Sejong Focus

[Sejong Focus] The 2026 U.S. Midterm Elections and the Post-Trump International Order

Date 2026-11-04 View 228 Writer Yeocheol YOON

On November 3, the United States held midterm elections for all 435 House seats, 35 Senate seats, and 36 governorships. Midterm elections serve as a de facto referendum on a president’s performance midway through the term, and the president’s party tends to lose seats when it fails to meet the expectations set at the start of the administration.
Unofficial Translation
Sejong Focus Logo The 2026 U.S. Midterm Elections and the Post-Trump
International Order
November 4, 2026
Yeocheol YOON
Visiting Research Fellow, Sejong Institute | yoon.yeocheol@gmail.com
| Introduction
On November 3, the United States held midterm elections for all 435 House seats, 35 Senate seats, and 36 governorships. Midterm elections serve as a de facto referendum on a president’s performance midway through the term, and the president’s party tends to lose seats when it fails to meet the expectations set at the start of the administration. In this cycle, the opposition Democratic Party had been expected to make significant gains amid backlash against the increasingly unilateralist policies of the second Trump administration and against the president’s erratic conduct and corruption. Democratic control of the House had long been anticipated.1) The Senate, however, appeared likely to remain under Republican control, if narrowly, given that this year’s contested seats were concentrated in traditionally Republican-leaning states.
Yet as centrist voters and even some of Trump’s traditional base defected late in the race, the Democrats regained majority control of both the House and the Senate by wide margins. What had initially been expected to be a “blue wave” is now being described as a “blue tsunami.” The result is expected to have a significant impact not only on U.S. domestic politics but also on the international order. This midterm election drew greater global attention than previous ones, most likely because U.S.-centric foreign and security policy and an unconventional approach unbound by established frameworks have deepened since the start of Trump’s second term, heightening uncertainty across the international order and leaving many allies struggling to formulate their responses. The world has therefore been watching to see whether this election could mark a turning point in the direction of U.S. foreign policy, both for the remainder of Trump’s term and beyond.
Given the significance of these results, and although the Trump administration still has just over two years left in its term, it is necessary at this stage to assess how the midterm results affect the U.S. domestic political structure and foreign policy, as well as the policy direction a future Democratic administration might pursue and the future international order. It is also necessary to examine South Korea’s options.
Although Trump’s midterm defeat had a range of causes, the decisive factor in the rout is assessed to be a severe affordability crisis among voters, as the administration’s excessive and indiscriminate use of retaliatory tariffs, along with the tensions and military clashes it needlessly triggered in the Middle East, Ukraine, and elsewhere, caused a surge in global oil and commodity prices, fueling inflation and eroding real incomes. Other important factors included Trump’s approval rating, which had fallen to the low 30s and become a major liability for Republican candidates; declining support even within the Republican base amid Trump’s extreme anti-immigration policies and acts of violence by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents during deportation operations; the mass defection of Latino and Asian American voters who had backed Trump in the presidential election; and a sharp surge in public resentment of the brazen corruption serving the private interests of Trump and his family.
Following the Democrats’ larger-than-expected landslide victory in the midterm elections, some of the Republican Party’s traditional internationalists and national security hawks may find both the justification and the political space to argue that Trump-style adventurism has wrecked ordinary Americans’ livelihoods and the party itself, as well as an impetus to return to traditional diplomatic approaches. This could also help drive the formation of a “bipartisan coalition to safeguard alliances” in Congress, shape the political direction of 2028 presidential contenders, and, to some extent, curb the lingering effects of MAGA, which will persist in American society for some time.
Given Trump’s personal disposition, the prevailing expectation (the so-called “angry duck” scenario) is that, for the remainder of his term following the midterm defeat, rather than reflecting on his past conduct and changing course, he will domestically refuse to accept the midterm results, prolonging the turmoil and resisting congressional checks, while externally his executive-driven unilateralist policies and unpredictability will intensify further. Yet Trump’s fixation may well, conversely, bring American people’s fatigue with his unconventional policies to a peak and stoke a longing to return to the established, predictable norms. Although it is too early to predict, should the next administration be a Democratic one, it is expected to build on this sentiment to pursue the rebuilding of multilateralism and liberal order, while taking a “selective and hybrid multilateralism” approach grounded in a Jake Sullivan-style “foreign policy for the middle class” that reflects the grievances MAGA supporters have voiced to date and the populist leanings of the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) within the Democratic Party.
