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Trump’s Golden Dome, Bush’s NMD, and ROK-U.S. Alliance |
| July 1, 2025 |
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Seong Whun CheonVisiting Research Fellow, Sejong Institute | dr.cheon@sejong.org
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Donald Trump, President of the United States, declared on May 20 that he would fully operate the "Golden Dome" during his term in office and appointed Gen. Michael Guetlein, Vice Chief of Space Operations, as the person in charge.1)
Trump said that he would deploy next-generation technologies, including space-based sensors and interceptor weapons, on land, at sea, and in space, to establish a system capable of shooting down missiles launched from the other side of the Earth or from space. He stated that he would complete the task begun by President Reagan 40 years ago—that is, to permanently end the missile threat to the U.S. mainland—and that he would also discuss it with Russian President Putin.
However, in the United States there are many skeptical views regarding the feasibility of the Golden Dome concept. The United States has spent $300 billion over the past 40 years building various missile defense systems, 2) but still remains limited to having interception systems in California and Alaska. The Golden Dome is expected to cost much more than the $175 billion (about 244 trillion won) proposed by Trump. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that it would require $542 billion over the next 20 years. Technically as well, establishing a system that can perfectly defend the mainland within four years is impossible, and it is expected to take at least 10 years.3) Nevertheless, Trump is expected to push ahead with making the Golden Dome his representative achievement, despite the economic burden, technological limitations, and domestic and international opposition. In response, China and Russia are openly opposing it, saying that it undermines strategic stability. 4) The Golden Dome may emerge as an important diplomatic issue and that the sparks could spread to our government.
The Golden Dome recalls President Bush’s “National Missile Defense” (NMD) of 2001. At that time, the Kim Dae-jung administration failed to respond carefully to the newly launched Bush administration’s NMD policy and suffered a major diplomatic ordeal. At the end of February 2001, the phrase “preservation and strengthening of the ABM Treaty” was inserted into the Korea-Russia joint statement, provoking a strong backlash from the Bush administration, which sought to abolish the ABM Treaty and establish NMD. 5) In the process of dealing with this issue, President Kim Dae-jung expressed regret twice during his visit to the United States in March of that year, and both the Minister and Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade were dismissed (the Minister on March 26th, the Vice Minister on April 2nd).
The newly inaugurated Lee Jae-myung administration should, on the basis of a thorough review of the circumstances at that time, carefully manage the Golden Dome issue so that it does not become a negative factor in the ROK–U.S. alliance. This article, apart from the technical problems inherent in the Golden Dome, intends to examine the implications of the U.S. president’s unconventional initiative at the alliance level and to avoid a recurrence of an incident like the NMD issue, which could have a negative impact on the ROK-U.S. alliance. -
The origin of the problem was Article 5 of the joint statement announced on February 27 by President Putin, who visited South Korea in late February 2001, and President Kim Dae-jung. 6)
The Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation agreed that the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (the ABM Treaty), concluded in 1972, is the cornerstone of strategic stability and an important foundation for international efforts on nuclear arms reduction and non-proliferation. Both sides expressed the hope for the early entry into force and full implementation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II), as well as the prompt conclusion of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty III (START III), while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty. In this context, the Republic of Korea welcomed the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II) by the Russian Federation.Reports in the New York Times that the South Korean government had openly sided with Russia on the NMD triggered the beginning of the so-called “NMD issue.” The New York Times reported that South Korea had expressed the strongest support for the ABM Treaty among America’s Asian allies, adding the interpretation that this was a move made in consideration of Russia and China, both of which had influence over North Korea. 7) At that time, the U.S. government expressed regret and raised objections through various channels. It was reported that the State Department immediately posed protest questions to the South Korean Embassy in the United States. 8) At the time, Representative Park Kwan-yong of the Hannara Party claimed that immediately after the announcement of the ROK-Russia joint statement, National Security Advisor Rice sent the following three points in a confidential protest document to Kim Ha-joong, Senior Secretary for Foreign Affairs and National Security. 9)- Is South Korea an ally of the United States?It was later revealed that behind Minister Lee Jung-bin’s announcement lay strong pressure from the United States. Torkel Patterson, NSC Senior Director, met with ROK minister to the U.S. Yu Myung-hwan in Washington and presented the following wording, requesting that it be announced. 10)
- While it is possible to express differences with the United States in multilateral meetings, it is very regrettable that in a bilateral relationship South Korea expressed agreement with an unfriendly country (Russia) on an aspect opposed to the United States
- In the long term, will South Korea maintain the ABM Treaty together with Russia?
As the issue spread, on March 2, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Lee Jung-bin announced the following three points as the government’s position.
