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‘America First’ and India’s Indo-Pacific Recalibration |
| September 15, 2025 |
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Yoon Jung ChoiPrincipal Fellow, Sejong Institute | yjchoi@sejong.org
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With the inauguration of President Donald Trump’s second term on January 20, 2025, U.S.-India relations - widely expected to remain stable - began to face unexpected headwinds. Although the early months of the second Trump administration appeared to continue the personal rapport that President Trump and Prime Minister Narendra Modi had cultivated during Trump’s first term, bilateral relations deteriorated rapidly from June 2025 onward. By September, the United States had imposed tariffs of up to 50 percent on major Indian exports, signaling the sharpest strain in the relationship in over two decades.1)
India’s evolving foreign policy posture, long shaped by its growing strategic value as a counterweight to China within the liberal international order, has therefore become a subject of heightened international attention. Domestically, skepticism toward the U.S.-India strategic partnership, built over the past twenty-five years, has grown, prompting renewed debate in India about how best to position its foreign policy. As a result, New Delhi has begun to recalibrate its relations with other major powers, including China, Russia, and Japan, in a more visible and deliberate manner.
A symbolic moment of this shift unfolded on September 1, 2025, at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Tianjin. Prime Minister Modi’s visit to China - the first in seven years - was closely watched, as images of Modi engaging cordially with President Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin were broadcast globally.2) Coming after years of deep freeze following the deadly Galwan Valley clashes of June 2020, the optics were widely interpreted as signaling a tentative thaw in Sino-Indian relations.3)
The Tianjin Declaration issued at the conclusion of the SCO summit underscored the need for a “multipolar world order” and implicitly criticized “unilateralism and hegemonism,” language that many observers read as a veiled rebuke of the U.S.-led international system.4) Although Prime Minister Modi departed China immediately after the summit and did not attend the subsequent Victory Day events in Beijing, speculation nonetheless intensified over whether India was drifting closer to China - or, more precisely, whether it was seeking greater strategic distance from Washington.
At the same time, India’s diplomatic outreach has not been confined to China and Russia. Just days before the SCO summit, Prime Minister Modi traveled to Japan for talks with Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba. During the visit, Japan announced plans to invest approximately $68 billion in India, while the two sides launched new initiatives on artificial intelligence and economic security, articulating a shared vision for shaping a more resilient Indo-Pacific order.5) Notably, the joint statement emphasized the defense of a rules-based international order while rejecting unilateralism and attempts to change the status quo by force - a formulation that can be read as expressing concern about coercive behavior more broadly, and about unilateral approaches by major powers.
Against this backdrop, a central debate has emerged regarding India’s strategic trajectory. Is New Delhi moving toward closer alignment with China and Russia in response to growing frictions with the United States? Or is it instead pursuing a more autonomous path, seeking to navigate between competing power centers without anchoring itself firmly to any single bloc? This study addresses these questions by examining India’s recent strategic recalibration. It analyzes the sources of the deterioration in U.S.-India relations under the second Trump administration, evaluates India’s tactical adjustments and structural constraints in its relations with China and Russia, and assesses the contours of the Indo-Pacific order that India increasingly seeks to shape. Finally, it considers the broader implications of these shifts for South Korea’s foreign and security strategy. -
A Landmark Success in Post–Cold War U.S. Diplomacy
Among the major bilateral relationships cultivated by the United States since the end of the Cold War, the transformation of U.S.-India relations has long been regarded as one of Washington’s most significant diplomatic achievements. Over the past twenty-five years since 2000, the strategic partnership between the two countries evolved into a model of cooperation between large democratic states sharing converging interests in political values, economic development, and security.