Meanwhile, how the war in Ukraine finally ends, as it emerges from heated debate between the Trump administration and the Democratic-controlled Congress, will indicate the direction of future U.S. engagement in international affairs. Europe, which has voiced concern over the United States’ departure from the traditional U.S.-led order and has urged its return, is likely to face limits in functioning as a unified partner for rebuilding multilateralism, as the ascendance of far-right parties such as France’s National Rally (RN) and Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD) shakes its internal cohesion.
During the two years remaining in Trump’s term, the South Korean government needs to capitalize on Trump’s obsession with his legacy and his characteristic transactionalism to pursue the revision of the ROK-U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (securing rights to low-level uranium enrichment and reprocessing) and U.S. approval for the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) as a package alongside bold investment in the United States, working to secure them early within Trump’s term. In addition, to prepare for the uncertainty surrounding the outcome of a North Korea-U.S. summit that could still be held late in Trump’s term, the government must strengthen ROK-U.S. communication and coordination while consolidating a firm ROK-U.S. defense posture against North Korea’s belligerence.
South Korea should frame the nuclear-powered submarine and nuclear energy capabilities that it is working to secure as a “core public good for Indo-Pacific allied defense,” establishing this framing across U.S. policy and political circles while building Democratic and bipartisan support for the ROK-U.S. alliance over the medium to long term. In trade relations as well, South Korea should negotiate to put the chaotic tariff policy of recent years on a mutually beneficial footing, while also working to restore the ROK-U.S. FTA as a foundation that supports the continued expansion of bilateral trade and allows South Korea’s future investment in the United States to expand efficiently.
| Factors Behind the Midterm Defeat of Trump and the Republican Party
Various factors, including cost-of-living concerns, reportedly not only rallied Democratic supporters but also led traditional Republican supporters to defect or lose the motivation to vote. In particular, Democratic candidates won Senate seats in states regarded as Republican strongholds, including Kansas (which elected its first Democratic senator since 1932), Texas, Ohio, Iowa, and Maine, as well as governorships in key states such as Texas, Georgia, and Ohio, bringing about the collapse of the formula that had delivered Trump’s 2024 presidential victory.
The Combination of Foreign Adventurism and Affordability
Foreign policy and national security issues are generally known not to be a major factor in U.S. domestic elections. Under the second Trump administration, however, unnecessary conflicts (wars of choice), such as unpredictable unilateral foreign interventions and aggressive military operations in the Middle East, as well as tariff threats, created instability in global energy supply chains, which led directly to a surge in international oil prices and maritime shipping costs and exerted strong upward pressure on U.S. import prices across the board. Scenes of ordinary Americans blaming Trump for gasoline prices at the pump and, particularly during the busy fall farming season, protesting rising diesel prices for farm equipment encapsulate the impact of this war on people’s livelihoods.2) At the same time, the spike in oil prices caused profits at major U.S. oil refiners to soar, which has also been pointed out as a factor that deepened inequality. Notably, the sweeping high tariffs imposed indiscriminately on allies and adversaries alike in the name of America First pushed up the prices of imported raw materials and consumer goods. In particular, retaliatory tariffs imposed by other countries closed off export markets to American farmers and manufacturers, increasing cost burdens across domestic industries.3)
This triggered an affordability crisis, a central issue since New York Mayor Zohran Mamdani’s election, and eroded support among Republican voters. As real household purchasing power collapsed under rising oil prices, soaring prices for groceries and daily necessities, and higher housing costs, suburban centrists and independent voters have come to regard Trump’s foreign policy not as protecting the national interest but as irresponsible foreign adventurism that wrecks household finances.4) According to an NBC News poll, 55 percent of voters said Trump’s policies had hurt the economy, and his approval rating on economic policy plummeted to 28 percent. The poll also found that 50 to 57 percent of voters cited soaring living costs, including gas, groceries, and housing, as the most pressing issue.5)
To voters, the Make America Great Again (MAGA) slogan had devolved into an “Unaffordable Policy” that brought hardship to ordinary Americans. As a result, foreign policy, which is not usually a decisive factor in U.S. elections, became an electoral liability this time because of its impact on livelihoods. The Trump administration’s sensitivity to this public discontent is evident in its reactions: it exempted Russian diesel from sanctions and pressured Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to halt strikes on Russian oil refineries.
