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[Outlook on Global Affairs 2026-Special Issue No.5] U.S. Foreign Policy Outlook in 2026 |
| December 11, 2025 |
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Beomchul ShinPrincipal Research Fellow, Sejong Institute | bcshin@sejong.org
- In the second half of 2026, the second Trump administration is expected to reach a turning point. In order to secure victory in the midterm elections scheduled for November, President Trump is likely to seek to leverage foreign policy achievements for domestic political purposes. To this end, the administration is expected to pursue the mediation of as many international conflicts as possible, seek to maintain stable external relations with China and Russia, and work toward demonstrating progress in the implementation of investment agreements concluded with allies and partners. In this process, efforts to advance negotiations toward an end to the war in Ukraine and to make progress in Middle East peace talks are likely to continue. However, given the structural instability of these regions, it will be difficult for underlying tensions to be fully resolved, and residual instability is therefore likely to persist. In East Asia, amid rising China-Japan tensions, the United States is expected to support Japan while avoiding direct confrontation with China, with the aim of consolidating its regional sphere of influence. On the Korean Peninsula, cooperation and friction between the United States and the South Korean government are likely to alternate over issues such as the implementation of investment commitments to the United States, the concrete direction of alliance modernization, and the construction of nuclear-powered submarines. President Trump’s efforts to pursue a U.S.-North Korea summit are also expected to become more visible, but in light of North Korea’s posture, difficult and protracted bargaining is likely.
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The foreign policy of the second Trump administration began under conditions of significant uncertainty. Departing from a traditional values-based foreign policy approach, President Trump repeatedly pursued a transaction-oriented diplomatic posture grounded in “America First.”1)
Over the past year, the administration’s shifting and often unpredictable application of this approach contributed to heightened uncertainty in international relations. As a result, the international order continued to exhibit increasingly complex dynamics, while armed conflicts in multiple regions alternated between temporary lulls and renewed escalation, sustaining a broader atmosphere of instability.
Drawing on what he has described as the shortcomings of his first term, President Trump staffed his second administration largely with loyalists. As a result, there have been few senior figures within the administration positioned to constrain the President, enabling a pattern of highly centralized decision making and rapid policy implementation. Against this backdrop, President Trump has pursued significant shifts in U.S. foreign policy across both the trade and security domains.
In the trade sector, the administration has used tariffs as a primary instrument to compel allies and partners to enter new negotiations. The post-Cold War U.S. emphasis on promoting free trade has no longer served as a guiding principle. Instead, the administration announced unilateral tariff increases and subsequently used the prospect of tariff reductions as leverage to secure increased investment in the United States and more favorable trade conditions. As a result, many countries have entered bilateral negotiations with the Trump administration and been subjected to tariff rates ranging from 10 to 25 percent. President Trump has emphasized returning tariff revenues to the American public while prioritizing the strengthening of domestic industrial competitiveness. At the same time, the inflationary pressures associated with higher tariffs suggest that the ultimate effectiveness of this policy approach will depend on future market assessments.
In the security domain, the United States has pursued an approach of selective engagement, seeking to bring major international conflicts to an end while avoiding direct confrontation with Russia and China. President Trump has demonstrated U.S. primacy in the Western Hemisphere through limited uses of force, including operations justified as counternarcotics actions near Venezuela and along the vicinity of Mexico. At the same time, the administration has engaged in peace efforts across multiple theaters, including between Israel and Palestine, Israel and Iran, and Thailand and Cambodia, projecting an image of the United States as a broker of conflict resolution. In this respect, Trump’s style of coercive diplomacy has at times produced tangible outcomes, compensating for what some viewed as shortcomings of the rules-based international order, which emphasized values but often lacked effective enforcement mechanisms. However, in cases involving Russia and China, where U.S. power does not translate into assured unilateral outcomes, the administration has been unable to secure decisive victories, resulting instead in calibrated pressure in contexts such as the war in Ukraine and tensions in the East China Sea.
