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Outcomes and Challenges of the Beijing ROK-China Summit: Economic Implications |
| January 8, 2026 |
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Byung-chul LeeVisiting Research Fellow, Sejong Institute | bcclee65@naver.com
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From January 4 to 7, 2026, President Lee Jae Myung paid a four day state visit to Beijing and Shanghai at the invitation of Chinese President Xi Jinping. The fact that this return visit took place only two months after President Xi’s state visit to South Korea on the margins of the Gyeongju summit in November 2025 is unprecedented in the history of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The rapid scheduling of the visit reflects the intersection of mutual interests. Korea sought to signal the importance it places on relations with China by visiting Beijing ahead of a planned visit to Japan, while China aimed to keep Korea within a framework of strategic communication amid concerns over the consolidation of trilateral security cooperation among the United States, Japan, and Korea.
This paper examines the economic outcomes of the Beijing summit and identifies key tasks and challenges going forward. -
The state visit appears to have been aimed at translating the momentum initiated at the Gyeongju summit toward restoring the ROK–China strategic cooperative partnership into practical cooperation. At the same time, it sought to specify manageable areas of cooperation, including supply chains, cultural exchanges, and people to people exchanges, while assessing the structural constraints and challenges facing ROK–China relations amid intensifying U.S.–China strategic competition.
President Lee Jae Myung arrived at Beijing Capital International Airport on the afternoon of January 4 and began his official schedule with a dinner meeting with members of the Korean community residing in China.
On the morning of January 5, the ROK–China Business Forum was held at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing, followed in the afternoon by a summit meeting at the Great Hall of the People.
At the summit, President Xi Jinping stated that “China has consistently placed ROK–China relations in an important position within its neighborhood diplomacy,” and emphasized that “amid an increasingly complex international environment, it is essential to stand firmly on the right side of history and make the correct strategic choices.”
The phrase “to stand on the right side of history” has been repeatedly used by President Xi at official events since he first employed it in May 2020 at a meeting with representatives from the economic sector during the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. Renmin Luntan Net, affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party’s official newspaper People’s Daily, has analyzed the phrase as meaning opposition to “anti-globalization” and “anti-openness,” and a commitment to firmly advancing comprehensive opening under principles of openness, inclusiveness, and win win cooperation.
It is reported that the two leaders reached a shared understanding on the following points during the summit:
They reaffirmed the comprehensive restoration of ROK–China relations and agreed to hold annual summit meetings. They agreed to pursue meaningful progress within the year on negotiations concerning services and investment under the ROK–China Free Trade Agreement. They expressed support for the gradual and phased expansion of cultural and content exchanges. They reaffirmed that peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula constitute a common interest of both countries. They also agreed to continue constructive consultations aimed at making the West Sea a sea of peace and shared prosperity.
Following the talks, 14 MOUs were signed in areas including social and cultural affairs, environment, digital technology, innovation, quarantine, and intellectual property.
* These included: an MOU on cooperation in ensuring children’s rights and promoting welfare; an MOU on science and technology innovation cooperation to address global common challenges; an MOU on environmental and climate cooperation; an MOU on cooperation between national park management authorities; an MOU on digital technology cooperation; an MOU on cooperation in the transport sector; an MOU on cooperation in small and medium enterprises and innovation; an MOU on establishing a new dialogue on commerce cooperation; an MOU on strengthening cooperation in industrial parks; an MOU on food safety cooperation; an MOU on sanitary measures related to the import and export of wild aquatic products; an MOU on cooperation in the field of export and import animal and plant quarantine; an MOU on deepened cooperation in the field of intellectual property; and an MOU on mutual cooperation for the protection of intellectual property rights at the border.
On January 6, President Lee met in the morning at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing with Zhao Leji, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and third in China’s leadership hierarchy. Their discussion touched on Zhao’s experience as Party Secretary of Shaanxi Province in attracting Samsung Electronics’ semiconductor investment, as well as on the normalization of ROK–China relations.
※ The episode concerning Zhao’s role in securing Samsung’s semiconductor investment in Shaanxi Province is introduced in the author’s recent book, K-Semiconductor Super Gap Strategy.
Subsequently, President Lee held a luncheon meeting with Premier Li Qiang at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing, where they discussed normalization of bilateral relations and the strengthening of cooperation.
On the evening of January 6, President Lee traveled to Shanghai and had dinner with Chen Jining, Party Secretary of Shanghai, exchanging views on subnational government exchanges and the management of sites related to the Korean independence movement.
On the morning of January 7 in Shanghai, President Lee attended the “Korea–China Venture Startup Summit,” where he emphasized venture cooperation between the two countries, stating that “innovation is not the exclusive domain of any one country.” -
The economic outcomes of the state visit can be summarized as follows.