During President Trump’s first term, India was formally incorporated into the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy as a core partner in balancing China. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), comprising the United States, Australia, Japan, and India, was elevated to the leaders’ level, symbolizing India’s growing strategic importance. President Trump publicly highlighted his personal rapport with Prime Minister Narendra Modi by attending the “Howdy, Modi!” event in Houston in September 2019, referring to Modi as a “true friend.” This personal diplomacy was further underscored at the “Namaste Trump” event in Ahmedabad in February 2020. Together, these episodes conveyed the impression that bilateral ties were approaching a quasi-alliance.6)
The Biden administration largely inherited and reinforced this trajectory. Cooperation between the United States and India deepened across defense, technology, and economic domains. In particular, India emerged as a central beneficiary of supply-chain realignment amid U.S.-China decoupling. By the second quarter of 2025, India had overtaken China as the largest supplier of smartphones to the U.S. market: 44 percent of smartphones imported into the United States originated in India, compared to 25 percent from China. This development marked a concrete milestone in the “China Plus One” strategy and reflected India’s expanding role in advanced manufacturing.7)
Defense and security cooperation advanced even more significantly. India concluded all four foundational defense agreements with the United States, thereby establishing a level of operational interoperability comparable to that enjoyed by America’s closest allies. These agreements include the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA, 2002), the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA, 2016), the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA, 2018), and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA, 2020). Together, they enabled intelligence sharing, logistical support, and the exchange of secure communications and geospatial data.
On this institutional foundation, India accelerated the modernization of its armed forces through large-scale acquisitions of U.S. defense systems, totaling approximately $20 billion. These included C-130J transport aircraft, C-17 strategic airlifters, P-8I maritime patrol aircraft, AH-64E Apache attack helicopters, and MH-60R Seahawk naval helicopters. In 2024, India further concluded a contract for 31 MQ-9B unmanned aerial vehicles, underscoring the depth of defense cooperation.8)
Economic ties expanded in parallel. Bilateral trade between the United States and India grew more than tenfold - from roughly $20 billion in 2000 to $212.3 billion in 2024.9) In services trade, India consolidated its position as a global hub for information technology and digital services, hosting major research and development centers for U.S. technology firms such as Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and Meta. By the mid-2020s, the breadth and depth of U.S.–India cooperation across security and economic sectors positioned the relationship as one of the most notable successes of American diplomacy in the post-Cold War era.
Policy Disruption under the Second Trump Administration
This accumulated trust, however, came under mounting strain as tariffs became a more central instrument in managing bilateral economic disputes. What had previously been managed through negotiation and strategic accommodation increasingly became a source of open friction.
The decisive turning point came after the large-scale terrorist attack in Pahalgam, in Indian-administered Kashmir, on April 22, 2025, which killed twenty-six Indian civilians. In the aftermath, serious military clashes erupted along the India-Pakistan border between May 7 and May 10. Although the conflict remained localized, it carried the risk of escalation between two nuclear-armed states. During this crisis, President Trump publicly framed the United States as a mediator, a move that introduced additional political sensitivities - especially in New Delhi, given India’s longstanding preference against third-party mediation.10)
Tensions intensified further following a telephone conversation between President Trump and Prime Minister Modi on June 17. President Trump repeatedly emphasized U.S. involvement in the crisis and publicly claimed credit for de-escalation, including by describing the outcome in highly personal terms. He also suggested that Pakistan intended to nominate him for the Nobel Peace Prize. The Indian government immediately rejected this narrative. Prime Minister Modi stated unequivocally that the ceasefire had been reached through direct communication between India and Pakistan, without any third-party mediation.11)
The situation deteriorated further when President Trump hosted Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, General Asim Munir, at the White House on June 18 - shortly after Modi declined an invitation to visit Washington. Media reports and political commentary at the time raised questions in India about potential conflicts of interest; regardless of their merits, these claims contributed to heightened skepticism about Washington’s impartiality. Subsequently, on June 21, Pakistan publicly expressed support for President Trump’s nomination for the 2026 Nobel Peace Prize.12)
Despite repeated public statements by President Trump highlighting American involvement in the India–Pakistan crisis, the Indian government never once acknowledged his role.13) Given India’s domestic political norms, where external mediation in disputes with Pakistan is broadly unacceptable, President Trump’s remarks, however, generated considerable debate and criticism within India. On July 27, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh addressed Parliament, stating explicitly that “India does not accept mediation by any external power,” signaling official disapproval of U.S. involvement.14)
Against this backdrop, President Trump’s posture toward India hardened dramatically. He publicly disparaged India’s economy as “dead” and accused New Delhi of indirectly financing Russia through continued energy imports. In late July, President Trump announced via social media the imposition of a 25 percent tariff on Indian imports, while setting a comparatively lower rate of 19 percent on Pakistani products. Within a week, the administration escalated further. On August 6, an executive order imposed an additional 25 percentage-point tariff on Indian goods, bringing the total rate to 50 percent - the highest tariff level applied by the United States to any country at the time.15) India was thus grouped with a narrow set of countries facing exceptionally high U.S. tariff rates, including Brazil (50 percent), Syria (41 percent), and Laos and Myanmar (40 percent).
