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[Outlook on Global Affairs 2026-Special Issue No. 7] Toward 2026: Strategic Assessment of China in 2025 and Policy Outlook |
| December 11, 2025 |
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Jae-Hung ChungSenior Research Fellow, Sejong Institute | jameschung@sejong.org
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Politics and Economy: The Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee and the Consolidation of Xi Jinping’s Centralized Leadership
In 2025, the final year of the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025), China emphasized sustained economic development and advanced technological innovation, and at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee unveiled the 15th Five-Year Plan together with the “China Standards 2035” agenda. To this end, Beijing sought to stimulate domestic demand through large-scale consumption incentives, improve the efficiency of economic investment, and expand domestic markets across multiple sectors, enabling China to achieve an approximate growth rate of 5 percent and to revive sluggish domestic demand. In particular, the government made efforts to boost household incomes in order to activate consumption within its domestic market of roughly 1.4 billion people and to strengthen both the real economy and consumer sentiment. However, prolonged economic headwinds stemming from the Russia–Ukraine war and intensifying U.S.–China strategic competition have exacerbated youth unemployment challenges. While official statistics report an unemployment rate of roughly 3 to 5 percent, some experts estimate that the actual youth unemployment rate may reach 15 to 20 percent, drawing attention to structural vulnerabilities in China’s broader economy and to emerging risks of social instability. Additionally, real estate investment in 2025 declined by approximately 12.9 percent year-on-year on a cumulative basis, marking the first negative growth in five years. Given that real estate has historically contributed 30 to 40 percent of China’s GDP through direct and indirect channels, declining prices and prolonged stagnation have begun to weigh on domestic demand and household consumption.
A particularly positive development observed in China in 2025 was the full-scale implementation of its advanced technology self-reliance policy. Both the China Standards 2035 strategy and the 15th Five-Year Plan, released in conjunction with the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee, placed strong emphasis on the concept of “new-quality productive forces” (新质生产力). This concept clearly reflects the strategic intention of the Chinese government to enhance global competitiveness by integrating advanced technologies, industries, and standards under strong state leadership. A representative example was China’s successful development of the open-source artificial intelligence model DeepSeek (深度求索), which attracted significant domestic and international attention as a major milestone in scientific and technological innovation. Support for advanced technological innovation aimed at achieving AI self-reliance is expected to expand further, enabling China not only to strengthen its leadership in the global AI market but also to extend this influence to broader technological and industrial domains. Aligned with the 15th Five-Year Plan and the China Standards 2035 strategy, China has increased investment in AI research and development (R&D) as part of an effort to secure technological dominance. China now possesses world-class competitive capabilities in AI algorithms, model training, and supercomputing, and has achieved progress toward AI self-sufficiency through the development of indigenous AI chips and the growth of open-source AI models such as Qwen and DeepSeek.1) In addition, China has begun integrating AI and semiconductors with blockchain and Digital Yuan initiatives to promote digital financial development, transforming itself into a digital-centered techno-economic state under Chinese standards.
In 2025, China positioned the final year of the 14th Five-Year Plan period (2021 to 2025) as a point of review for the economic and technological policy achievements accumulated over the previous four years. At the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee, the leadership confirmed proposals for formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026 to 2030) and endorsed the strategic direction of the China Standard 2035 initiative in order to address persistent structural challenges, including the real estate downturn, weak consumption, youth unemployment, and the widening urban–rural development gap. The Fourth Plenary Session, which constituted the most consequential political event of the year, also identified high-quality growth, scientific and technological self-reliance, and the expansion of domestic demand as the three core policy priorities. These decisions provided a practical institutional pathway for advancing China’s stated objective of achieving the basic realization of Chinese-style modernization by 2035. Meanwhile, senior-level reshuffles within the military and the party-state apparatus contributed to reinforcing President Xi Jinping’s centralized leadership. Notably, in the absence of a clearly designated successor, nine high-ranking military officials were dismissed and eleven members of the Central Committee were replaced. This turnover represented the largest personnel adjustment since 2017 and signals heightened political consolidation around President Xi Jinping, suggesting a more centralized and coherent governance environment as China enters the next long-term planning period.