Even before its impact on prices, the U.S.-Israel alliance’s involvement in the Iran War and the resulting geopolitical and economic shocks have drawn strong backlash from voters, with 62 percent of voters saying the war is not worth fighting.6) This is seen as having led to deep distrust of the Trump administration’s foreign and national security policies among ordinary voters.
Aversion to Trump Himself, and Corruption
Resentment over the way Trump dominates decision-making and runs the government has kept his job approval rating in the mid-to-upper 30s, a level lower than even the approval ratings of Bill Clinton and Barack Obama just before the crushing defeats of 1994 and 2010. As a result, many voters, including independents, framed this election as a vote against Trump, shifted their support to the Democratic Party, and rallied behind it in large numbers, with 52 percent of voters saying they would not vote for a candidate endorsed by Trump.7) Violence during ICE agents’ enforcement of Trump’s anti-immigration policy, including deaths and injuries, as well as adverse treatment of legal immigrants, disillusioned those who had initially supported the policy.8) Evangelical Christians, a pillar of Trump’s support, lost the motivation behind their blind support for his policies once the Supreme Court’s June 2022 ruling in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization achieved their goal of overturning Roe v. Wade, the 1973 decision that established women’s constitutional right to abortion. This loss of motivation has also been cited as one of the factors weakening the unity of his base.
Notably, Trump has used his office to secure private financial gains by spending public funds on events for personal purposes, by having foreign governments give him personal gifts or use facilities tied to his private businesses, and through cryptocurrency companies set up by his family. This corruption has generated as much attention and distrust as the recent affordability problem, intensifying the trend toward voting against Trump.9)
Because of this erosion of public support, candidates whom Trump recklessly backed, prioritizing MAGA loyalists over broader electoral appeal, suffered a string of defeats, and the Republican electoral strategy collapsed.10) As the scale of these losses grows, Trump is expected to face mounting blame, and criticism from traditional Republicans is likely to intensify.
Controversy over Domestic Policies Favoring the Wealthy
During his presidential campaign, Trump attacked Washington elites and claimed to protect the marginalized. Instead, he deepened inequality through a tax overhaul favoring the wealthy and pushed to cut spending on Medicaid, the health care assistance program for low-income people, accelerating the loss of centrist voters. In particular, 42 percent of voters said they would not vote for a candidate who supports the Republican Party’s 2025 tax and spending bill, which shows that resentment over economic inequality was reflected in voting intentions.
| Shifts in the U.S. Political Landscape After the Republican Defeat
In this midterm election, Republicans lost their majority in Congress after the first half of Trump’s second term, and Democrats won a landslide. As a result, the center of power in Washington is splitting sharply, an early lame-duck period is expected, and Trump’s camp is also expected to put up strong resistance.11) In other words, having lost control over legislation and the budget, Trump is, if anything, free of reelection pressure and highly likely to enter a phase in which he does what he wants through executive orders and summit diplomacy and tries to force through his legacy.12) As he has defiantly vowed to veto every bill passed by the Democratic-led Congress, there are even predictions that he will become not a lame duck, the term usually used for the waning of power at the end of a term, but an “angry duck,” consumed by rage and stopping at nothing.13)
However, Democratic control of the House is expected to significantly constrain the Trump administration’s policies through its power over the budget. With Democrats also holding a majority in the Senate, the administration is likely to have difficulty winning Senate confirmation not only for key executive branch officials but also for judicial nominees at all levels. This is likely to accelerate the lame-duck dynamic that Trump, who bears much of the responsibility for the Republican defeat, is already facing even within the Republican Party.
