Ⅰ. Why the Reprocessing Debate Must Be Reopened

The April 3, 2026 Korea–France summit elevated bilateral relations to a “Global Strategic Partnership” and led to the signing of a comprehensive MOU on nuclear fuel cycle cooperation between Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP) and Orano, France’s state-controlled nuclear fuel-cycle company.1) However, the agreement appears to focus primarily on cooperation in new reactor construction and nuclear fuel supply, while spent nuclear fuel reprocessing has not yet been treated as a core agenda item. Nevertheless, the establishment of an institutional framework for Korea–France nuclear cooperation may be regarded as creating a political opportunity to begin more substantive discussions on cooperation on the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, encompassing all stages of nuclear fuel management following reactor use, including spent fuel storage, reprocessing, and final disposal. This paper examines the feasibility and conditions for such cooperation and proposes a realistic policy roadmap.

South Korea’s spent nuclear fuel problem has long been treated as a “long-term challenge” that would eventually have to be addressed at some point in the future. However, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy’s 2023 reassessment undermines this complacent assumption. According to the revised estimate, spent fuel storage facilities are expected to reach saturation at Hanbit in 2030, Hanul in 2031, and Kori in 2032, one to two years earlier than projected at the end of 2021.2) https://www.motie.go.kr/kor/article/ATCL8764a1224/155118306/view Once storage capacity reaches its actual limit, operations of the affected reactors could be suspended under the Nuclear Safety Act. The issue therefore extends beyond waste management and poses a direct challenge to South Korea’s power-sector policy and energy security.

Domestic debate over this issue generally falls into two broad approaches. One emphasizes final disposal, arguing that spent nuclear fuel is ultimately radioactive waste and that priority should therefore be placed on interim storage and permanent disposal systems. The other adopts a fuel-cycle approach, arguing that spent nuclear fuel should not be viewed solely as waste, but also in terms of its potential for reprocessing and reuse. In practice, however, these two approaches are less contradictory than they appear. They are closer to complementary approaches operating on different timelines.

In South Korea’s case, moreover, spent nuclear fuel reprocessing is not merely a matter of technical policy. It simultaneously involves the U.S.–ROK Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, international nonproliferation norms, Washington’s prior consent rights, the precedents established by France and Japan, domestic acceptance in nuclear plant host regions, and long-term energy security considerations. This paper therefore examines the seriousness of South Korea’s spent fuel storage challenge, compares U.S. and French reprocessing capabilities, assesses the implications of Japan–France cooperation, and reviews policy options centered on a realistic roadmap for Korea–France cooperation.

Ⅱ. South Korea’s Spent Nuclear Fuel Problem and the Response of the Government and National Assembly

As of 2026, South Korea operates 26 commercial nuclear reactors and ranks among the world’s top five nuclear power producers.3) YYet the problem of spent nuclear fuel generated by reactor operations has accumulated for more than four decades as an unresolved national challenge. All spent fuel is currently stored in temporary facilities located at reactor sites, while neither interim storage facilities nor permanent disposal repositories have been secured. Some observers note that, among the world’s ten largest nuclear power-generating countries, only South Korea and India have not even initiated the process of selecting a final disposal site.

The most significant domestic response has been the enactment of the Special Act on High-Level Radioactive Waste Management (hereafter “Special Act on High-Level Waste”), which passed the National Assembly plenary session on February 27, 2025 and was promulgated on March 25, 2025.4) The law sets targets for the operation of an interim storage facility before 2050 and a final disposal repository before 2060, while also institutionalizing the establishment of a High-Level Radioactive Waste Management Committee under the Prime Minister and codifying site-selection procedures.

The decision to set such long-term target dates reflects a combination of technical and socio-political factors. Technically, the construction of a high-level waste repository constitutes one of the world’s most complex geological and civil engineering projects. Geological surveys and safety evaluations during the site-selection phase alone generally require 10 to 15 years, while the subsequent stages of design, construction, and test operations may require an additional 20 to 25 years or more. Finland’s Onkalo repository, widely regarded as the world’s most advanced high-level disposal project, illustrates this reality well: more than 40 years have passed since research first began in 1983, yet the facility has still not reached full completion.

