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The Russia–Ukraine War: Current Status and Outlook |
| December 17, 2025 |
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Andrei LankovVisiting Research Fellow, Sejong Institute | andreilankov@sejong.org
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The Russia–Ukraine war is not only the largest interstate war in Europe in nearly 80 years, but also a rare case of war between countries that are not considered “underdeveloped.” The conflict is, in part, a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union, with complex historical legacies contributing to the outbreak of war.
The histories of Russia and Ukraine are deeply intertwined. Russian and Ukrainian share close linguistic affinity and are largely mutually intelligible. Russian nationalists have rarely regarded Ukrainians as a distinct nation, instead viewing them as part of the Russian nation and considering the Ukrainian language to be a dialect of Russian. In other words, segments of the Russian elite have not even fully acknowledged the existence of a separate Ukrainian national identity.
One of the most contentious issues in Russia–Ukraine relations has been the status of Crimea. Crimea originally belonged to the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic but was transferred to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1954. Even after Ukraine gained independence in 1991, Crimea remained Ukrainian territory; however, the majority of its population was ethnically Russian, and strong pro-Russian separatist sentiment persisted.
A similar situation emerged in eastern Ukraine, particularly in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, where some residents were dissatisfied with being part of Ukraine.
After 2008, Vladimir Putin and his close associates adopted increasingly anti-Western positions. Their worldview came to be shaped by a nineteenth-century conception of international politics, in which great powers manage the world by dividing spheres of influence. From this perspective, the former Soviet space constitutes Russia’s natural sphere of influence. Consequently, the expansion of Western influence in Ukraine was perceived as a direct threat to Russia’s national interests. In particular, the preference among much of Ukraine’s political elite for EU and NATO membership, along with the growing pro-Western orientation of Ukrainian youth, generated deep concern within the Russian leadership. -
In 2014, Ukraine’s unpopular, pro-Russian Yanukovych government collapsed. Exploiting the resulting political turmoil, Russian forces seized key facilities and state institutions in Crimea. Russian authorities facilitated the formation of a local pro-Russian government, which subsequently declared Crimea’s incorporation into Russia.
The annexation of Crimea marked the first forcible change of borders in Europe since 1945. Western states condemned the annexation and imposed sanctions on Russia, but these measures remained largely symbolic and failed to inflict severe damage on the Russian economy.
Immediately after the annexation, Russian intelligence services organized large-scale protests against the Ukrainian central government in eastern Ukraine, particularly in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. In this process, two entities—the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic—were proclaimed as independent states. However, no country internationally recognized them. The Ukrainian central government responded by deploying military force to suppress the separatists, and fighting continued until 2022. Russian forces supported the separatists and effectively participated in the conflict. -
On February 24, 2022, Russian forces launched a military operation against Ukraine. The Russian leadership miscalculated that President Volodymyr Zelensky’s government lacked popular support and that the majority of Ukrainians would not strongly resist Russian troops. Russia’s plan was to enter Kyiv within weeks, install a pro-Russian government, and compel it to cede territory and implement pro-Russian policies.
Instead, the invasion sharply intensified Ukrainian patriotism and strengthened national cohesion. The offensive toward Kyiv failed. Nevertheless, during the first few months of the war, Russian forces succeeded in occupying significant portions of eastern and southern Ukraine.
In the fall of 2022, Russia formally declared the annexation of four Ukrainian regions—Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia—into its territory. At the time, however, Russian forces only partially controlled Kherson and Zaporizhzhia.
From 2023 onward, the war evolved into a protracted war of attrition and stalemate. During 2024–2025, Russian forces advanced slowly westward, but at a very limited pace. In 2025, the area newly occupied by Russian forces was estimated at approximately 3,500–5,000 square kilometers, equivalent to about 0.6–0.8 percent of Ukraine’s total territory. As of the end of 2025, Russia controlled roughly 19–20 percent of Ukrainian territory. -
The Russian leadership currently believes that time is on Russia’s side. This confidence rests on several factors.