Several factors help explain the rapid deterioration of U.S.-India relations in mid-2025. First, the second Trump administration relied increasingly on a diplomacy characterized by direct leader-level engagement and prominent public signaling. While this approach accelerated decision-making in some areas, it also reduced opportunities for traditional alliance consultation, sometimes straining established relationships.16)
Second, from a strategic perspective, the administration increasingly viewed India’s continued engagement with Russia as incompatible with U.S. global objectives. India’s large-scale imports of Russian crude oil, along with allegations that some Indian firms had facilitated sanctions circumvention, provided justification for economic pressure. Third, the growing influence of hard-line figures within the administration, including trade adviser Peter Navarro - who had long criticized India’s tariffs and market barriers - further amplified confrontational policy impulses.17)
These developments triggered concern even among American policy experts. Prominent voices warned that coercive unilateral measures risked reversing decades of patient diplomacy that had gradually aligned U.S. and Indian interests.18) By failing to account for India’s complex domestic political landscape as a large and pluralistic democracy, the Trump administration damaged the credibility of the United States as a reliable long-term partner. Within India, a widespread perception took hold that Washington could readily abandon even close partners when short-term interests dictated otherwise.19) Even if the Trump administration were to seek reconciliation in the future, the erosion of trust may prove difficult to reverse. As Indian policymakers and the public reassess their strategic assumptions, New Delhi is likely to recalibrate its broader foreign policy posture in the near term, reflecting deepened skepticism toward the United States. -
Tactical Rapprochement with China: A Pragmatic Choice under Structural Constraints
Against this backdrop, the easing of tensions between India and China observed in the latter half of 2025 is best understood not as a strategic realignment, but as a tactical adjustment shaped by immediate pressures. Both countries have been directly or indirectly affected by the Trump administration’s high-tariff policies, creating a limited incentive for coordination amid external economic stress.
The meeting between President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Narendra Modi on September 1, held on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin, symbolized this shift. The two leaders held their longest bilateral conversation since the deadly Galwan Valley clash in 2020, reportedly lasting around forty-five minutes. Following the meeting, both sides agreed to maintain peace and stability along the border and to expand practical cooperation at the working level. In his address to the SCO plenary, Prime Minister Modi emphasized that “the twenty-first century is the century of Asia,” underscoring the importance of regional cooperation.20) On the surface, these gestures suggested the beginning of a thaw in relations that had remained frozen for more than five years.
Yet the structural sources of Sino-Indian rivalry remain largely unresolved. The most fundamental issue continues to be the two countries’ 3,488-kilometer-long disputed border. The violent confrontation between Indian and Chinese forces in the Galwan Valley of eastern Ladakh on June 15, 2020 - resulting in dozens of casualties - marked the first deadly clash between the two sides in forty-five years. Since then, both countries have deployed more than 50,000 troops each along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), sustaining a highly volatile military standoff. Although an agreement reached in October 2024 led to limited troop withdrawals in the Galwan sector, this accounted for less than three percent of the overall disputed area. More critically, China continues to claim the entire Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh - approximately 83,000 square kilometers - as part of its territory, referring to it as “Zangnan(藏南).” This fundamentally constrains the prospects for a durable settlement.21)
Economic frictions further complicate the relationship. In 2024, India’s trade deficit with China reached a record $99.2 billion, representing 37 percent of India’s total trade deficit.22) The Indian government has attempted to curb imports through the imposition of 382 anti-dumping duties and 39 safeguard measures on Chinese products. These efforts, however, have proven insufficient to substitute for India’s heavy reliance on Chinese consumer goods and intermediate inputs.
At the same time, China has reacted sensitively to India’s efforts to reduce economic dependence on Beijing while expanding exports to the United States under the “China Plus One” strategy. Chinese state media have repeatedly warned against India’s growing economic alignment with the West, signaling that Beijing would not remain passive if New Delhi were to pursue an excessively pro-Western trajectory.
As a result, China-India relations are likely to continue operating under a pattern of ‘adversarial cooperation’. The two sides may cooperate on selected issues - such as climate change, global governance platforms like BRICS and the G20, and limited areas of trade and investment - while simultaneously competing and confronting one another on core security issues. These include the unresolved border dispute, maritime influence in the Indian Ocean, and strategic rivalry centered on Pakistan and South Asia more broadly.