President Trump’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula has likewise remained consistent with the America First framework. Through tariff negotiations, the administration secured approximately $350 billion in pledged investment into the United States and established conditions enabling more flexible and multifunctional use of U.S. Forces Korea. From South Korea’s perspective, these arrangements reflected a pragmatic compromise, given the importance of maintaining competitiveness in the vast U.S. market, which generates annual trade surpluses of several tens of billions of dollars. Nevertheless, it is difficult to deny that such arrangements represented a transactional approach not previously characteristic of the traditional ROK-U.S. alliance. One area in which Washington and Seoul appeared to reach a more voluntary convergence of views was North Korea policy. Beyond reaffirming the principle of pursuing the denuclearization of North Korea, the two leaders also shared an understanding on the need for more active engagement, particularly with regard to resuming dialogue.
As the year draws to a close, President Trump is facing mounting domestic political challenges. His aggressive immigration enforcement policies, while welcomed by segments of his political base, have generated adverse effects on the U.S. economy. At the same time, divisions have emerged within the MAGA movement, a core support base, over issues related to the Epstein files, and his approval ratings have declined in the aftermath of the government shutdown. How this weakening of President Trump’s domestic political standing will affect the direction and conduct of U.S. foreign policy going forward warrants close attention.
As the United States enters the new year, the external environment at the end of 2025, which had been marked by pervasive uncertainty, is becoming increasingly transparent, whether viewed from a positive or negative perspective. At the same time, while U.S. influence in the international community remains substantial in terms of “hard power,” including economic and military capabilities, its “soft power,” grounded in democracy, market economics, and respect for human rights, appears to be gradually eroding. -
U.S. foreign policy in 2026 is expected, in broad terms, to follow the trajectory established in 2025. However, changes in the domestic political environment are likely to present President Trump with new challenges, and these developments are expected to be a key variable in determining whether he will be able to exercise the same level of strong leadership as in the previous year. At the same time, the prospect of an end to the war in Ukraine could present President Trump with new opportunities. In addition, the question of a durable peace in the Middle East, where peace negotiations and conflict continue to alternate, strategic competition with China, and the implementation process of tariff agreements are all expected to be major areas of focus in the coming year.
November Midterm Elections
As he concludes his first year in office, President Trump’s approval rating has not exceeded 50 percent.2) At the same time, he suffered a series of electoral setbacks in November, including losses in the New York mayoral race and the Virginia gubernatorial election. If such negative developments continue, President Trump is likely to conduct U.S. foreign policy throughout 2026 under the shadow of the November midterm elections, with domestic political considerations weighing heavily on his external agenda.
President Trump is now a single term president with just over three years remaining in office. The Republican Party currently controls both the House of Representatives and the Senate, but if it were to lose control of even one chamber, President Trump’s ability to govern would likely be constrained, and political momentum could shift to the Democratic Party or to emerging presidential contenders. To be sure, President Trump has repeatedly defied conventional expectations and secured reelection under difficult circumstances. However, the absence of any possibility of another reelection constitutes a major structural constraint and represents one of the most significant challenges to his ability to exercise strong leadership. Accordingly, victory in the midterm elections is a critical objective for President Trump, and he is likely to adjust both domestic and foreign policy as necessary in pursuit of that goal.
The issue with the greatest impact on the midterm elections is the economy. Improvement in domestic economic conditions is essential for electoral success. However, President Trump’s extensive tariff increases have raised consumer prices in the United States. Public dissatisfaction with inflation thus constitutes the most significant risk factor facing President Trump’s economic policy. Although President Trump may seek to sustain public support by returning cash to U.S. households, controlling inflation will not be easy. Persistently high prices also complicate President Trump’s objective of pursuing interest rate cuts. As a result, President Trump is likely to prioritize managing the effects of foreign relations on the U.S. economy. While formally maintaining existing agreements, his administration may seek to extract additional economic benefits from allies and partner countries. At the same time, countries that fail to fulfill investment commitments may face intensified pressure.
International Conflict
The conflict most likely to have the greatest impact on the United States among international wars in 2026 is the war in Ukraine. Now entering its fourth year, the prolonged conflict has generated fatigue not only in Russia and Ukraine, but also among the United States and European countries supporting Ukraine. As a result, the likelihood is increasing that in 2026 the war in Ukraine will reach some form of termination or settlement.
