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Implications of the VOA and RFA Shutdown and Policy Options for South Korea |
| April 2, 2025 |
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Peter WardResearch Fellow, The Sejong Institute | pward89@sejong.org
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Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA)—two major U.S.-funded broadcasters that provide radio news to North Korean audiences and report on North Korea to the broader world—have either partially or fully ceased operations.
The Trump administration has taken the view that VOA has become a platform for "far-left propaganda" and is beyond repair. While RFA has not been directly implicated in such accusations, it appears to be collateral damage in the broader domestic ideological conflict in the United States. Without renewed funding, RFA is also expected to suspend operations in the coming month.
VOA has long been an important channel for communicating the U.S. government’s positions on a wide range of global and regional issues to both North Korean and South Korean audiences. It has also offered insight into elite opinion in Washington, D.C., particularly through regular YouTube content. Importantly, VOA has broadcast extensively into North Korea via medium- and shortwave radio from South Korea and Mongolia, providing a rare and crucial source of information on international affairs and American society for North Korean listeners.
RFA, meanwhile, has been a key source of information about life inside North Korea for South Korean and English-speaking audiences. Its journalists maintain a network of sources inside the country who provide regular updates on conditions, as well as occasional leaks of internal documents considered state secrets. As such, RFA has functioned as a vital conduit of reliable information on North Korea. In addition, it broadcasts six hours daily into North Korea, offering a wide range of content—from domestic and international news to stories about everyday life in South Korea and beyond—reaching an audience otherwise deprived of independent information.
The loss of VOA and RFA broadcasts would mean a significant decline in both the ability to influence North Korean audiences and to gather intelligence from inside the country. The South Korean government faces several options in responding to this situation. While it cannot directly fund either organization for obvious political and diplomatic reasons, it could take meaningful steps to mitigate the impact.
Should VOA and RFA permanently cease operations, South Korea could consider hiring former journalists from these organizations to support the production of new content tailored for North Korean audiences. Additionally, the frequencies currently used by VOA and RFA could be made available to private civilian broadcasters interested in expanding outreach to North Korean listeners. The government could also increase funding for its own state-run broadcasting initiatives targeting North Korea.
Finally, South Korea may wish to reassess the governance model of its existing broadcasters to the North. In particular, moving away from direct government editorial control—which characterizes at least some current operations—toward a more independent model, similar to how RFA is structured, could improve both the credibility and diversity of content. Such reforms would enhance editorial consistency across administrations and increase the effectiveness of information dissemination to North Korean audiences. -
On March 14, the Trump administration issued an Executive Order (EO) directing the United States Agency for Global Media (USAGM) to reduce its execution of “statutory functions and associated personnel to the minimum presence and function required by law.” As a direct result, all U.S. government funding for Radio Free Asia (RFA) has been suspended, and Voice of America (VOA) staff in Seoul and other locations have been placed on administrative leave. Similar measures have been taken against all USAGM-managed broadcasters targeting foreign audiences, including Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (serving Russia and other post-Soviet states), the Middle East Broadcasting Networks, and Radio Televisión Martí (focused on Cuba).
As a consequence, most VOA and RFA radio programming has ceased, and VOA websites have stopped being updated. RFA continues to operate in South Korea, albeit with reduced staff. Many of its contractors have been furloughed, although the organization’s website is still being updated. The Korea office reportedly retains sufficient funds to continue limited operations until sometime between late March and early April.
USAGM has long been a focal point for criticism from President Trump and the broader MAGA movement, with scrutiny intensifying since the 2010s. The agency receives just under $1 billion annually from the U.S. federal government to oversee international broadcasting, including VOA and RFA, as well as the Open Technology Fund (OTF). The OTF supports initiatives related to digital security, anti-censorship technologies, and online freedom of expression—among them, the Tor network, a widely known tool for anonymous internet use and secure communications.
USAGM was prominently criticized in Project 2025, a comprehensive policy blueprint for the next Republican administration released by the Heritage Foundation in April 2023. While Trump publicly distanced himself from the document during the campaign, many of the criticisms it raised—particularly against VOA and other broadcasters—have since been echoed by his administration. These include accusations that USAGM-affiliated outlets promote anti-American narratives, far-left perspectives, and even content sympathetic to U.S. adversaries. Similar claims were reiterated in a White House press release on March 15.