Meanwhile, on the domestic front, the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA), the left wing of the Democratic Party, has made major gains, defeating traditional Democratic candidates in recent primaries and securing nominations for a large number of general-election races. A key variable ahead of the 2028 presidential election is whether the DSA’s strongly progressive orientation, which Republican smear campaigns portray as “communist,” will instead end up hurting Democrats’ vote share overall.14)15) In addition, the affordability debate and the rise of the DSA may deepen a populist streak that differs from MAGA, one that focuses on inequality in American society and attacks the establishment and corporations.
The Republican defeat in the midterms, which proved more severe than expected, may give a stronger voice to a small group of veteran Republican lawmakers in the House and Senate who work on security and foreign policy, mainly internationalists and national security hawks who favor a traditional, Reagan-style Republican foreign policy. They could argue that Trump’s arbitrary tariffs and reckless provocation of conflicts drove up oil prices and hurt the party, and hold him responsible for the party’s rout.16) In that case, the standing of Trump loyalists (such as the Freedom Caucus) could wane, and traditional conservative views could begin to gain wider acceptance within the party.17) Depending on circumstances, Democratic congressional leaders and traditional Republican hawks could join forces to pass the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and legislation to reclaim trade authority, measures that would block outright Trump’s erratic threats to cut U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), his efforts to undermine NATO, and additional unilateral tariffs.
In addition, careful analysis is needed of how the “voter backlash over livelihoods” behind this election defeat will bring the nexus between future U.S. foreign policy and the livelihoods of ordinary citizens at home into focus, and how it will shape the views of international politics held by the 2028 presidential contenders. That is, Republican presidential hopefuls, having witnessed voters’ anger over the affordability crisis, may be expected to distance themselves from the extreme MAGA line and shift toward a “realist hegemonic diplomacy that prioritizes price stability and alliance cooperation.” A structural shift that limits, even if only partially, the lingering effects that the MAGA forces, which currently lead American conservatives, will leave behind also appears possible. Conversely, if the influence of the affordability issue drives American politics toward a competition between left-wing and right-wing populists and strengthens anti-corporate and protectionist tendencies, it could take the form of nation-first policies distinct from MAGA’s.
Of course, the MAGA movement is expected to continue to influence domestic U.S. politics for a considerable time. Trump may also continue to make his voice heard from outside government after he leaves office, as he did during President Biden’s term, but given his age and public fatigue, he seems unlikely to command the attention he once did. Vice President JD Vance, who will succeed Trump as leader of the MAGA camp, is also assessed to lack Trump’s charisma, which captivates his base, and his ability to mobilize crowds, and it is uncertain whether he can maintain, even without Trump, the influence that has so far derived from Trump. His record of disparaging Trump in the past may also reignite doubts about the consistency of his political conviction, or he may even shift outright to pragmatism or traditional Republican values. Given his moderate, pragmatic inclinations, it also appears uncertain whether Secretary of State Marco Rubio, another potential presidential contender, will remain a genuine ideological leader of MAGA beyond the efforts he has made so far to earn Trump’s trust, and he is not expected to take on a role in strengthening the MAGA line going forward. Conversely, there is also talk that they could distance themselves from Trump, turn to a pragmatic line, rebuild the traditional Republican Party, and take the lead in the 2028 presidential race.
| Shifts in U.S. Foreign Policy and Outlook for the International Order and the Korean Peninsula
The International Order
The more Trump resists pressure to normalize policy after the midterm defeat and repeats his erratic unilateral behavior, the more American voters’ confusion and fatigue will reach a peak.18) This could give the next Democratic candidate a strong political impetus to pursue the restoration of predictable multilateral norms.19)
The way the war in Ukraine ends will also be a decisive variable shaping the international order going forward: (1) a settlement during Trump’s term that tolerates Putin’s aggression, such as an imposed territorial freeze, is feared to justify American isolationism, weaken bipartisan cohesion, and entrench both the dissolution of NATO and the solidarity of “CRINK”; (2) if the war ends after Trump’s term in the form of a multilateral security guarantee linked to NATO, with active European defense burden-sharing combined with an orderly American security guarantee, this could lay the foundation for U.S.-Europe cooperation and also create an opening for the United States to try to rebuild “responsible multilateralism,” which traditional Republicans and Democrats share.