- Today’s global security situation is different from the Cold War era, and therefore a new change in approach is required
- We trust President Bush’s leadership in pursuing and developing such new approaches
- We hope that the U.S. government will deal with this issue through sufficient consultation with allies and related countries in a way that promotes international peace and securityThe world today is fundamentally different from the Cold War era. Our approach to deterrence and defense also requires change. President Bush has strongly argued that the threat of weapons of mass destruction and missiles as their delivery means is increasing, and we trust President Bush’s leadership on this issue. Missile defense is an important element of such a response. We acknowledge that the United States is taking a proper stance on this point, and in particular, we recognize the need to deploy an effective missile defense system for our military and territorial defense.The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade quickly clarified that the wording of the Korea-Russia joint statement did not imply opposition to NMD and expressed a favorable position on NMD as a measure in anticipation of the Korea-U.S. summit on March 7. Following the summit, President Kim Dae-jung and President Bush jointly announced the following regarding NMD. 11)President Kim and President Bush agreed that the global security environment is fundamentally different from the Cold War era. With the emergence of new forms of threats, including the threat from weapons of mass destruction and missiles as delivery means, a new approach to deterrence and defense is required. The two leaders shared the recognition that addressing these threats requires a comprehensive strategy encompassing various measures, including active nonproliferation diplomacy, defense systems, and other related actions. The two leaders also agreed that it is important to consult with allies and other stakeholders regarding these measures, including missile defense, in order to strengthen global peace and security.At the press conference held after the summit, President Kim explained that the problematic phrase “preservation and strengthening of the ABM Treaty” in the Korea-Russia summit statement appeared in documents issued at various international meetings in which the United States participated, including the 6th NPT Review Conference in May 2000 and the G-8 Okinawa Summit joint statement in July, and clarified that this does not represent our opposition to NMD. 12) While the Russian side had proposed inserting wording opposing NMD into the joint statement, he explained that Korea opposed, and expressed regret over the misunderstanding.
President Kim’s expression of regret continued at a luncheon jointly hosted by the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) the following day. Regarding the NMD issue, President Kim responded as follows. 13)The government feels very “regretful” that such an issue arose. However, this does not mean that we took Russia’s side in opposing NMD. We immediately announced through a statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade that such a misunderstanding was not true. The Russian side strongly requested opposition to NMD, but we refused. We thought it would have been better if phrases regarding ballistic missile defense [ABM] had not been included in the [Korea-Russia] statement.As a result of the NMD issue that erupted at the end of February, the government issued expressions of regret four times. 14) On March 2, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade issued a statement; on March 6, Kim Ha-joong, the Senior Secretary for Foreign Affairs and National Security met with National Security Advisor Rice at the White House to explain and express regret; on March 7, President Kim expressed regret at the press conference following the summit; and on March 8, he expressed regret at the AEI luncheon. -
The NMD issue in the spring of 2001 was an incident that caused the newly inaugurated Bush administration to develop a negative perception of the Korean government. It was a mistake that could have been avoided if our government had been fully aware of the realities and issues of the U.S.-Russia strategic competition and had recognized that the Bush administration’s policies were significantly different from those of the previous Clinton administration. As a result, at the summit on March 8, 2001, President Bush called President Kim Dae-jung “this man,” sparking controversy, and riding this wave, the U.S.-Korea conflict over the North Korean nuclear issue is believed to have continued until the end of President Kim’s term.
Recognition of the Marked Policy Differences between Biden and Trump
The ABM Treaty “Preserve and Strengthen” phrase in the Korea-Russia joint statement appears in the agreement concluded by President Clinton and President Yeltsin in 1997. It was a compromise chosen by the Clinton administration, which sought to build a regional missile defense system within the framework of maintaining the ABM Treaty, while taking into account Russia’s position on preserving the ABM Treaty. The Kim Dae-jung administration may have assumed that it was acceptable because the phrase originated in the previous administration, but the problem was failing to understand the marked policy differences between Clinton and Bush. For Bush, who sought to build a defense system covering the entire United States beyond Clinton’s regional defense network, the Korea-Russia joint statement would have been perceived as a clear challenge and obstacle. The difference between Biden and Trump is much greater than that between Clinton and Bush in all aspects, including worldview, the role of the United States, and perspectives on national interests. Trump’s personal style and disposition are also significantly different from Biden’s. The goal of Trump and the MAGA supporters is to completely reform post-Cold War policies.
