| Introduction

On August 6 and August 12, 2026, North Korea launched unidentified ballistic missiles into the East Sea. To date, however, North Korean state media has disclosed neither the specific purpose behind the launches nor any of the associated launch data. For its part, South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) stated only, with respect to the August 6 launch, that it had "tracked and monitored related developments from the outset and shared launch-related information with Japan," without providing any further details on range, flight altitude, or other launch parameters. Regarding the August 12 launch, however, the JCS did state that "the detected missile flew a distance of over 700km, and the ROK and the United States are conducting a detailed analysis of the launch data."

North Korea's continued missile launches call for both a strengthening of South Korea's security response capabilities and a renewed assessment of the security environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula. Accordingly, now is the time to analyze North Korea's political and military provocation intent from multiple angles and to undertake efforts to respond to future changes in the security landscape.

This paper seeks to assess the security environment surrounding North Korea's latest ballistic missile launches and to review North Korea's missile development trends in the first half of 2026, with the aim of identifying the technical purpose and strategic significance behind these launches. To this end, it examines recent trends in Japan's military buildup and North Korea's perception of ROK-U.S.-Japan combined exercises, and further explores, from multiple angles, how the deepening of North Korea-China relations and the China-Japan rivalry structure may be shaping North Korea's perception of and response to Japan.

| North Korea's Perception of the Recent Security Environment Surrounding the Korean Peninsula

Trends in Japan's Military Activities Surrounding the Korean Peninsula

Japan has continued to strengthen its defense capabilities, citing China's military buildup, the advancement of North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities, and heightened security uncertainty surrounding the Taiwan Strait. In particular, through the revised National Security Strategy adopted in December 2022, Japan formalized its acquisition of "counterstrike capability" (the ability to respond to missile launches and other armed attacks by an adversary), while maintaining its existing principle of "exclusively defense-oriented policy." The Japanese government describes this as the minimum exercise of the right of self-defense, to be invoked only in the absence of other appropriate means in the event of an armed attack against Japan; North Korea, however, characterizes this as "in effect an attempt to acquire a preemptive strike capability."

This policy of military buildup has, in 2026, taken concrete shape at the level of actual force deployment. On March 31, Japan deployed an improved ground-launched surface-to-ship guided missile (Type 25) to a Ground Self-Defense Force garrison in Kumamoto Prefecture, and the Type 25 Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile (HVGP) to a garrison in Shizuoka Prefecture. The Japanese government described these deployments as the first operational fielding of domestically produced standoff missiles, defined as missiles capable of striking an adversary's vessels or bases from beyond the reach of its air defenses or attack range, and characterized the move as a measure to strengthen deterrence and response capability. However, the conversion of long-range precision-strike assets into actual operational capability for the Self-Defense Forces indicates that Japan's defense concept is expanding from one centered on territorial and coastal defense to one incorporating long-range strike capability.

Missile operational training conducted overseas likewise reflects this shift in defense policy. In May, Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force deployed surface-to-ship guided missiles to Luzon Island in the northern Philippines during the multinational "Balikatan 2026" combined exercise, which involved the United States, the Philippines, and other participants, and conducted live-fire training against a decommissioned vessel located approximately 75km away. This is significant in that it marks an instance of the Self-Defense Forces actually operating surface-to-ship missiles outside Japanese territory, demonstrating that the scope of Japan's military activity has expanded beyond the defense of its own territory to a stage in which missile forces are operated in extraterritorial areas through combined exercises with allied and partner countries. In addition, on July 29, Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force conducted its first live-fire test of the Tomahawk long-range cruise missile from the Aegis destroyer Chokai in the Pacific Ocean, with the U.S. Navy providing support in the form of range access, maritime and airspace surveillance, and test planning.

North Korea perceives this series of developments not as a set of isolated defense enhancements, but as evidence that Japan's expanding military role and pursuit of long-range strike capability are now in earnest. That is, North Korea regards the fact that Japan's counterstrike capability has entered the stage of actual operational employment, that standoff missiles have been deployed domestically, and that missile operational capability has been extended to extraterritorial areas through combined exercises with the United States, the Philippines, and others, as signs of Japan's "military buildup" and "resumption of overseas military activity." Kim Yo Jong's statement of August 5, in which she referenced the Balikatan combined exercise in May and the Tomahawk cruise missile test-firing in July, denouncing that "Japan's scheme to formalize the possession of preemptive strike capability is entering an actual criminal stage" and asserting that "the United States stands behind Japan's dangerous military moves," offers a clear illustration of how North Korea perceives the trend of Japan's military buildup.