Furthermore, as part of President Xi Jinping’s efforts to eliminate corruption among senior military leaders and strengthen internal discipline, Zhang Shengmin, a fellow native of Shaanxi Province with Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia and a long-time figure responsible for discipline within the military, was newly appointed as Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission.2) In addition, in order to reinforce the party–state system, the leadership intensified efforts to eradicate corruption among senior cadres, rectify formalism and bureaucratism, and tighten controls on unhealthy cultural practices and customs. As a result, maintaining internal political, economic, and social stability emerged as a more important governance priority than in previous years. Ultimately, through the 20th Fourth Plenary Session, the consolidation of a leadership system centered on President Xi Jinping strengthened the Party’s leadership, promoted internal political cohesion, and fostered economic and social stability, demonstrating China’s intent to realize Xi Jinping’s vision of Chinese-style socialist modernization in the new era. To this end, Beijing pursued stable economic development and improvements in people’s livelihoods through measures such as restoring domestic demand and expanding the consumer market, expanding government-led investment in advanced technologies centered on private enterprises, transitioning toward high-quality development, and strengthening social welfare protection, while responding to a range of internal and external challenges and crises.
Diplomacy and Security: The Arrival of the U.S.-China Strategic Competition 2.0 and Strengthened China-Russia Strategic Cooperation
The launch of the second Trump administration in 2025 and the subsequent resumption of the U.S.–China trade war prompted a strong response from Beijing. China criticized the Trump administration’s trade policy toward China, arguing that arbitrary tariffs and threats severely damaged mutual trust and harmed global supply chains. Beijing also opposed what it described as U.S.-style power politics, unilateralism, and America-first policies, and began emphasizing the need for a more equal, autonomous, and orderly multipolar international system as well as a more inclusive political and economic order. China further argued that pressure, coercion, and threats against Beijing were not the correct solution but rather a miscalculation. It stated that if the United States truly intended to resolve issues such as trade imbalances and the fentanyl problem, it should pursue reasonable communication and negotiation based on mutual respect for core interests, instead of threatening retaliatory tariffs. However, China also warned that if the United States had hidden intentions aimed at harming China’s development and economic interests, Beijing would not back down and was prepared to fight to the end, signaling that additional countermeasures were possible. As the U.S.–China trade war intensified, China added approximately fifteen to twenty American firms to its unreliable entities list and imposed export controls on dual-use items that could be used for military purposes on around fifteen to twenty U.S. companies. Through these measures, Beijing demonstrated its willingness to adopt a tit-for-tat approach and respond with strong retaliatory actions.
Following the APEC Summit in Gyeongju in November, President Xi Jinping and President Donald Trump held their first one-on-one meeting in Korea in approximately six years, resulting in a temporary easing of tensions surrounding the U.S.–China trade dispute. During the summit, the two leaders reached several agreements. First, the United States reduced tariffs on Chinese fentanyl-related products to 10 percent. Second, the United States withdrew its plan to impose an additional 100 percent tariff on Chinese goods. Third, China agreed to purchase U.S. soybeans and agricultural products, and the United States granted a temporary suspension of export controls on rare earths. These developments were assessed as contributing to a partial reduction in the trade brinkmanship that had persisted for nearly six months. However, the agreement reached between President Trump and President Xi on the occasion of the Gyeongju APEC Summit amounted only to a superficial easing of tensions, leaving core issues unresolved. As a result, if economic, trade, diplomatic, or security-related conflicts were to escalate again, the possibility of renewed deterioration in U.S.–China relations cannot be ruled out. For example, the two sides failed to reach concrete outcomes on issues such as U.S. semiconductor export restrictions toward China and China’s purchase of U.S. agricultural products, falling short of a comprehensive agreement. In the end, the Gyeongju APEC Summit temporarily eased the trade conflict by facilitating direct dialogue and partial agreements between the two leaders, yet continued negotiations and discussions remain underway on major contentious issues such as semiconductors and advanced technologies, U.S.-bound Chinese investments, rare earth exports, and agricultural imports.
