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Alliance First Approach for Pragmatism and Self-Reliance |
| June 26, 2025 |
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Bee Yun JoResearch Fellow, Sejong Institute | bjo87@sejong.org
- As North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats are growing day by day, the ROK-U.S. alliance, the core pillar of deterrence against the North, is facing a critical turning point amid the transactional alliance perspective of Trump’s second term and the unprecedented closeness between North Korea and Russia. The revival of the North Korea-Russia alliance not only involves Russia’s transfer of key technologies to North Korea and military training through troop deployments to the Russo-Ukrainian war, but also, from the perspective of deterrence, leaves open the possibility of Russian intervention in the event of a contingency on the Korean Peninsula, which means that the credibility and implementation of the security guarantees and extended deterrence commitments provided by the United States to South Korea could be undermined. In addition, as symbolized by the renewed debate over the reduction of U.S. Forces in Korea, Trump’s second term is likely to demand posture adjustments for expanding the strategic flexibility of U.S. forces in Korea and for transferring wartime operational control, ultimately requiring South Korea to establish its own defense posture against North Korea’s threats1) , and if such measures lead to a “loosened alliance,” they could result in significant vulnerabilities in terms of deterrence against the North. China may also seize this opportunity to take additional measures to expand its influence over the Korean Peninsula, such as pushing for the internalization of the Yellow Sea. In this situation, in order to explore South Korea’s response direction, this paper seeks to emphasize the continued necessity of alliance-first. Within South Korea, dichotomous approaches such as “alliance” versus “improving relations with China,” “alliance” versus “self-reliance,” and “pressure” versus “engagement/dialogue” with North Korea continue to exist, and in the context of the launch of a new administration, various alternative discussions are also taking place in terms of “pragmatism” and “balance.” However, in whatever form, a “loosened alliance” cannot be an alternative in South Korea’s security environment; rather, what is required is pragmatism and self-reliance through the alliance. This paper highlights the recent adjustments of U.S. Forces in Korea (role changes, strategic flexibility) as a major case of the ROK-U.S. alliance in transition, and focuses on presenting South Korea’s response options.
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1. The Possibility of Alliance Loosening Triggered by Trump
The Trump administration, while reaffirming the “ironclad” ROK-U.S. alliance (Secretary of State Marco Rubio) and the alliance’s ability to “continue to thrive” at the launch of the new government2) , is accelerating preparations to shift the role of U.S. Forces Korea from the defense of the Korean Peninsula to maintaining stability in the Indo-Pacific region. The “Interim National Defense Guidance,” which serves as the foundation of the Trump administration’s second National Defense Strategy (NDS) scheduled for publication in August 2025, is reported to specify deterring China’s invasion of Taiwan and defending the U.S. homeland as top priorities, while delegating threats such as North Korea to allies. This strategic orientation appears to be leading to an overall review and adjustment of the U.S. posture in the Indo-Pacific region, including U.S. Forces Korea. For example, according to a Wall Street Journal (WSJ) report on May 23, 2025, it has been revealed that the United States is considering a reduction of 4,500 U.S. troops stationed in Korea.3) In addition, Robert Peters, Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, who was involved in drafting “Project 2025” known as the blueprint for Trump’s foreign and security policy, argued in a recent study that all regional unified commands must develop plans to prepare for a contingency involving China.4)
Furthermore, the issue of strategic flexibility for U.S. Forces Korea cannot be ruled out as being linked to the long-stalled transition of wartime operational control (OPCON). Many experts predict that in order to change the role of U.S. Forces Korea, the United States may demand an early transition of OPCON and the establishment of a defense posture led by South Korea. 5) In fact, at the 26th Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD) held in Washington, D.C. on May 1–2, 2025, the two allies reaffirmed their joint commitment to systematically and stably promote a “conditions-based OPCON transition” while accelerating South Korea’s capability development.6) Although the Guidelines for Combined Defense after OPCON Transition agreed upon by the two sides in 2018 stipulate the continued stationing of U.S. Forces Korea after the transition, the scale of deployment could be sufficiently reduced depending on the nature of U.S. regional posture adjustments, and the fact that the agreement lacks legal binding force could further heighten uncertainty.