The foundation of optimism among Russia’s elite is the country’s economic performance and its perceived economic superiority over Ukraine. In the spring and summer of 2022, during the initial weeks of the war, Western countries imposed unprecedentedly severe sanctions on Russia. At the time, many experts predicted that these measures would cause Russia’s GDP to contract by 10–35 percent. These forecasts proved incorrect. Although Russia’s GDP did decline in 2022, the contraction was minimal. According to World Bank estimates, Russia’s GDP fell by only 1.4 percent in 2022. Contrary to expert expectations, 2023 and 2024 became years of impressive economic growth for Russia. The World Bank estimates growth at approximately 4.1 percent in 2023 and about 4.3 percent in 2024.
The Putin regime has made a concerted effort to keep the war distant from the daily lives of most citizens—that is, to ensure that the majority of the population does not directly experience the war—and has largely succeeded. Moscow, St. Petersburg, and most major cities continue to function much as they did in peacetime. Moreover, economic growth in 2024–2025 led to a substantial rise in household incomes. Between 2023 and 2024, real incomes increased by 16 percent. As a result, for many Russians, the wartime period has been associated more with rising living standards than with economic hardship.
There are, however, signs of economic slowdown in 2025. The IMF and other institutions estimate real GDP growth in 2025 at around 0.6 percent. Even so, most experts believe that Russia can continue the war for several more years without facing serious internal problems, even if the current level of military intensity is sustained. -
Russia’s current system of troop recruitment has played a significant role in minimizing discontent among soldiers and their families. Although the Putin regime implemented a partial mobilization in the fall of 2022, the overwhelming majority of Russian troops fighting at the front are contract volunteers rather than conscripts.
Most contract soldiers are men aged 30–50 with relatively low levels of education, often from economically underdeveloped regions of Russia. Their typical civilian monthly income is around USD 500, whereas active-duty soldiers receive at least USD 2,500 per month. In the event of death in combat, families receive substantial compensation.
This reliance on voluntary enlistment combined with high financial incentives has been effective in suppressing social discontent, despite rising Russian military casualties.
At present, virtually all opposition activity in Russia is suppressed. Only pro-government parties or so-called “systemic opposition” parties exist in parliament, while most political activists and anti-government intellectuals have been forced into exile. Opposition-leaning media outlets have been shut down, and social media platforms with significant opposition influence have been blocked.
Taken together, these factors suggest that the Putin regime is likely to be able to continue the war for several more years without facing serious economic or political challenges. -
By contrast, Ukraine’s situation is far more difficult than Russia’s. In 2023, Russia’s GDP was approximately 12–13 times larger than Ukraine’s. Population comparisons are more complex, as millions of Ukrainians are currently residing abroad, making precise estimates difficult. Even so, Russia’s population is roughly four to five times larger than Ukraine’s.
Under these conditions, effective Ukrainian resistance has depended critically on military and economic support from Europe and the United States. Immediately after Russia’s invasion, NATO, the European Union, and the United States pledged substantial assistance, but the actual scale of delivered support has been relatively limited.
According to data from the European Parliament, from February 2022 to October 2025, EU member states provided Ukraine with a total of USD 205 billion in assistance, of which USD 73 billion was military aid. During the same period, U.S. assistance totaled USD 175 billion, including USD 67 billion in military aid. By contrast, estimates by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) indicate that Russia’s military expenditures between 2022 and 2025 amounted to approximately USD 530 billion. Even if only part of this spending was directly related to the war in Ukraine, it is clear that Western support for Ukraine represents only a fraction of Russia’s war-related expenditures.
With a smaller economy and population, Ukraine must rely heavily on conscription to replenish its forces. However, mobilization efforts are encountering increasing difficulties, and many Ukrainian units suffer from chronic manpower shortages. Losses among conscripted soldiers are directly felt across society, contributing to a rapid growth in public war fatigue. -
Since Donald Trump assumed office as President of the United States in January 2025, the battlefield situation has shifted significantly to Ukraine’s disadvantage. President Trump, who has long displayed strong isolationist tendencies, has consistently taken a negative stance toward supporting Ukraine.
