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The Takaichi Government's Announcement of the "Evolution of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)": Assessment and Implications |
| May 14, 2026 |
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Kitae LEESenior Research Fellow, Sejong Institute | ktleekorea@sejong.org
- Japan's announcement of the "Evolution of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)"1) by Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae(高市早苗) in Hanoi, Vietnam on May 2, 2026, is assessed as an attempt to reestablish the direction of Japan's diplomatic and security strategy amid a changing international order. In particular, within the structural environment of deepening DPRK-China-Russia cooperation and the prolongation of U.S.-China strategic competition, Japan is maintaining the foundational principles of the existing FOIP while reinforcing a more practical and strategic approach. This trajectory represents an evolution built upon the policy foundations accumulated through the administrations of Abe Shinzo(安倍晋三), and Kishida Fumio(岸田文雄), with its character and priorities becoming more clearly defined under the Takaichi administration. This paper examines the trajectory of Japan's FOIP strategy, analyzes the characteristics and strategic significance of the new FOIP announced by Prime Minister Takaichi, and presents implications and directions for response on the part of South Korea.
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FOIP is a core concept symbolizing Japan's external strategy and was raised in earnest beginning with the second Abe administration. Prime Minister Abe, who announced FOIP in Nairobi, Kenya in 2016, asserted that Japan bears the responsibility of upholding "freedom from coercion," the "rule of law," and "market economy."2)
Abe's FOIP put forward the values necessary for stability and prosperity not only in the Asia-Pacific but also in regions encompassing the Indian Ocean and Africa, grounded in universal values. Japan required a response through the "rule of law" to address China's expanding maritime presence driven by its military buildup and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As an island nation dependent on imports for energy and food, "market economy" and "freedom from coercion" such as embargo measures advanced in the form of strengthening a multilateral cooperation framework centered on the alliance with the United States.
Japan, with the U.S.-Japan alliance as its central axis, employed the broad concept of the "rule of law," which could be accepted even by states not operating under democratic systems. Japan subsequently sought cooperation from ASEAN, India, and African nations, obtaining a degree of support. Not only the Obama administration at the time of the FOIP announcement, but also the first Trump administration expressed understanding of Prime Minister Abe's explanation of FOIP and adopted the terminology "Free and Open Indo-Pacific."
While the initial FOIP was closer to a vision presentation centered on "values" and "principles," it gradually developed into concrete policy. Japan expanded cooperation with Southeast Asian, South Asian, and African countries through infrastructure development, maritime security, and capacity-building support, thereby developing FOIP into a "public goods provision-type strategy." Japan also strengthened the multilateral character of FOIP through the Quad, its cooperation framework with the United States, Australia, and India.
The Kishida administration carried forward Abe's FOIP while developing it into a more comprehensive and implementation-centered strategy. The FOIP action plan announced in India in 2023 maintained the existing value-based diplomacy while presenting an expanded agenda encompassing non-traditional security domains such as climate change, health, and digital cooperation.3) In particular, it emphasized "inclusiveness" and "cooperation with the Global South," adopting an approach of encouraging participation in a rules-based order rather than directly excluding China.
In this manner, FOIP evolved from the strategic vision of the Abe administration through the Kishida administration into a multilayered strategy equipped with concrete policies and an action plan. This developmental process reflected Japan's will to play a more proactive role in shaping the regional order, while simultaneously representing the outcome of strategic adjustments to adapt to a changing international environment. -
As of 2026, the situation confronting Japan is changing. The United States, FOIP's most important partner, has resorted to using tariffs as a weapon to "coerce" various countries. In its military confrontation with Iran, the United States displayed a conspicuous disregard for international law, and President Trump even imposed a "reverse blockade" on the Strait of Hormuz. China, amid the deterioration of China-Japan relations triggered by Prime Minister Takaichi's November 2025 remarks on an "existential crisis situation" related to a Taiwan contingency, imposed export controls on critical materials. Russia continues its invasion of Ukraine in violation of international law. As Japan and other countries experienced the weaponization not only of military force but also of the economy, the values underpinning FOIP began to lose persuasive force.4)
Against this backdrop of shifting international conditions, Prime Minister Takaichi delivered a speech on May 2 at Vietnam National University in Hanoi before an audience of approximately 270 students and experts, with the intent of advancing Japan's diplomatic policy of FOIP. Prime Minister Takaichi first referenced the intensification of geopolitical competition, technological innovation, and the rise of the Global South since former Prime Minister Abe put forward FOIP in 2016, emphasizing the need to "adapt to new realities." She expressed her intention to place greater weight on economic security responses including supply chain strengthening and to accelerate efforts to make the entire Indo-Pacific region "together, stronger, and more prosperous," declaring that Japan would enhance "resilience" and "autonomy." In other words, while emphasizing the importance of "each country determining its own destiny with its own hands," she argued that possessing "resilience" and "autonomy" capable of responding to threats across all dimensions, including economic, social, and security, would lead to the realization of FOIP.