Even so, limited economic cooperation remains unavoidable. India continues to require Chinese capital goods and technology to advance its manufacturing sector, while China views India’s large market and relatively low-cost labor force as economically attractive. In green transition industries - including electric vehicles, solar panels, and battery production - clear complementarities exist that could facilitate joint ventures or technology exchanges. Signs of pragmatic cooperation are already visible, such as China’s BYD exploring factory expansion in India and India’s Tata Group introducing Chinese battery technology.
Nevertheless, competition in advanced technologies is expected to intensify. India is seeking to reduce reliance on China and build indigenous capabilities in sectors such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and quantum computing. China, while making selective use of India’s IT and software talent, remains cautious of India’s rise and is determined to protect the competitiveness of its own industries.
From a geopolitical perspective, rivalry in the Indian Ocean is also likely to sharpen. In response to China’s “String of Pearls” strategy, India has sought to counter Chinese influence in neighboring states such as Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Seychelles, and Bangladesh. Political instability in Myanmar has further emerged as a new arena for diplomatic competition. In short, India and China are likely to sustain a complex relationship in which tactical accommodation coexists with deep structural rivalry, and where underlying mistrust remains unresolved despite episodic gestures of rapprochement.
A Special Relationship with Russia: Continuity and Strategic Distance
Risk hedging has long been a defining feature of India’s foreign policy, and its continued engagement with Russia - alongside limited rapprochement with China - should be understood within this broader diversification strategy. Yet India’s relationship with Russia differs fundamentally from its ties with China. For New Delhi, Moscow remains a uniquely important strategic partner that no other country can readily replace. The importance of India’s ties with Russia has become most clearly visible in two areas: defense cooperation and energy.
When Western states refused to supply arms to India in the 1950s, the Soviet Union emerged as New Delhi’s principal defense partner. The military cooperation initiated during that period has endured for more than seventy years and continues to underpin India’s defense capabilities today. Even now, an estimated 60 to 70 percent of India’s military equipment is of Russian origin. Key platforms - including T-90 tanks, Su-30MKI fighter aircraft, the aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya, and the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile - have been acquired largely through joint development or technology transfer with Russia.23)
The deployment of the S-400 Triumf air defense system represents one of the most symbolic examples of this partnership. India currently operates three S-400 regiments, which are widely regarded as a central pillar of its air defense network, capable of countering China’s J-20 stealth aircraft and Pakistan’s F-16s.24)
Russia has also become indispensable to India in the energy sector. By 2025, India sourced between 36 and 40 percent of its crude oil imports from Russia, a dramatic increase from less than 2 percent in 2021, prior to the outbreak of the Ukraine war. Major Indian refiners - including Indian Oil, Reliance, and Nayara Energy - have purchased large volumes of Russian Urals crude at discounts of $8-12 per barrel, allowing India to save an estimated $12.6 billion in import costs.
Despite this deep cooperation, India is unlikely to revert to the level of alignment with Russia that characterized the Cold War era. Since the 1990s, shifts in Russia’s economic and geopolitical position have led New Delhi to pursue a more measured relationship, guided primarily by national interest rather than broader ideological commonality.25)
Russia’s growing proximity to China - and, increasingly, to Pakistan - poses particular concerns for India. Moscow’s support for expanding the SCO and discussions surrounding North Korea’s potential full membership are unwelcome developments not only for South Korea but also for India. While New Delhi has historically maintained cordial relations with Pyongyang, North Korea’s nuclear program and the resulting instability on the Korean Peninsula conflict with India’s nonproliferation principles and its broader East Asia strategy.
Accordingly, India is likely to continue close cooperation with Russia while carefully calibrating its engagement to ensure that an emerging Russia-Chin-Pakistan alignment does not undermine its core security interests.
Strategic Alignment with Japan: Seeking a New Axis in the Indo-Pacific
India’s decision to visit Japan prior to traveling to China offers important insight into its broader strategic intent. New Delhi appears to be exploring an Indo-Pacific order that does not rely excessively on the United States by deepening cooperation with Tokyo.