In addition to U.S. posture adjustments in the Indo-Pacific, pressure regarding defense cost-sharing is also likely to intensify. On April 2, 2025, President Trump imposed a 25% reciprocal tariff on South Korea, and during a call with Acting President Han Duck-soo on April 8, he reportedly proposed a so-called “one-stop shopping” approach linking tariffs and the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) on defense cost-sharing. This means that issues such as expanded imports of U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG), shipbuilding, and joint investment in the Alaska gas pipeline would be addressed together as a package with tariffs and defense cost-sharing. Although a 90-day grace period for the U.S. reciprocal tariff measures was secured through the 2+2 Finance and Trade Ministers’ Meeting held in Washington on April 22, a “package deal” must be designed by the expiration of the grace period on July 8. Against this backdrop, President Trump has recently demanded that Asian allies, including South Korea, increase their defense spending to 5% of GDP. Issues such as the adjustment or reduction of U.S. Forces in Korea, the OPCON transition, and defense budget increases are highly likely, from the U.S. perspective, to serve as means of simultaneously pressing for a more favorable package deal and adding a leading role for South Korea in the defense of the Korean Peninsula while adjusting the posture of U.S. Forces Korea.
2. The Structural Limits of “Pragmatism and Balanced Diplomacy Centered on National Interest”
Against this backdrop, “pragmatic diplomacy centered on national interest” has been emphasized domestically with the launch of the new administration.7) As its core line of “national-interest-centered pragmatic diplomacy that opens the future,” the Lee Jae-myung government has presented a foreign policy direction of strengthening Korea-U.S.-Japan cooperation based on a solid ROK-U.S.8) alliance while also managing relations with neighboring countries. In particular, regarding China, it declared that China is “an important trading partner and a country that affects security on the Korean Peninsula” and that it will “stably manage the ROK-China relationship, which had deteriorated to its worst state under the previous government.” Concerning Japan, it stated that “historical and territorial issues will be dealt with in principle, while social, cultural, and economic areas will be approached constructively and with a future-oriented perspective,” and with respect to Russia, it announced that relations will be handled “from the perspective of prioritizing national interest.” Wi Sung-lac, who has served as National Security Advisor since Lee’s candidacy, explained to the press that “the emphasis is on the ROK-U.S. alliance, the Korea-Japan partnership, and ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation, and based on this axis, other countries will also be managed.” Considering his past comment that “if the U.S. pulls us toward 3 o’clock and China toward 9 o’clock, we should be around 1:30,” the Lee Jae-myung administration’s “pragmatic diplomacy centered on national interest” can be said to pursue a certain degree of “balance” within Korea’s alliance-focused foreign and security policy direction.
More specifically, under the immediate reality of Trump’s second term, the Lee government’s foreign and security policy seems to pursue three main objectives. First, it seeks to ease the North Korean threat and reduce military tensions on the Korean Peninsula through peace and dialogue. Even if deterrence against the North may be partially shaken in the course of alliance adjustments, the aim is to create an atmosphere of peace by addressing the root cause of the threat environment through dialogue with North Korea. Second, it seeks to secure strategic space for a pragmatic, national-interest-centered approach in the midst of U.S.-China competition. The calculation is that the more military tensions on the Korean Peninsula are reduced, the more South Korea can adopt a gradual and systematic approach toward U.S. demands. Third, it seeks to secure South Korea’s comprehensive deterrence capabilities by turning U.S. requests for greater burden-sharing into an opportunity. President Lee’s campaign pledges explicitly included “securing comprehensive deterrence capabilities based on a solid ROK-U.S. alliance,” specifying “enhancing the performance of Korea’s ballistic missiles and advancing the Korean-style missile defense system,” as well as “pursuing the transfer of wartime operational control on the basis of the ROK-U.S. alliance.9)
However, South Korea’s foreign and security environment needs to be carefully examined from the following perspectives. First, the possibility of creating peace with North Korea is highly uncertain. In its 2024 constitutional revision and Supreme People’s Assembly speech, North Korea officially codified a “two-state theory” that designated South Korea as “hostile.” Moreover, through the revival of the North Korea-Russia alliance, Pyongyang has not only secured economic revenue by supplying shells and missiles to the Russo-Ukrainian war, but also gained technological support for satellites and missiles, and acquired battlefield confidence through combat experience from troop deployments. Under this North Korea-Russia alignment, North Korea has consolidated the fait accompli of its nuclear status, diversified its nuclear deterrent including maritime-based capabilities (first- and second-strike options), and strengthened its operational capabilities and technologies, while rejecting Trump’s repeated attempts to send personal letters.10) From Pyongyang’s perspective, dialogue with the U.S. or South Korea, which would inevitably entail the “trap of denuclearization,” has lost its strategic incentives. Furthermore, the recent U.S. airstrike on Iran is more likely to push North Korea toward strengthening its military alliance with Russia and improving ties with China rather than bringing it to the negotiating table. As a result, instead of the resumption of substantive dialogue, what is more likely to become entrenched is nuclear coercion, military provocations, or non-response from the North.