The Lee Jae-myung administration must design its diplomatic policy toward the United States based on the reality that the lines and guardrails the U.S. used to respect, considering the positions of its allies over the 70 years since the signing of the U.S.-Korea Mutual Defense Treaty, have disappeared. In Europe, countries such as Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, which had relied on U.S. security support since World War II, are striving to break free from dependence on the United States. While not severing the link of U.S. support, they focus on strengthening independent capabilities and enhancing intra-regional cooperation among neighboring countries. The new administration must not rely on the traditional perspectives and inertia that have governed U.S.-Korea relations. It must not expect the customary U.S. policies we have been accustomed to since the end of the Cold War. In response to the international order that causes tectonic shifts and the unprecedented, unconventional moves of the Trump administration, it is necessary to shift thinking and realize national interests based on new approaches.
Issues in the Construction of the Golden Dome and South Korea’s Response
If the new administration fails to respond wisely to the Golden Dome initiative, it is feared that the repercussions could be far greater than those of the NMD issue. The following differences between the Golden Dome and NMD illustrate the severity of the issue. First, in a situation where U.S.-China and U.S.-Russia strategic competition is intensifying, the interests of the U.S., which seeks to build a perfect defense system, and those of China and Russia, which are determined to block it, will clash far more sharply than in the case of NMD. Since Trump and both Putin and Xi may confront each other at stake not only strategically but also politically, the international situation could deteriorate significantly. Second, if the United States demands South Korea’s participation in the Golden Dome, the possibility of a second THAAD-like incident is high. South Korea experienced diplomatic turmoil over the THAAD deployment during the Park Geun-hye administration, and the Moon Jae-in administration was criticized for “humiliating diplomacy” by promising China the so-called ‘Three No’s and One Restriction.’15)
Third, North Korea is likely to intensify its critical offensive against South Korea in coordination with China and Russia. The three countries strongly oppose the Golden Dome because they fear it could neutralize their strategic nuclear capabilities, and they will seek to prevent South Korea’s participation as much as possible. Fourth, North Korea may use the Golden Dome as an opportunity to showcase the strengthened North Korea-Russia alliance. On June 4, Chairman Kim Jong-un met with Shoigu, Secretary of the Russian Security Council and close associate of Putin, and stated that he would “unconditionally support Russia’s positions and foreign policy on all serious international political issues, including the Ukraine issue.” Kim Jong-un is expected to criticize the Golden Dome while strengthening ties with Russia and simultaneously use it as a strategic move in preparation for future negotiations with the United States.
Response to the Golden Dome will become a core diplomatic task for the new administration. A meticulous response strategy must be prepared, taking into account the lessons of the past NMD issue, the acute international conflicts surrounding the Golden Dome, North Korea’s anticipated actions, and the experience of the THAAD incident. Fundamentally, it is necessary to recognize that today’s security situation in the new Cold War era is not substantially different from that of the past Cold War era. Just as it was impossible to side with the Soviet Union on security issues during the Cold War, it is in the national interest to respond in a manner that strengthens the ROK-U.S. alliance today. The government should express a principled willingness to support the Golden Dome to avoid diplomatic friction between South Korea and the United States. Furthermore, selective participation in areas where practical benefits can be obtained during the construction of the Golden Dome is also necessary. 16) To prevent South Korea’s participation in the Golden Dome from escalating into a second THAAD incident, the government must engage in careful diplomacy toward China and persuasive communication with the public. If the new administration establishes the principle of firmly responding to foreign interference in security matters while simultaneously explaining and persuading the public, it can gain the support of the majority of citizens.
Trump’s “Peace Through Strength” with an Emphasis on Peace
It is necessary to understand what the Trump administration’s foreign policy principle of “Peace Through Strength” is aiming at. President Trump’s unilateral style and harsh rhetoric can easily lead to the misunderstanding that the United States is wielding unchecked power over the world. However, in Peace Through Strength, the part Trump places emphasis on is peace. Trump repeatedly stresses that during his first administration the United States did not start a new war. Even though the second administration has declared that it will reduce overseas intervention and focus on domestic development, it has also claimed the role of mediator in conflict regions around the world. This stems from President Trump’s conviction that innocent lives must be spared and unnecessary wars must be ended. Within less than six months of his term, Trump has led peaceful resolutions of the Russia-Ukraine war, the Gaza war, the India-Pakistan conflict, and the Rwanda-Democratic Republic of Congo conflict, and has achieved certain results by conducting negotiations for hostage releases with Hamas and talks with the Houthi rebels. 17) Trump had demanded of Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to end the Gaza war and not to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities. 18) After Iran’s nuclear facilities were directly struck, Trump immediately led a ceasefire agreement. For Trump, the Golden Dome is not an offensive weapon targeting China and Russia, but a means for the safety and peace of the United States.
The new administration should fully support President Trump’s conviction regarding peace and his philosophy of ending wars that harm human lives, and it would be desirable to express willingness for South Korea to also participate in the Golden Dome initiative. Firm support for and alignment with the Trump’s philosophy and conviction could serve as an important opportunity to dispel concerns in some quarters of our society that ROK-U.S. relations might deteriorate under the new administration, and to earn the trust of the United States.