The joint statement released after the fifteenth India-Japan Annual Summit in Tokyo on August 28 articulated this vision clearly. Both leaders reaffirmed their commitment to upholding a rules-based international order and pledged to respond jointly to unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force. As noted earlier, this language can be interpreted as signaling restraint toward both U.S. unilateralism and China’s revisionist behavior.
Japan’s pledge to invest $68 billion in India further underscores the strategic dimension of the partnership. This initiative goes beyond conventional economic cooperation and reflects a shared ambition to secure technological sovereignty. The two countries are expanding joint research and development in advanced sectors such as semiconductors, quantum computing, space technology, and cybersecurity, with the explicit aim of building a technological ecosystem less dependent on either the United States or China.
Cooperation in artificial intelligence has been particularly prominent. As the current chair of the Global Partnership on AI (GPAI), India is seeking to assert leadership in AI governance on behalf of the Global South. New Delhi has proposed expanding GPAI membership from 29 to 65 countries to ensure broader representation of developing states in the formulation of AI norms traditionally shaped by advanced Western economies.26)
At the core of the India–Japan AI initiative lies the joint development of international standards for “Trustworthy AI.” Both countries emphasize human-centered principles that differ from the approaches associated with U.S. big technology firms and China, particularly with regard to data protection, algorithmic transparency, and bias mitigation. This effort has attracted attention as a potential attempt to shape a third pathway in the intensifying competition over technological governance.
Taken together, Japan has emerged as a key partner with whom India can pursue strategic cooperation beyond the United States. By expanding collaboration across security, economic, and technological domains, the two countries seek to establish a new central axis in the Indo-Pacific. For India, alignment with Japan provides a means to constrain China while securing a strategic alternative to overdependence on Washington. For Japan, partnership with India enhances deterrence against China and North Korea while advancing supply-chain diversification. The strengthening of this India-Japan partnership thus offers a new option for the regional order and expands the space for middle-power solidarity. -
What Path Will India Encourage in the Emerging International Order?
The heightened international attention to India’s recent diplomatic moves reflects the potentially far-reaching implications of its strategic choices for the future international order. President Trump’s unilateral actions and disparaging rhetoric triggered a wave of shock and anger within India, temporarily consolidating anti-American sentiment across the political spectrum. In this context, Prime Minister Modi’s sudden visit to China - despite India’s enduring distrust of Beijing - was received with relatively limited domestic resistance. Paradoxically, this reaction can be understood as a backlash against the unilateral style of U.S. diplomacy under the second Trump administration rather than a fundamental shift in India’s strategic orientation.
India had initially planned to place greater emphasis on China-related security issues at the Quad summit scheduled for November. However, as relations between President Trump and the Indian leadership cooled, uncertainty emerged over Trump’s participation, particularly as he prioritized tariff negotiations with China during the same period. With doubts even surrounding whether the summit would take place, India found itself in an increasingly difficult political and diplomatic position.
Despite these pressures, it remains unlikely that India will align with China and Russia to construct a new international order that excludes the United States. India itself is acutely aware of the constraints it faces. First, as discussed earlier, the structural sources of conflict between India and China remain unresolved. Border disputes, competition for influence in the Indian Ocean, rivalry over Pakistan, and persistent trade imbalances may resurface at any time, even if temporarily contained through diplomatic gestures. The cordial interaction between Modi and Xi Jinping at the SCO summit in Tianjin in September should therefore be understood primarily as symbolic diplomacy rather than evidence of a durable rapprochement. In practical terms, it would be difficult for India to establish a fully cooperative relationship with China on matters of security sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Second, India’s expectations toward Russia are increasingly tempered. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, New Delhi has recognized that Russia no longer possesses the economic capacity or global influence it once commanded. Russia’s growing international isolation following the war in Ukraine, combined with its economic vulnerabilities, has reinforced this perception. Moreover, Moscow’s efforts to deepen alignment with China - and even Pakistan - in opposition to the West run counter to India’s core strategic interests. The multipolar order India envisions presupposes India itself as one of the poles; within a Russia- and China-led framework, India’s role would inevitably remain constrained. Discussions within the SCO regarding North Korea’s full membership, as well as Russia’s apparent drift into a junior-partner position vis-à-vis China, serve as cautionary signals for New Delhi. While India will continue to cooperate with Russia, it is likely to remain vigilant to ensure that such cooperation does not evolve into an anti-Western bloc reminiscent of a new Cold War.
