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The End of Liberal Hegemony: Prospects and Implications of the U.S.-Russia Peace Negotiations |
| February 28, 2025 |
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Jungsup KimPrincipal Fellow, The Sejong Institute | jungsupkim@sejong.org
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After a 1.5-hour phone call between President Trump and President Putin on February 12, 2025, peace negotiations to end the Ukraine war gained momentum. The situation is unfolding as the U.S.-Russia negotiations, excluding Ukraine and Europe—both of which are directly involved and have deep stakes in the war—shock the international community. The framework for the peace negotiations pushed by the Trump administration significantly deviates from traditional Western policies. U.S. Secretary of Defense Hegseth and President Trump have drawn a line, stating that Ukraine’s NATO membership and the recovery of territories lost in the war are unrealistic. Before the negotiations even started, the U.S. had already sided with Russia and President Putin. Additionally, the U.S. is pushing for peace without consulting Ukraine and European allies, with whom it had been fighting for three years. On the surface, it appears as though the lines of confrontation are suddenly crumbling, with allies and enemies seemingly switching places. The U.S., which had been leading the war against Russia, is now approaching Russia, while serious cracks are emerging with Western allies it had been fighting alongside. Most strikingly, on February 24, marking the third anniversary of the war in Ukraine, the U.S. voted against a UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russia—siding with Russia, North Korea, and Iran. This has created a situation where the U.S. is aligning with the group it had previously labeled as the "Axis of Evil," breaking away from the Western bloc.
What will the peace negotiations pushed by the Trump administration look like? The main question is whether Ukraine will continue fighting even without U.S. support, or whether Europe will bear the burden of the war on its own, and continue to support Ukraine without the U.S. The most crucial issue is providing security guarantees for Ukraine. There have been proposals for European countries to send troops to Ukraine after the war, but internal disagreements among European nations have not been fully resolved yet. There are also broader questions beyond the prospects for peace. If peace is achieved and U.S.-Russia relations improve, how will the geopolitical landscape of Eurasia unfold? As realists have pointed out, will the closer ties between China and Russia, which have accelerated after the Ukraine war, loosen, creating a geopolitical environment where the U.S. can focus on containing China? The future of NATO is also a major concern. Can Europe, now awakening from its habitual reliance on the United States, achieve genuine independence through rearmament and enhanced internal cohesion? What role will NATO, which is based on a commitment to collective defense, play in this process? The war in Ukraine is not just Europe’s problem. Under the Biden administration’s early emphasis on linking NATO and the Indo-Pacific, countries like South Korea, Japan, and Australia, members of the AP4, have been directly or indirectly involved in the Ukraine war. How will changes in the European geopolitical landscape impact East Asia? How will Europe’s relationship with China evolve, and what will happen to the rapidly strengthened North-Russia ties after the war? Furthermore, what should South Korea’s future policy be, as it has supported Ukraine as part of the West and participated in sanctions against Russia? There are many questions to address and policies to consider.
Above all, the end of the U.S.-Russia conflict is expected to be a historic moment that announces the end of an era and the arrival of a new world order. Although President Trump had pledged this from his election campaign, the reversal in U.S. foreign policy is now unfolding in a striking manner. Values and norms such as the territorial sovereignty of sovereign nations or the liberal international order now seem like distant slogans. The world is now witnessing statements from the U.S. president about things that would have been unimaginable in the past, such as buying Greenland, securing control of the Panama Canal, and owning the Gaza Strip. The Trump administration appears to have no qualms about recognizing Ukraine as part of Russia's traditional sphere of influence and seems to be aiming to end the war through negotiation and compromise between great powers. This approach is comparable to President Roosevelt’s decision at the Yalta Conference after 1945, where he handed over the fate of Eastern Europe to Stalin. Like Ukraine, South Korea is located at a geopolitical fault line where the spheres of influence of great powers intersect. The confusion faced by Ukraine and Europe is not a distant issue for South Korea. The following explores the prospects of peace negotiations in Ukraine and analyzes the implications for the changing international order and security on the Korean Peninsula. -
The peace settlement that Trump is pushing for is highly uncertain in terms of whether it will bring lasting peace to Europe. There is a possibility that the war could reignite after a peace agreement, and it is unclear whether the parties involved, including Ukraine and its European allies, will readily accept the terms of a peace deal. President Zelensky, although perplexed by the shift in U.S. policy under the Trump administration, maintains a firm stance that they will not surrender to Russia. European allies have also emphasized that their support for Ukraine remains unchanged. However, it is uncertain how long Ukraine, already facing significant challenges in mobilizing troops, can sustain the front lines without U.S. military support. Even with continued European assistance, an operational gap in real-time targeting, command-and-control support, and other strategic aspects will be inevitable without the assistance. As war fatigue grows among the Ukrainian population, domestic political support for the war is also waning. A January poll showed President Zelensky's approval rating had dropped to its lowest level since the war began, with 52% support. It also indicated that he could lose to former commander-in-chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi in a potential presidential election.