Second, the acceptability of South Korea’s pragmatic and balanced approach under Trump’s second term is expected to be very low. For example, although the White House confirmed in response to President Lee’s election that “the alliance between the U.S. and South Korea remains ironclad” 11) and assessed that the election was “free and fair,” it simultaneously issued an unusual message of restraint against China, stating that “the United States continues to express concern and opposition to China’s interference and influence over democratic countries around the world.” 12) Furthermore, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, in his May 31, 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue speech, declared that the threat from China is imminent, and warned that “many countries are tempted to pursue both economic cooperation with China and defense cooperation with the United States,” but that this would mean falling into China’s trap—effectively delivering a warning against the so-called “security with the U.S., economy with China” approach.13) Steve Bannon, who served as Trump’s strategist during his first term, also recently stressed in an interview with The Chosun Ilbo that President Lee’s notion of pragmatic diplomacy is “full of shit,” bluntly arguing that Korea’s balancing between the U.S. and China is impossible.14) If the U.S. pulls Korea to 3 o’clock and China to 9 o’clock, the degree of “balance” acceptable to the U.S. in Trump’s second term may not be around 1:30, as Wi Sung-lac once described, but rather much closer to 2:30 or even further.
Third, securing South Korea’s comprehensive deterrence capabilities through balancing in the alliance is virtually impossible. At a U.S. House Appropriations Subcommittee hearing on the FY2026 defense budget, Secretary of Defense Hegseth explained the Department of Defense’s response to the China threat, listing cooperation with Australia, India, Japan, and the Philippines along the First Island Chain in order. 15) While this was likely because there is no substantive cooperation with South Korea in deterring China, the fact that he did not mention South Korea even once (and only mentioned North Korea once) throughout his entire remarks on the FY2026 defense budget symbolically shows the extent of U.S. focus on the China threat. As noted earlier, the likelihood that the U.S. will respond positively to South Korea’s “security with the U.S., economy with China” approach remains extremely low. -
1. Possibility of Adjustments to U.S. Forces Korea
Under Trump’s second term, scenarios for the adjustment or reduction of U.S. Forces Korea can be broadly summarized into three categories. First is the possibility of adjusting the Stryker Brigade Combat Team under the Eighth Army’s ground forces. In May 2025, The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) was the first to report the possibility of a withdrawal of 4,500 troops from U.S. Forces Korea, projecting that the 4,500-strong Stryker Brigade Combat Team, which has been rotationally deployed every nine months since 2022, could be redeployed to Guam and bases in the Indo-Pacific region. On May 17 and 18, 2025, The New York Times (NYT) also reported on the possibility of the withdrawal of the ground force Stryker Brigade Combat Team. However, it pointed instead to the U.S. southern border rather than another part of the Indo-Pacific, reporting that President Trump was revising Army regulations to allow the Army to perform domestic law enforcement missions to strengthen surveillance against illegal immigration and drug cartels at the southern border, and projecting that the Stryker Brigade Combat Team scheduled for rotation to Korea might remain at the border, effectively resulting in a partial reduction.16)