Third, India has consistently advocated a multipolar international system. What New Delhi seeks is neither a U.S.-dominated unipolar order nor a China-led regional hegemony, but a balance among multiple major and middle powers. This position aligns with India’s long-standing belief that China should not become the sole hegemon in Asia. India does not reject the existing international order outright; rather, it presents itself as a constructive actor seeking to reform and supplement its shortcomings.27)
Instead, India’s strategic autonomy may play a stabilizing role amid intensifying U.S.-China rivalry. By refraining from full alignment with either camp, India increases the incentive for both Washington and Beijing to adopt more flexible approaches toward New Delhi. At the 2025 SCO summit in Tianjin, China openly promoted resistance to the U.S.-led order, yet India maintained a cautious distance and emphasized only the principle of multipolarity. This behavior supports the view that India could contribute to preventing the crystallization of a rigid, bloc-based new Cold War.
In sum, although the unconventional diplomacy of the second Trump administration has clearly reshaped India’s external outlook, these shifts are unlikely to culminate in a world order without the United States or the formation of a new Cold War alliance structure. India is likely to continue pursuing tactical adjustments to maximize national interests while maintaining, over the longer term, an independent course that avoids excessive dependence on either the United States or China. This posture creates important diplomatic space for middle powers - including South Korea - and adds flexibility and pluralism to an international system otherwise dominated by great-power competition.
Implications for South Korea: Linking Strategic Diversification and Cooperation in Emerging Technologies
India’s strategic recalibration offers South Korea new diplomatic and economic opportunities. Like India, South Korea faces mounting pressure from intensifying U.S.-China rivalry and remains wary of the emergence of a China-centered regional order. In this context, Korea has strong incentives to find common ground with India’s preference for preventing a new Cold War dynamic and promoting a multipolar system. Regularizing high-level strategic dialogue between Seoul and New Delhi and strengthening coordination on foreign policy priorities should therefore become a central objective.
The most immediate scope for cooperation lies in the economic domain. In particular, South Korea should make strategic use of the ongoing negotiations to upgrade the Korea-India Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA). The existing CEPA, which entered into force in 2010, focused primarily on tariff reductions in goods and has been criticized for contributing to India’s trade deficit with Korea, estimated at approximately $14.6 billion annually. Rather than incremental adjustments, the agreement could be elevated into a next-generation trade framework incorporating new chapters on future industries such as artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and green energy. Korea’s strengths in semiconductors, batteries, green hydrogen, and smart-city technologies complement India’s vast domestic market and labor pool, offering clear potential for mutually beneficial cooperation that enhances both economic returns and supply-chain resilience.
Expanding cooperation in shipbuilding and the defense industry also appears promising. India is pursuing large-scale naval modernization to strengthen maritime security and defense capabilities, and as the world’s second-largest arms importer - with annual imports estimated at $13-15 billion - its demand is substantial. Korea and India have already established a foundation for collaboration in shipbuilding. In 2017, the two governments signed a memorandum of understanding for joint naval vessel development, followed by technological cooperation between HD Hyundai Heavy Industries and India’s Cochin Shipyard, as well as Hanwha Ocean’s participation in India’s submarine programs. This cooperation could be deepened by linking Korean technology with Indian production bases to develop advanced naval platforms such as submarines, destroyers, and aircraft carriers. Korea’s KSS-III submarines and next-generation destroyer technologies align well with India’s Make in India defense localization policy and are likely to attract positive interest. Such collaboration would allow Korea to expand its defense export portfolio while enabling India to diversify its military dependencies and advance its maritime ambitions.
There is also strong potential for joint leadership in advanced technology governance, particularly in artificial intelligence. India’s current efforts, together with Japan, to develop AI norms distinct from those of the United States and China create an opening for Korea. Korea possesses global competitiveness in AI-related infrastructure, including semiconductors, 5G/6G communications, and robotics, while India offers strengths in software development and access to a large data ecosystem. Through cooperation, the two countries could jointly promote reliable and transparent AI standards and shape global agendas. Initiatives such as a Seoul-Bangalore AI Initiative could support this goal by establishing joint research centers, facilitating researcher exchanges, and building startup collaboration platforms. Given India’s push to organize a coalition of developing countries in response to China-led AI norms, the current moment may represent an optimal window for Korea–India cooperation in this field.