The war in Ukraine carries broad ripple effects across multiple relationships, including U.S.–Russia relations, Europe–Russia relations, and Russia–North Korea relations. If the war comes to an end, the United States is likely to seek to expand its influence by assuming a leading role in Ukraine’s postwar reconstruction, reinforcing its leadership over NATO member states in Europe, and facilitating Russia’s reintegration into the international community.
Russia’s calculus, however, differs. Rather than pursuing a settlement that places the postwar order under U.S. influence, Moscow appears intent on ending the war in a manner that consolidates Russia’s status and standing. President Trump has sought to persuade Russia and facilitate an end to the conflict, but reports indicate that his proposed peace framework contains numerous provisions unfavorable to Ukraine.3) As a result, opposition from Ukraine and Europe may delay the conclusion of a peace agreement in the near term. Over time, however, underlying power realities may limit Ukraine’s ability to prevail over Russia.
The issue of Middle East peace also remains an area of focus for President Trump. Israel’s current ceasefire arrangement with Hamas is likely to hold in the near term. However, if Israel seeks to extend military or political consolidation beyond Gaza to include the West Bank, relations with Sunni Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, could develop into a new source of tension. Conversely, if the Palestinian issue moves toward stabilization, Saudi Arabia could join the Abraham Accords, potentially further promoting regional stability. Nonetheless, it remains unclear whether Israel’s internal political instability will be fully resolved, and given the limits of President Trump’s influence over Prime Minister Netanyahu, it is premature to conclude that uncertainty in the region has been eliminated.
In addition, new sources of conflict are expected to emerge across different regions in 2026, in which President Trump is likely to seek to exert influence. In these cases as well, the anticipated approach is one rooted in “America First,“ characterized by selective engagement in conflicts deemed necessary, the pursuit of short-term outcomes, and the subsequent use of those outcomes for domestic political purposes.
Indo-Pacific Strategy and Potential Conflicts
The Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy is expected to maintain its core objective of securing an advantage in strategic competition with China. The recently released U.S. National Security Strategy clearly reflects this orientation. However, the trajectory of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy is unlikely to unfold solely according to American intentions. China’s sustained economic growth and the resolute posture of the Xi Jinping leadership mean that China is no longer a variable that President Trump can shape at will. In particular, a full scale confrontation would carry significant risks for the U.S. economy, raising concerns about negative repercussions ahead of the November midterm elections. Against this backdrop, President Trump is likely to seek to preserve a functional relationship with President Xi Jinping while placing greater emphasis on securing U.S. investments in China, encouraging Chinese investment commitments in the United States, and expanding Chinese purchases of American goods.
With respect to relations with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, a key question in 2026 will be the level of pressure President Trump chooses to apply regarding the implementation of agreements reached in 2025. South Korea and Japan have pledged investments in the United States on a substantial scale, yet significant uncertainty remains surrounding the concrete execution of these commitments. Between the United States and Japan, disputes persist over the designation of investment targets. Between South Korea and the United States, issues extend beyond the identification of investment targets to include the removal of non tariff barriers in areas such as agricultural markets and other sectors. If these negotiations fail to progress smoothly, friction will be difficult to avoid. It therefore remains to be seen whether President Trump will continue a strategy of unilateral pressure as in 2025 or adopt a more flexible approach in order to secure the agreed investment flows more rapidly.