Second, the possibility of adjusting part of the air power (Seventh Air Force) is also evident. The A-10 Thunderbolt attack aircraft (Osan), which has been in operation, is scheduled to retire in September 2025, and after retirement, about half of the squadron members will be reassigned to other modernized aircraft or redeployed to operate A-10s in the U.S. mainland.17) In addition, the F-16 fighters, the main force of the Seventh Air Force previously dispersed between Osan and Gunsan, have been consolidated at Osan since July 2024. By October 2025, all F-16s from Gunsan will be relocated, reorganizing into two super squadrons with a total of 62 F-16s.18) Instead, the U.S. is reviewing a plan to permanently station one squadron of F-35As (about 20 aircraft) in Gunsan and rotationally deploy another squadron.19)
Third, more comprehensive adjustments cannot be ruled out. Broadening the perspective to the Indo-Pacific, the United States is modernizing major bases along the First and Second Island Chains. If the expansion of flexibility for U.S. Forces Korea is limited, units such as the rotationally deployed Stryker Brigade Combat Team and air squadrons mentioned above could be partially redeployed outside the Korean Peninsula, and once relocated, the proportion of forces rotationally deployed back to the Peninsula could be significantly increased. Of course, in terms of strengthening U.S. Forces Korea’s role vis-à-vis China, as emphasized by Deputy Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby, ground forces required for initial ground combat could be reduced, while medium- and long-range air and missile defense assets could be reinforced. However, considering the structural environment facing the United States, including defense budget cuts and crises in the Middle East, the additional deployment of such new strategic assets may be carried out on a rotational basis. Moreover, in order to avoid escalating regional crises caused by permanent deployments, there remains the possibility of gradually or fully expanding the medium- and long-range assets of U.S. Forces Korea through rotational deployments. Under President Trump’s “Golden Dome” plan, there could also be demands for additional deployment of THAAD and for strengthening the integration of the missile defense network. Given that during the Biden administration there had already been discussions about rebuilding and modernizing nuclear storage facilities on the Korean Peninsula to enable the temporary or rotational deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, the deployment of means beyond conventional assets cannot be ruled out.20)
2. Implications for South Korea
The above-mentioned adjustments carry the following implications for South Korea. First, U.S. Forces Korea would be reorganized primarily around air power. The Stryker vehicles, which are subject to reduction and adjustment, are 25-ton, eight-wheeled armored vehicles that can carry 11 personnel and are equipped with large rubber tires, enabling them to travel at speeds of over 97 km/h. 21) If the mobile Stryker force is withdrawn, the core assets of the Eighth Army would consist mainly of Apache attack helicopters, artillery, missile defense systems, and reconnaissance aircraft. This implies that in the event of a contingency, much of the initial ground battle would be delegated to South Korea. Such a trend is also evident in the process of replacing the A-10 attack aircraft. The A-10, designed for close air support (CAS), has primarily been used for tactical support of ground units, especially for striking armored units. Its main mission has been to perform the “tank killer” role with its 30mm cannon rounds and missiles, and it has been operated mainly with North Korea’s large ground forces in mind.
However, this trend is not in fact new. Before the rotational deployment of Stryker units began in 2022, armored brigades equipped with M1 tanks and other heavy weapons had been rotationally deployed from 2015 to 2022. In the past, an armored brigade possessed about 80 M1 tanks. In addition, before 2015, the 1st Brigade of the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division was permanently stationed as the core combat unit of U.S. ground forces in Korea, but this was adjusted under the rotational deployment policy. In other words, U.S. efforts to secure flexibility have been a gradual yet continuous phenomenon since the 2000s, and if the Stryker Brigade Combat Team is also reduced, the shift in the role of U.S. Forces Korea toward an air-power-oriented posture could accelerate further.
