts on Accountability recommended that UN member states enact legislation to apply extraterritorial jurisdiction and called for the strengthening of OHCHR to support the development of international prosecution strategies and plans. The UN Human Rights Council (HRC) regularly discusses North Korea’s human rights situation and continues to adopt resolutions condemning widespread human rights abuses in the country. As 2024 marks the 10th anniversary of the Commission of Inquiry’s (COI) first report, the UN Human Rights Council has requested an updated report, which will be prepared by OHCHR.

4. Conclusions

Judicial accountability offers a key advantage in enabling asset seizures and travel bans, but tracking overseas assets remains a significant challenge. While rulings from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or the International Criminal Court (ICC) could help mobilize international public opinion and positively influence advocacy efforts, it is uncertain whether they would actually change North Korea’s behavior or lead to compensation for victims. The legal costs of pursuing cases in South Korean and U.S. courts are also extremely high, making it financially burdensome for many victims to seek justice. While these legal options should continue to be explored and supported, additional alternatives must also be considered.

At present, there appear to be no realistically viable options aside from the International Court of Justice (ICJ). However, in addition to pursuing ICJ litigation, it would be worthwhile to explore preparatory measures for referring cases to the International Criminal Court (ICC) or establishing a special tribunal. If international judicial accountability efforts are to be pursued in the near future, it is crucial to conduct concrete assessments and preparations for an ICJ case. Referring a case to the ICC would require substantial evidence and careful jurisdictional considerations, making it inherently a long-term accountability effort. A special tribunal could be a practical policy tool during a transitional period following a regime change in North Korea, but at present, it is not a viable option for immediate implementation.

Invoking universal jurisdiction in various national courts presents complex legal challenges, making its implementation difficult. However, such efforts could have a positive impact by facilitating the transfer of North Korean overseas assets to victims of human rights abuses, making it a worthwhile option for consideration. Providing financial and legal support to groups such as South Korean POWs, families of abductees, and Zainichi Koreans deceived by the repatriation program could greatly assist in overcoming the complex legal issues related to recognizing foreign court rulings and seizing assets in overseas jurisdictions.

At a broader level, it is essential to carefully assess the potential impact of judicial accountability efforts on the stability of the North Korean regime. One of the key challenges in accountability efforts is securing linkage evidence that directly connects high-ranking officials to serious human rights violations. However, the practical impact of such evidence on their actions remains limited. Many direct perpetrators are merely lower-level functionaries within the regime’s bureaucratic structure, and North Korean society itself is built on a system of mutual surveillance, making widespread human rights violations an inherent feature of the system. Rather than facilitating political or economic change within North Korea, accountability efforts could instead push high-ranking officials to resist reform out of fear that any loosening of control could lead to regime collapse. This possibility must be carefully examined when considering future accountability strategies.

South Korea currently lacks a legal framework for human rights sanctions, but calls for the adoption of a "Korean Magnitsky Act" are growing among human rights organizations and key experts. There is an increasing need to consider its introduction. The Transitional Justice Working Group has advocated for the establishment of a Korean Magnitsky Act, and leading experts suggest that South Korea could benchmark existing human rights sanctions regimes in the United States and Europe to develop its own version.

The Seoul Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) is relatively small in scale and requires expansion to better support judicial accountability efforts. Additionally, its mandate has been criticized as somewhat ambiguous, highlighting the need for greater clarity and expansion of its role. The South Korean government could play a more significant role within the UN in addressing these issues. Two similar UN General Assembly (UNGA)-established mechanisms serve as potential models: The International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) for Syria, and the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM). These mechanisms conduct investigations and analyses of serious human rights violations in their respective countries, while also supporting investigations, prosecutions, and legal proceedings. Compared to the Seoul OHCHR office, these mechanisms operate on a much larger scale with greater capacity, making them valuable models for enhancing the role and effectiveness of the Seoul OHCHR office in the future.

In the process of drafting the updated Commission of Inquiry (COI) report, which was adopted at the 55th session of the UN Human Rights Council, there is a possibility that new public hearings and other open procedures will be included. The South Korean government can play a constructive role by proposing methods and approaches for the COI update process.

A more systematic approach to documenting human rights violations is needed, along with enhanced cooperation between the South Korean government, NGOs, and international organizations to establish common standards for future accountability efforts. The South Korean government can play a key role in developing new policies on documentation methodologies by gathering input from relevant NGOs and government agencies through close communication. Additionally, by collaborating with the UN OHCHR, South Korea can propose new standards for holding North Korea accountable for human rights abuses. Currently, efforts in this area are fragmented, with the Ministry of Unification, the Ministry of Justice, OHCHR, and multiple NGOs conducting their own initiatives separately. A unified set of standards and a common methodology for judicial accountability must be developed to ensure consistency and effectiveness in future legal proceedings.

The South Korean government must expand its role in supporting human rights organizations, as the North Korean human rights sector faces an existential crisis. Given the suspension of funding from the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), critical activities such as documenting human rights violations and advocacy efforts have been severely impacted. To address this, the South Korean government’s involvement is more crucial than ever. It must explore both emergency assistance measures and long-term strategies to ensure the survival of North Korean human rights organizations.

In discussions on accountability, utilizing North Korea’s own judicial system has been largely dismissed for practical reasons. However, alternative approaches to improving human rights conditions within North Korea should also be considered. If the South Korean government takes a more proactive role in expanding access to information for North Koreans, it could help raise awareness among North Korean citizens about their own legal system, including how to report abuses or engage in whistleblowing. By leveraging North Korea’s informal information networks, efforts could be made to disseminate knowledge on human rights violations and how these acts violate both international law and North Korea’s own legal framework. Developing strategies to promote whistleblowing within North Korea could create opportunities for holding perpetrators accountable—even within the North Korean system—under certain circumstances. Additionally, applying pressure on the North Korean delegation in international human rights forums, such as the UN Universal Periodic Review (UPR), could push for improvements in correctional facilities, reforms in criminal procedures, and legal system revisions.

The South Korean government should consider ways for victims of human rights abuses in North Korea to receive compensation or support from their host governments without requiring legal proceedings. In countries with significant North Korean defector populations, such as South Korea and the United States, there is a need to expand financial support for psychological assistance and mental health treatment services for survivors of severe human rights violations. Additionally, various compensation and support programs, including grants and other financial aid mechanisms, should be explored to help victims recover from the long-term consequences of human rights abuses.

Supporting victims of human rights abuses in North Korea and commemorating their suffering remains a significant challenge. The South Korean government has already announced plans to establish a National North Korean Human Rights Center in Magok-dong, Seoul. However, beyond government efforts, the private sector should also consider establishing a permanent museum to raise awareness about North Korean human rights issues and provide insight into the lives of North Korean citizens and the functioning of the regime. f a museum is to be built in Seoul, securing a suitable site may be necessary. To avoid political controversy, it may be preferable for NGOs to take the lead in managing operations and curating exhibitions. Although initial investment costs would be required, the museum could become self-sustaining through visitor admissions, fundraising, and sponsorships. With proper planning, it could function as both an educational and advocacy platform while maintaining financial stability.