Efforts to reshape USAGM in alignment with Republican priorities have a precedent. During Trump’s first term, Michael L. Pack was briefly appointed head of the agency in 2020—the first political appointee since 2017. He moved swiftly to install new leadership across USAGM's constituent broadcasters, directing them to align editorial content more closely with the administration’s priorities.
Since the current administration took office, the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), led by Elon Musk, has pursued an aggressive bureaucratic downsizing agenda with the White House’s backing. This has included the suspension of USAID activities and deep cuts to quasi-federal institutions such as the U.S. Institute of Peace and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, among others.
The closure of VOA marks a significant shift. Founded in 1942 to counter Nazi propaganda during World War II, VOA has played a central role in U.S. public diplomacy and strategic communications for over eight decades. RFA, though a more recent creation, emerged in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. Created by Congress to address growing concerns over human rights in China, RFA began broadcasting in 1996 and later expanded to cover North Korea. It gained particular prominence during the first Trump administration for its reporting on developments in Xinjiang, which helped spur broader investigations by NGOs into the mass detention of Uyghurs. -
Need for broadcasting to North Korea
A distinctive feature of the information environment in North Korea is that radio broadcasting remains one of the main methods of strategic communication into the country — the primary means of delivering alternative and uncensored information about the outside world to the population. The country’s media is entirely owned and operated by the North Korean authorities, and all content is heavily censored of anything that could be considered critical of the country’s leaders. There is no independent media in the country worth speaking of, and all journalists are part of the ruling Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) and/or the Journalists Union (which is under the party).
Externally produced and broadcast content is thus vital as a source of information about both what is happening outside the country, and even what is happening within the country – RFA reporters have networks of sources within North Korea that provide information that is then often broadcast into the North. The RFA and VOA also produce a range of programs about life and politics outside North Korea, shedding light on how unusual and unfree North Koreans are.
If our goal is to promote the eventual change inside North Korea, either of evolutionary or revolutionary nature, strategic communication efforts are vital. Such policies have demonstrated their effectiveness during the Cold War. The similar efforts played a major role in the disintegration of the Communist Bloc in the late 1980s. The popular support for communist regimes was slowly undermined by the low efficiency of the state-run economy, shortages and low quality of consumption goods, not to mention the lack of the individual and political freedoms. However, all these objective facts became a political factor only because the people in the Communist bloc countries were aware of the material prosperity and freedoms enjoyed by peoples in the market economy democracies. Broadcast and other information dissemination efforts targeting Communist Bloc countries played a major role in bringing about this awareness.
However, the strategic communications efforts are not necessarily about fermenting revolutionary change. The spread of knowledge about inefficiencies of the North Korean system will also create pressure for reforms, which are likely to be implemented by the existing elite. Such reforms, somewhat similar to what was done by the Communist party leaders in China and Vietnam, will not lead to a regime change, but will make North Korea a better place for its common people, as well as less dangerous to its neighbors.
The historical effectiveness of broadcast media is acknowledged even by figures on both sides of the Cold War divide. Markus Wolf, the former head of East Germany’s Stasi, once wrote: “Of all the various means used against the East during the Cold War, I would count [Radio Free Europe] as the most effective.” Similarly, Lech Wałęsa—leader of the Polish Solidarity movement and later president of Poland—observed:
“Presenting works that were on the red censorship list, [Radio Free Europe and Voice of America] were our ministry of culture. Exposing absurd economic policies, they were our ministry of economics. Reacting to events promptly and pertinently, but above all truthfully, they were our ministry of information.”
This legacy underscores the enduring value of international broadcasting as a means of expanding the flow of truth and fostering awareness in closed societies like North Korea.
The Strategic Importance of Broadcasting to North Korea
One of the most distinctive features of North Korea’s information environment is the continued strategic relevance of radio broadcasting. Radio remains one of the few viable channels for delivering alternative, uncensored information into the country—information that challenges the state’s complete monopoly over media and narrative control.
All media within North Korea is owned and operated by the regime. Every outlet is tightly censored, and any content critical of the leadership is prohibited. There is no independent press to speak of. All journalists are affiliated with the ruling Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) or its subsidiary, the Journalists’ Union, which operates under party control.
Against this backdrop, externally produced content—especially from broadcasters like VOA and RFA—plays a critical role. Not only do they inform North Korean listeners about global affairs and life outside the country, but in the case of RFA, they also offer insights into developments inside North Korea through reports from clandestine sources. This includes accounts of everyday hardships, internal policy shifts, and even leaked state documents. By broadcasting this information back into North Korea, VOA and RFA help paint a more complete picture of reality—both abroad and at home.