Second, the operational range of U.S. Forces Korea’s assets is expected to expand overall. As noted, the United States plans to replace the gap left by the A-10 with F-16s and F-35s. The F-35, with its stealth capabilities, offers greater survivability on the battlefield than the A-10 and F-16, as well as the ability to strike key facilities preemptively without detection. Equipped with EA and EO/IR sensors, it can also carry out electronic warfare and reconnaissance missions, making it more versatile than the F-16. At the same time, the F-35 has 2.5 times the fuel capacity and 1.5 times the operational range of the F-16, making it a medium- to long-range asset that expands operational coverage. The Seventh Air Force has stated that its F-16 super squadrons aim to “integrate aircraft and personnel to enhance combat power and maximize operational capabilities,” 22) which effectively shortens the strike distance to North Korea by more than 100 km (for example, Gunsan–Kaesong at Mach 2 in 5 minutes 20 seconds; Osan–Kaesong at Mach 2 in 2 minutes 30 seconds), while also shortening the distance to China.
From the perspective of deterrence against North Korea, these changes in U.S. Forces Korea carry strategic implications for the ROK-U.S. alliance as a whole. Even gradual changes, if pushed unilaterally, could critically weaken U.S. deterrence not only against North Korea but also against China. For South Korea, which has relied on U.S. extended deterrence commitments and combined readiness with U.S. Forces Korea, this would mean a weakening of “comprehensive deterrence.” South Korea must fill this gap, but independent efforts to secure “comprehensive deterrence” without allied support are in reality insufficient to deter North Korea, which has consolidated its nuclear capabilities and strengthened its alliance with Russia, and such capabilities cannot be secured in the short term. The remainder of this paper presents South Korea’s possible response directions. -
1. Strategic Synchronization with the United States and Message Management
Ham Hyung-pil, Director of the Center for Security Strategy at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, suggested at the 5th Sejong Special Policy Forum hosted by the Sejong Institute on June 12, 2025, that in order to prevent a deterrence gap against North Korea under the trend of alliance restructuring in Trump’s second term, active coordination between South Korea and the United States on joint threat perception and strategic objectives is required. While full-scale “strategic integration” that completely accepts U.S. demands such as expanding the flexibility of U.S. Forces Korea may be limited when considering Korea’s core interests, he pointed out the need for a level of “strategic synchronization.” 23) This paper likewise argues that, in order to prevent radical measures such as a full-scale reduction of U.S. Forces Korea under Trump’s second term, close consultation and communication are needed to secure reinforcement forces capable of filling the gaps created by changes in U.S. Forces Korea. Message management through an alliance-first approach is more important than ever, with deterrence against North Korea as the top priority.
Furthermore, under Trump’s second term, the issue of expanding the strategic flexibility of U.S. Forces Korea is in fact highly likely. The United States is prioritizing deterrence against China while simultaneously facing the protracted wars in the Middle East and Russia-Ukraine. In this situation, where the U.S. security environment is becoming much more complex and multi-layered, the credibility of U.S. security commitments to allies and the nuclear umbrella will be under even greater strain. For South Korea, while giving top priority to its role centered on the Korean Peninsula, a certain degree of synchronization with U.S. regional initiatives will be required in order to deter provocations from adversaries stemming from the weakening of U.S. commitment and the erosion of confidence in the nuclear umbrella.
2. Strengthening Cooperation for ROK-U.S. Extended Deterrence: New Transition at Level of CNI
The transitional phase of the ROK-U.S. alliance should be seized as an opportunity to strengthen Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) between the two allies. Since the 2023 Washington Declaration and the launch of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), the ROK and the U.S. have sought to enhance the integration of U.S. nuclear forces and allied conventional forces as a means of bolstering deterrence against North Korea. In particular, South Korea has sought to clarify its conventional role under U.S. nuclear strategy in order to more firmly secure from the United States a security commitment encompassing “all means, including nuclear weapons.” Within this CNI framework, South Korea should demand the “continuity” of U.S. extended deterrence commitments in the face of partial reductions of U.S. Forces Korea or the retirement of outdated platforms, while seeking new forms of assurance measures. For instance, it is important to reaffirm a declaratory policy that if North Korea uses nuclear weapons, nuclear-armed America will employ the “full range of U.S. capabilities” to “bring an end to the Kim regime,” to ensure the continued operation of extended deterrence consultative bodies such as the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG) and the Nuclear Consultative Group, and to guarantee the regularity of combined training and exercises.