If compromise is rejected, worst-case scenarios, including a peace agreement without security guarantees, domestic political division, and large-scale emigration, cannot be ruled out. It is an extremely difficult decision to accept losing 20% of territory due to a brutal invasion by a great power. However, it is also projected that if Ukraine continues to fight, it may not be able to preserve even the remaining 80% of its territory. While the physical losses are significant, the greatest concern is the loss of human resources. Among the 4.3 million Ukrainians who have fled to Europe, about one-third are under 18. The death toll and injuries from the war, along with this significant loss of productive population, raise serious questions about Ukraine's ability to rebuild as a functioning nation. Therefore, some degree of compromise seems inevitable for Ukraine. As a red line for accepting peace, Ukraine will likely exert considerable effort to secure measures such as establishing ties with the West, ensuring continued financial and material support, preventing excessive demilitarization, and obtaining peacekeeping deployments from Europe as deterrents to further escalation of the conflict.
The choices of Europe are also crucial. What stance will Europe take on the U.S.-Russia peace proposal, and what practical alternatives can it offer for the security guarantees that Ukraine desperately desires? Europe's response to Trump's peace proposal, which seems closer to Russia's position, is mixed, with many advocating for a hardline approach, while some are offering more pragmatic viewpoints. The hardline position emphasizes that no concessions should be made to Putin’s aggression. The rationale is not only based on the inviolability of the territorial integrity of sovereign nations but also on the international political consequences of Russia’s victory. From the perspective of seeing Russia's invasion of Ukraine as imperialistic expansion, the war in Ukraine will not end there—it carries serious implications for the security and borders of Europe. The success of Putin’s Russia in altering the status quo could potentially lead to Russian actions in Georgia, Moldova, or the Baltic states, reshaping Europe’s map. There is also fear that, with the U.S. stepping back from Europe, Russia’s provocations in the grey zone could have a broader impact on Europe’s internal political landscape, deepening Russia’s shadow over the continent. The hardliners criticize the West’s weak response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its hesitancy in supporting Ukraine with arms after Russia's invasion in 2022. By failing to show resolve when needed, they argue, the West has allowed the Russia threat to grow, leading to greater costs and risks.
On the other hand, pragmatists criticize the hardliners for their obsession with a victory narrative that lacks a clear exit strategy. The war in Ukraine is characterized as a typical war of attrition, where the side with more troops and weapons is likely to win. Despite Western financial and material support, Russia holds an advantage in this regard, particularly in terms of troop mobilization. For Ukraine to win, direct NATO intervention is the only option, but this is impossible due to Russia’s nuclear deterrence. Such a move would risk a third world war and nuclear conflict. Realistically, the war was one that Ukraine could not have won from the start, as the conditions were too clear from the outset. Pragmatists argue that continuing with reckless sacrifices is futile, and instead, a realistic exit strategy should be pursued.