More decisive, however, are the social and political constraints. South Korea experienced severe conflict during the 2003–2005 Buan radioactive waste disposal controversy, when intense local opposition derailed the project. Even after that episode, securing sites for low- and intermediate-level waste facilities required decades of political negotiation and public persuasion. Given that high-level waste repositories are likely to generate far stronger local resistance, the target dates of 2050 and 2060 ultimately reflected what lawmakers considered politically achievable timelines. In this sense, the schedule embodied not only the technical realities of repository construction, but also a political compromise intended to manage future conflicts over site selection. The committee held its first meeting in February 2026, and by April 2026 it had reached its full nine-member composition with the appointment of National Assembly-recommended members.5)

Yet the enactment of the Special Act does not in itself resolve the problem. A gap of roughly 20 to 30 years remains between the law’s target timetable (2050–2060) and the expected saturation of on-site storage facilities (2030–2032). Bridging this gap will require short-term measures, including the expansion of dry storage at reactor sites and related regulatory adjustments. Dry storage refers to a system in which spent fuel, after sufficient cooling, is sealed in metal containers and stored within reinforced concrete structures, using air or inert gas rather than water for cooling and shielding.

At the same time, South Korea’s ability to secure reprocessing capabilities remains structurally constrained under the current U.S.–ROK Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, signed in 2015 and valid through 2035, which requires written U.S. consent.6) The so-called “prior consent right” means that South Korea must obtain advance written approval from the United States before transferring, reprocessing, or enriching nuclear material or related technology originally provided by the United States. Because this provision effectively applies to virtually all nuclear fuel used in South Korea’s reactors, U.S. consent constitutes a legal precondition for any reprocessing cooperation with France.

Nevertheless, the fact sheet released after the 2025 U.S.–ROK summit stated that the United States “supports a pathway leading to peaceful civilian uranium enrichment and used fuel reprocessing for South Korea.”7) This language is notable because it creates at least some political space for future negotiations and possible revisions to the bilateral agreement.

In terms of reprocessing technology, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) is currently conducting research on pyroprocessing, an electrochemical dry reprocessing technology. However, commercialization is expected to require considerable time. Pyroprocessing has the advantage of offering greater proliferation resistance because it avoids the isolation of pure plutonium, but the technology remains limited to the pilot-scale Advanced Spent Fuel Conditioning Process Facility (ACPF), which currently processes only about 0.2 tons annually8) Accordingly, in the short to medium term, South Korea is likely to have little choice but to consider multiple options, including overseas contract reprocessing.

Ⅲ. U.S. and French Reprocessing Capabilities: A Structural Comparison

1. The United States: A Gatekeeper, Not an Industrial Partner

The United States is the most important rule-setter in the global nuclear order and the country with the greatest influence over South Korea’s nuclear policy. From an industrial perspective, however, the United States is not in a position to directly solve South Korea’s spent nuclear fuel problem. As the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) itself notes, there are currently no operating commercial reprocessing facilities in the United States.9) Commercial reprocessing in the United States was effectively halted following the Carter administration’s 1977 shift toward a stronger nonproliferation policy. Although the Reagan administration reversed that policy in 1981, commercial facilities were never restarted because of economic considerations.

To be sure, the H-Canyon facility at the Savannah River Site (SRS), operated under the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), remains the only functioning radiologically shielded chemical separation facility in the United States. However, its role is limited to defense, research, and federal asset management purposes. It does not provide commercial reprocessing services for international clients.10) The second Trump administration issued an executive order in May 2025 directing a review of spent nuclear fuel reprocessing and recycling, but considerable time would still be required before such a policy could translate into commercially available reprocessing services.11)

In short, the importance of the United States lies less in its industrial capability than in its regulatory authority. A substantial portion of South Korea’s spent nuclear fuel is classified as U.S.-obligated material. This means that if the uranium used in the fuel originated in the United States or was enriched or processed using U.S. technology, South Korea may own the fuel itself, but any transfer to a third country or any reprocessing activity still requires prior written U.S. consent. Accordingly, both third-country transfer and reprocessing fall under the scope of the U.S.–ROK Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. Even if South Korea pursues cooperation with France, prior consultation with Washington is unavoidable. This is both a political reality and a legal one. South Korea must therefore position the United States accurately as a partner that must be included politically, but cannot realistically serve as the lead industrial implementer.