The new FOIP carries forward the foundational principles of the existing FOIP while presenting a response to the real-world risks of hegemonism and supply chain disruption. It also constitutes an initiative to advance FOIP within a cooperation framework with like-minded countries and to address the coercive actions of great powers. Based on this recognition, the new FOIP announced three priority areas.
The first priority area is the "construction of an economic ecosystem for the AI and data era," encompassing the strengthening of energy and critical materials supply chains. In specific terms, this includes: (1) the strengthening of critical mineral and energy supply chains. The objective is to diversify critical minerals in which Japan has high dependence on China, such as rare earths, lithium, and nickel, and to enhance economic crisis response capabilities through energy supply diversification, including oil stockpiling and discharge systems and the expansion of the share of renewable energy. The intent is to provide a practical response roadmap to China's export controls and economic retaliation, thereby alleviating the structure of "economic hostage-taking" with respect to specific countries.
(2) The "FOIP Digital Corridor Initiative." Japan announced its intention to secure trustworthy communications infrastructure by advancing the "FOIP Digital Corridor," which involves the construction of submarine cable and satellite communications infrastructure for artificial intelligence research and development and the transmission and reception of large volumes of data. The strategy through this initiative is to form Japan-led norms and infrastructure networks in data and AI governance with countries in Asia, the Indian Ocean region, and Africa.
(3) The development of mother-tongue AI and advanced human resources. Japan plans to strengthen AI competitiveness and digital transformation capabilities through the development of "mother-tongue AI" reflecting Asian languages and the cultivation of regional human resources through joint research, training programs, and start-up support. The direction is to extend a Japan-led AI and data ecosystem to the region rather than engaging in simple technology exports.
The second priority area is the "co-creation of a public-private integrated economic frontier" and "rule sharing." In specific terms, this includes: (1) the development of a public-private cooperation-type economic frontier. The direction is to jointly create "new economic frontiers" in ASEAN, India, and the Global South by combining official development assistance (ODA), public funds, and private investment and technology. The strategy is to simultaneously expand opportunities for Japanese companies' overseas expansion and regional economic growth by identifying projects in infrastructure, digital, energy, and carbon neutrality domains in which private sector companies can participate.
(2) Rule sharing and the expansion of FTA networks. Japan announced its intention to expand and supplement free trade and investment rules such as the TPP and CPTPP, and to design rules oriented toward reducing excessive dependence on specific countries. The intent is to reduce dependence on China and strengthen a rules-based economic order together with Japan, the United States, India, and other partners, linked to a rules-centered economic security strategy.
(3) Linkage with the private sector, start-ups, and local governments. Japan seeks to build a "public-private integrated network" encompassing diverse projects including crowdfunding, smart cities, and digital agriculture in addition to large-scale infrastructure, through a structure in which Japanese companies, local governments, and local partner companies cooperate. The intent is to transform Japan's FOIP from a simple ODA model into a multilayered private sector participation-type economic cooperation platform.
The third priority area is the strengthening of "security sector linkages" for regional peace and stability. In specific terms, this includes: (1) the strengthening of Official Security Assistance (OSA). Japan intends to strengthen surveillance, detection, and response capabilities in maritime, aviation, and cyber domains by utilizing OSA, through which Japan provides defense equipment and technology to allies and like-minded countries. In particular, Japan will expand equipment, training, and information sharing support to ASEAN countries with strong interest in maritime security such as Vietnam and the Philippines, with the aim of enhancing maritime security capabilities.
(2) The expansion of regional military and security networks. With the U.S.-Japan alliance as the central axis, Japan will expand a "regional security network" involving the United States and other security-oriented like-minded countries by linking security cooperation with the Quad (U.S.-Japan-Australia-India), Japan-ASEAN, Japan-India, and Japan-Europe frameworks. This reflects a determination to check China's unilateral maritime actions and military demonstrations while emphasizing compliance with international law, and simultaneously to expand Japan's defense role to a certain level.