One of the issues realistically being discussed post-peace settlement is the idea of European troop deployments to Ukraine. This proposal suggests that European countries should send troops to Ukraine to ensure its security and prevent Russia's re-invasion. However, there is currently no unified European stance on this issue. French President Macron and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer have expressed a willingness to consider peacekeeping troop deployments, but many other countries, including Germany, are cautious and argue that it is premature to discuss this. Poland, which has been at the forefront of supporting Ukraine, has firmly rejected the possibility of sending troops, likely out of concerns that such a move would weaken NATO's cohesion and lead to a divergence in security between the U.S. and Poland. The question remains: which European countries, with what size forces, and under which mandate, will deploy troops? At a minimum, this would involve small peacekeeping forces carrying out ceasefire monitoring missions. At the maximum, it could involve tens of thousands of troops acting as a deterrent to Russian re-invasion, serving as a tripwire. Naturally, Ukraine hopes for the latter, as it seeks to raise the costs of a Russian re-invasion and increase the threshold for war. However, Europe must also consider the potential consequences of a breach of deterrence. Will Europe be willing to go to war with Russia to protect Ukraine? Therefore, the specific form of European troop deployments will likely involve difficult choices between the need for security guarantees for Ukraine and the risks of becoming embroiled in war with Russia. -
If the Ukraine war proceeds according to the current flow of discussion, how can it be evaluated? If Ukraine were to lose 20% of its territory and, without the NATO membership it originally hoped for, reach a peace agreement, how should the overall outcome of the war be assessed? First, there is no doubt that Ukraine is the biggest victim. Not only would it lose a fifth of its territory, which is concentrated in industrial zones, but the destruction of its land and the immense human casualties would also be devastating. In particular, the death toll of over 500,000, in addition to more than 5 million people leaving the country, raises bleak prospects about the future, as it is uncertain whether these people will return after the war, which would make national reconstruction extremely difficult. On top of this, after a painful process, the Trump administration’s pressure on a mineral agreement has reached a broad framework of agreement. Initially, President Zelensky had resisted, saying, “It would take 250 years to repay $500 billion” and “I won’t sign a debt that 10 generations must repay,” but it seems he accepted it as a last resort to encourage American involvement in Ukraine. Although the terms were less harsh compared to the initial proposal by the U.S., Ukraine still failed to secure any promises regarding security guarantees. Instead, it agreed to let the U.S. hold development shares in strategic minerals, oil and gas, and infrastructure assets. In other words, Ukraine is now in a position where its resources are being exploited by the U.S. after being destroyed by Russia.
Europe, which has seen its economic cooperation model with Russia collapse and now faces the task of rearming, is now under a dual burden of security and economic challenges. Europe had relied on Russia for about a quarter of its energy demand, but now it is paying a high price in terms of rising energy costs and disruptions to industrial competitiveness. The impact on Germany, which had deep economic ties with Russia, is especially severe. Above all, how Europe will manage Eurasian security without the U.S. has become an urgent issue. While the Atlantic alliance has not dissolved and the U.S. has not withdrawn, with about 100,000 American troops still in Europe, the key issue is not the wording of treaties but the commitment to collective defense. NATO’s spirit is represented by Article 5, which states that an attack on one member is considered an attack on all. However, there is growing doubt about this core commitment, and within Europe, proposals for independent defense capabilities are emerging. Some of the proposals suggest that major EU countries should quickly increase defense spending to 3% of GDP and expand it to 5% within a few years, and that a European Rearmament Bank should be established to facilitate this. There are also suggestions for centralizing Europe’s weapon procurement to acquire air defense systems, strategic airlift capabilities, and command and control capabilities that individual nations find difficult to develop or purchase. These were military capabilities Europe had relied on the U.S. for. There are also calls for an increase in nuclear weapons production, with the importance of low-yield nuclear weapons being highlighted, particularly for the deterrence of frontline states. In short, this signifies European defense being increasingly Europeanized and a move toward strategic independence from the U.S.
Even if Russia were to end the war under favorable conditions, it would still face significant strategic losses. First, the strengthening of anti-Russian sentiment (Russophobia) and the deterioration of the geopolitical environment to the point that reconciliation with Europe becomes difficult is a huge loss for Russia. The NATO membership of Finland and Sweden, which has effectively encircled the Baltic Fleet, is also a significant security burden. Russia’s reliance on the Eurasian east and central regions as its only viable option after being cut off from Europe is another painful aspect. However, blocking Ukraine’s NATO membership and taking control of southeastern Ukraine means that Russia has at least achieved its minimal goal of securing a buffer zone, which it had cited as a justification for the war. Besides, the emergence of the Trump administration opens up the possibility of restoring Russia’s international stature, which could be a strategic gain. The U.S. respecting Russia’s sphere of influence and the potential for a U.S.-China-Russia triangular great power dynamic would align with President Putin’s vision of Russia playing a central role in a multipolar international order.
