| Xi Jinping's Visit to Pyongyang: Why Now?

President Xi Jinping's visit to Pyongyang in June 2026 drew considerable attention as his first overseas visit of the year and his first visit to North Korea in seven years since 2019. The visit carried the character of a reciprocal visit in response to Chairman Kim Jong Un's trip to China in September 2025, while also taking place in the lead-up to the 65th anniversary of the "Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between China and the DPRK" concluded in 1961, making it an occasion for reaffirming the strategic significance of the DPRK-China relationship.

The visit also drew attention for occurring immediately following the U.S.-China summit and the China-Russia summit. In the aftermath of the U.S.-China summit, the White House stated that the two leaders had reaffirmed a shared goal of denuclearization of North Korea, whereas China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs stopped short of directly referencing denuclearization, instead emphasizing the continuity of its existing position on the Korean Peninsula issue and its own constructive role. At the China-Russia summit that followed, peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and a political resolution of the Korean Peninsula issue were emphasized, and opposition to sanctions and pressure against North Korea was reaffirmed. Against this backdrop, President Xi's visit to Pyongyang heightened interest in whether China was seeking to play a mediating role in U.S.-DPRK dialogue or to strengthen the DPRK-China-Russia cooperative framework.

The reporting that emerged from both sides following the visit, however, demonstrates that the summit was not centered on mediating U.S.-DPRK dialogue or on the denuclearization agenda. Rather than specific references to the political resolution of the Korean Peninsula issue, denuclearization, or improvement of U.S.-DPRK relations, the language of strategic cooperation, development of socialism, alignment of development strategies, border area cooperation, people-to-people exchange, and multilateral cooperation came to the fore. This suggests that the visit was less a phase of U.S.-DPRK mediation and more an occasion for reconfiguring the role of the DPRK-China relationship itself and the modalities of cooperation within it, in response to the changed international environment.

These changes need to be understood in the context of the altered international environment and North Korea's evolved strategic position since 2019. North Korea has broadened its external strategic options through the expansion of cooperation with Russia, while China has faced a growing need to adjust its relationship with North Korea to new conditions, taking into consideration the deepening of U.S.-China strategic competition, the challenge of developing its northeastern region, stability on the Korean Peninsula, and the impact that advances in DPRK-Russia relations may have on the order of Northeast Asia. Drawing on this set of concerns, this paper examines the background to President Xi's visit to Pyongyang, reviews the major cooperation agenda items put forward at the DPRK-China summit, and analyzes the implications for the DPRK-China relationship and the situation on the Korean Peninsula.

| 2019 and 2026: What Has Changed

President Xi Jinping's 2019 visit to Pyongyang took place at a time when U.S.-DPRK summit and inter-Korean summit diplomacy had fallen into a state of deadlock. The core of DPRK-China summit diplomacy at that time was the restoration of traditional friendship, the strengthening of strategic communication, and the political resolution of the Korean Peninsula issue. In President Xi's contribution to Rodong Sinmun and in the summit-related reporting in 2019 as well, China emphasized "the political resolution of the Korean Peninsula issue," "dialogue and negotiations," and "addressing the reasonable concerns of the Korean side." This demonstrates that the DPRK-China relationship at the time was situated in the context of managing the Korean Peninsula situation and cooperating toward a process of political resolution.

By contrast, the 2026 reporting brought expressions such as "strategic cooperation" and "strategic coordination" to the fore. The core change lies not in the simple expansion of areas of cooperation, but in the fact that the manner of describing the DPRK-China relationship is shifting from the management of the Korean Peninsula situation and its political resolution toward socialist development cooperation and responses to regional order. Whereas in 2019 strategic communication aimed at U.S.-DPRK dialogue and the political resolution of the Korean Peninsula issue formed the larger context, in 2026 expressions such as "safeguarding sovereignty, security, and development interests," "opposing hegemonism," and "multipolarization" stand out prominently, with the DPRK-China relationship being described in the context of a joint response to the changed international order.

Changes are also apparent in the manner of characterizing the relationship. In 2019, historical narratives were highlighted, including the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, the legacy of predecessor leaders, and traditional friendship. In 2026, traditional friendship and the memory of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea remain important elements, but socialism, modernization, and responses to the changed international environment carry greater weight. This demonstrates that the DPRK-China relationship is being described not as one that relies solely on shared experiences of past struggle, but as one that simultaneously emphasizes joint development as socialist states and strategic cooperation within the changed international environment.