Meanwhile, China has been accelerating the formation of a multipolar international order through the development of an increasingly close strategic economic and security partnership with Russia. During their meetings in China, President Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council, agreed with President Xi Jinping that China and Russia would strengthen mutual strategic cooperation and internal drivers of collaboration, and enhance closer strategic communication through platforms such as the United Nations (UN), BRICS, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in order to promote the development of a multipolar international order. Furthermore, during President Putin’s visit to China in September to attend China’s Victory Day commemorations, the China–Russia summit emphasized strategic cooperation between the two sides. The leaders noted that 2025 marks the eightieth anniversary of the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War, characterizing it as a highly special and significant year for both countries and affirming their commitment to advancing the joint development and rejuvenation of China and Russia. The two sides highlighted the importance of cooperation in energy, trade, the economy, and security, and agreed that their cooperation was not aimed at any third party but rather intended to enhance long-term stability and development in the Eurasian region. To this end, both countries agreed to further expand their political, economic, and trade engagements. China also reaffirmed its position of non-interference and non-involvement in the Russia–Ukraine war, noting that military support provided by certain Western countries to Ukraine was aggravating the conflict and increasing global instability. China emphasized the need to end the conflict as soon as possible through mutually acceptable security guarantees and negotiations. In addition, military-technical cooperation between China and Russia has been expanding to include drones, hypersonic missiles, aircraft, stealth technology, bombers, submarines, and the space and cyber domains. The two sides have also accelerated strategic diplomatic, security, and military cooperation, including by conducting their first joint naval exercise near Vladivostok involving live-fire drills and missile launches.
Korean Peninsula, The Emergence of North Korea–China–Russia Trilateral Alignment and Changing Regional Dynamics
Following the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war, North Korea has begun shedding its status as an isolated state and seeking a new position in the international community by establishing cooperative relations not only with China but also with Russia. For decades, the United States has sought North Korea’s denuclearization through strong U.S.-led sanctions, but this effort has been undermined by the restoration of North Korea–Russia relations, while North Korea’s relations with China, its largest economic and trade partner, have also been recovering. Despite sanctions imposed by the United States and other Western countries, North Korea has retained its nuclear weapons and ICBMs, and by fully restoring relations with Russia, it has gained a significant new momentum for safeguarding its security and developing its economy. In particular, after North Korea dispatched military forces to Russia’s Kursk region, a strategic alignment among China, Russia, and North Korea began to take concrete shape. Although trilateral military cooperation among North Korea, China, and Russia has not yet materialized directly, China–Russia joint military exercises and North Korea’s troop deployment to the Kursk region indicate indirect linkages among the three. Russia has already received support from North Korea, including combat personnel, weapons, and ammunition, while China and Russia have provided economic support to Moscow through increased energy and trade cooperation. As a result, a highly practical framework of trilateral alignment and cooperation among North Korea, China, and Russia has begun to emerge.
In line with these rapidly changing regional dynamics, strategic cooperation between North Korea and China has also begun to accelerate at a new level. Since the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war, the rapid strengthening of North Korea–Russia relations has introduced new dynamics into North Korea–China relations as well. China has been North Korea’s largest trading partner and sole treaty ally, playing a critical role in sustaining the North Korean regime. However, amid structural shifts such as the intensifying U.S.–China strategic competition and North Korea’s pursuit of recognized nuclear-armed status, Beijing has been reassessing the existing paradigm of its relations with Pyongyang. In this context, the restoration of North Korea–China relations extends beyond the bilateral dimension and is interconnected with multilayered geopolitical factors such as the protraction of the Russia–Ukraine war, U.S.–China strategic rivalry, the strengthening of North Korea–China–Russia relations (symbolized by the logic of “security with Russia, economy with China”), and the deepening trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the United States, and Japan. China, for its part, emphasizes three core principles in its Korean Peninsula policy, first, the maintenance of peace and stability on the peninsula, second, the denuclearization of the peninsula rather than the unilateral denuclearization of North Korea, and third, resolving the North Korean nuclear issue through dialogue and negotiation rather than through sanctions and pressure. Beijing has also highlighted the need for improved inter-Korean relations. Foreign Minister Wang Yi underscored in a media interview that “we do not wish to see tensions on the Korean Peninsula intensify at a time when military conflicts are occurring in various parts of the world,” stressing that the fundamental solution to the Korean Peninsula issue lies in dialogue and negotiation based approaches. This reflects a vision for establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula based on mutual recognition of systems, coexistence, and practical cooperation between the two Koreas, grounded in a new joint and multilateral security perspective, suggesting that significant changes in the regional order may be inevitable.