In addition, Trump harbors strong personal resentment toward Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. In 2019, Zelensky refused to provide Trump with information that could have been politically advantageous to him in connection with allegations that Hunter Biden, the son of then-candidate Joe Biden, was involved in corruption linked to Ukrainian companies. Trump believes that Zelensky’s lack of cooperation caused serious damage to both himself and the Republican Party during the 2020 U.S. presidential election.
Trump also views the Russia–Ukraine war as a major source of global economic instability. In particular, he is concerned that a prolonged war could lead Russia to become decisively subordinated to China. Because Trump regards competition with China as the central priority of U.S. foreign policy, he has a clear interest in weakening Russia–China cooperation. However, he believes this objective cannot be achieved without a rapid end to the Russia–Ukraine war.
Trump has little sympathy for Ukraine, and his objective is not the restoration of Ukraine’s prewar borders but rather a swift and simple termination of the conflict. To that end, he has applied strong pressure on Ukraine, with the suspension of critical military assistance serving as his primary leverage.
Trump’s views are also shaped by his perception of Europe. He believes that the United States effectively subsidizes European defense spending, both directly and indirectly, and that European countries are free-riding on American security guarantees. From his perspective, the Ukraine war is fundamentally a European problem, and it is therefore logically appropriate for Europe to bear the full financial burden of supporting Ukraine.
Throughout 2025, Trump’s supporters actively promoted this narrative through the media, arguing that the United States should not assist Ukraine and that the war is Europe’s responsibility. Given current conditions, it appears highly unlikely that the U.S. administration will reverse course in 2026 and agree to shoulder a substantial portion of the costs of supporting Ukraine.
Although EU member states continue to emphasize solidarity with Ukraine, they show little willingness to dramatically increase the scale of assistance. Expanding support would require either cuts to social welfare spending or tax increases, measures that European governments are reluctant to adopt.
There has been growing discussion of rearmament in Germany and other European countries. While rearmament is not impossible in the long term, at present Europe does not appear to possess a sufficiently acute sense of crisis to undertake such efforts at the necessary scale. -
Ukraine’s deteriorating situation, the Trump administration’s reluctance to provide support, and Europe’s indecision have further strengthened the Russian leadership’s conviction that “time is on Russia’s side.” Moscow believes that Ukraine will soon begin to yield under Russian pressure. Although the pace of Russian military advances remains slow, Russia expects Ukrainian defensive lines to weaken significantly in 2026, enabling a marked acceleration of offensive operations. Russia also anticipates that worsening economic conditions and deepening war fatigue among the Ukrainian population will trigger a political crisis in Kyiv. Under such circumstances, Moscow believes Ukraine will be forced to accept Russian terms and sign a peace agreement.
At present, the Russian leadership no longer seeks to dominate all of Ukraine or install a pro-Russian puppet government in Kyiv. Events of recent years have demonstrated that such objectives are unattainable.
Russia’s current war aims can be summarized as follows. Although achieving all of these goals may be difficult, Moscow believes that ending the war will be impossible if it fails to secure at least some of them.
- Formal recognition of Russian control over Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk. Russia will demand that Ukraine officially recognize Russian sovereignty over these territories and, if possible, will seek some form of international recognition as well.
- Potential further annexation of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. If the military situation develops favorably, Russia will seek the formal incorporation of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia into the Russian Federation.
- Restrictions on Ukraine’s military capabilities and prohibition of NATO membership. Russia will demand limits on the size of Ukraine’s armed forces and the types of weapons it may possess, as well as explicit, legally binding guarantees prohibiting Ukraine’s accession to NATO.
- Conclusion of a permanent peace treaty. Russia seeks not a temporary ceasefire but a peace treaty that permanently and irreversibly fixes territorial changes.
Recently, negotiations between Russia and the United States regarding a potential Ukraine peace agreement have intensified. In particular, the currently discussed “28-point plan,” according to leaked documents, appears to have been drafted by the Russian side and partially revised by the Trump administration. Nevertheless, given current conditions, the likelihood of a peace agreement being concluded within the next few months remains low. Moscow appears to have proposed the plan primarily to maintain contact with the Trump administration.
