Sejong Focus

[Sejong Focus] Repatriation of North Korean POWs in Ukraine

Date 2025-06-04 View 76 Writer Yoo JoonKoo, Peter Ward

In November 2024, reports emerged that North Korea had begun to deploy troops to Russia, with the scale of the deployment estimated to reach as many as 12,000 personnel. Allegations had already surfaced that North Korea had dispatched a number of high-ranking military officers, reportedly linked to its Strategic Rocket Forces.
Repatriation of North Korean POWs in Ukraine
March 5, 2025
    JoonKoo Yoo
    Senior Fellow, The Sejong Institute | jkyoo88@sejong.org

    Peter Ward
    Research Fellow, The Sejong Institute |pward89@sejong.org
      In November 2024, reports emerged that North Korea had begun to deploy troops to Russia, with the scale of the deployment estimated to reach as many as 12,000 personnel. Allegations had already surfaced that North Korea had dispatched a number of high-ranking military officers, reportedly linked to its Strategic Rocket Forces.1)

      In January 2025, it was reported that North Korean soldiers participating in combat in Russia’s Kursk region had been captured by Ukrainian forces. Ukrainian authorities released photos and videos of the captured soldiers, who also appeared in interviews with South Korean media. These soldiers reportedly expressed a desire to go to South Korea rather than be repatriated to the North, and a spokesperson for Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence (HUR) has indicated that repatriation to South Korea may be a possibility.

      The potential transfer of North Korean POWs to South Korea raises a number of issues under international law that would need to be carefully examined. Furthermore, it is expected to have significant diplomatic repercussions among the parties involved in the war, particularly North Korea and Ukraine. First and foremost, the situation could place considerable pressure on North Korea. Fears of large-scale desertions may grow, potentially deterring further troop deployments—a factor that could motivate the Ukrainian government to cooperate with South Korea. If a significant number of North Korean soldiers were to be captured and seek asylum in the South, it would further damage North Korea’s image. Russia, too, might begin to question the operational effectiveness of North Korean troops, thereby straining the North Korea–Russia relationship. Moreover, as negotiations between the United States and Russia are reportedly underway to bring the war to an early end, the issue of North Korean troop repatriation could emerge as an additional complicating factor.

    1) The Ukrainian authorities currently estimate that around 4,000 of them have been either killed or seriously wounded."
    | Background
      Until Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, relations between North Korea and Russia were amicable but remained distant. Russia was generally known to comply with United Nations sanctions on North Korea, though it also actively advocated for sanctions relief at the UN. However, following its invasion of Ukraine, Russia became diplomatically isolated on the international stage, facing condemnation and sanctions from the European Union, the United States, and various international bodies, including the United Nations. This drastically reshaped the relationship between Moscow and Pyongyang.

      At the outset of the war, North Korea was among the few countries to openly side with Russia, taking a stance against Ukraine in the United Nations and other international forums. By the second half of 2022, U.S. intelligence agencies began releasing reports alleging that North Korea was supplying arms to Russia. In 2023 and 2024, reports emerged that large quantities of artillery shells and short-range missiles had been transferred from North Korea to Russia for use on the Ukrainian battlefield.

      The two sides also held numerous working-level and high-level summits, marked by frequent exchanges, including mutual visits by top military commanders and senior civilian officials. This deepening of ties culminated in June 2024 with the signing of the "Treaty on the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation." Article 4 of the treaty stipulates that “in the event that either party finds itself in a state of war due to an armed attack by an individual state or multiple states, the other party shall, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and the laws of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation, promptly provide military and other assistance using all means at its disposal.” This provision has widely been interpreted as signifying a de facto military alliance between the two countries.

      The reported deployment of North Korean troops to the war in Ukraine appears to substantiate claims of a shift in the Russia–North Korea relationship. Although available information on the deployment remains limited, with questions surrounding the credibility of sources and the accuracy of troop estimates, there is now little doubt that North Korean forces are participating in Russia’s war effort in Ukraine.

      In particular, the release of numerous videos and photographs purportedly showing North Korean troops deployed to the front lines—as well as documents belonging to captured North Korean soldiers and recorded testimonies in their own voices—has left little room for doubt regarding their presence in the conflict.

      However, the capture of these prisoners of war raises multiple concerns for both the South Korean government and North Korean authorities. It also places the Ukrainian government in a position where it must make highly delicate legal and diplomatic decisions. While the issue currently appears to involve only two soldiers, the possibility of additional cases arising in the future suggests that it would be prudent to examine these matters now in order to safeguard the welfare of those involved and to prepare for any future prisoner-related issues.
    | International Legal Issues Surrounding the Repatriation of North Korean Soldiers
      The legal issues surrounding the repatriation of North Korean prisoners of war must first be examined in the context of the Geneva Convention III relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Article 109 of the Convention deals with the treatment of prisoners and establishes the principle of repatriation to their home country. Additionally, Article 118 of the Convention stipulates that all prisoners of war must be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of hostilities. The issue arises, however, in situations like the present one, where North Korean prisoners of war may wish to be repatriated not to North Korea but to a third country such as South Korea. The Geneva Convention did not explicitly prohibit forced repatriation during its drafting, despite controversy at the time regarding this issue, as the Convention’s main aim is the protection of human rights, including the protection of prisoners of war. Therefore, forced repatriation, which could worsen the condition of prisoners, should not be permitted.