From a security perspective, the United States will face a wide range of issues requiring cooperation with allies in the Indo-Pacific. Beyond diplomatic coordination aimed at constraining China, Washington is likely to seek to strengthen deterrence through various minilateral military frameworks, including cooperation among the United States, South Korea, and Japan, as well as expanded groupings such as the United States, South Korea, Japan, and Australia. Although President Trump has shown limited enthusiasm for multilateral cooperation and cooperation with Australia under AUKUS has progressed slowly, the overall direction of security coordination is expected to be maintained. Several variables will shape this process. In the case of South Korea, attention will focus on the implementation of the agreement reached at the late October summit allowing the construction of nuclear-powered submarines. In the case of Japan, emerging domestic debates over nuclear-powered submarines4) are likely to elevate the importance of consultations between Washington and Tokyo. As these discussions unfold, periods of friction and cooperation are expected to alternate. -
Managing Tensions Under the Continuity of President Trump’s Foreign Policy Orientation
The U.S. foreign policy in 2026 is expected to begin under more favorable conditions than in 2025, with a correspondingly narrower scope for abrupt change. With difficult tariff negotiations largely concluded, U.S. foreign policy is likely to be more accommodating than in the previous year. As a result, the intensity of friction across Europe, Russia, the Middle East, China, and relations with South Korea and Japan is expected to decline. This overall trajectory is likely to facilitate progress toward an end to the war in Ukraine and to foster at least a formal atmosphere of stabilization in the Middle East. Strategic competition with China is also expected to continue under the outward appearance of a truce, while behind the scenes both sides intensify efforts to secure relative advantage.
However, underlying tensions with U.S. allies are unlikely to be resolved quickly. While the Trump administration has sought to avoid direct confrontation with adversarial actors such as Russia, China, and North Korea, it has applied pressure optimized for U.S. national interests toward partners such as Europe, Japan, and South Korea. As a result, 2026 is likely to see sustained frictions over the implementation modalities of already agreed investment commitments to the United States. If the Trump administration chooses to unilaterally interpret existing agreements and enforce them through coercive means, relations between the United States and its allies are likely to enter a phase of continued deterioration.
The ROK-U.S. relationship is no exception to this dynamic. Facing midterm elections, President Trump is likely to react sensitively to the pace of Korean investment in the United States and may intensify pressure if implementation falls behind schedule. While the total commitment stands at 350 billion dollars, the annual ceiling does not exceed 20 billion dollars, which limits South Korea’s short term burden. Nevertheless, disagreements may emerge over the sectors and modalities of investment. If investments fail to materialize in areas prioritized by President Trump, retaliatory measures could follow. In such a scenario, particular attention should be paid to the risk of delays in issues that require cooperation from the U.S. administration, including the nuclear powered submarine project and matters related to the bilateral nuclear cooperation framework.
Advancing Alliance Modernization in the Course of Implementing the Indo-Pacific Strategy
President Trump is expected to pursue regional policies aimed at securing strategic advantage in the Indo-Pacific. In this process, he is likely to seek close cooperation with South Korea and Japan, extending beyond deterrence of the North Korean threat to include balancing China. The concrete substance of ROK-U.S. cooperation is likely to be embedded in the modernization of the ROK-U.S. alliance. Although alliance modernization was agreed upon at the summit in October, the specific details and road map have yet to be announced. As a result, the process of operationalizing alliance modernization can be assessed as one of the most sensitive challenges facing both governments in the coming year.
The United States is seeking to employ U.S. Forces Korea with greater flexibility. To that end, the joint fact sheet issued after the summit declared the intention to shape U.S. Forces Korea into a force capable of responding to “all threats.” South Korea’s acceptance of this formulation was driven largely by the context of tariff negotiations. Going forward, however, careful attention will be required in the process of further coordination, particularly with respect to China related contingencies.
The issue of South Korea’s construction of nuclear-powered submarines presents a similar dynamic. President Trump is likely to seek to maximize U.S. interests in the course of South Korea’s nuclear-powered submarine program. In particular, the question of where construction takes place may reemerge as a salient issue. While construction would in principle occur at domestic shipyards, partial construction in the United States could be considered if it were linked to guaranteed participation in U.S. naval vessel and submarine production projects. From President Trump’s perspective, especially in the run up to the midterm elections, the prospect of job creation within the United States will be a major consideration. If concrete agreements are not concluded before the U.S. midterm elections, and the ruling Republican Party suffers electoral defeat, the nuclear-powered submarine program could face serious risk. Accordingly, it will be necessary to produce detailed, formalized agreements at an early stage and to secure the required congressional approvals. This constitutes a top priority that must be addressed in 2026.