Ultimately, Japan's defense buildup and North Korea's advancing nuclear and missile capabilities carry the potential to feed a vicious cycle of "security dilemma," in which mutual threat perceptions continue to reinforce one another. Japan expands its counterstrike capability and long-range strike forces on the grounds of North Korea's nuclear and missile threat and China's military expansion, while North Korea interprets this as an expansion of Japan's offensive capability and an intensification of U.S.-led military pressure against North Korea, using this interpretation to justify its own nuclear and missile advancement. Accordingly, Japan's military buildup and North Korea's nuclear and missile development should not be viewed as fragmented, independent phenomena, but rather analyzed comprehensively as a process of interaction in which ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation, the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan military alliance, and North Korea's nuclear force advancement mutually influence one another, thereby reshaping the security environment in Northeast Asia.

Trends in ROK-U.S.-Japan Combined Military Exercises Surrounding the Korean Peninsula

North Korea has recently escalated its criticism of the expansion of regional combined military exercises centered on the ROK, the United States, and Japan, along with the integration of their command and control systems, characterizing these developments as a sign that military pressure against North Korea is now in earnest. In particular, Kim Yo Jong, in her statement of August 5, referenced the Self-Defense Forces' missile test launches and the U.S.-Japan-Philippines combined exercise, and warned of the possibility of "additional military options" in response to Japan's military buildup. In this vein, North Korea asserts that the U.S.-led multinational combined exercises and ROK-U.S.-Japan military cooperation go beyond simple defensive training, constituting a process of accumulating real-world operational capability for the conduct of actual combined operations in a contingency.

Among the exercises North Korea has persistently taken issue with, most notably in its KCNA commentary¹⁾ of August 4, is "RIMPAC 2026," conducted from June 24 to July 31. This exercise, in which approximately 30 countries and more than 30,000 personnel participated, along with surface vessels, submarines, and aircraft, involved a range of maritime and land operations, including anti-submarine, anti-air, and anti-surface warfare, combined amphibious operations, and live-fire missile training. Notably, the ROK Navy served, for the first time, as the Combined Force Maritime Component Commander overseeing multinational maritime forces, while Japan served as deputy commander of the combined task force. This indicates that RIMPAC is evolving beyond a simple multinational exercise into a stage in which the forces of multiple countries are integrated under a single command structure to verify actual operational capability.

ROK-U.S. combined exercises are likewise developing beyond unit-level combat training, moving in a direction that strengthens sustained wartime operational capability and reflects the latest patterns of modern warfare. The ROK-U.S. Combined Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (CJLOTS) exercise, conducted from July 20 to August 1, focused on the rapid deployment and resupply of wartime personnel, ammunition, equipment, and fuel, as well as on verifying ship-to-shore offloading and transport capability under adverse conditions such as simulated port destruction, with the aim of strengthening the logistics support system needed to sustain a protracted conflict. In addition, the "Resolute Dragon 26"²⁾ exercise, conducted in June in Okinawa, Kyushu, and other locations in Japan, assessed command and control and multi-domain operational capability between the U.S. Marine Corps and Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force, with the aim of enhancing interoperability between the two militaries.

This trend continues into the ROK-U.S. combined exercise "Ulchi Freedom Shield" (UFS), scheduled from August 17 to 27. Reflecting the latest lessons drawn from real-world combat cases such as the Russia-Ukraine war, this year's UFS is focused on strengthening response capability against the diverse threats of modern warfare, including countering drone and unmanned aerial vehicle attacks, cyber and electronic warfare, and the Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) system for countering cruise missiles and drones. The exercise also involves large-scale, realistic field training exercises (FTX) spanning "Multi-Domain Operations" across land, sea, air, cyber, and space, along with joint live-fire training and combined river-crossing exercises, while simultaneously conducting a Full Operational Capability (FOC) assessment of the future Combined Forces Command in preparation for the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON). In this connection, the U.S. Eighth Army in Korea, in an August 13 press release,³⁾ indicated that UFS carries the character of "checking China" as part of ROK-U.S. combined defense posture. In response to these ROK-U.S. moves, North Korea launched a ballistic missile into the East Sea on August 12, and on August 13, a spokesperson for North Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement denouncing the ROK-U.S. combined exercise.⁴⁾ In light of this sequence, North Korea's August 12 missile launch can be understood as both a preemptive warning against, and a show of force in response to, the ROK-U.S. combined exercise.