2. France: The West’s Only Practical Back-End Fuel Cycle Partner

France’s comparative advantage lies in its ability to maintain the entire back end of the nuclear fuel cycle as an integrated industrial chain. The La Hague reprocessing complex operated by Orano is the world’s largest commercial reprocessing center, with a licensed capacity of 1,700 tHM (tonnes of heavy metal) per year. By 2024, the facility had processed more than 36,000 tons of spent nuclear fuel cumulatively.12) Through the PUREX (Plutonium Uranium Redox EXtraction) process, roughly 96 percent of spent nuclear fuel is recovered as reusable material, including approximately 95 percent uranium and 1 percent plutonium. The recovered plutonium is then fabricated into MOX (Mixed Oxide) fuel at the Melox facility in Marcoule,13) which has a licensed capacity of 195 tHM annually.14)

France’s continued commitment to reprocessing reflects more than simple economic logic. Lacking abundant domestic energy resources, France adopted maximum uranium utilization as a national strategy and now derives roughly one-quarter of its nuclear electricity generation from recycled nuclear material. The “Aval du Futur” (“Downstream of the Future”) program announced in 2024 includes multi-billion-euro investments extending through 2040–2050, including construction of the new UP4 reprocessing plant at La Hague to replace the existing UP2-800 and UP3 facilities, as well as construction of Melox 2 at Marcoule. This demonstrates that France views reprocessing not as a short-term commercial undertaking,15) but as a central pillar of its long-term national nuclear energy strategy extending into the second half of the twenty-first century.

At the same time, South Korea must clearly recognize the legal limitations surrounding cooperation with France. Article L.542-2 of the French Environmental Code explicitly prohibits the permanent storage of foreign radioactive waste in France.16) Accordingly, while France may process South Korean spent nuclear fuel, it cannot permanently assume responsibility for South Korea’s final radioactive waste. All residual waste generated through reprocessing would have to be returned to South Korea. This means that any bilateral cooperation framework would require detailed prior arrangements regarding waste return conditions, ownership of recovered materials, transportation procedures, and related safety measures.

Ⅳ. The Japan–France Cooperation Model and Its Implications for South Korea

Cooperation between Japan and France represents the most concrete and empirically relevant precedent for South Korea. Between 1977 and 1978, Japan obtained U.S. acquiescence and concluded overseas reprocessing contracts with France and the United Kingdom. Until completion of its domestic reprocessing facility at Rokkasho, Japan relied for decades on French reprocessing services while simultaneously accumulating technical expertise and operational experience. The Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant, whose design was modeled on La Hague technology, began construction in 1993 and was originally scheduled for completion in 1997. However, completion has been delayed more than twenty-seven times, and the facility is now targeting initial operations in the second half of fiscal year 2027. These prolonged delays resulted from the interaction of five major factors.

First, there were technical failures. While the core reprocessing technology itself was imported from France, the vitrification system independently designed by Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited (JNFL)—the final-stage process that solidifies high-level liquid waste into glass form—experienced repeated structural problems, including platinum-group element precipitation, deformation of stirring rods, and detachment of interior wall tiles. These failures reflected the consequences of only partial technology transfer. Second was the collapse of plutonium demand. The Monju fast breeder reactor, which had been designed as the principal consumer of plutonium separated through reprocessing, was effectively abandoned after the 1995 sodium leak accident and subsequent safety-management failures, ultimately leading to its decommissioning in 2016. As a result, separated plutonium inventories continued to accumulate without sufficient downstream utilization. Third, safety regulations were strengthened following the Fukushima disaster. After 2011, Japan’s Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) introduced new regulatory standards requiring repeated large-scale modifications, including reinforced seismic protection and additional severe-accident response systems. Fourth was the absence of independent oversight. Because JNFL’s major shareholders were simultaneously involved as contractors, structural conflicts of interest undermined effective internal cost control. Fifth was local political entrenchment. Over several decades, the economy of Rokkasho Village became heavily dependent on the facility, creating a political environment in which major policy reversals became increasingly difficult.17)

Japan–France nuclear cooperation has continued to deepen in recent years. In May 2023, the Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan (FEPC) and Orano agreed to cooperate on demonstration research and development for the reprocessing of spent MOX fuel. The originally planned reprocessing volume of approximately 200 tons was expanded in February 2025 to 400 tons, including 20 tons of spent MOX fuel.18) Building on this framework, Orano and the Nuclear Reprocessing Organization of Japan (NuRO) signed a major contract on January 20, 2026, covering the reprocessing of spent fuel from Kansai Electric Power reactors. On March 25, 2026, the two governments formalized the arrangement through an exchange of diplomatic notes.19) Furthermore, at the Japan–France 2+2 Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting held on April 1, 2026, the two governments adopted a joint declaration promoting cooperation in fast reactor development (next-generation reactors that use fast neutrons to burn and utilize plutonium and other actinides as fuel), nuclear fuel cycle advancement, and fusion energy research. This demonstrated that Japan–France nuclear fuel cycle cooperation is evolving beyond simple contract reprocessing toward broader joint development of next-generation nuclear technologies.