(3) The structuring of linkages between economic security and traditional security. The direction is to recognize critical elements such as critical minerals, energy, semiconductors, and communications infrastructure as "security resources," and to strengthen policy mechanisms linking economic security and traditional security. Through this, Japan will reinforce a Japanese-style "economic security-integrated security" framework that comprehensively manages supply chain risks, the weaponization of the economy, and threats in new domains such as cyber, space, and AI.
These three priority areas merit attention in that they are not confined to declaratory initiatives but are secured with implementation capacity through their combination with policy instruments already being advanced by the Japanese government. Representative examples include supply chain management based on the Economic Security Promotion Act, infrastructure and financial support utilizing the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), and subsidy policies for the semiconductor and battery sectors, all of which function as core tools for FOIP implementation. In the digital domain, an approach of simultaneously preempting norms and markets through trust-based data norms (Data Free Flow with Trust: DFFT) and international standardization strategies is also being pursued in parallel. -
The Takaichi administration's new FOIP is significant in that it has made clear a transition from the existing "values and norms-oriented" approach to a "comprehensive strategy centered on economic security and technological competition response." Whereas the Abe administration's FOIP placed the diffusion of universal values such as the "rule of law," "freedom," and "market economy" and the defense of the maritime order at the forefront, the Kishida administration focused on presenting an action plan that, building on this foundation, encompassed non-traditional security domains including climate change, health, and digital cooperation. The Takaichi administration goes further, redefining FOIP as a strategy of a more realist character, premised on an environment in which the weaponization of the economy and supply chain risks have become constants. In other words, while the new FOIP does not explicitly name China, it is multidimensionally reinforcing its response to China, centered on economic security, which is a core tenet of Prime Minister Takaichi's convictions.
First, the comprehensive presentation of "resilience" and "autonomy" demonstrates that the core objective of FOIP is shifting from "norm diffusion" to "securing crisis response capability and the availability of strategic choices." Economic security encompassing supply chains, energy, critical minerals, and advanced technology has been incorporated as the central axis of FOIP, serving as the structural response logic to the combined economic and security threats manifested through U.S. tariff policy, China's export controls on critical materials, and Russia's invasion of Ukraine. As a result, FOIP is expanding from a stage focused on maritime order and infrastructure cooperation into a multidimensional economic security framework encompassing the material, digital, institutional, and normative dimensions.
Second, the new FOIP reveals an intent to broaden Japan's independent strategic space by emphasizing the concept of "autonomy" while presupposing the U.S.-Japan alliance. The Takaichi administration, while treating the United States as the core partner of FOIP, shows a tendency to institutionally expand Japan's policy autonomy in consideration of U.S. policy volatility as manifested in tariff policy, sanctions, and disregard for international law. In other words, the new FOIP may be interpreted as an attempt to transform FOIP not merely into a supplementary strategy for the U.S.-Japan alliance, but into an "alliance-based multilayered network strategy" through linkage with ASEAN, India, and the Global South. As a result, the new FOIP reflects Japan's medium to long-term diplomatic and security vision of seeking to institutionalize a balance between "alliance dependence" and "securing strategic autonomy."
Third, among the three priority areas, "construction of an economic ecosystem for the AI and data age" and "co-creation of a public-private integrated economic frontier" demonstrate the intent to utilize FOIP as a national strategy platform combining industrial and technology policy. The Japanese government, moving beyond the public goods provision model centered on infrastructure and ODA, is seeking to simultaneously shape norms and markets by combining public and private resources in digital infrastructure, data governance, AI norms, and supply chain investment. This signifies that FOIP has evolved from a simple diplomatic initiative or regional vision into a Japanese-style Indo-Pacific strategy framework integrating industrial policy, external economic strategy, and security strategy.
These changes suggest that FOIP is undergoing a phased transition from the "values-centered strategic vision" of the Abe administration through the "comprehensive action plan" of the Kishida administration to an "implementation-centered national strategy placing economic security and technological competition response at the forefront" under the Takaichi administration. Ten years after the announcement of FOIP, Prime Minister Takaichi, who carries forward the political legacy of former Prime Minister Abe, is evolving it into a form suited to current realities while emphasizing economic security. At the same time, a transformation in the character of FOIP may be confirmed in the fact that while the orientation of attaching importance to the Global South, ASEAN, and India is being maintained, the content of cooperation is undergoing a qualitative restructuring from a focus on values and ODA to supply chain, digital, and security cooperation. -
The Takaichi administration's new FOIP simultaneously presents South Korea with strategic opportunities surrounding economic security, technology, and security cooperation, as well as new challenges in terms of alliance management and burden sharing. Japan's three priority areas of strengthening energy and critical materials supply chains, constructing an AI and data economic ecosystem, and reinforcing security linkages overlap considerably with domains that South Korea has already prioritized in its strategic industries and economic security policy. Given the significant complementarity between South Korea and Japan in semiconductors, batteries, critical minerals, and digital infrastructure, there is considerable room for generating mutual benefit in the process of global supply chain restructuring should the two countries institutionalize cooperation.