Furthermore, the fact that the leaders of North Korea, China, and Russia gathered together for the first time in approximately sixty six years during the eightieth anniversary commemorations of China’s Victory Day in October symbolically demonstrated the emergence of a new international order following the Russia–Ukraine war. In particular, the seating arrangement on the reviewing stand during the military parade, with President Xi Jinping in the center, President Vladimir Putin on his right, and Chairman Kim Jong Un on his left, was interpreted as reflecting China’s strategic intention to highlight its position as the central axis of the North Korea–China–Russia alignment. For China, this alignment is viewed as a means to prepare for intensified US China strategic competition. For Russia, it provides a basis for seeking support that may mitigate sanctions linked to the protracted Russia–Ukraine war. For North Korea, it presents opportunities to strengthen ties with China and Russia, escape international isolation, and gain de facto recognition as a nuclear armed state. As a result, strategic coordination and cooperation among North Korea, China, and Russia are structurally likely to deepen and are accelerating changes in the security order on the Korean Peninsula. -
Politics and Economy: Full Implementation of the 15th Five Year Plan and China Standards 2035 with a Focus on Internal Political Stabilization
China’s economic outlook for 2026 is expected to show relatively moderate growth. According to major analytical forecasts, the OECD projects 4.3 percent growth, the World Bank projects 4.2 percent, and Goldman Sachs forecasts 4.8 percent. This economic growth is expected to rely primarily on external exports, with China’s exports recording growth of around 8 percent in 2025. This export momentum is expected to continue going forward. In particular, China’s economic growth rate in 2025 reached around 5 percent despite the intensification of the U.S.–China trade war and heightened domestic and international uncertainties. Beijing’s plan is to sustain economic growth through continued activation of domestic consumption and by expanding into markets in the Global South, which include ASEAN, Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. However, China’s property sector remains in a large scale restructuring phase, and unemployment among younger generations is unlikely to decline in the short term, which continues to affect domestic demand and consumer sentiment. Therefore, in order to expand domestic demand and stimulate consumption, China is expected to pursue large scale infrastructure investment that can create new jobs relatively quickly. Beijing is also expected to significantly increase investment in advanced manufacturing and emerging and future industries as part of efforts to advance the China Standards 2035 initiative.
Under the China Standards 2035 strategy, the Chinese government is expected to lead and concentrate investment and support in eight emerging industries, specifically:
(1) next generation information technology (including 5G communications and data),
(2) new energy (such as solar and wind renewable energy),
(3) new materials (including advanced materials and nanomaterials),
(4) high end equipment (such as semiconductor manufacturing equipment and machine tools),
(5) new energy vehicles (such as electric vehicles and autonomous driving),
(6) environmental protection and eco friendly technologies,
(7) civil aviation, and
(8) shipbuilding and marine engineering equipment.
In addition, nine future industries have been identified for intensive support and investment, specifically:
(1) the metaverse (virtual reality platforms),
(2) brain machine interface technologies (BMI, neuroscience applications),
(3) quantum information (including quantum computing and quantum communications),
(4) humanoid robots,
(5) generative artificial intelligence (AI),
(6) bio manufacturing,
(7) future display technologies,
(8) future network technologies, and
(9) new energy storage systems.