What North Korea is particularly watching closely is the fact that these combined exercises are moving beyond the mere joint employment of personnel and equipment toward a structural integration of command and control systems.⁵⁾ In March 2025​, Japan established the Joint Operations Command (JJOC) to direct and coordinate integrated operations among the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces, while the United States is likewise restructuring U.S. Forces Japan into a joint force command system with independent operational capability. Should the command structures of both countries be enhanced in this manner, it is expected to lay the groundwork for closer coordination in information sharing, the formulation and adjustment of operational plans, and the conduct of joint operations in a contingency. Combined with the repeated deployment of the U.S. mid-range missile system Typhon to Japan and the possibility of its future permanent stationing there, as well as the accelerating improvement of Japan's long-range strike capability, North Korea is likely to perceive regional military cooperation as extending beyond the level of training exercises into a genuine enhancement of actual operational and strike capability.

Ultimately, North Korea's recent criticism directed at the United States, South Korea, and Japan can be understood as taking issue not so much with the scale of individual exercises, but rather with the structural shift toward the institutional integration of interoperability and command and control systems among ROK-U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Japan forces through combined exercises, and with the fact that realistic ROK-U.S. combined exercises reflecting the patterns of modern warfare could pose a substantive military threat to North Korea. North Korea appears likely to invoke this security environment as a justification for further advancing its nuclear and missile forces and for additional shows of force, a dynamic expected to further deepen mutual threat perception and arms competition across the Northeast Asian region.

Restoration of North Korea-China Relations

North Korea-China relations appear to have entered a phase of marked restoration and deepening at the political and diplomatic level, catalyzed by Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Pyongyang on June 8, 2026. It is worth noting, in particular, that a series of high-level exchanges between the two countries has continued in the wake of the June summit. In July, marking the 65th anniversary of the signing of the People's Republic of China-Democratic People's Republic of Korea Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, a party and government delegation led by North Korean Premier Pak Thae Song visited China (July 10 to 12), where Premier Pak was received personally by President Xi. Subsequently, a Chinese delegation led by Wang Huning, Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, visited North Korea (July 15 to 17) to attend commemorative events marking the treaty's 65th anniversary. ​ In his meeting with Wang Huning, ​Kim Jong Un praised China's commitment to faithfully implementing the agreements reached at the June Pyongyang summit and reaffirmed North Korea's position of developing the two countries' friendly cooperative relationship in multiple directions in keeping with the demands of the times. These developments indicate that North Korea-China relations are being institutionalized at the party and government level, moving beyond mere personal rapport between the two leaders.

This trend of North Korea-China rapprochement is unfolding in tandem with Japan's military buildup and the intensification of China-Japan tensions over the Taiwan issue. The restoration of North Korea-China relations raises the likelihood that North Korea will come to regard Japan's military buildup as a security concern it shares with China, an environment that could in turn reinforce North Korea's rationale for military responses toward Japan.

Against this backdrop, it is worth noting that the Northeast Asian security landscape at the time of North Korea's ballistic missile launches was marked by the simultaneous emergence of a strengthening North Korea-China strategic alignment, deteriorating China-Japan relations, and moves to expand the regional military role of the ROK-U.S. and U.S.-Japan alliances. From China's perspective in particular, amid the growing prominence of the possibility of Japanese military involvement in a Taiwan Strait contingency, Beijing may also need to factor in the possibility that U.S. Forces Korea and ROK-U.S. combined forces could be employed in operations along the First Island Chain in a contingency. Accordingly, amid the strengthening of North Korea-China strategic alignment, both countries are likely to have closely monitored the content and direction of ROK-U.S. combined exercises, particularly moves to enhance the regional power-projection and logistics support capabilities of U.S. forces stationed in South Korea and Japan, as a key security variable. As a result, the likelihood increases that North Korea's military responses toward South Korea and the United States will become interlinked with China's efforts to check the United States and Japan, a dynamic that could further heighten security instability across Northeast Asia, including the Korean Peninsula.

| Technical Considerations Underlying the Missile Test Launches

An examination of North Korea's missile development trends in the first half of 2026 shows a focus on verifying the reliability of existing missile systems while simultaneously advancing them into systems capable of realistic, integrated operational employment on an actual battlefield. This pattern is evidenced by developments such as △ the development of hypersonic missiles capable of evading an adversary's missile defense network, △ attempts at mixed operational employment combining short-range tactical missiles with irregular maneuvering trajectories, △ the mass launch of super-large multiple rocket launchers, △ warhead diversification, including cluster warhead testing, and △ the diversification of launch platforms, including the launch of strategic cruise missiles from a destroyer.