India may also play a constructive role in issues related to the Korean Peninsula. Since establishing diplomatic relations with North Korea in 1973, India has maintained cordial ties while consistently supporting international nonproliferation norms. Following North Korea’s sixth nuclear test in 2017, India “strongly condemned” the action and joined UN Security Council sanctions. Amid Russia’s recent efforts to elevate North Korea’s international profile through platforms such as the SCO,28) India’s relatively neutral diplomatic channels could be leveraged to facilitate dialogue aimed at peace and phased denuclearization. Reports that India is preparing to reassign its ambassador to Pyongyang - vacant since the COVID-19 pandemic - further underscore this potential. While sensitive, such engagement could complement Korea’s broader diplomatic strategy.
Looking ahead, high-level exchanges between Korea and India should be actively pursued. Opportunities for a summit between President Lee Jae-myung and Prime Minister Modi are likely to arise around multilateral gatherings, including the UN General Assembly in late September 2025, the ASEAN Summit in Malaysia in late October, and the G20 Summit in South Africa in late November. These meetings could pave the way for a state visit to India by the Korean president in early 2026, serving as a turning point in bilateral relations. Two options merit consideration: participation as Chief Guest at India’s Republic Day celebrations on January 26, 2026 - following the precedent set in 2010 - or attendance at a Global AI Summit planned by the Indian government. The latter would provide a platform to formally launch a Korea-India AI cooperation initiative, announce concrete projects such as a Seoul-Bangalore joint AI research center, and advance joint work on AI governance standards and talent exchange.
Ultimately, how South Korea understands and utilizes India as a strategic partner is becoming an increasingly important challenge. Korea should maintain the ROK-U.S. alliance as the cornerstone of national security while strengthening cooperation with middle powers, including India, to advance constructive alternatives to a great-power-centric international order. At this critical juncture of global transformation, closer Korea–India collaboration in support of multipolarity and inclusive governance could help mitigate the sharpest tensions of U.S.-China competition and contribute to a more stable international environment. While Trump’s second term has introduced short-term disruptions in U.S.–India relations, it has also, paradoxically, opened new opportunities for Korea to deepen cooperation with India and pursue long-term strategic gains. Korea should seize this moment to build a forward-looking partnership with India in pursuit of regional and global peace and prosperity.
| Introduction
1) CNBC, “India’s nearly $87 billion exports to U.S. under threat due to Trump tariffs”, August 7, 2025.
2) Eduardo Baptista, “China’s Xi met Putin and Modi, as Trump’s shadow loomed”, Reuters, August 31, 2025.
3) Sputnik News India, “Modi’s China Visit: RIC Triangle Key to Multipolar World Order”, September 1, 2025.
4) Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. “Tianjin Declaration of the 2025 SCO Summit,” September 1, 2025, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/40076.
5) Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. "15th India-Japan Annual Summit Joint Statement: Partnership for Security and Prosperity of our Next Generation," August 29, 2025, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl%2F40062.
| U.S.-India Relations: The Unraveling of the Twenty-Five Years of Trust
6) Rezaul H. Laskar, “From ‘Howdy Modi’ to 50% tariffs: How Trump-Modi bromance turned sour”, Hindustan Times, August 10, 2025.
7) Ian Hall, “Donald Trump was once India’s best friend. How did it all go wrong?”, The Conversation, September 2, 2025.
8) Congressional Research Service. 2025. “India–U.S.: Major Arms Transfers and Military Exercises,” Report IF12438, May. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF12438.pdf.
9) United States Trade Representative, “India,” last modified July 31, 2025, https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/south-central-asia/india..
10) Al Jazeera, “India-Pakistan border clash leaves six soldiers dead”, May 15, 2025; Mujib Mashal, “Trump Claims He Prevented World War III Between India and Pakistan”, The New York Times, June 18, 2025.
11) Reuters. 2025. “Trump hosts Pakistani army chief, disagrees with India over India-Pakistan war mediation.” June 19. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/india-will-not-accept-third-party-mediation-relations-with-pakistan-modi-tells-2025-06-18.
12) Reuters, “Pakistan to nominate Trump for Nobel Peace Prize”, June 21, 2025
13) TRT World. 2025. “India’s Modi denies Trump brokered peace with Pakistan.” July 29. https://trt.global/world/article/0e522908cdb2.