Substantive negotiations are more likely to begin only after Russia conducts winter military operations aimed at destroying Ukraine’s energy system, potentially in the spring of 2026. Moscow expects such operations to weaken the resolve of Ukraine’s leadership. Russian officials also anticipate that a major corruption scandal in Kyiv in November, implicating close associates of President Zelensky, will further exacerbate political instability within Ukraine. -
There are three plausible scenarios for how the Russia–Ukraine war could evolve in 2026.
- Scenario 1: An agreement to end major combat is reached in 2026. The likelihood of this scenario appears fairly high, and has been rising in recent months. Contributing factors include: (1) sustained diplomatic activity by the Trump administration; (2) Washington’s willingness to pressure Ukraine while refraining from providing additional military and financial assistance; and (3) the fact that EU states are not prepared to dramatically increase support to a level that would compensate for a U.S. cutoff.
- Scenario 2: The war continues. In this scenario, Russian forces would keep pressuring Ukraine while seizing additional territory, and Ukrainian forces would likely retreat gradually. Russia’s advance would probably remain slow overall. That said, a catastrophic collapse of the Ukrainian front—analogous to the German front’s breakdown at the end of World War I in 1918, which led to Germany’s surrender—cannot be completely ruled out. However, the probability of such a total collapse is low.
- Scenario 3: Ukraine successfully holds the line and may even counterattack. This scenario would become realistic only if foreign assistance rises sharply to several times its current level. At present, the likelihood of this scenario appears extremely low.
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From the standpoint of South Korea’s national interests, the following considerations are important.
- A peace agreement in 2026 is relatively plausible, but it remains possible that fighting continues for another 1–2 years.
- Over the long term, the battlefield trajectory favors Russia, and the war is likely to end in a Russian victory. However, given Russia’s limited capacity to control all of Ukraine, the most realistic outcome would be annexation of some territory and partial constraints on Ukrainian sovereignty.
- After the war ends, the Trump administration will likely pursue normalization of relations with Russia. While there are ideological factors, the more important driver will be Washington’s interest in preventing deeper Russia–China alignment.
On the one hand, Russia’s actions have shaken the international order and will be recorded as a dangerous precedent. Most EU countries that maintain close relations with South Korea view Russia’s conduct as a direct challenge to themselves. If they conclude that South Korea is leaning pro-Russian, ROK–EU relations could suffer.
On the other hand, the international community has failed to demonstrate meaningful solidarity with Ukraine in practical terms, and the United States in particular appears to be prioritizing the restoration of relations with Russia. In this context, adopting an excessively hardline position toward Russia offers limited benefits and may instead harm South Korea’s economic and political interests.
Contrary to early expectations at the start of the war in 2022, it is now clear that Russia will not remain permanently isolated from the international community. Accordingly, restoring relations with Russia will likely become a near-term task for South Korean diplomacy. Seoul should begin preparing for this, but must do so in a way that does not damage relations with the United States or the EU. If the pace of rapprochement is too fast, it could be perceived as a challenge to democratic states—especially European countries.
Russia–North Korea relations are another obstacle to improving ROK–Russia ties. However, an end to the war—the basic condition for any improvement in ROK–Russia relations—could also weaken Russia–North Korea ties relatively quickly. Russia may still support North Korea in international forums and may seek to import North Korean labor, but military cooperation is likely to diminish significantly.
Once the war ends, Ukraine will begin large-scale recovery and reconstruction projects. This could present major opportunities for Korean companies, especially in construction. Ukraine may remain a risky investment environment after the war, but if reconstruction is backed by the EU, the United States, and international institutions, Korean firms could operate more safely. For this reason, it is necessary to maintain working-level contacts with the Ukrainian government and businesses starting now. Even if the war ends in Ukrainian defeat, that defeat is unlikely to mean a total state collapse, and a significant portion of the current political and economic elite is likely to remain in place.
| Historical Background
| Crimea’s Annexation and Pro-Russian Separatism in Eastern Ukraine
| The Russia–Ukraine War
| Russia’s Domestic Political Situation: Economic Stability
| Political Stability
| Ukraine’s Situation: Heavy Dependence on External Support
| Donald Trump’s Position
| Moscow’s Expectations
| Outlook for 2026
| Implications for South Korea: Outlook of the War and Policy Recommendations
※ The contents published on 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institue