However, having already experienced the unpredictability of Trump’s unilateralist policies, Europe appears likely to keep pursuing “strategic autonomy” as a hedge against uncertainty, even if the United States makes efforts to return to a traditional approach. Meanwhile, the rise of far-right forces within Europe, such as France’s National Rally (RN) and Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD), could paralyze the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Compounded by rifts in security perceptions between Eastern and Western Europe, this could severely constrain Europe’s capacity as a partner in restoring multilateralism and leave it out of step with the United States. The possibility is also emerging that even efforts by some in the United States to return to the traditional order and role will fail to gain momentum.
Outlook for the Direction of U.S. Foreign Policy
Previously, the Biden administration sought a return to multilateralism and a liberal rules-based order in order to move beyond the effects of Trump’s aberrant first-term policies. In practice, however, it strongly aimed to expand the competitiveness of the U.S. economy and the benefits to the American public through the “foreign policy for the middle class” that Jake Sullivan built by combining security, industrial, and trade strategies, and through legislation centered on American industry (the Inflation Reduction Act and the CHIPS and Science Act). These policies, which put the country’s own interests first, offset the administration’s domestic political vulnerability. If a new Democratic administration takes office, it is expected to make every effort to restore alliances and multilateral partnerships while drawing on this pragmatic approach to win over some citizens who are still loyal to America-centrism.20)
Accordingly, because the U.S. government cannot abandon demands to rebuild domestic manufacturing and protect workers in order to address voters’ grievances over livelihoods, the outcome in trade is expected to be a “selective and hybrid multilateralism” that retains Buy American.
Issues Concerning the Korean Peninsula
As American isolationist tendencies are substantially corrected through cooperation between some traditional Republicans and Democrats, the norms-based order could, for the time being, be strongly reshaped around key minilateral networks such as the ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral, AUKUS, and the Quad. A best-case scenario also cannot be ruled out: to deter the authoritarian alignment of China, Russia, and North Korea and gain the upper hand in geopolitical competition, the U.S. Congress and the next administration shift to a stance of approving, from a realist perspective, the strengthening of the defense capabilities of a trustworthy ally (South Korea) and its securing of a peaceful nuclear fuel cycle. That said, with the war in Ukraine continuing, there is concern that internal divisions in Europe and closer strategic ties between North Korea and Russia will keep the geopolitical gray zones of Eastern Europe and Northeast Asia unstable.
Pressure from a Democratic-led Congress, emboldened by its landslide midterm victory, for strict hearings and denuclearization verification appears highly likely to block headline-grabbing agreements to a considerable extent. Even so, it is not out of the question that Trump will try to leave one last mark through a surprise North Korea-U.S. summit during his remaining term, as shown by his recent remark on a cryptocurrency theft case, in which he said he would use the case as a topic for talks with North Korea and signaled expectations for the possibility of a meeting.21) In addition, North Korea, too, is closely watching the results of the midterm elections, and rather than enter an uncertain and risky negotiation with a Trump who has been weakened to the point that long-term implementation can hardly be guaranteed, it appears likely to maintain its existing solidarity with China and Russia and hold to a defensive posture through its “two hostile states” doctrine and bellicose threats toward South Korea.
| Policy Recommendations
Goals to Achieve During the Remainder of Trump’s Term
For the South Korean government, the two years remaining in Trump’s term should be used to capitalize fully on his fixation on his legacy and his transactionalism. The goal should be to realize a swift exchange of the large-scale investment in the United States reached with Trump for approval of nuclear-powered submarine development and uranium enrichment and reprocessing. To Trump, who is under pressure to cement his legacy and show results, South Korea should present a bold package that includes building a naval ship maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) hub in the United States, investment to revive the U.S. shipbuilding industry, and supplies of artillery shells and other military materiel, and in return induce him to commit, through a leader-level decision at the White House, to approving the acquisition of Korean-model nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) on terms comparable to Australia’s under AUKUS and permitting the enrichment and reprocessing of reactor fuel at a level comparable to Japan’s.22)
In particular, for revising the ROK-U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, it is necessary to make every possible effort to proactively conclude, within Trump’s term, an administration-level memorandum of understanding (MOU) on revising the agreement or a joint statement that lays the basic framework, before traditional Republicans reject Trump’s decision and before some inflexible nonproliferation advocates take office in the Democratic administration that follows.