China’s medium to long term strategy is to promote high quality development on the basis of achieving a high level of scientific and technological self reliance and innovation, and by securing advanced technological innovation capabilities and industrial manufacturing capacity.3) In particular, China has adopted industrial upgrading and the concept of new quality productive forces as core strategies, and is actively fostering next generation growth industries such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors, electric vehicles, batteries, advanced materials, and environmentally friendly technologies. In other words, Beijing is pursuing a structural shift from quantitative manufacturing centered growth to qualitative industrial development, and is seeking new economic and technological growth momentum by restructuring the economy and industrial system around future oriented industries. The government is already expected to concentrate investment in advanced fields such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors, quantum technologies, 6G communications, and green industries. Investment in the green energy sector has already doubled from 11 trillion yuan to 22 trillion yuan, and approximately one hundred national level industrial parks are being newly established. In addition, in order to expand China’s economic, political, and technological influence, Beijing has presented a medium to long term vision to strengthen political, economic, and technological cooperation with non Western countries such as the Global South and BRICS. In this context, as part of advancing the China Standards 2035 strategy, China is expected to expand its participation and influence in international standard setting organizations such as ISO and IEC.
In parallel, internal political stability has become the most critical condition for sustained economic development and technological innovation. Under President Xi Jinping’s consolidated one-man leadership structure, Beijing is expected to maintain the policy line of pursuing progress while maintaining stability (wen zhong qiujin, 溫中求進). Rather than prioritizing quantitative growth, China is placing high quality and qualitative economic development at the center of its policy agenda. Beijing aims to make reform and innovation the fundamental drivers of growth and to respond to rising public expectations for a better quality of life, thereby advancing the construction of Chinese style socialist common prosperity (gongtong fuyu, 共同富裕) through qualitative growth. President Xi has already secured institutional and legal conditions that enable long term rule, including the removal of presidential term limits and the absence of a designated successor during the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee, which has further consolidated his authority. Following the session, the official communiqué emphasized that the entire Party, the armed forces, and all ethnic groups in the country must unite more closely around the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core in order to strive for the basic realization of socialist modernization. This indicates expectations for stable state governance and suggests that China will further strengthen a new national governance system to advance socialist modernization. However, some experts have raised the possibility of elite factional tensions within China, particularly in light of the large scale purge of senior military figures during the Fourth Plenary Session, indicating the need for continued observation.
Foreign Policy and Security, Competition for Leadership in the New International Order and Intensifying China–Japan Tensions
Over nearly four years, the Russia–Ukraine war has pushed the international order back into bloc confrontation and a new Cold War structure. U.S.–China relations have intensified beyond economic, technological, and ideological conflict into bloc competition between China and Russia on one side and the United States and the West on the other, suggesting that the world is entering a period of major geopolitical upheaval. The protraction of the Russia–Ukraine war and U.S.–China strategic rivalry has accelerated the emergence of a China and Russia led multipolar order that departs from the U.S. and Western-centered unipolar system. China has already begun formalizing strategic alignment with Russia, the Global South, BRICS, and members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), making it likely that the future trajectory of the international order will diverge significantly depending on the outcome of the Russia–Ukraine war. In particular, under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the concept of a Community of Shared Future for Mankind, China has proposed the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI), the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI), and more recently the Global Governance Initiative (GGI), calling for a more equitable and balanced multipolar international order. As a result, the divide between Western and anti Western camps has become more pronounced, and the prolonged Russia–Ukraine war, U.S.–China strategic competition, cross-Strait instability, U.S.–ROK and U.S.–Japan security cooperation, and North Korea–China–Russia alignment together indicate that the world has entered an era of strategic competition for leadership in a new international order.