If the long-term objective is to support change inside North Korea, strategic communications remain an indispensable tool. Their importance is not hypothetical—similar information campaigns proved effective during the Cold War. Broadcasting efforts by the West contributed meaningfully to the weakening of communist regimes in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. Popular disillusionment with those regimes was not driven solely by poor economic performance or a lack of freedoms—it was also fueled by the public’s awareness that alternative systems offered greater prosperity, choice, and dignity. That awareness was, in large part, the product of sustained information operations, especially radio broadcasts.
Importantly, strategic communication is not necessarily about provoking regime collapse or sudden revolutionary change. The dissemination of factual information about the inefficiencies and failures of the North Korean system can also generate internal pressure for reform. If anything, such an outcome is both mnore desirable and more likely. Such reforms—perhaps modeled after China or Vietnam’s economic liberalization—are more likely to be initiated by the ruling elite. While unlikely to democratize North Korea, such changes could still improve the material conditions of ordinary citizens and reduce the regime’s threat to regional stability. -
Korean-language radio broadcasts targeting North Korea can be broadly categorized into three main types.
First are radio stations not primarily intended for a North Korean audience. This category includes broadcasters from countries with relatively friendly ties to the DPRK, such as Russia Today (RT) and China Global Television Network (CGTN, 중국국제방송). These stations operate under significant self-censorship, both to align with their domestic political directives and to avoid antagonizing the North Korean government.
Other international stations—such as NHK (Japan), the BBC World Service, and Radio Taiwan International—also offer Korean-language programming. However, their content is primarily designed for South Korean or global Korean-speaking audiences, not North Korean listeners.
From the standpoint of shaping internal opinion within North Korea, these stations have limited strategic value. Nevertheless, their broadcasts can have unintended, yet positive, consequences. For instance, CGTN frequently highlights the successes of China’s reform and opening policies, while RT depicts Russia’s economic development following its departure from a centrally planned socialist model. These narratives may, albeit subtly, encourage North Korean listeners to question aspects of state propaganda and contemplate the benefits of alternative policy paths. Similarly, if North Koreans do access democratic countries’ broadcasts, they may obtain useful, uncensored information. Still, in terms of long-term strategic value for South Korea, the influence of these stations is marginal and can largely be disregarded in policy planning.
Second are international broadcasters targeting the North Korean public. This group includes Radio Free Asia (RFA) and Voice of America (VOA)—two U.S. government-funded broadcasters whose mission explicitly includes delivering factual, independent news and information to audiences in closed societies, including North Korea. Both have traditionally offered content critical of the North Korean regime and sought to provide alternative narratives about international events, governance, and daily life abroad.
Given their credibility, reach, and institutional knowledge, these broadcasters have long played a key role in U.S. and allied strategic communications toward the DPRK.
Third are South Korea-based broadcasters with South Korean government or US government support. This category includes several stations that are either state-operated or receive direct or indirect support from the South Korean government. KBS Hanminjok Pangsong (KBS 한민족방송), operated by the state broadcaster KBS, this is a formal government-run service. National Unity Radio (국민통일방송), funded in part by grants from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), this outlet is reportedly facing funding insecurity due to recent U.S. budget cuts under the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). Free North Korea Radio (자유북한방송), previously supported by NED/State Department funding, this station has publicly stated that it no longer receives U.S. government support. Echo of Hope (희망의 메아리 방송), widely believed to be operated by the National Intelligence Service (NIS), this outlet is generally assumed to serve intelligence and psychological operations objectives in addition to public information functions.
These South Korea-based outlets serve as a critical complement to U.S.-funded operations, though their editorial independence, transparency, and effectiveness vary considerably. As external funding becomes more uncertain—particularly in the wake of U.S. administrative restructuring—South Korea may need to reassess how it supports, coordinates, and governs these broadcasters to ensure continued outreach to North Korean audiences.
Why the VOA and RFA are especially important
The principal advantage of Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA) has been their relative detachment from the domestic political dynamics of both South Korea and the United States. This distance allowed the two broadcasters to maintain a stable editorial and political line across administrations—regardless of shifts in inter-Korean relations or changes in the political climate. This consistency stood in contrast to the often fluctuating tone and messaging found in some other outlets.
Notably, KBS Hanminjok Pangsong, a South Korean government-funded broadcaster, has also demonstrated a degree of editorial neutrality, as have certain South Korea-based private broadcasters primarily supported by U.S. funding.