Building Bipartisan Support in the U.S. Congress
Following the midterm elections, the South Korean government should engage intensively with senior Democratic members of the congressional foreign affairs and armed services committees and with mainstream conservative Republican lawmakers who will make a comeback after Trumpism, making the case that the nuclear energy and nuclear-powered submarine capabilities South Korea stands to acquire are an essential asset that lightens the U.S. security burden and shares responsibility for deterring China and North Korea. By securing bipartisan support during the remainder of Trump’s term, it should put in place a basic framework for implementing the agreements on U.S. support for nuclear-powered submarines and for enrichment and reprocessing. Even after a new administration takes office, it should keep up this momentum by underscoring that the matter is essential to strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance in a changed international security environment marked by developments such as the emergence of CRINK cooperation, so that it can be completed without delay.23) In addition, it should induce the United States to write into the NDAA not only provisions blocking reductions of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) but also supplementary provisions supporting ROK-U.S. cooperation in nuclear energy and naval capabilities, thereby creating a safeguard, removing uncertainty over U.S. defense commitments, and solidifying the foundation for stability on the Korean Peninsula.
Managing Security on the Korean Peninsula
As a matter of principle, the South Korean government needs to make efforts to create opportunities for inter-Korean dialogue and ease tensions between the two Koreas. At the same time, in preparation for a North Korea-U.S. summit whose outcome is hard to predict, it should strengthen communication and coordination with the United States and work to lay the foundation for dialogue, while making clear that an increase in North Korea’s military threats against South Korea and a weakening of South Korea’s deterrence against North Korea are red lines it cannot accept. In addition, given North Korea’s increasingly belligerent posture since it proclaimed its two hostile states doctrine, and the offensive capabilities it has strengthened through combat experience gained from its involvement in the war in Ukraine, South Korea should qualitatively strengthen its combined defense readiness posture with the United States and accelerate completion of the Korean-style three-axis system.
Separately, on the transition of wartime operational control (OPCON), if it is completed within the Trump administration’s term, efforts should be made to build, on the basis of mutual trust, a command structure in which a South Korean commander can lead the ROK-U.S. combined forces without problems and the deployment of reinforcements and strategic assets in a contingency is not impeded. If an early agreement cannot be reached and the timing of the transition passes to the next administration, South Korea should secure additional U.S. measures to keep strengthening combined forces under the current arrangement while impressing upon the United States its determination to strengthen the alliance.
In preparation for the next Democratic administration in the United States, the South Korean government should maintain broad communication with pro-Korea Democratic lawmakers and governors who are potential presidential candidates, convey South Korea’s determination to strengthen its role within the alliance, and underscore that nuclear-powered submarines, nuclear fuel, and OPCON transition are necessary for that purpose, thereby sustaining momentum on the issues of interest to South Korea. In addition, in the process of resetting ROK-U.S. relations with the new administration, it should draw on the support of traditional Republicans to institutionalize the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) on a bipartisan basis and establish it as a permanent combined deterrence body linked to field training exercises.
Adapting to the Post-Trump Order
Even if the United States strengthens its Buy American protectionist barriers under broad domestic populist pressure, the South Korean government should leverage the local investment in the United States and the job creation that began during Trump’s term to develop mechanisms that circumvent these barriers and secure tangible gains for South Korea through joint research and development and co-production of strategic goods. Meanwhile, although the new U.S. administration will also make efforts to sort out Trump’s chaotic tariff policies as a whole, the South Korean government should likewise work to have the ROK-U.S. FTA reactivated promptly, given its immense contribution to expanding trade between the two countries. In particular, it should persuade the United States that restoring the FTA early is urgent for the early realization of the various investment projects pledged during Trump’s term and for contributions to domestic technology sharing and job creation.