With the Russia–Ukraine war extending beyond four years, both Russia, which is in confrontation with Europe, and China, which is engaged in medium to long term competition with the United States, emphasize the importance of China–Russia strategic cooperation based on shared historical and geopolitical experiences. The leaders of both countries have defined the China–Russia relationship as being at its highest level in history and have emphasized even closer strategic cooperation in all fields including politics, diplomacy, security, and the economy. They have also issued joint statements declaring that they intend to actively respond to NATO’s eastward expansion, U.S.–ROK–Japan security cooperation, and the Indo-Pacific Strategy through joint military exercises, joint naval and air patrols, and military-technical cooperation.4) The international order shifts triggered by the Russia–Ukraine war are expected to accelerate in 2026. Ironically, the deepening of the China–Russia strategic relationship is likely to strengthen U.S. leadership and drive greater alignment and cooperation among Western states such as NATO members, Japan, and South Korea. At the SCO Summit held in Tianjin, China in September 2025, Beijing announced the first Global Governance Initiative (GGI), completing a medium to long term strategic framework that incorporates the existing GDI, GSI, and GCI initiatives, and presenting an alternative international order distinct from the U.S. and Western-led unipolar system.5)
At the same time, in November 2025, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi stated in the Diet that “a Chinese attack on Taiwan could trigger an existential crisis that threatens Japan’s survival.” Shortly thereafter, Xue Jian, the Chinese Consul General in Osaka, used threatening language on social media, saying that he would “cut the dirty neck,” leading to a rapid deterioration in China–Japan relations. Following Prime Minister Takaichi’s remarks suggesting that Japan could exercise its right of self defense in the event of a Taiwan contingency, China swiftly initiated economic retaliation. Beijing imposed multilayered economic coercive measures including a ban on imports of Japanese seafood, restrictions on visa issuance for students and tourists, rare earth export controls, and semiconductor equipment restrictions. Subsequently, on November 16, China’s Coast Guard conducted a patrol inside the territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands (known as Diaoyu Islands in China). Simultaneously, China’s Northern and Eastern Theater Command navies began live fire and missile training exercises in the Yellow Sea region, signaling the start of overt military pressure. As a result, on December 7, 2025, in international airspace near Okinawa, a Chinese J-15 and a Japanese F-15 aircraft intermittently locked radar on each other, creating a serious situation in which the possibility of physical collision could not be ruled out.
China’s pressure on Japan has already moved beyond a mere diplomatic dispute and has begun to inflict direct costs on Japan. Japanese automobile manufacturers have experienced a sharp decline in sales in the Chinese market, and concerns have emerged regarding the possible suspension of Japanese exports of key minerals such as rare earths, gallium, and germanium. In particular, following the Taiwan issue, territorial frictions between China and Japan have also begun to intensify over the Senkaku Islands. China has asserted that the Senkaku Islands fall under Chinese sovereignty, effectively pushing the issue toward a disputed territorial status, and military tensions between China and Japan have been rising rapidly.6) This suggests that the Taiwan and Senkaku issues are no longer merely bilateral territorial disputes between China and Japan, but rather core elements of the strategic competition between China and the United States. U.S. involvement can be interpreted as an external signal to counter China’s expanding influence by strengthening Indo Pacific strategic cooperation with South Korea, Japan, Australia, and the Philippines. South Korea has also included language stating that it “opposes unilateral changes to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and emphasizes freedom of navigation and overflight,” indicating that Japan–China tensions over Taiwan and the Senkaku Islands may drive the Taiwan–Senkaku–Korean Peninsula issues into an even more difficult phase to resolve.
Furthermore, cross-strait relations continue to develop in a confrontational direction, and since the inauguration of the Lai Ching-te administration, which seeks Taiwan’s de facto independence, a confrontation between the global democratic camp and the authoritarian camp has accelerated. President Lai has emphasized an anti-China line and has signaled that Taipei will work with countries that share democratic values, including the United States, Japan, and European countries, and will actively respond to China’s hardline policies through close strategic cooperation. As a result, uncertainty surrounding cross-strait relations and the Taiwan issue is expected to increase further.