14) Rajnath Singh. 2025. “No Foreign Pressure Behind Operation Sindoor Halt: Rajnath Singh.” Lok Sabha Speech, July 27. DD News. https://ddnews.gov.in/en/no-foreign-pressure-behind-operation-sindoor-halt-rajnath-singh.
15) The White House, “Executive Order on Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of the Russian Federation,” August 6, 2025, Presidential Actions,https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/08/addressing-threats-to-the-united-states-by-the-government-of-the-russian-federation/
16) Mujib Mashal & Suhasini Raj, “How Trump’s Nobel Prize Obsession Poisoned U.S.-India Relations”, The New York Times, August 30, 2025.
17) Peter Navarro. 2025. “India’s Oil Lobby Is Funding Putin’s War Machine — That Has to Stop: Its Dependence on Russian Crude Undermines the Effort to Isolate Moscow,” Financial Times. August 18, 2025.
18) Kurt M. Campbell and Jake Sullivan, “The Case for a U.S. Alliance With India: Washington Should Draw New Delhi Closer, Not Push It Away,” Foreign Affairs, September 4, 2025, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/india-alliance-jake-sullivan-kurt-campbell; Alex Zerden and Tamanna Salikuddin, “The Trump Administration Needs a Strategic Reset with India,” Atlantic Council, July 22, 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-trump-administration-needs-a-strategic-reset-with-india.
19) Happymon Jacob, "The Shocking Rift Between India and the United States: Can Progress in the Partnership Survive Trump?," Foreign Affairs, August 14, 2025, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/india/shocking-rift-between-india-and-united-states.
| India’s Calculations Become More Complex
20) Ministry of External Affairs (India), “PM Modi’s Remarks at 2025 SCO Summit (Tianjin)”, September 1, 2025
21) Reuters. 2025. “India Rejects China’s Latest Renaming of Places in Arunachal Border State.” May 14. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/india-rejects-chinas-latest-renaming-places-arunachal-border-state-2025-05-14/.
22) KNN India. 2025. “India–China Trade Deficit at USD 99.2 Bn, USD 161 Bn Export Potential Untapped: ICRIER Study.” August 29. https://knnindia.co.in/news/newsdetails/global/indiachina-trade-deficit-at-usd-992-bn-usd-161-bn-export-potential-untapped-icrier-study
23) Dolbaia, Tina, Vasabjit Banerjee, and Amanda Southfield. “Guns and Oil: Continuity and Change in Russia–India Relations.” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), August 22, 2025. https://www.csis.org/analysis/guns-and-oil-continuity-and-change-russia-india-relations
24) IDRW.org, “India Set to Bolster Air Defense with S-400 Deliveries; Fourth Regiment Expected by Q4 2025, Fifth by August 2026,” May 15, 2025, https://idrw.org/india-bolsters-air-defense-with-s-400-deliveries-fourth-regiment-expected-by-q4-2025-fifth-by-august-2026/. In fact, during “Operation Sindoor,” which India carried out following the Pahalgam terrorist attack in May 2025, India’s S-400 system successfully intercepted unmanned aerial vehicles and missiles launched from Pakistan’s northern bases, marking the first combat use of the system.
25) Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "Russia and India: A New Chapter," September 19, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2022/09/russia-and-india-a-new-chapter?lang=en.; ORF America. "The Decline of India-Russia Strategic Relations," Background Paper No. 28, January 5, 2025, https://orfamerica.org/newresearch/india-russia-strategic-relations.
26) The Economic Times. 2025. “India’s Bid to Make GPAI as AI Regulator Gets Global Support.” June 25. https://economictimes.com/tech/technology/indias-bid-to-make-gpai-as-ai-regulator-gets-global-support/articleshow/111439030.cms.
| Assessment and Implications
27) As the 2025 Munich Security Report observed, India is best understood not as a status-quo power or a revisionist power, but as a “participatory power” that supports gradual change in line with national interests. This framework helps explain why India is unlikely to spearhead efforts with China and Russia to dismantle the U.S.-led order altogether. (Munich Security Conference. 2024. Munich Security Report 2025: “India: Modi-fied Status.” Munich Security Conference, August 30. https://securityconference.org/publikationen/munich-security-report-2025/india/).
28) Umut Uras, “Iran, North Korea seek full SCO membership amid anti-Western sentiment”, Al Jazeera, September 1, 2025
※ The contents published on 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institue