These changes are also confirmed in the itinerary of the 2026 visit. In 2019, President Xi visited the headquarters of the Korean Workers' Party Central Committee, taking a commemorative photograph with Politburo members and demonstrating party-to-party friendship. In 2026, by contrast, he visited the Korean Workers' Party Central Cadre Training School, observed a Party policy lecture, and engaged in an exchange of views on the Party's cadre training system. This symbolically demonstrates that party-to-party relations between North Korea and China are expanding beyond the dimension of friendship into the dimension of exchanging the ruling party's operational experience, cadre training, and socialist governance capacity.

| Xi Jinping's Four Proposals and the New Direction of the DPRK-China Relationship

The four proposals put forward by President Xi Jinping as reported by the Chinese side constitute important indicators of the future direction of the DPRK-China relationship. The substance of the proposals can be broadly divided into political and security cooperation, practical cooperation linked to development strategies, sociocultural exchange, and coordination on international issues. These are assessed not as ceremonial expressions but as a vision for developing the DPRK-China relationship into a more comprehensive strategic cooperative relationship that goes beyond the dimension of personal rapport between leaders or traditional friendship.

The first proposal is the cultivation of a foundation for high-level exchanges and political mutual trust. This carries the meaning of developing the relationship into a more stable and sustained cooperative framework through party-to-party exchanges, cooperation between state organs, and strategic coordination.

In this connection, the composition of participants at this summit also warrants attention. On the Chinese side, participants included Cai Qi, Director of the Central Office of the Party; Wang Yi, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Liu Jianchao, Minister of the International Liaison Department; Zhang Fangyou, Director of the Policy Research Office; as well as Dong Jun, Minister of National Defense; Zheng Shanjie, Chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission; and Wang Wentao, Minister of Commerce. On the North Korean side, participants included Party officials Kim Jae-ryong, Ri Il-hwan, and Kim Song-nam, as well as Choe Son-hui, Minister of Foreign Affairs; No Kwang-chol, Minister of National Defense; and Kim Tok-hun, First Vice Premier of the Cabinet.

Given that the Chinese delegation in 2019 also included officials from the National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Commerce, the participation of personnel from the economic and development cooperation domains is not entirely new in itself. Kim Tok-hun, First Vice Premier of the Cabinet, who attended on the North Korean side, is an individual with broad experience in economic policy, having previously served as Party Secretary for Economic Affairs and Premier of the Cabinet, and is currently assessed to be concurrently serving as Vice Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee with overall responsibility for external economic cooperation. This may be viewed as corresponding to the role performed at the time by Pak Pong-ju, Vice Chairman of the Korean Workers' Party and Vice Chairman of the State Affairs Commission, who attended in 2019. Considering that economic cooperation agenda items such as development strategy linkage and border area cooperation carried considerable weight at this summit, the fact that North Korea placed an official with relevant experience and responsibilities in attendance is further confirmation in the composition of participants that economic cooperation agenda items were treated as a priority.

Also noteworthy is the fact that both the Chinese Minister of National Defense and the North Korean Minister of National Defense attended the summit. While military-to-military exchange was referenced in 2019 as well, comparing the current summit to that occasion, when the Director of the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission of China and the Chief of the General Staff of the Korean People's Army attended, the defense ministers of both countries participated directly in the talks this time. This reflects the growing importance of strategic communication and coordination on military and security issues between North Korea and China in the changed security environment. Taking into account the expansion of DPRK-Russia military cooperation and changes in the Northeast Asian security environment, the possibility that military-domain exchanges and consultations between North Korea and China will be concretized to a certain degree going forward cannot be ruled out, though the specific scope and level cannot be definitively assessed on the basis of what has been publicly disclosed to date.

The second proposal is the linkage of the two countries' development strategies and the elevation of practical cooperation. What warrants attention here is that cooperation agenda items related to production, industrial, and livelihood foundations, including economic trade, agriculture, construction, science and technology, and healthcare, were put forward within the framework of development strategy linkage. This may be understood not as simple economic assistance or the expansion of trade, but as a vision for jointly setting cooperation agenda items and their scope while mutually taking into account each country's national development strategies and policy priorities. From China's perspective, this provides an opportunity to connect DPRK-China cooperation with northeastern regional development, neighboring country diplomacy, and socialist modernization strategy, while from North Korea's perspective it allows for the securing of an external cooperation foundation necessary for advancing local development, scientific and technological development, healthcare improvement, and industrial base expansion, all of which have been emphasized since the 9th Party Congress. Ultimately, what is noteworthy is less the simple quantitative expansion of DPRK-China economic cooperation than the fact that existing cooperation agenda items are being reinterpreted within the two countries' national development strategies and presented in a direction of elevating the level of cooperation.