In this context, uncertainties in China–Japan relations and the Taiwan issue are heightening uncertainties in China–U.S. relations, and Washington’s efforts to strengthen the ROK–U.S. alliance and trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the United States, and Japan, as well as to improve relations with Vietnam, the Philippines, Australia, and other neighboring states, have provoked strong backlash from Beijing. In particular, China has even raised the issue of the “exercise of the right of self-defense” at the United Nations, while the United States has demonstrated firm resolve in defense of Japan, suggesting that the front lines of China–Japan tensions will expand further. Against this backdrop, South Korea may face growing pressure to clarify its position in the event of a “Taiwan contingency,” and the possibility cannot be ruled out that 2026 could become a year of strategic choice for Seoul. Accordingly, South Korea will require a multilayered diplomatic strategy based on objective analysis. As China–Japan tensions intensify, the Taiwan issue escalates, and China–Russia, North Korea–Russia, and North Korea–China cooperation expands, South Korea’s strategic position may become a critical variable in determining peace and stability in the region. It will therefore be essential for South Korea to make sustained efforts to preserve amicable relations with neighboring countries in order to prevent a rapid deterioration of the regional security environment.
Korean Peninsula: Potential Consolidation of the North Korea–China–Russia Trilateral Alignment and the Pursuit of a New ROK–China Relationship
Following the Victory Day commemorations in China in September 2025, China, Russia, and North Korea are expected to actively pursue changes in the international order through strategic cooperation. While some experts argue that the three countries harbor divergent interests, suggesting that substantive cooperation will remain limited, others contend that North Korea will break away from its traditional diplomatic isolation and participate more actively in a China–Russia led restructuring of the international order in pursuit of political and economic development. In particular, given the apparent consideration and support shown by China and Russia toward North Korea during the Victory Day events, the possibility of North Korea joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) or participating as a BRICS observer state cannot be ruled out.
In effect, the international changes triggered by the Russia–Ukraine war have led, for the first time since the Cold War, to the leaders of China, Russia, and North Korea jointly attending Victory Day events, signaling a shifting international landscape. China, Russia, and North Korea have already expressed their intention to contribute to the establishment of a new international order and to enhance economic and security cooperation with BRICS and SCO member states in order to advance their respective national interests. Whereas China and Russia once played a mediating role on the North Korean nuclear issue in pursuit of denuclearization, both states are now moving toward a role as North Korea’s supporters, suggesting that the nuclear issue will face even greater obstacles going forward. Furthermore, the prolonged Russia–Ukraine war, intensifying United States–China strategic competition, escalating China–Japan tensions, and the Taiwan issue may collectively contribute to a more concrete North Korea–China–Russia alignment. If such a configuration materializes, significant adjustments will likely become unavoidable not only for the Korean Peninsula peace process but also for North Korea–United States and inter-Korean relations.
Although the Gyeongju APEC Summit and the China–U.S. Summit in November underscored the importance of communication on the Korean Peninsula and the North Korean nuclear issue ahead of President Trump’s planned visit to China in April 2026, there remains a high likelihood that China–U.S. relations could again deteriorate rapidly if the ongoing trade disputes intensify in advanced technology sectors such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and CPUs, and if the Taiwan and Korean Peninsula issues become intertwined. Notably, the outcome of the Russia–Ukraine war, growing China–Japan tensions, and the Taiwan issue are directly connected to developments on the Korean Peninsula. Whether President Trump’s visit to China in April materializes will inevitably have a significant impact on the Korean Peninsula, inter-Korean relations, North Korea–United States relations, and ROK–China relations, making continued monitoring essential. If the visit takes place, the likelihood of substantive discussions on the Korean Peninsula issue will increase, which would inevitably have direct implications for inter-Korean relations and ROK–China relations and could require South Korea to consider new policy approaches.