Meanwhile, the U.S. has effectively capitalized on the strategic opportunities created by the war, such as NATO cohesion and the linkage between Europe and the Indo-Pacific. The Biden administration has framed the war as a division of the world into liberal and authoritarian camps and has pursued the dual objectives of weakening Russia and containing China. The collapse of the energy and industrial cooperation between Germany and Russia, which had been uncomfortable for the U.S., is something it likely welcomes. Although U.S. policies have shifted dramatically with the rise of thei Trump administration, the strategic losses and damages for the U.S. are smaller compared to those of Ukraine and Europe. While the Biden administration has invested heavily in military expenditures and economic support, the Trump administration’s forced acquisition of mineral shares from Ukraine has allowed the U.S. to recover at least economically, even turning a profit. -
The interest lies in whether the dramatic improvement of U.S.-Russia relations could lead to a geopolitical shift where the U.S. enlists Russia to join the containment of China. This refers to the potential re-emergence of the Kissinger strategy, which, during the Nixon administration, allowed the U.S. to gain an upper hand in its geopolitical competition with the Soviet Union through rapprochement with China. Realist theorists have consistently argued that weakening the Sino-Russian alliance would align with U.S. geopolitical interests. However, the restoration of U.S.-Russia relations is unlikely to bring about a change on the same scale as the U.S.-China détente during the Cold War. Despite lingering traditional distrust and limitations in Sino-Russian relations, their shared strategic goal of containing the U.S. remains firm. Above all, the tensions between China and Russia are not sharp enough. Nixon's strategy of U.S.-China rapprochement succeeded because the Sino-Soviet conflict had become so severe that it nearly escalated into war. President Xi Jinping and President Putin, through a phone call on February 24, also made it clear that the Sino-Russian relationship is not subordinated to external influences. However, if U.S. policy toward Russia shifts, the dynamics that accelerated Sino-Russian rapprochement could dissipate, and the foundation for a new great power politics involving the U.S., China, and Russia might be laid.
Europe seems to be responding to the U.S. shift by rearming, but there are also suggestions that the security architecture of Europe, including Russia, needs to be redesigned. Realists diagnose that the war in Ukraine is, in some respects, the result of the failure to establish a sustainable Eurasian security order, including Russia, after the end of the Cold War. There was no agreement on Russia's appropriate position in the Eurasian order. Europe was shocked by Russia's invasion of Ukraine and is worried about the next threat after Ukraine. Concessions to Russia are seen as a temporary fix, and the prevailing Western view is that this will lead to even greater risks in the future. The error of Chamberlain, who was deceived by Hitler, must not be repeated. However, realists believe that while underestimating Russia is dangerous, overestimating it is also problematic. As the mainstream worries, Putin and his geopolitical strategists may indeed dream of restoring the empire and expanding Russia's influence. The problem, however, lies in Russia’s capabilities. Despite having secured only about 20% of Ukraine’s territory over the past three years, Russia’s ability to expand its geopolitical sphere beyond securing a buffer zone for its security remains uncertain. If Russia and Europe continue their antagonism and engage in an arms race, the security dilemma will deepen, and the countries at the frontlines of both spheres of influence will have to live in grim circumstances. Instead, it is argued that Europe and Russia should accept each other as they are and make a geopolitical compromise to establish a stable status quo. In such a case, Ukraine could also transform from a point of competition and conflict into a bridge and buffer zone between the two sides.
The Trump administration’s push for an end to the war in Ukraine symbolizes the end of the U.S.'s liberal hegemonic diplomacy that has persisted since World War II. While the Afghanistan War and the Iraq invasion were efforts to spread freedom in the periphery, NATO expansion was a project to extend U.S. hegemony and values in the heart of Eurasia. However, the U.S. has acknowledged its failure both at the periphery and in the core, and has declared its intention to abandon the role of supporting the existing liberal international order. The international order is now returning to traditional power-balancing politics. The U.S. had long assumed the role of a hegemon that provided order to the international anarchy. Given the world’s acceptance of America’s transcendent position and exceptional role, it was sometimes referred to as an "invited empire" or "benevolent hegemon." However, the U.S. is now abandoning its hegemonic status and transforming into a typical great power that aggressively pursues its narrow national interests. If that happens, the international order will inevitably change into a power-balancing system where great powers openly and ruthlessly pursue their own national interests, with compromises and transactions occurring alongside.
In a power-balancing or multipolar order, the most important issue is the delineation of spheres of influence among the great powers. An agreement and respect for spheres of influence between major powers is the minimum prerequisite for stabilizing the international order. The peace talks between Trump and Putin can be seen as a re-negotiation of the great powers’ agreement on Russia’s sphere of influence. There is debate about whether a multipolar or unipolar order is more stable. What is clear is that countries within the direct gravitational pull of great powers' spheres of influence may face exhaustion and danger. Ukraine is one such case, but so are Greenland, Panama, Mexico, and Canada, which Trump criticized. Trump is asserting that while recognizing Russia’s share in Eurasia, the Americas are firmly within the U.S.'s sphere of influence. It is not surprising to describe this as the "expansionary revival of Monroeism."