ROK–U.S. Policy Coordination Amid U.S.–DPRK Efforts to Work Toward a Summit
President Trump is expected to continue pursuing a summit with Chairman Kim Jong Un. Around the time of President Trump’s anticipated visit to China, reportedly scheduled for April next year, efforts to arrange another U.S.–North Korea summit may intensify. If a summit between President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un were to take place and contribute positively to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, President Trump would likely publicize the outcome extensively. Such a development could be framed domestically as resolving a North Korea issue that no previous U.S. president had been able to address, and thus could be leveraged both in pursuit of a Nobel Peace Prize and in the run-up to the November midterm elections.
Of course, President Trump’s will alone cannot guarantee outcomes. A reciprocal response from Chairman Kim Jong Un is essential. Two key variables shape this dynamic. First is whether the war in Ukraine comes to an end. If an early settlement is reached, North Korea would likely become concerned about a potential reduction in support from Russia. Under such circumstances, Pyongyang may begin to consider improving U.S.–North Korea relations as a means of securing a strategic safety net.
Second, the critical question concerns Chairman Kim Jong Un’s underlying objectives. If, as he has declared, his true goal is a situation in which North and South Korea coexist in a state of hostility, he is more likely to prioritize regime stability through maintaining relations with China and Russia under a manageable level of tension, rather than pursuing dialogue with the United States. If, however, Kim’s objective is to move toward becoming a normal state, engagement with the United States would be indispensable. These factors will shape the prospects for a U.S.–North Korea summit, and it is likely that the feasibility of such a meeting will be determined before October, when the U.S. midterm election campaign enters a full-scale phase.
If North Korea does not respond to President Trump’s overtures for dialogue, there remains the possibility of a reversion to a more hardline policy approach. This would imply renewed references to strategies such as the 2017 “fire and fury” rhetoric or the so-called “bloody nose” option. However, emphasizing the North Korean threat and intensifying pressure on Pyongyang is unlikely to be politically beneficial in the context of the November midterm elections. Historically, economic conditions have been the most decisive issue in U.S. midterm elections, and President Trump has repeatedly highlighted his personal rapport with Chairman Kim Jong Un. Under these circumstances, an abrupt policy shift could be interpreted as an admission that President Trump’s North Korea approach has failed, making such a reversal less likely.
Overall, the fact that the U.S. government is actively pursuing dialogue with North Korea constitutes an opportunity for the South Korean government, which holds a broadly similar position. Accordingly, Seoul should advance alliance coordination with the United States and its North Korea policy with all possibilities in mind, while preparing in advance to link a potential U.S.–North Korea summit to an inter-Korean summit, should such talks take place. At the same time, caution is warranted regarding the assumption that “the holding of a summit itself equates to the national interest of the Republic of Korea.” While the convening of talks is important, equal importance should be placed on the exercise of wisdom to keep the door open to dialogue, without losing sight of the longer-term objectives of South Korea’s North Korea policy, including the sustained pursuit of denuclearization, tangible reductions in inter-Korean military tensions, the resolution of issues related to separated families and detainees, and the longer-term improvement of human rights conditions for the North Korean population.
| Review of U.S. Foreign Policy in 2025
| Key Observations on U.S. Foreign Policy in 2026
| Outlook on U.S. Foreign Policy in 2026 and the Korean Peninsula
1) Regarding “America First,” David Rowe, “The Meaning of America First,” Key Alumi Magazine (Fall 2025, Vol. 47.1.) https://bulletin.kenyon.edu/article/the-meaning-of-america-first/ 참조 (Accessed 2025. 11. 25)
2) The Economist “Tracking the presidency: 40% approve, 57% disapprove, 4% not sure,” (Nov. 25, 2025) https://www.economist.com/interactive/trump-approval-tracker (Accessed 2025. 11. 25)
3) BBC, “Updated peace plan could be a deal Ukraine will take – eventually,” (Nov. 25, 2025.) https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn4d27dx80no (Accessed 2025. 11. 25)
4) Joongang Ilbo, “日 방위상 “핵잠수함 도입 논의 당연…한국도 호주도 보유,” (2025. 11. 12.) https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25381589 (Accessed 2025. 11. 25)
※ The contents published on 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institue