The Japanese experience offers five major lessons for South Korea. First, prior U.S. consent is an indispensable prerequisite. Japan was able to pursue overseas reprocessing in France because the revised 1988 U.S.–Japan Nuclear Cooperation Agreement granted Tokyo comprehensive long-term consent rights for reprocessing and uranium enrichment below 20 percent. Securing comparable authority remains a fundamental prerequisite for South Korea as well. Second, the phased roadmap of “contract reprocessing → technological cooperation → domestic facility construction” has demonstrated practical effectiveness. By consigning approximately 7,100 tons of spent nuclear fuel to France and the United Kingdom over several decades, Japan accumulated technological expertise while laying the groundwork for its own domestic reprocessing infrastructure. Third, technology transfer must be comprehensive and complete. The repeated failures in Rokkasho’s vitrification facilities illustrate the risks of incomplete technology transfer in which only core processes are transferred while auxiliary systems are independently designed. South Korea should therefore ensure that any future agreement with France explicitly includes full-process technology transfer, access to detailed design documentation, and direct participation by Korean engineers in operational processes. Fourth, plutonium supply and demand must be balanced in advance. Japan constructed its reprocessing infrastructure before securing a stable downstream plutonium consumption framework, only to see the fast breeder reactor program effectively collapse afterward. This sequence produced a serious plutonium surplus problem. South Korea must therefore establish concrete plans for the utilization of separated uranium and plutonium before pursuing large-scale reprocessing infrastructure. Fifth, an intergovernmental legal framework must precede corporate contracts. As demonstrated by the 2026 Japan–France exchange of notes, government-level legal arrangements are essential for providing political legitimacy and regulatory stability to subsequent industrial cooperation.

At the same time, the Japanese case also offers four major warnings. First is the rapid accumulation of separated plutonium. As of the end of 2024, Japan possessed approximately 44.4 tons of separated plutonium—8.6 tons domestically and 35.8 tons stored in France and the United Kingdom. In theoretical terms, this quantity could correspond to roughly 5,500 nuclear warheads, continuing to generate international nonproliferation concerns. Second is the extraordinary escalation of costs. Construction costs for the Rokkasho facility increased to roughly five times the original estimate, while total projected costs over forty years—including operations and decommissioning—have risen to approximately ¥15.6 trillion (roughly US$104 billion), far exceeding initial expectations. Third is the danger posed by the absence of independent governance. When project operators and contractors share overlapping interests, effective cost control becomes exceedingly difficult. Fourth is the risk of local dependency and policy lock-in. Once local communities become economically dependent on nuclear facilities, major policy adjustments become politically difficult to implement.20) Taken together, these warnings21) suggest that while South Korea may draw important lessons from the Japanese model, any Korean adaptation must incorporate much stricter conditions emphasizing minimized stockpiles, enhanced international monitoring, and close linkage between reprocessing capacity and actual downstream demand.

Ⅴ. Directions for Korea–France Cooperation and Policy Recommendations

1. Principles of Cooperation: Not a “Comprehensive Solution,” but a “Strategic Bridge”

The first misconception South Korea must abandon in pursuing cooperation with France is the expectation that France can somehow solve South Korea’s spent nuclear fuel problem in its entirety. Such an expectation is inconsistent both with the French legal framework and with geopolitical realities. Instead, South Korea should position France as a partner serving three distinct purposes. First, in the short term, France can provide processing and demonstration options capable of easing immediate storage saturation pressures. Second, in the medium term, cooperation with France can allow South Korea to accumulate practical experience in recycled fuel management and in the institutional operation of the back-end fuel cycle, including reprocessing and recycling systems. Third, in the long term, France can serve as a comparative model for designing South Korea’s own national back-end fuel cycle strategy, including reprocessing, storage, and disposal policies.

Korea–France cooperation should therefore be designed not merely as a technology-import arrangement, but as a reciprocal strategic partnership. France requires a stable long-term customer base in order to recover investments associated with the Aval du Futur program. South Korea, meanwhile, possesses world-class capabilities in nuclear plant construction and operation, shipbuilding, defense industries, and digital process management, as well as opportunities for joint expansion into third-country nuclear markets. The more Seoul frames cooperation not simply as the purchase of processing services, but as a broader package combining long-term offtake agreements, industrial cooperation, and joint research, the greater the room for strategic negotiation will become.