The third proposal is the expansion of cooperation in the sociocultural domain. This encompasses youth, education, culture and arts, sports, media, and local exchanges. The Chinese side presented this as serving to "take the inheritance of friendship as a driving force and further strengthen the bond of people-to-people connectivity (民心相通)." This carries the meaning of carrying forward the traditional friendship of the past into present-day people-to-people exchange and sociocultural cooperation, and of broadening the social foundation of the DPRK-China relationship. In this context, the strengthening of management of memorial facilities for Chinese People's Volunteer Army martyrs within North Korea was also referenced. Tourism, furthermore, possesses sociocultural functions in the recovery of people-to-people contact and the expansion of mutual understanding, while simultaneously constituting a multidimensional area of cooperation that can be connected to the revitalization of border areas, North Korea's foreign currency earnings, and regional economic recovery. Youth, education, culture and arts, sports, media, local exchange, and tourism may accordingly be viewed as mechanisms for carrying forward the historical bonds shared by the two countries into present-day people-to-people exchange and social cooperation, and for underpinning the continuity of the DPRK-China relationship.

The fourth proposal is the substantive enrichment of strategic cooperation. The Chinese side put forward the direction of "upholding equity and justice as guiding principles and enriching the substance of strategic cooperation." It further characterized Asia as a shared space in which regional countries including China and the DPRK live in stability, and emphasized that the two countries must strengthen strategic coordination and cooperation, safeguard each other's sovereignty, security, and development interests, and jointly maintain regional peace and development. This perspective connects to the expression in President Xi's Rodong Sinmun contribution that the two countries "must strengthen multilateral coordination and firmly safeguard equity and justice in the international community." This reflects a vision of positioning the DPRK-China relationship not in terms confined to the Korean Peninsula issue, but within the broader context of international and regional cooperation and solidarity. Whereas the 2019 DPRK-China summit diplomacy placed relatively greater weight on the political resolution of the Korean Peninsula issue, this time broader agenda items such as regional peace and development, strategic coordination, and equity and justice in the international community are being emphasized alongside it.

Also noteworthy is the fact that following President Xi's return home, the Korean Central News Agency released a message of gratitude. In the message, President Xi assessed that the two sides had achieved "a series of important common understandings" and that the DPRK-China relationship had entered "a new historic journey." The fact that China's supreme leader issued a separate follow-on message to reaffirm the significance of the summit immediately after its conclusion merits attention. In particular, the expression that the relationship had "entered a new historic journey" reads as reflecting the Chinese side's intent to position this summit not as a one-off symbolic event but as the starting point for future cooperation. The actual significance of this summit will, however, be more concretely confirmed through the implementation of follow-on measures including the reopening of border crossing points, the expansion of people-to-people exchange, and practical sectoral cooperation.

| The Reactivation of Border Area Economic Cooperation and Changes in Modes of Cooperation

The area most likely to translate into tangible outcomes from this summit is the full reopening of border crossing points. The reopening of crossing points could serve as the starting point for restoring DPRK-China trade, logistics, tourism, and people-to-people contact that had contracted following COVID-19, and for revitalizing border area economic cooperation. North Korea maintained a prolonged border closure following COVID-19, during which DPRK-China trade and people-to-people contact contracted sharply, and has only recently shown signs of gradual recovery. Against this backdrop, the presentation of border crossing point reopening, the resumption of international passenger rail and civil aviation services, and the normalization of people-to-people exchange as cooperation agenda items carries important significance for the resumption of economic cooperation in the DPRK-China border area.

Numerous crossing points and exchange hubs exist along the DPRK-China border, and prior to COVID-19, trade, logistics, tourism, and people-to-people contact were conducted centered on major hubs. The Dandong-Sinuiju area is the core hub of North Korea's trade with China, while the Hunchun-Wonjong-ri-Rason area carries significance as a strategic border cooperation space connecting China's Northeast region's East Sea access aspirations with the development of North Korea's Rason area. Other border areas such as Ji'an, Tumen, and Changbai have also served as major hubs for DPRK-China exchange. Taking into account the sanctions environment, normalization of crossing point operations, customs and quarantine cooperation, logistics resumption, and expansion of people-to-people contact are more likely to be pursued as priorities than large-scale infrastructure investment or full-scale industrial cooperation. Through this, North Korea can expect trade expansion, logistics recovery, tourism revitalization, and local economic recovery, while China can connect these to the Northeast Revitalization Strategy, the activation of border cities, and the expansion of border economic zones. The full reopening of crossing points may therefore serve not merely as a normalization of DPRK-China trade, but as the starting point for revitalizing border area economic cooperation centered on the Yalu River and Tumen River basins.