While expanding its role within the alliance, strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance, and building trust, South Korea should also maintain communication with middle powers such as Japan, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, exchange strategies for responding to the rapidly changing world order, and cooperate closely with them where necessary. In addition, while preparing for a weakening of EU-level cohesion resulting from the far-right shift in major European countries, it is advisable for South Korea to apply differentiated strategies to individual European countries and expand and manage K-defense and military maintenance networks centered on Poland, the three Baltic states, and Romania, which face the Russian threat.
Since South Korea has sufficiently expressed its displeasure over Ukraine’s violation of a nonpublic agreement, it would be prudent to manage the bilateral relationship going forward through behind-the-scenes negotiations. South Korea should not view this issue solely in terms of the practical benefits of taking part in postwar Ukrainian reconstruction. Rather, it needs to consider the meaning of the war in Ukraine as seen from the perspective of free world countries working with South Korea, and to view the matter from the standpoint of managing South Korea’s international “trust capital.”24) Taking into account the possibility that, if a new Democratic administration is established in the United States, it will shift to a stance of actively supporting Ukraine in cooperation with Europe, South Korea should consider an appropriate sequence of future responses.

  1. The Economist, 2026.10.19. Republicans stare down the midterms barrel
  2. Al Jazeera, 2026.9.7. Iran war: How US consumers spent an additional $100bn on fuel
  3. PBS News, 2026.4.13. Already under financial pressure, farmers squeezed further by tariffs and Iran war
  4. Time Magazine, 2026.9.13. Iran War Has Cost U.S. Nearly $40 Billion and Fueled Inflation, CBO Finds
  5. NBC News (2026.9.20.) Most voters say Trump has hurt the economy
  6. Ibid.
  7. Ibid.
  8. Trump’s MAGA supporters derided Republicans who disagree with them as RINOs (Republicans in name only), but Republican opponents of Trump are reportedly announcing their break with him by calling him a RITO (Republican in theory only).
  9. CBS Polling Partners (2026.10.26.) 83% of voters state that government corruption is a major factor in the congressional vote.
  10. In the Senate race in Texas, a Republican stronghold, Trump endorsed Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton rather than incumbent Senator John Cornyn, but Paxton lost by a wide margin to the Democratic candidate, Talarico.
  11. Washington Post, 2026.10.20. Would Trump accept GOP midterm losses? 7 in 10 Americans doubt it.
  12. CNN, 2026.10.22. Midterms and Iran: Congress could change hands, but Trump would still control the war
  13. CBS News, 2026.11.3. Trump says he is prepared to use “tremendous powers” if Democrats take control
  14. AP, 2026.7.26. Republicans decry a new Democratic Socialists of America platform as Dem primaries split the party
  15. Politico, 2026.6.24. Democratic socialists are coming for 2028
  16. Polish Institute of International Affairs, 2026.7. The Republican Party ahead of the 2026 midterms
  17. The Atlantic, 2026.9.25. The Republicans Are Bolting From Trump
  18. Kristen Soltis Anderson (NYT Opinion, 2026.5.5.) Trump Is Losing Normie Republicans
  19. Philip Gordon (Foreign Affairs, 2026.6.9.) Don’t Give Up on Global Order
  20. Rana Foroohar (FT Opinion 2026.10.9.) Foreign policy matters — and the Democrats need one
  21. 머니 투데이 (2026.11.1.) 트럼프 "바이낸스 해킹, 소행 확인되면 북한과 대화"
  22. 박인국 (조선일보, 2026.10.12.) 이재명 외교, ‘골키퍼 없는 페널티킥’ 놓칠 것인가
  23. 마이클 그린 (중앙일보, 2026.10.22.) 트럼피즘의 종말
  24. 이재승 (중앙시평, 2026.10.20.) 우크라이나 전쟁, 우리가 놓치고 있는 것들
※ The opinions expressed in Sejong Focus are those of the author and do not represent the official views of the Sejong Institute.
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