Preparation for North Korea·U.S. Nuclear Arms Reduction Negotiations
Trump’s philosophy of leaving force as the last resort while achieving peace through negotiations and deals also has negative aspects for us. It is highly possible that Trump will conduct nuclear arms reduction negotiations with North Korea, tie down North Korea’s nuclear capability at a certain level, and then declare that peace has been achieved. 19) If the long-range missile capability that threatens the U.S. mainland is eliminated, American public opinion will evaluate that Trump has safeguarded U.S. security. North Korea is also expected to regard the nuclear arms reduction proposal of Trump’s second administration as in effect recognizing its possession of nuclear weapons, and to come to the negotiating table. Considering North Korea’s stance of excluding South Korea and Trump’s tendency to prefer bilateral deals, it is highly likely that South Korea will be excluded from future negotiations. The greatest problem is that we have no independent cards with which to secure participation in nuclear negotiations. Rather than insisting that South Korea cannot be excluded, the government would be wise to obtain reciprocal concessions from the United States in return for allowing North Korea–U.S. negotiations. Securing a tactical nuclear balance that can proportionally respond to North Korea’s tactical nuclear capability would be the reasonable alternative.
1) 조준형, 트럼프 "우주기반 MD '골든돔' 재임 중 가동…레이건 과업 완수"(종합), 연합뉴스, 2025년 5월 21일.
2) W.J. Hennigan, “The reality of Trump’s Colden Dome,” New York Times, May 21, 2025.
3) Max Boot, “Trump should build millions of cheap drones, not Golden Dome,” Washington Post, May 28, 2025.
4) 전성훈, "전략적 안정(Strategic Stability)에 대한 미-러, 미-중 갈등과 정책적 시사점," 세종포커스, 2025년 5월 26일.
5) The Bush administration officially withdrew from the ABM Treaty on December 13, 2001. “U.S. Withdrawal From the ABM Treaty: President Bush’s Remarks and U.S. Diplomatic Notes,” Arms Control Association, January 2001.
| Spring 2001 NMD Issue
6) 한·러 공동성명 전문, 청와대 보도 자료, 2001년 2월 27일.
7) Patrick Tyler, “South Korea takes Russia’s side in dispute over U.S. missile defense plan,” New York Times, February 28, 2001.
8) 조선일보, 2001년 3월 2일.
9) 중앙일보 , 2001년 3월 14일
10) 한국일보, 2001년 6월 15일.
11) 한미 공동성명 전문, 청와대 보도 자료, 2001년 3월 8일.
12) Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Bush and President Kim Dae-Jung of South Korea (Washington, D.C.: The White House, March 7, 2001), p. 5.
13) 중앙일보, 2001년 3월 10일.
14) 조선일보, 2001년 3월 10일.
| Policy Implications and Considerations
15) ‘Three No’s and One Restriction’ Pledge consisted of: ①no additional THAAD deployment, ②no participation in the U.S. missile defense network, ③no trilateral military alliance among South Korea, the United States, and Japan, and ④restrictions on the operation of THAAD. Despite this pledge, it is reported that South Korea suffered damage amounting to 22.4 trillion won due to more than 43 types of economic retaliation from China. China is operating a massive early-warning radar base in Shandong Province, about 500 km from Seoul, which can detect not only the Korean Peninsula but also the Japanese archipelago.
16) 골든 돔이 초기 구상 단계이므로 아직 우리의 참여 문제가 제기되진 않았다. 그러나 세계미사일방어망 구축이라는 취지에서 볼 때, 동북아의 지정학 요충지인 한국은 참여를 요청받게 될 것이다. 이미 주한 미군 우주군이 2022년 12월 14일 오산에 창설되었다. 닛케이에 따르면 이시바 총리가 5월 트럼프 대통령과의 전화 통화에서 골든 돔 구상을 함께 추진하는 방안을 논의했다고 한다. “日, 트럼프의 '골든돔'에 협력 검토.. 관세협상의 카드로도 활용,” 조선일보, 2025년 6월 6일.
17) David Ignatius, “Trump the improviser has a head-spinning diplomatic week,” Washington Post, May 13, 2025.
18) "Trump to Netanyahu: 'The war is exhausting itself - finish it' - report," Jerusalem Post, June 10, 2025. Despite the final ultimatum, when the prospects for nuclear negotiations with Iran darkened, Trump directly struck three Iranian nuclear facilities on June 22.
19) 전성훈, "트럼프 행정부 2기의 북핵정책과 북·미 핵군축협상 전망," 세종포커스, 2024년 11월 7일.
※ The contents published on 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institue