In this regard, South Korea needs to selectively deepen economic security cooperation with Japan. First, it is necessary to set a cooperation agenda centered on areas with high mutual dependence and clear tangible benefits, such as semiconductor supply chains encompassing equipment, materials, and design, next-generation batteries and critical mineral procurement, and energy transition including hydrogen and ammonia. Second, in areas such as digital infrastructure, data norms, and AI ethics, South Korea needs to seek the development of joint ROK-Japan proposals or coordinated positions by linking the norms Japan seeks to establish through FOIP with South Korea's digital strategy. Third, by identifying joint ROK-Japan entry models for infrastructure, digital, and human capacity development projects in ASEAN countries such as Vietnam and in Global South nations, mutual competition can be managed and the effects of cooperation maximized.
At the same time, the new FOIP's emphasis on "autonomy" requires a reexamination of South Korea's strategic position within the ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral cooperation structure. Should Japan expand its independent economic security and defense roles, the United States may demand a more active burden sharing from both South Korea and Japan. In this context, South Korea needs to clearly establish principles and criteria through which it can secure autonomous policy space on specific issues, such as relations with China and modes of Global South cooperation, while maintaining the ROK-U.S. alliance and ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation as its foundation. That is, long-term strategic autonomy must be maintained by elaborately designing in advance the scope and limits of economic security, technology, and security cooperation.
Furthermore, as Japan strengthens its economic and technological cooperation with ASEAN, India, and the Global South through the new FOIP, South Korea also needs to further systematize its own regional strategy. South Korea needs to concretize a middle power-type cooperation package combining ODA, digital transformation, carbon neutrality, health, and education and people-to-people exchange, in linkage with existing policies such as the Indo-Pacific Strategy and the K-Global Strategy. Through this, a complex strategy is required that manages the relationship with Japan's FOIP in a "competition-complementarity coexistence" structure, building cooperation in the form of joint projects in specific regions and sectors while constructing a differentiated brand in other domains.
Summarizing the future policy tasks: first, it is necessary to establish a whole-of-government "ROK-Japan Economic Security Cooperation Roadmap" and advance it with priority areas and phased objectives specified across three stages: short-term (one to two years) supply chain stabilization, medium-term (three to five years) technology and standards cooperation, and long-term (five years or more) joint industrial ecosystem construction. Second, response consistency to Japan's new FOIP and changes in U.S. strategy toward China must be secured by establishing "strategic guidelines" that define South Korea's role and limitations within the ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation framework. Third, South Korea needs to separately formulate a medium to long-term regional cooperation strategy document that simultaneously supplements South Korea's Indo-Pacific implementation strategy targeting ASEAN, India, and Africa, and incorporates measures for coordination with and differentiation from Japan. - 外務省, “自由で開かれたインド太平洋(FOIP)の進化” 2026年5月2日 <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/pageit_000001_02918.html> (Accessed: May 13, 2026).
- 外務省, “TICAD VI開会に当たって・安倍晋三日本国総理大臣基調演説” 2016年8月27日 <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/afr/af2/page4_002268.html> Accessed: May 13, 2026). In 2016, it was announced in the form of a "strategy" (FOIP Strategy), but from 2017 onward, with China in mind, it was changed to a "vision and initiative." Subsequently, in Prime Minister Kishida's announcement of the action plan in 2023, the designation "vision and initiative" was also dropped, and it is currently referred to simply as the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)."
- 外務省, “自由で開かれたインド太平洋(FOIP)のための新たなプラン” 2023年7月9日 <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/fp/pp/page3_003666.html> (Accessed: May 13, 2026).
- “同志国と「法の支配」維持, 実務協力で「力の時代」対処 新外交方針,” 『日本経済新聞』 2026年5月2日.
| The Development of FOIP: From Abe Strategy to Kishida Action Plan
| Prime Minister Takaichi's "New FOIP": Principal Contents and Characteristics
| Assessment of the Strategic Significance and Changes of the New FOIP
| Implications for South Korea and Directions for Response
※ The contents published on 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institue