First, an institutional foundation for practical cooperation in the economic and industrial fields was established. Following agreement at the Gyeongju summit to advance the “2026-2030 Korea–China Economic Cooperation Joint Plan,” the two sides agreed in Beijing to establish a new “Commerce Cooperation Dialogue.” This signifies the restoration of a ministerial level regular dialogue platform between Korea’s Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy and China’s Ministry of Commerce, which had been launched in May 2002 but suspended for 15 years after its seventh meeting in July 2011. The dialogue had not been convened due to the launch of FTA negotiations in 2012 and remained suspended following the 2016 THAAD related dispute. This mechanism is assessed as providing a channel to address pending issues in trade, investment, and supply chains.
Second, initial progress was made in addressing outstanding bilateral issues. In particular, regarding “Hanhanryeong(限韓令),” China had consistently avoided official acknowledgment while maintaining that no such measures existed. At this meeting, however, both sides agreed to “expand cultural and content exchanges gradually and in stages.” Beginning with sports exchanges such as Go(Baduk) and football, and then expanding to content sectors such as drama and film, this approach is assessed as representing an initial step toward lifting these restrictions.
In the intellectual property field, an MOU on deepened cooperation in intellectual property and an MOU on mutual cooperation for the protection of intellectual property rights at the border were concluded. In the fisheries sector, an MOU between Korea’s Ministry of Food and Drug Safety and China’s General Administration of Customs expanded the scope of exports to include all wild caught aquatic products and simplified sanitary assessment procedures, representing tangible progress.
Third, a basis for cooperation in digital and innovation sectors was established. MOUs on digital technology cooperation and on cooperation in small and medium enterprises and innovation were signed, indicating shared understanding on strengthening digital sector collaboration. This follows earlier agreement at the Gyeongju summit to enhance cooperation in artificial intelligence, biopharmaceuticals, green industries, the silver industry, and innovative startups, which was reaffirmed at the Beijing summit. Although competition between the two countries is intense in these areas, opportunities for cooperation may exist in joint investment, standards cooperation, joint entry into third country markets, talent exchanges, and digital governance.
Fourth, a favorable atmosphere for economic cooperation was created. The ROK–China Business Forum resumed for the first time in eight years since President Moon Jae In’s 2017 visit to China, with approximately 600 business representatives from both countries in attendance. Unlike in 2017, when Chinese companies mainly dispatched second or third ranking executives, this forum saw participation by senior executives, including the Chairman of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade(CCPIT) and leaders from CATL, Tencent, and TCL. This is interpreted as a more proactive signal from the Chinese side regarding bilateral cooperation. The scope of cooperation expanded beyond manufacturing to services such as content, gaming, and finance. A total of 32 MOUs were signed in fields including AI and autonomous driving, K-pop, and consumer goods and food products. However, the business forum remains structurally limited in that it is an event linked to summit diplomacy. -
Despite these outcomes, structural constraints surrounding ROK–China relations are likely to make the generation of substantive results difficult. As the past vertical division of labor between the two countries has shifted toward a pattern of horizontal competition, industrial interdependence has weakened and the space for cooperation has gradually narrowed.
Political and security distrust accumulated since the deployment of THAAD remains, and the fragmentation of global supply chains amid intensifying U.S.–China strategic competition has further complicated cooperation.
Within these structural constraints, South Korea appears to have placed greater emphasis on the lifting of restrictions on Korean cultural content, the restoration of economic cooperation, and a constructive Chinese role on the North Korean nuclear issue. China, by contrast, is interpreted as having prioritized securing South Korea’s strategic alignment as a cooperation partner within the broader framework of balancing the United States. The summit thus both reaffirmed the need for mutual cooperation and revealed its limitations.
First, no joint statement was issued. While the meeting was held only two months after the Gyeongju APEC summit, limiting time for working level coordination, differences over denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait issue appear to have been the primary factors. This suggests a significant long term challenge for ROK–China relations.
Second, discussion of tangible economic cooperation was limited. As with the Gyeongju summit, this meeting did not produce concrete economic outcomes that would be directly perceptible to South Korea. The MOUs concluded at the government level remain statements of intent without legal binding force. Regarding the second stage negotiations on services and investment under the ROK–China FTA, the two sides agreed to seek “meaningful progress within the year,” and the 13th follow up round of negotiations was held in Beijing from January 19 to 23. However, given that little substantive progress has been achieved over 12 rounds of talks during the past eight years, prospects for rapid advancement appear limited.
Third, no explicit agreement was reached on lifting the restrictions on Korean cultural content, which was of primary interest to South Korea, and only the principle of “gradual and orderly expansion of cultural exchanges” was reaffirmed. President Xi responded with the proverb, “Three feet of ice does not form in a single day, and fruit falls only when it ripens” (冰冻三尺非一日之寒，瓜熟蒂落). These restrictions should be understood not merely as retaliation over security issues, but as a policy instrument combining cultural management, industrial policy, and ideological control. They represent a strategic calculation to impose economic costs on sectors such as Korean popular culture content, tourism, and cosmetics in response to security decisions, thereby constraining the ROK–U.S. alliance. They also reflect concern over the growing preference for Korean culture among Chinese youth, alongside efforts to strengthen the competitiveness of domestic content industries and to manage the social and ideological influence of foreign culture. The more attention South Korea places on lifting these measures, the more likely they are to function as negotiating leverage aimed at eliciting diplomatic concessions. Unless South Korea takes steps that align with China’s foreign policy and security expectations, a comprehensive lifting of these restrictions appears structurally difficult.