Meanwhile, during the Gyeongju APEC Summit in November 2025, President Xi Jinping visited South Korea for the first time in approximately eleven years. Following his summit with President Lee Jae-myung, the two leaders agreed to advance bilateral relations by strengthening political and economic trust and expanding exchanges at the societal level. The leaders also agreed to promote the mature development of the ROK–China Strategic Cooperative Partnership. President Lee stated that South Korea would pursue national interest based pragmatic diplomacy in managing relations with the United States, China, Japan, and Russia, and requested that China play a constructive role in achieving denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula. President Xi emphasized that China and South Korea are neighboring countries that cannot relocate and are indispensable cooperation partners, and stated that the future development of bilateral relations would require policies focused on strengthening strategic communication and respecting each other’s core interests, advancing second stage negotiations on the ROK–China FTA and cooperation in future industries such as artificial intelligence, biopharmaceuticals, green industries, and the silver economy, expanding people to people and cultural exchanges among youth, media, and think tanks, and promoting the Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) and practicing multilateralism.
Although President Xi’s visit to South Korea after approximately eleven years helped create a favorable atmosphere for improving ROK–China relations, there remain numerous complex and sensitive issues that cannot be resolved in the short term, including intensifying China–U.S. strategic competition, strained China–Japan relations, the Taiwan and North Korean nuclear issues, the Yellow Sea maritime structure issue, the ban on Korean cultural content in China, supply chain concerns related to rare earths, and the nuclear-powered submarine construction issue. This suggests that both countries will need continuous communication and cooperation under the principle of seeking common ground while shelving differences in order to manage unexpected risks. With the Russia–Ukraine war bringing about a transition toward a new international order, South Korea now faces highly complex and difficult geopolitical challenges and risks on and around the Korean Peninsula. In particular, it is essential for South Korea to maintain amicable relations with neighboring states while taking into account the peninsula’s geopolitical and geoeconomic characteristics as a bridge between continental and maritime spheres. If ROK–China relations deteriorate amid the complex great power rivalry, geopolitical tensions, and crises surrounding the Korean Peninsula, the level of peninsula-related risks may rise significantly compared to the past.
Accordingly, the ROK will need to adopt a more proactive and creative foreign policy to manage Korean Peninsula risks, maintain a stable regional environment through sustained communication and cooperation with China and neighboring states, and ensure that key bilateral relationships, U.S.–China, North–South, DPRK–U.S., ROK–China, and China–Japan, evolve toward mutually beneficial and virtuous dynamics rather than adversarial configurations.
| Assessment of China in 2025
| Outlook for 2026
1) Despite U.S. efforts to restrict China’s access to advanced technologies, Beijing has been accelerating the development of domestic AI standards and semiconductor capabilities by strengthening the development of its own AI chips (including GPUs and NPUs) and rapidly building a China-led AI ecosystem through open source AI models such as Qwen and DeepSeek.
2) Zhang Shengmin, Secretary of the Central Military Commission’s Discipline Inspection Commission, has now assumed the position of third in rank within the People’s Liberation Army. This reflects President Xi Jinping’s strong determination to continue eliminating corruption within the military. Since being appointed as Secretary of the Military Discipline Inspection Commission in 2017, Zhang has overseen anti corruption investigations and disciplinary enforcement within the military for approximately eight years.
3) China’s research and development (R&D) investment has reached an all time high, having increased by more than 50 percent over the past five years to approximately 1.2 trillion yuan (around 230 trillion won). Through strengthened technological self reliance and innovation capacity, Beijing aims to reduce dependence on existing global supply chains and shift toward a domestic demand driven growth model supported by increased household consumption.
4) In their joint statement, China and Russia expressed a unified position firmly opposing U.S.-led military alliance integration that directly targets China and Russia, including nuclear sharing arrangements and the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons. They also opposed efforts to secure extended deterrence through the development of medium and intermediate range missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, the pursuit of missile defense systems (MD) that undermine and threaten global strategic stability, and the deployment of ground launched medium and short range missiles.
5) According to some assessments, as of 2024 the combined trade volume and economic capacity of BRICS have surpassed those of the G7 advanced Western economies. As a result, China is expected to compete more actively and assertively for global leadership against the United States and the West, in contrast to its past posture.
6) On November 22, the U.S. Department of State immediately reaffirmed that “the United States’ commitment to the defense of Japan, including the Senkaku Islands, remains ironclad,” emphasizing that the U.S.–Japan alliance constitutes the cornerstone of peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region.
※ The contents published on 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institue