      Furthermore, the principle prohibiting forced repatriation is an established norm in international law, as outlined in the International Refugee Convention and the Convention Against Torture. In the case of refugees who may face persecution upon repatriation, forced repatriation is prohibited. In fact, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) expressed on the 20th that, in accordance with the prohibition on forced repatriation, North Korean prisoners of war should not be sent back to their home country. Specifically, OHCHR spokesperson Innu Riz Trocell stated, “If there is credible and reasonable evidence that prisoners of war would face torture, the detaining state must seek a third country that can provide safety for the prisoners of war.”

      When examining the issue of repatriation of North Korean soldiers, it is inevitably necessary to review the international legal status of North Korean prisoners of war. Currently, Russia and North Korea do not officially recognize formal deployment, raising the issue of whether the North Korean soldiers belong to the Russian military or are mercenaries. If the North Korean soldiers are legitimate combatants, they could be granted the status of prisoners of war under Article 4 of Geneva Convention III upon capture. However, mercenaries, who do not qualify as legitimate combatants, are not recognized as prisoners of war by many countries. If the Ukrainian government refuses to repatriate them to North Korea, repatriation to North Korea would not be possible. Furthermore, there are indications that North Korean soldiers are participating in the war under false Russian identities, so confirming their nationality is also necessary. This issue will likely arise when official prisoner repatriation of North Korean soldiers takes place. However, if discussions on prisoner repatriation between Russia and Ukraine intensify, and if the North Korean soldiers are repatriated to Russia, the likelihood of them being sent to South Korea decreases. Finally, it has been suggested that, in accordance with Article 3 of the Constitution, North Korean soldiers could be repatriated to South Korea. Under this provision, the legal status of North Korean nationals could be considered as South Korean citizens, which would allow for their repatriation to South Korea through defection procedures. However, since North Korea does not recognize itself as a belligerent party, it would face significant issues in asserting a direct repatriation to North Korea without going through Russia.
    | Political and Diplomatic Issues
      These legal considerations will undoubtedly pose challenges for the South Korean government, but the issue of prisoners of war could also generate potential political and diplomatic problems for the North Korean authorities. Some of these issues could present opportunities that the South Korean government might leverage in its favor.

      First, according to reports, there have been claims that North Korean soldiers facing the threat of capture were instructed to commit suicide. Additionally, Ukrainian authorities have released footage allegedly showing Russian forces burning the body of a North Korean soldier who appears to have been killed. The fact that North Korean soldiers have been deployed to Ukraine seems to be a secret the North Korean government wishes to conceal from its citizens. Therefore, the existence of war prisoners could potentially deal a significant blow to the North Korean regime. However, the damage could be mitigated if South Korea increases efforts to expand access to information for North Korean citizens.

      Second, if the number of North Korean soldiers taken prisoner increases, additional issues could arise in negotiations for a ceasefire or peace settlement. In any form of negotiation related to an armistice or cessation of hostilities, the status and handling of North Korean prisoners of war could become a contentious issue among the negotiating parties. While this may appear to be a relatively minor issue compared to other major challenges Ukraine faces, such as territorial recovery, refugee repatriation (including missing persons), and post-war reconstruction, the situation could change rapidly if the scale of prisoners increases or if North Korea begins to formally demand their repatriation.

      Third, if South Korea were to engage in psychological operations or other means to capture North Korean soldiers and actively assist in their repatriation to South Korea, it could lead to diplomatic friction with both North Korea and Russia. As pointed out by the UN Special Rapporteur on North Korean human rights, there is a clear humanitarian basis for such repatriation measures. The lives of the captured North Korean soldiers are at stake, and the actions would be necessary to ensure their protection and safe treatment. Historically, during the Korean War (1950–1953), prisoner repatriation became a flashpoint of intense conflict, and thus, the issue of North Korean prisoners of war in the Ukraine conflict could potentially have similar ripple effects.

      Fourth, while unlikely, if less experienced North Korean military units were to become involved in the conflict, the possibility of large-scale defections could arise. Should this occur, it could create new sources of tension in Russian-North Korean relations. However, it currently appears that there are no plans for a significant increase in the deployment of North Korean troops, and if peace talks for the war in Ukraine come into clearer focus, the likelihood of large-scale North Korean military involvement remains low.
    | Implications and Recommendations
      The issue of North Korean prisoners of war (POWs) in the Russia-Ukraine conflict marks the internationalization of the dispute, which is also influencing South Korea politically and diplomatically. The close cooperation between North Korea and Russia has become a key factor in prolonging the conflict. While the deployment of North Korean troops to the frontlines does not seem to have significantly impacted the course of the war so far, the capture of these soldiers could give rise to various diplomatic issues. In particular, should the repatriation of North Korean POWs become a reality, it would likely lead to diplomatic and legal controversies involving Russia, North Korea, and South Korea.

      The main controversy revolves around the issue of where these North Korean POWs should be repatriated. The Geneva Convention III, which governs the treatment of prisoners of war, explicitly states that POWs should not be forcibly repatriated to countries where they might face torture or other serious human rights violations. North Korea has denied the presence of its troops on the Ukrainian frontlines, which complicates the legal status of these prisoners. However, under South Korea's Constitution, these individuals may be considered South Korean citizens, raising the argument that South Korea has a responsibility to ensure their safety and assist in their repatriation.

      Secondly, this issue has the potential to negatively impact the domestic standing of the North Korean regime. As the number of POWs increases, and if a significant portion of them express a desire to be repatriated to South Korea, this could introduce new variables not only in the negotiations for a ceasefire in the Russia-Ukraine conflict but also in inter-Korean relations. Although the likelihood of a large-scale defection is currently low, the issue of North Korean POWs should not be underestimated, especially when considering past cases involving South Korean POWs. If more North Korean soldiers are repatriated to South Korea, North Korea might use this as a pretext for provocative retaliatory actions.



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