From the perspective of allied capabilities, reductions or adjustments in U.S. Forces Korea should be approached as opportunities to acquire new strategic assets. The F-35A, which is being pursued as a replacement for the A-10 attack aircraft, could serve as a platform for tactical nuclear missions (Dual-Capable Aircraft, DCA) usable as a stepwise or emergency response means for deterrence against North Korea—thus opening the possibility of discussing its role as a platform capable of operating and carrying U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. Flexible rotational deployment of tactical nuclear weapons and South Korea’s participation in DCA missions could be considered as the next stage in alliance restructuring. In addition, the F-16 super squadrons currently being advanced by the United States aim at integrated operation of aircraft and personnel for the execution of high-intensity operations, reflecting a new U.S. approach to maximizing mobility. These measures already appear to be exerting an effective deterrent effect against North Korea: on May 1, 2025, Rodong Sinmun strongly protested the establishment of the first super squadron, calling it a “dangerous military action for preemptive attack.” Missile defense, too, may serve as a crucial instrument of ROK-U.S. extended deterrence and CNI. As confirmed in the recent Israel-Iran conflict, missile defense is not only a means of denial deterrence but also a key tool for damage limitation and for ensuring resilience and survivability in the event that deterrence fails.
3. Building a ROK-led Combined Defense Posture and Self-Reliance
Finally, changes in U.S. Forces Korea and the structural transformation of the ROK-U.S. alliance should be implemented as a positive external shock to fundamentally reconfigure the combined defense posture of the alliance and South Korea’s overall defense readiness. As U.S. Forces Korea becomes “lightened” and shifts toward an air-centered structure, South Korea must increase its defense budget to an appropriate level while demanding from the United States rapid technology transfers and weapons acquisitions, so that the ROK military can expand its own capabilities and build a combined defense posture led by South Korea in areas such as ISR and missile defense. Furthermore, the issues of an early transfer of wartime operational control and the expansion of the strategic flexibility of U.S. Forces Korea are also linked to the reorganization of U.S. Forces in Japan. For example, under Trump’s second term, amid the trend of reducing four-star generals, discussions are reportedly underway on a plan to downgrade the future Combined Forces Command deputy commander to a U.S. three-star general, while a U.S. four-star general would concurrently serve as both UN Commander and Commander of U.S. Forces Japan. After the transfer of OPCON, close consultations between South Korea and the United States on the future Combined Forces Command and institutional preparations to guarantee South Korea’s ability to conduct theater-level operations in a leading role will be required. A redefinition of the role of South Korea’s Strategic Command and an acceleration of defense innovation are also necessary.
The United States under President Trump is not the same as the America we once knew. It is no longer a benevolent hegemon pursuing liberal internationalism familiar to us. Yet in an anarchic world defined by a war of all against all, South Korea cannot demand complete morality from the United States, the ally on which it has depended. In the context of the risk of alliance neglect under Trump’s second term, North Korea’s advancement of nuclear and missile capabilities, combat experience gained through the war in Ukraine, and the renewed strengthening of the North Korea-Russia alliance, it is urgent for South Korea to pursue strategic synchronization with changes in the alliance in order to sustain deterrence against the North, its core national interest. Considering the structural reality that self-reliance, as increasingly advocated domestically, cannot be achieved in the short term, the foremost task facing the current South Korean government is to ensure that the transition of the alliance does not lead to weakened deterrence against North Korea through alliance loosening, by strengthening cooperation with its long-standing ally, the United States, and actively persuading Washington of South Korea’s concerns and needs.
| Introduction
1) Elbridge Colby’s 2024 interview with Yonhap News and the U.S. “Interim Defense Strategic Guidance” reported in March 2025
| Possibility of a Loosened Alliance and South Korea’s Reality
2) Rubio, Marco. (2025. 6. 3.). “Election of Republic of Korea President Lee Jae-myung.” US Department of State.; KBS. (2025. 6. 11.). “State Dept.: US Confident Alliance with S. Korea will Thrive under Lee’s Leadership.”