Although the Trump administration has been openly critical of the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM)—the parent agency of VOA and RFA—such criticism has rarely, if ever, targeted the Korean-language services. Korean Peninsula issues have historically occupied a marginal role in the broader ideological contest between the Democratic and Republican parties, and have not been a consistent focal point in U.S. foreign policy. As a result, the Korean editorial teams at VOA and RFA operated with a level of political insulation that allowed them to avoid significant partisan pressure.
This “invisibility” gave the Korean-language services room to develop a distinctive editorial identity: critical of the North Korean regime, but generally avoiding the overly aggressive tone characteristic of some South Korea-based stations. This more measured and consistent approach likely contributed to their credibility among certain segments of their audience.
However, VOA and RFA also faced structural limitations. Chief among them was their direct affiliation with the U.S. government. Many North Korean listeners, socialized to view the United States as a hostile foreign power and existential threat, perceived the broadcasters as extensions of U.S. strategic messaging. For some, they were seen as little more than “CIA psychological operations”—a perception that inevitably influenced audience receptivity and trust.
Additionally, the broadcasters were constrained in their ability to engage critically with U.S. domestic and foreign policy. Journalists and guest contributors were often expected to avoid commentary that could be seen as directly critical of the U.S. government. This form of de facto editorial self-censorship limited their capacity to offer balanced or fully impartial analysis of global affairs, especially on issues where U.S. policy was controversial.
While VOA and RFA maintained credibility through consistency and professionalism, their institutional positioning as U.S.-funded outlets inevitably shaped how their content was received by North Korean audiences—an enduring tradeoff between access, editorial control, and strategic credibility. -
The ultimate fate of Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA) remains unclear. The recent actions taken by the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM) are currently the subject of ongoing litigation in U.S. courts. It is possible that these actions will be ruled unlawful, potentially requiring the reinstatement of funding and the resumption of operations at both broadcasters. However, given the current political climate, the future of these stations remains highly uncertain. It is therefore prudent to consider contingency measures to mitigate the impact of their potential permanent closure.
In Europe, some allies have already taken proactive steps. The Czech government, for example, has indicated its willingness to support Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)—headquartered in Prague—should U.S. funding not be restored. For VOA, however, such external support is less feasible. Given the station’s branding as the official voice of the U.S. government and the scale of its global operations, it would be politically inappropriate for the South Korean government to provide direct funding.
RFA, while less overtly branded, is primarily oriented toward strategic communications targeting China. Although its Seoul bureau plays a significant role in North Korea-focused reporting, direct funding by the South Korean government could appear politically awkward without some level of rebranding or restructuring, since taking the entire RFA structure will provoke unnecessary tensions with China.
Rather than assuming control of RFA or VOA operations in South Korea, the South Korean government could instead absorb experienced personnel—journalists, producers, and other content creators—from these organizations to strengthen its own North Korea-facing broadcasting infrastructure. In particular, this could enhance the output and scope of KBS Hanminjok Pangsong, the state-run broadcaster targeting North Korean audiences. One option might be to launch a new KBS-branded station using the existing VOA or RFA shortwave frequencies, thereby preserving continuity in audience outreach, and re-hiring the RFA personnel.
Alternatively, the government could enable private South Korean broadcasters targeting North Korea to utilize the broadcast infrastructure (frequencies, equipment, and facilities) currently employed by VOA and RFA. Many of these private entities have long complained about regulatory and licensing barriers that prevent them from transmitting directly from South Korean soil. As a result, they rely on facilities in third countries such as Mongolia. Easing these restrictions and offering access to domestic broadcast infrastructure would significantly enhance their reach and operational effectiveness. In such a model, the government could consider establishing a secondary KBS channel—with content partially provided by independent broadcasters—to maximize both scale and diversity of programming.
At a more structural level, the South Korean government should revisit the governance framework under which its current broadcasters to the North operate. In particular, it may be time to move away from direct state editorial control, which still characterizes certain state-controlled operations, and adopt a more arm’s-length model—similar to that of RFA. In this respect, KBS Hanminjok Pangsong provides a viable model for editorial autonomy within a publicly funded institution. Applying this model more broadly could improve the credibility, neutrality, and content quality of South Korea’s information outreach to the North.
| Introduction
| What Is Happening at VOA and RFA
| Why is the VOA and RFA important
| The Current State of Broadcasting to North Korea
| Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
※ The opinions expressed in 'Sejong Focus'are those of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institute