This developmental direction was demonstrated even more clearly in North Korea's May 26 tests of a "lightweight multipurpose missile launch system" and a "multiple tactical cruise missile weapons system." According to the reporting and photographs made public, the "lightweight multipurpose launch system" is capable of mounting and launching one tactical ballistic missile alongside nine 240mm multiple rocket launcher rounds, while the "multiple tactical cruise missile weapons system" is capable of launching and operating 22 cruise missiles from a single launch vehicle. This indicates that North Korea is advancing toward an approach to missile operations involving the simultaneous employment of weapons with differing flight characteristics and guidance methods, in a form of combined-fires operation. The simultaneous or staggered employment of ballistic missiles with improved irregular-trajectory flight performance, strategic cruise missiles that approach at low altitude to evade detection, and various multiple rocket launchers capable of projecting a large volume of rounds within a short period, could impose a complex and compounded defensive burden that would be difficult to counter with any single interceptor system alone. Accordingly, the May 26 test can also be assessed as reflecting a trend toward the practical application of "combined-fires operations" designed with the penetration of an adversary's missile defense system in mind, going beyond a simple verification of individual weapons systems' performance.

Regarding the type of projectile launched on August 6 and 12, media outlets have speculated on several possibilities, including 1) an improved variant of a short-range tactical ballistic missile, 2) a reduced-range launch of a medium-range ballistic missile, and 3) a hypersonic missile. Given North Korea's missile development trends this year, however, it is possible that these launches represented a technical verification effort building on the May 26 tests. In particular, there is a possibility that the launches were intended to assess the irregular maneuvering performance of warheads such as the hypersonic glide vehicle, aimed at neutralizing the ROK-U.S. missile interception system.

The question of North Korea's missile operations in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war also carries important implications. On August 5, Ukrainian intelligence authorities claimed that a North Korean missile unit had been deployed to the Voronezh region in western Russia, alleging that approximately 90 North Korean missile unit personnel, up to 120 ballistic missiles, including 40 KN-23 (North Korea's version of the Iskander) and KN-24 (North Korea's version of the ATACMS) missiles, and six launchers had been transported and deployed.⁶⁾ While this information has not been officially confirmed by either Russia or North Korea, if accurate, it would carry significant implications, indicating that North Korea's missile forces are advancing beyond a simple arms-export stage to one in which North Korean missile unit personnel are directly participating in actual combat operations, thereby verifying the "combat viability" of these weapons on a real battlefield. Given that North Korea could, through the Russia-Ukraine battlefield, establish a weapons-improvement mechanism running from performance verification through actual operational use, to the accumulation of battlefield data, to the correction of deficiencies and technical refinement, and ultimately to the advancement of missile forces, it is worth considering the possibility that the ballistic missile test launches of August 6 and 12 may be related to performance improvement and operational reliability verification efforts undertaken with actual deployment in Russia in mind. Should such a linkage prove to be the case, North Korea's accumulation of battlefield data and technical evolution through the Russia-Ukraine war would be expected to heighten military uncertainty on the Korean Peninsula and further increase the response burden on the ROK-U.S.-Japan combined defense posture.

| Inferring the Purpose of North Korea's Missile Launches and Its Implications

At the time of these ballistic missile launches, the security environment in Northeast Asia can be characterized as having developed along the following structural lines: ① North Korea-China relations were restored at the strategic level, catalyzed by Xi Jinping's visit to Pyongyang in June, ② China-Japan tensions over the Taiwan issue intensified, ③ interoperability and operational capability expanded through increasingly sophisticated ROK-U.S.-Japan combined exercises, and ④ North Korea, sharply criticizing these developments, continued its military demonstrations and the advancement of its nuclear and missile capabilities.

Against the backdrop of this complex security situation, North Korea's ballistic missile launches on August 6 and 12 likely reflect several strategic purposes operating in combination. The first is political and military warning and deterrence signaling. Most of North Korea's missile launches, beyond serving a technical performance-verification purpose, can also be understood as reflecting politically and diplomatically demonstrative acts directed at neighboring countries. Given that the launches came just ahead of the ROK-U.S. combined exercise "Ulchi Freedom Shield" (UFS, August 17 to 27), a warning message aimed at the combined exercise can be regarded as a primary triggering factor. At the same time, the fact that the launch occurred just one day after Kim Yo Jong sharply criticized Japan's military buildup on August 5 and referenced the possibility of "additional military options" suggests that the launches were not merely a response to the ROK-U.S. combined exercise, but also carried an element of preemptive warning and deterrence signaling directed at Japan's acquisition of long-range strike capability and the strengthening of U.S.-Japan military cooperation.