Meanwhile, it is difficult to confirm on the basis of reporting released by both sides to date whether the Tumen River sea access issue was addressed as a major agenda item at this summit. However, given that the recent China-Russia summit referenced the continuation of trilateral consultations related to sea access through the Tumen River, and that this DPRK-China summit also emphasized the reopening of border crossing points and the expansion of people-to-people exchange and logistics connectivity, the strategic significance of border cooperation linking the Tumen River, Rason, and Hunchun continues to warrant close attention. As a space where China's Northeast development vision, North Korea's utilization of the Rason area, and Russian Far East development can converge, its significance will become clearer through subsequent measures and actual patterns of implementation.

Another expression worth noting in the reporting from this summit is "two-way exchange." Future DPRK-China cooperation may extend beyond Chinese support for North Korea or the dispatch of tourists, toward broader mutual exchange encompassing people-to-people contact, experience sharing, and technology exchange. China may send not only tourists but also business people and local government officials to North Korea, while North Korea may dispatch economic officials, local administrative cadres, agriculture, construction, and light industry technicians, science and technology personnel, healthcare specialists, and education officials to China. Taking into account North Korea's recently emphasized local development policy, tourism revitalization, healthcare and education improvement, and science and technology development strategy, such exchanges could develop into a mode of cooperation that reinforces North Korea's policy implementation capacity.

| Shared Historical Memory and the Symbolic Reinforcement of the Strategic Relationship

Another aspect of the Pyongyang visit that warrants attention is the reference to strengthening the management of memorial facilities for Chinese People's Volunteer Army martyrs within North Korea. While President Xi's visit to the Tower of Friendship took place on both the 2019 and 2026 visits, the 2026 reporting explicitly emphasized the joint preservation and management of Chinese People's Volunteer Army martyr memorial facilities, revolutionary tradition education, and ideological and moral education for youth. In particular, the Chinese side's statement that it would "carry out distinctive revolutionary tradition education and youth ideological education to inherit the red genes and traditional friendship of the two countries" demonstrates that this matter is extending into the question of historical education for succeeding generations. The fact that strengthening memorial facility management and the continuity of historical education are emphasized alongside what goes beyond simple commemoration suggests that this carries the meaning of connecting the shared struggle experience of the past to the present-day DPRK-China relationship and utilizing it as a historical asset underpinning the continuity of the bilateral relationship.

What is noteworthy is the fact that North Korea is already leveraging shared combat experience with Russia as a symbol of the strategic relationship. On April 26, 2026, North Korea held the inauguration ceremony of the Museum of Combat Achievements of Overseas Military Operations. This event, described as having been held to coincide with the first anniversary of the conclusion of the Kursk liberation operation, was attended by the Russian Minister of National Defense and the Chairman of the State Duma, with Chairman Kim Jong Un delivering remarks in person. In his remarks, Kim Jong Un characterized the Kursk operation as "a sacred war that crushed the war ambitions of hegemonic forces" and stated that the museum had "inscribed in blood a new history of DPRK-Russia friendship." Whereas the Chinese People's Volunteer Army martyr memorial facilities are focused on utilizing the historical memory of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea as a source of traditional friendship between the two countries, the Museum of Combat Achievements of Overseas Military Operations is utilizing ongoing military cooperation and actual combat experience as a symbolic asset of the strategic relationship. One represents the management and inheritance of historical memory; the other, the symbolization of present-day memory.

This difference reflects the fact that North Korea's relationships with China and Russia each serve distinct functions. The relationship with China is a multilayered one grounded in historical legitimacy and strategic cooperation while also encompassing economic and regional cooperation, whereas the relationship with Russia is one centered on ongoing military and security cooperation that is reinforcing strategic solidarity. North Korea is expanding its external autonomy and diplomatic options by utilizing these two relationships according to their respective characters. Shared historical memory and combat experience function as political instruments underpinning North Korea's complex external strategy.