2. A Phased Roadmap

In the short term (2026–2027), the key priorities should include launching a joint Korea–France feasibility study, expanding personnel exchanges, institutionalizing regulatory dialogue, and simultaneously conducting high-level consultations with the United States. Any attempt by Seoul to first conclude a comprehensive MOU with France and only afterward persuade Washington would risk simultaneously provoking nonproliferation controversy and generating distrust within the alliance. What is therefore required is a structure of “parallel coordination,” in which Korea–France feasibility discussions and confidential Korea–U.S. policy consultations proceed simultaneously.

In the medium term (2027–2030), assuming revision of the Korea–U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreement and the securing of comprehensive prior consent rights, South Korea could pursue a pilot overseas contracted reprocessing project at La Hague while preparing facilities for the return and management of residual waste from reprocessing. The central argument presented to the United States should be straightforward: the objective is not to acquire greater plutonium-separation capability, but rather to achieve better management and stronger control by easing storage saturation pressures through transparent cooperation with a responsible partner.

In the long term (2030–2040), South Korea should dispatch technical personnel to France’s planned UP4 facility, deepen joint research on pyroprocessing technologies, and comprehensively redesign its own national back-end fuel cycle policy, including interim storage, disposal strategies, recycling options, and the possible development of domestic facilities. At the same time, it must be clearly recognized that constructing a domestic reprocessing facility cannot serve as a short-term solution to storage shortages. Meaningful progress in domestic storage and disposal policy, together with strengthened international safeguards and oversight mechanisms, must come first.

3. Policy Recommendations

Based on the above analysis, the following policy recommendations may be proposed.

First, before debating the merits or drawbacks of reprocessing itself, both the government and the National Assembly should prioritize the rapid implementation of the Special Act on High-Level Radioactive Waste Management and the establishment of an independent management framework. Expansion of dry-storage capacity and accelerated implementation of the legislation are domestic measures that must take precedence over any international cooperation initiative with France.

Second, the government should ensure that Korea–France cooperation moves beyond symbolic summit declarations by institutionalizing within the next two years a joint feasibility study, personnel-exchange programs, and formal regulatory dialogue channels. In particular, the Korea–U.S. High Level Bilateral Commission on Civil Nuclear Cooperation (HLBC) should be reactivated as quickly as possible in order to facilitate parallel prior consultations with Washington.

Third, under the leadership of the Presidential National Security Office, the government should establish an interagency strategic task force involving the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, the Ministry of Science and ICT, the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission, KHNP, and KAERI. The purpose of such a mechanism would be to integrate negotiations with both the United States and France into a single strategic framework. Without such coordination, inconsistencies in messaging and rushed and uncoordinated policy moves could easily emerge.

Fourth, in discussions with the United States, South Korea should avoid foregrounding the “need for reprocessing” itself. Instead, Seoul should frame cooperation in terms of storage-saturation management, strengthened international oversight, and limited and phased demonstration projects conducted with responsible partner countries. Washington’s primary concern is not the word “reprocessing” itself, but rather the possibility of uncontrolled plutonium-separation capabilities (i.e., the capacity to extract weapons-usable plutonium through reprocessing) and the broader symbolic implications for the nonproliferation regime.

Fifth, South Korea should adopt the strengths of the Japanese experience while avoiding its pitfalls. In practical terms, this means establishing strict upper limits on plutonium stockpiles, accepting resident/on-site IAEA and U.S. verification mechanisms, and clearly codifying waste-return obligations within contractual arrangements. Most importantly, South Korea must view France not simply as a service provider, but as a long-term strategic partner in developing national capabilities for managing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle.

South Korea’s spent nuclear fuel problem is no longer an issue to be addressed “someday in the future.” It has already become an urgent national challenge. The convergence of impending storage saturation in the early 2030s, the initial implementation phase of the Special Act on High-Level Radioactive Waste Management, the expansion of nuclear power policy, and the elevation of Korea–France relations to a global strategic partnership has created a narrow but significant window of opportunity. Unless meaningful groundwork is laid between 2026 and 2027, that window may rapidly narrow. Successfully utilizing this opportunity will require a coordinated national strategy built simultaneously on three pillars: the credible implementation of domestic institutional reforms, meticulous diplomatic coordination with the United States, and mutually beneficial package-based cooperation with France.