As U.S.-Russia peace negotiations begin, memories of the Yalta Conference at the end of World War II are also being revived. This is because, in the process of building spheres of influence among great powers, smaller countries are once again reduced to mere subjects of negotiation and compromise. At that time, the leaders of the U.S., Soviet Union, and the UK made a “dirty” compromise by conceding to Stalin’s demand for exclusive spheres of influence and handing over Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union. As a result, half of Europe came under Soviet control, and Eastern Europe suffered under communist dictatorship for half a century. The same pattern of great power diplomacy sacrificing smaller nations for the sake of stability is now being repeated, from Yalta to Riyadh in Saudi Arabia. -
Over the past 70 years, South Korea has secured its safety and achieved prosperity under the American-led order and hegemony. Economically, it has also benefited from China's rise. However, with the major shift in the international order, it is now time for South Korea’s foreign policy to fundamentally reflect on its core paradigm. In the new international order, strategic competition will intensify within the spheres of influence of great powers, and forms of survival-based self-reliance and alliances will emerge. Examples of this include Europe strengthening its independent defense capabilities, the simultaneous competition and alliance between the U.S., China, and Russia, and the diplomatic balancing act of the Global South.
One of immediate interest is the impact on North Korea-Russia relations. The provision of artillery shells and the dispatch of North Korean troops to the Ukraine war have elevated North Korea’s strategic value, leading to closer ties between North Korea and Russia. Some suggest that if the Ukraine war ends, the North Korea-Russia relationship may cool, but it seems likely that strategic cooperation between the two will continue even after the war. Beyond simple military aid, there are other incentives for cooperation, such as the exchange of labor and energy between North Korea and Russia. Moreover, Russia’s alignment with North Korea is not just about the need for artillery shells but also linked to a strategic shift towards the east. Unless Russia fundamentally improves its relationship with Europe, it has no choice but to turn its gaze toward the eastern end of Eurasia, and in this regard, North Korea’s strategic value remains significant. However, if U.S.-Russia relations improve, the alignment of “the U.S.-South Korea-Japan versus North Korea-China-Russia” may loosen somewhat. Therefore, the end of the Ukraine war could provide South Korea with some room to maneuver in improving South Korea-Russia relations and managing inter-Korean relations. Notably, if South Korea manages and restores its relationship with Russia, it could gain a voice in countering Russia’s military support to North Korea.
South Korea’s foreign strategy should still prioritize the U.S.-South Korea alliance and pro-Western diplomacy, but efforts should be made to minimize the risks of entanglement in great power politics while maintaining flexibility and focusing on self-reliance. Countries like South Korea, located on geopolitical fault lines, need to be especially cautious as a balance of power order emerges. Countries positioned in regions where spheres of influence overlap and borders have not been clearly defined could face situations where their national fate is influenced by great power competition or compromises between them. Therefore, South Korea must avoid being trapped in bloc diplomacy and make efforts to maintain friendly relations with China and Russia, while also forming multilateral alliances with Europe, Australia, and the Global South to navigate the challenges faced during the Trump era. Of course, a geopolitical response is necessary in light of China’s rise. While the change in the East Asian balance of power may not directly threaten South Korea, it is undeniably a geopolitical challenge. Hence, while not disregarding the utility of trilateral security cooperation between the U.S., South Korea, and Japan, it is necessary to consider the level and methods of cooperation within a loose balancing framework.
It is important to understand that North Korea, which used to be a rogue state trying to develop nuclear weapons, has now become part of the great power geopolitical game. In other words, while reunification and denuclearization are non-negotiable principles, the situation has become such that these are no longer immediate policy goals. For now, South Korea must face the reality that the stable maintenance of the current state of inter-Korean relations – that is, a passive peace – is the most achievable goal. This means that the priority should be placed on reducing military tension and ensuring stability on the Korean Peninsula, while seizing opportunities for dialogue and improving relations. In other words, reunification and denuclearization will only be possible if the geopolitical situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula dramatically changes, and thus South Korea must think in the long term. For now, it is a time that requires careful observation of the changing international order and the ability to respond quickly and flexibly, based on efforts for self-reliance.
| Questions Raised from U.S.-Russia Peace Negotiations
| Prospects for the Peace Negotiations: The Dilemma of Ukraine and Europe
| The Settlement of the War
| The Future of Security in Eurasia and the Transformation of the International Order
| The Implications of Korea’s Diplomacy and Security
※ The contents published on 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institue