| Policy Implications for South Korea

First, South Korea's North Korea policy needs to manage the denuclearization objective and the task of peaceful coexistence in parallel, distinguishing between them by tier. While the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula should be maintained as a long-term objective, policies capable of producing substantive results in the changed reality must be pursued alongside it. North Korea is currently institutionalizing nuclear forces as a core element of its constitution and national strategy, and denuclearization and the resumption of U.S.-DPRK dialogue did not come to the fore at this DPRK-China summit either. Under such conditions, if demands for denuclearization continue to occupy the foreground of North Korea policy discourse, practical peaceful coexistence agenda items such as crisis management, border area stability, and humanitarian cooperation will find it difficult to secure sufficient policy space. South Korea therefore needs to take as a realistic starting point the setting of freeze-equivalent measures, such as a halt to additional fissile material production and the restraint of ballistic missile technology development, as negotiation agenda items in the short to medium term. At the same time, peaceful coexistence agenda items such as prevention of military conflict, crisis management, humanitarian affairs, health, disaster response, border area stability, and people-to-people exchange must be maintained as a separate policy domain. In a situation where the DPRK-China relationship is expanding around North Korea's development strategy and regional cooperation agenda items, if the North Korean nuclear issue continues to occupy the center of North Korea policy discussions, it will be difficult to adequately assess and proactively respond to changes in the regional order created by DPRK-China and DPRK-Russia cooperation and adjustments in North Korea's external strategy.

Second, in response to the qualitative changes in DPRK-China cooperation, South Korea also needs to make its practical and livelihood-oriented cooperation agenda items more concrete. At this summit, both sides highlighted socialism as a common orientation for characterizing the bilateral relationship and jointly emphasized party-to-party exchange, youth and education exchange, and the inheritance of historical memory. This may also influence North Korea's external perceptions and regime maintenance discourse, and could over the long term expand the gap in values and perceptions between South and North Korea. South Korea cannot directly block this trend. South Korea's response therefore needs to be designed not to remain in the realm of ideological competition, but to maintain and expand points of contact capable of providing tangible benefits to both South and North Korean residents. The tangible benefits of cooperation are not, however, limited to economic benefits reducible simply to profits or investment returns. Infectious diseases, natural disasters, climate crises, forest and water resource management, agricultural damage, and maritime and border area safety are all domains that can bring shared harm to both South and North Korea. Cooperation in such areas lends itself to a pragmatic approach in that it can focus on stability in residents' lives and risk reduction rather than on political symbolism. Healthcare, disaster response, agricultural technology, climate and environmental cooperation, local administration, tourism operations, and vocational education need to be concretized as practical cooperation agenda items capable of accumulating mutual benefits while mitigating the expansion of social distance between South and North Korea.

Third, border area economic cooperation needs to be reinterpreted from the perspective of Northeast Asian multilateral cooperation. The reopening of crossing points in the DPRK-China border area and the recovery of exchange in the Yalu River and Tumen River basins will initially emerge as a matter of DPRK-China bilateral cooperation, but over the medium to long term has the potential to develop into a space where China's Northeast Revitalization strategy, North Korea's local development, Russian Far East development, and South Korea's peaceful coexistence vision intersect. South Korea needs to understand these changes as part of a process in which Northeast Asian economic geography and the security order are being restructured simultaneously. In particular, cooperation in the border area surrounding the Tumen River basin and Rason-Hunchun is a space where the interests of China, North Korea, and Russia intersect, and as such can connect with South Korea's Northern cooperation vision. South Korea needs to broaden the practical foundation for peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula through multilateral cooperation agenda items in which mutual benefits are clear and tangible outcomes can be expected, such as northern logistics, border area stability, health, environmental and disaster response, and local government cooperation.

Fourth, South Korea must prepare for an environment in which the sanctions regime and the expansion of DPRK-China cooperation proceed in parallel. China, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, officially maintains its existing positions on denuclearization and the UN framework, and has neither recognized North Korea as a nuclear state nor publicly negated the sanctions regime against it. At the same time, however, China has consistently expressed opposition to sanctions and pressure against North Korea, and through this summit has demonstrated its intent to advance cooperation across diverse domains including development strategy linkage, border area cooperation, people-to-people exchange, tourism, healthcare, and science and technology cooperation. This suggests the possibility of a trajectory in which the formal framework of the international sanctions regime is maintained while the actual space for cooperation is gradually expanded. The future DPRK-China relationship may therefore be difficult to explain through the binary of sanctions maintenance versus lifting alone. South Korea needs to continuously assess the impact that the expansion of DPRK-China cooperation may have on North Korea's economic and social structure and the Northeast Asian regional cooperation order, premised on a situation in which the formal framework of sanctions is maintained but the actual space for cooperation may expand.

※ The opinions expressed in 'Sejong Focus' are those of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institute.