3) The Wall Street Journal. (2025. 5. 23.). “U.S. Considers Withdrawing Thousands of Troops From South Korea.”
4) “Direct all geographic combatant commands to plan for a China contingency,” see, Peters, Robert. (2025. 6. 6.). “It’s Time To Restructure the U.S. Military’s Command Plan.” The Heritage Foundation.
5) 함형필. (2025. 6. 12.). “신정부의 한반도 안보정책 방향: 국방분야.” 제5차 세종특별정책포럼 (세종연구소 컨퍼런스룸, 서울).
6) 국방일보. (2025. 5. 7.). “한미, ‘북 완전한 비핵화’ 목표 재확인... 연합연습훈련 강화.”
7) 제21대 대통령선거 이재명 공약목록 중 4항 “[외교통상] 세계질서 변화에 실용적으로 대처하는 외교안보 강국을 만들겠습니다”의 이행방법 중.
8) KTV. (2025. 6. 5.). “한미동맹 기반 '실용외교'···한미일 협력도 강화.”
9) ” 제21대 대통령 선거 이재명 공약목록, 4항 중.
10) NK News. (2025. 6. 11.). “North Korea refusing to accept Trump letter aimed at restarting dialogue: Source.”
11) Rubio, Marco. (2025. 6. 3.). “Election of Republic of Korea President Lee Jae-myung.” US Department of State.
12) Reuters. (2025. 6. 4.). “White House Calls South Korea Election ‘Fair,’ Expresses Concern about Chinese Influence.”
13) “we know that many countries are tempted by the idea of seeking both economic cooperation with China and defense cooperation with the United States... But beware the leverage that the CCP seeks with that entanglement. Economic dependence on China only deepens their malign influence and complicates our defense decision space during times of tension.” US Department of Defense. (2025. 5. 31.). “Remarks by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth at the 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore (As Delivered).”“we know that many countries are tempted by the idea of seeking both economic cooperation with China and defense cooperation with the United States... But beware the leverage that the CCP seeks with that entanglement. Economic dependence on China only deepens their malign influence and complicates our defense decision space during times of tension.” US Department of Defense. (2025. 5. 31.). “Remarks by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth at the 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore (As Delivered).”
14) 조선일보. (2025. 6. 12.). “트럼프 책사 배넌 ‘美·中 균형 외교는 불가능… 주한미군 감축, 엄청난 실수될 것.”
15) Hegseth, Pete. (2025. 6. 10.). “FY26 Written Posture Statement.” US House Appropriations Committee.
| Prospects and Challenges of Expanding the Strategic Flexibility of U.S. Forces Korea
16) The New York Times. (2025. 5. 15.). “Trump’s Military Buildup at the Border Expands.”
17) 문화일보. (2025. 5. 10.). “9월 퇴역 앞둔 주한미군 ‘탱크킬러’ A-10기 일반에 마지막 고별인사…6년 만에 재개 오산에어파워데이.”
18) 연합뉴스. (2025. 4. 25.). “미 7공군, F-16 31대 보유 '슈퍼 비행대대' 오산에 2번째 창설.”
19) 연합뉴스. (2025. 4. 27.). “미군, 군산에 F-35A 상시배치 검토…F-16은 오산에 집중배치.”
20) NBR 1.5트랙 확장억제 워크샵 중. 2025년 4월 25일, 하와이 호놀룰루, 프리스와이키키 호텔.
21) The New York Times. (2025. 5. 15.). “Trump’s Military Buildup at the Border Expands.”
22) Seventh Air Force. (2025. 4. 24.). “Seventh Air Force to extend Super Squadron test for Second year, Expand scope.”
| Response Strategy: Alliance-First for Pragmatism and Self-Reliance
23) 조비연. (2025. 6. 16.). “제5차 세종특별정책포럼 회의보고서.” 세종연구소.
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