The second is a technical purpose aimed at improving the capability to penetrate the ROK-U.S.-Japan missile defense architecture. North Korea's development priorities appear to be shifting toward the question of how rapidly it can mass-produce missiles and how effectively it can employ a mixture of varied flight trajectory types to penetrate an adversary's defense system and enhance survivability. Accordingly, this launch, too, may reflect an attempt not merely to confirm range and accuracy, but to verify whether missile survivability and operational reliability could be secured under actual operational conditions. In this connection, given that the hypersonic missile remains among the weapons systems whose development has not yet been completed, it is presumed that the test was intended to assess the irregular maneuvering performance of the hypersonic glide vehicle or of tactical missile warheads.

The third is the verification of combat viability for missiles intended to support Russia. Since the start of 2026, North Korea has, alongside efforts to improve its capability to evade an adversary's defense systems, devoted considerable effort to verifying the performance and enhancing the reliability of weapons systems provided in support of the Russia-Ukraine war and required for actual operational use. Accordingly, it is also possible that these launches were intended to verify the performance of missiles assembled with actual battlefield conditions in Russia in mind, and to render a final assessment of the reliability of the new ballistic missile launch system to be provided for operation by actual North Korean missile units in Russia.

In sum, the ballistic missile launches of August 6 and 12 can be analyzed as reflecting multiple strategic intentions operating in combination: ① a political and military deterrence and warning signal directed at the ROK-U.S. combined exercise, Japan's military buildup, and ROK-U.S.-Japan military cooperation, ② an effort to enhance survivability and penetration capability against the ROK-U.S.-Japan missile defense network, and ③ verification of actual operational capability for tactical ballistic missiles under real battlefield conditions.

1. KCNA, August 4, 2026, "The U.S.-Japan-ROK Trilateral Threat Entrenched as a New Security Crisis in the Asia-Pacific Region": The commentary states that RIMPAC has "continuously expanded in scale and content with the aim of establishing U.S. regional hegemony," and that what gives rise to concern is "the increasingly evident nature and character of RIMPAC as a war exercise directed against the sovereign states of the region, and the leading roles played by Japan and South Korea, which are thoroughly subordinated to and oriented toward the realization of the U.S. hegemonic strategy."
2. KCNA, June 29, 2026, "The Reckless Bluster of a Defeated Nation Seeking an Opportunity for Reinvasion": The commentary criticizes "Resolute Dragon" as "a war exercise thoroughly premised on actual combat, through which Japan is continuously enhancing its capability for aggression," and warns that "Japan, in serving the world's largest arms merchant [the United States] and rushing down the road to reinvasion, must bear in mind that this will lead only to a miserable end, and must refrain from reckless action."
3. The Dong-A Ilbo, August 14, 2026: In an August 13 press release on UFS, U.S. Eighth Army stated that "establishing theater-level logistics and sustainment systems remains U.S. Eighth Army's top priority," and that "this year's UFS exercise includes rapid distribution and readiness procedures for Army Prepositioned Stock-4 (APS-4), which will demonstrate the alliance's capability to rapidly project combat power and secure key terrain within the First Island Chain."
4. KCNA, August 13, 2026: A spokesperson for North Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that "the United States has made no secret that this joint military exercise is clearly different from those conducted over the past five years, and that its purpose lies in completing preparations for an actual military confrontation with our state, by openly revealing that the exercise's focus is on mastering war-fighting capability based on the new patterns of modern warfare."
5. KCNA, July 31, 2026, "U.S. Forces Japan Command Is Transforming Itself into a War Command": The commentary criticizes the plan to restructure U.S. Forces Japan, which had previously performed largely administrative functions such as managing the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement, into a "Joint Force Command" with actual operational command authority, stating that while this is aimed at further strengthening America's overseas forces of aggression into a field force possessing independent wartime operational capability, "its more important hidden intent lies in using Japan's 'Self-Defense Forces' as a spearhead and basic combat force for an all-out war in the Asia-Pacific region in the event of a contingency."
6. Andriy Cherniak, spokesperson for Ukraine's Defense Intelligence, statement of August 5, 2026, as reported by Reuters.

※ The opinions expressed in 'Sejong Focus' are those of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institute.