Fourth, explicit outcomes related to cooperation on supply chain risks were limited. The 2021 urea solution shortage demonstrated the impact that China originated supply chain disruptions can have on the South Korean economy. Given China’s effective control over key minerals and raw materials within global supply chains, rare minerals represent one of the most significant potential risk areas for South Korea. During the summit period, China in fact announced export controls on dual use goods to Japan, strongly indicating that it is prepared to use controls on critical mineral exports as a tool to exert pressure on counterpart countries. -
The most significant risk factor in economic cooperation with China is the acceleration of China’s technological self reliance and indigenization. As localization within Chinese industry advances, competition with South Korea’s key industries is likely to intensify not only in the Chinese domestic market but also in global markets. In addition, if South Korea aligns more closely with the United States amid escalating U.S.–China strategic competition, the likelihood of retaliatory or restrictive measures against South Korean firms operating in China may increase. Accordingly, future policy toward China requires a dual track approach that seeks cooperation opportunities while simultaneously managing risks.
First, practical activation of cooperation and communication mechanisms is necessary. For the numerous MOUs concluded at the Gyeongju and Beijing summits to produce tangible results, the ministerial level commerce dialogue channel should be activated promptly, accompanied by regular implementation reviews and follow up measures. As U.S.–China technology competition intensifies, issues such as establishing cooperation mechanisms to ensure stable supplies of critical minerals including rare earths, as well as addressing non tariff barriers, could be addressed through the ministerial commerce cooperation dialogue. In addition, various issues and potential points of friction arising from intensified U.S.–China strategic competition should be continuously managed through bilateral consultation channels.
Second, new models of ROK–China economic cooperation should be explored. Cooperation, which has historically centered on manufacturing, should be expanded to services, culture, and finance, as well as to innovation sectors such as digital technologies and startups. Given that both summits reaffirmed willingness to cooperate in these fields, government level efforts to generate visible outcomes should be strengthened. The second stage negotiations on services and investment under the ROK–China FTA could provide an institutional foundation for such expanded cooperation. Moreover, whereas the past structure has largely involved one way South Korean investment into China and market entry, it may be necessary to consider more reciprocal and multi layered cooperation models, including Chinese direct investment in South Korea and joint entry into third country markets.
Third, attention should be given to standards cooperation with China. China views standards as the decisive arena of technological competition and, moving beyond its previous role of adopting international rules, aims to become a country that designs standards under the “China Standards 2035” initiative. Exclusion from standards frameworks can lead to marginalization within supply chains. Therefore, it may be necessary to include standards cooperation as an agenda item within the ministerial commerce dialogue, establish regular consultative mechanisms between the two countries’ standards authorities, and expand cooperation within international standard setting bodies. At the same time, a balanced approach is required to avoid one sided incorporation into Chinese standards, while preserving South Korea’s technological sovereignty and leadership in international standards.
Fourth, the expansion of people to people exchanges is important. Sustained cooperation requires not only government to government interaction but also exchanges through diverse channels such as Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues. Consideration should be given to reviving initiatives such as the “Year of ROK–China Cultural Exchange” and ROK–China youth exchange programs, as well as to institutionalizing the current reciprocal visa exemption measures. Without trust at the societal level, intergovernmental agreements are difficult to sustain. -
ROK–China economic cooperation is currently unfolding under three overlapping constraints: intensifying U.S.–China strategic competition, closer alignment among North Korea, China, and Russia, and uncertainty surrounding the foreign policy of the Trump administration. In addition, a range of issues that may generate dissatisfaction on the Chinese side, including the pursuit of nuclear powered submarine construction, modernization of the ROK–U.S. alliance, and the strengthening of trilateral security cooperation among the ROK, the United States, and Japan, create an environment akin to walking on thin ice, where relations could deteriorate at any time. In this context, while pursuing balanced diplomacy is important, sustained diplomatic engagement and economic cooperation are difficult to maintain if the two sides lack mutually beneficial areas of exchange. As China’s technological advancement accelerates, the question arises as to what can serve as South Korea’s strategic leverage in ROK–China relations. In an era of economic security, safeguarding industries where South Korea holds a clear advantage and securing technological leadership in future industries appear to be the only path to survival for South Korea.
The next ROK–China summit, expected to be held on the margins of the 2026 APEC Leaders’ Meeting in Shenzhen, will serve as a key test of how the outcomes of the recent visit are translated into concrete results.
| Introduction
| Key Activities
| Outcomes (Economic Sector)
| Limitations and Future Tasks
| Future Directions
| Conclusion
※ The contents published on 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institue