1. The “Comprehensive Cooperation MOU on the Nuclear Fuel Cycle” between Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP) and Orano, as well as the “Nuclear Fuel Technology Cooperation MOU” between KHNP and Framatome, were concluded on the occasion of French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to South Korea on April 3, 2026. Office of the President of the Republic of Korea, “Senior Presidential Secretary Kang Yoo-jung’s Written Briefing on the Results of the Korea–France Summit,” Korea Policy Briefing, April 3, 2026.
2. Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, “Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Saturation Timeline Advanced by One to Two Years,” February 10, 2023.
3. World Nuclear Association, “South Korea — World Nuclear Outlook Report,” updated January 19, 2026. https://world-nuclear.org/our-association/publications/world-nuclear-outlook-report/south-korea---world-nuclear-outlook-report (accessed April 1, 2026).
4. Korea Legislation Research Institute, Special Act on the Management of High-Level Radioactive Waste, Act No. 20843, promulgated March 25, 2025, effective September 26, 2025. https://www.law.go.kr. The bill passed the National Assembly plenary session on February 27, 2025, with 190 votes in favor.
5. Korea Policy Briefing, “First Meeting of the High-Level Radioactive Waste Management Committee,” February 23, 2026; “High-Level Radioactive Waste Management Committee Completes Nine-Member Composition,” April 7, 2026. Finland’s Onkalo repository aims to begin receiving spent nuclear fuel in the late 2020s after site investigations began in 1983, meaning that more than 40 years are required from initiation to operation. Posiva Oy, “Final Disposal,” https://www.posiva.fi/en/index/finaldiposal.html; OECD/NEA, Radioactive Waste Management and Decommissioning: Strategic and Policy Issues (2024).
6. Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy between the United States and the Republic of Korea(2015), Article 11. https://fissilematerials.org/library/kr123.pdf
7. Korea–U.S. Summit Joint Fact Sheet (November 14, 2025), officially released by the White House and the Office of the President of the Republic of Korea. The full text is available through Korea Policy Briefing (www.korea.kr).
8. Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC), “Pyroprocessing and the Korea–U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreement,” October 2015. The Advanced Spent Fuel Conditioning Process Facility (ACPF) possesses an annual processing capacity of 0.2 tons. Joint research with Idaho National Laboratory (INL) continued into the 2020s.
9. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Reprocessing,” https://www.nrc.gov/materials/reprocessing; “Fuel Reprocessing (Recycling),” https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/fuel-reprocessing-recycling
10. Savannah River Site, Environment Bulletin, March 5, 2026. https://www.srs.gov
11. Jasper Boers, “Closing the Loop: The Power and Promise of Nuclear Fuel Recycling,” American Affairs Journal, March 2, 2026.
12. Orano, Annual Activity Report 2024, p. 40.
13. Marcoule is located in the Gard department in southern France along the Rhône River. Developed since the 1950s as a core site of the French nuclear program, it currently hosts Orano’s Melox MOX fuel fabrication facility and research installations operated by the French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission (CEA).
14. Orano, Annual Activity Report 2024, p. 40; Orano public materials, https://www.orano.group/en/orano-across-the-world/france
15. Orano, “Aval du Futur,” https://www.orano.group/avaldufutur/fr; Orano press release, March 12, 2026.
16. Code de l’environnement(France), Article L.542-2. https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr
17. IPFM (International Panel on Fissile Materials) is an independent nuclear nonproliferation research network centered at Princeton University that tracks and analyzes the production, inventories, and management of fissile materials, including plutonium and highly enriched uranium. IPFM Blog, “New Provisional Operation Plan for Rokkasho,” February 11, 2026; JNFL (Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited), “Provisional Operation Plans for Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant and MOX Fuel Fabrication Plant (Possible Annual Quantities of Reprocessing and Plutonium for MOX Fuel Fabrication),” January 28, 2026, https://www.jnfl.co.jp/en/release/press/2025/detail/20260128-1.html (accessed April 1, 2026).
18. World Nuclear News, “French-Japanese MOX Fuel Recycling Studies Expanded,” February 13, 2025; NEI Magazine, February 17, 2025.
19. Orano, “Orano Signs an Agreement with Japanese Customer for the Reprocessing of Spent Fuel to Advance Bilateral Demonstration Studies on the Reprocessing of Spent MOX Fuel,” April 2, 2026; Nuclear Engineering International, April 8, 2026.
20. Tadahiro Katsuta, “Nuclear Power’s Role in Japan Is Fading. The Myths of Reactor Safety and Energy Needs Can’t Change That Reality,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, December 11, 2025.
21. IPFM Blog (see note 17 above), updated January 2026.

※ The views expressed in this Sejong Focus are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Sejong Institute.