File
|
Israel’s Strategy of Preemptive Deterrence: A Warning for South Korea’s Security |
| July 29, 2025 |
-
Kwang Sup JooVisiting Research Fellow, Sejong Institute | myjohj1@naver.com
-
“Operation Rising Lion,” launched by Israel over a 12-day period beginning on June 13, 2025, is now regarded as a case that redefined the strategic boundaries of modern preemptive strike. Rather than a single aerial raid, the operation constituted a multi-layered campaign that struck a broad array of targets across Iran, including nuclear facilities, command structures, missile bases, drone operation centers, and air defense systems. In particular, during the middle phase of the operation, the United States Air Force carried out precision strikes against Iran’s underground nuclear facilities, a point that underscores the practical implementation of allied burden-sharing and operational integration.
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reportedly struck more than 1,200 targets, simultaneously neutralizing Iran’s nuclear program, ballistic missile, UAV capabilities, military leadership, and critical strategic infrastructure. High-value targets included the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and several nuclear scientists. Notably, the underground enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow were confirmed to have been destroyed by United States GBU-57 bunker buster bombs. As a result, Iran lost more than half of its inventory of 2,000 missiles, suffered heavy losses to its UAV bases, and experienced a sharp decline in its strategic retaliatory capacity.
In response, Iran launched more than 500 missiles and over 1,000 drones against Israel. However, Israel’s multi-layered missile defense network, comprising the Iron Dome (for short-range rockets and mortars), David’s Sling (for medium-range missiles and cruise missiles), Arrow (for long-range ballistic missiles), as well as electronic and laser-based defense systems, intercepted more than 99 percent of the incoming threats. Civilian casualties were limited, and no Israeli fighter aircraft were lost during the operation. Through this operation, Israel not only secured a meaningful degree of strategic operational freedom, but also presented a viable operational model for preemptive strikes against states on the verge of acquiring nuclear weapons.
This article examines the strategic conditions and decision-making processes that led Israel to undertake such a large-scale preemptive operation. It also analyzes the progression of the campaign, international responses, Iran’s countermeasures, and the military implications that may be drawn for South Korea. -
At the time immediately preceding the operation, Iran had acquired the technical capability to enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels (90 percent). Its nuclear facilities, distributed across Natanz, Fordow, Isfahan, and Arak, were operating continuously. Iran had systematically violated its transparency obligations by removing IAEA surveillance cameras and obstructing inspector access. Particularly, in April 2025, the IAEA Board of Governors officially adopted a resolution declaring that Iran had committed a serious breach of its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which triggered full-scale discussions within the international community about possible military responses.
Indicators of nuclear weaponization were also observed in the structural features and personnel arrangements of Iran’s nuclear facilities. The underground enrichment facility at Fordow was constructed more than 80 meters beneath a mountainous area and was fortified with a triple-layer wall system and radiation shielding. The facility was reportedly operating over 5,000 high-speed centrifuges, and nuclear physics experiments, assumed to be related to warhead development, were said to be underway in parallel. At Natanz, a clandestine production line suspected of manufacturing metallic fuel plates suitable for weaponization appeared to be in operation. In addition, signs emerged that several nuclear physicists previously involved in Iran’s nuclear development had returned to active duty.
Simultaneously, Iran rapidly expanded its conventional strategic arsenal alongside its nuclear program. Solid-fueled medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), mounted on mobile Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) systems, significantly shortened launch preparation time. In addition, Iran domestically produced thousands of Shahed-136, Paveh, and Ababil series drones, thereby acquiring the capacity for large-scale deployment of offensive UAVs. These developments were seen as a decisive indicator of Iran’s enhanced strategic deterrence, deliberately placing maximum strain on Israel’s existing air defense systems.
The turning point at which Israel came to perceive the threat as an “existential threat” lay in the fact that Iran was in the process of completing a threat structure that integrated nuclear and conventional capabilities. Although it had not officially declared the possession of nuclear weapons, Iran had acquired the means to exercise strategic deterrence on the basis of a credible retaliatory capability. In particular, by securing precision strike capabilities through missiles and drones in addition to its nuclear program, Iran established the conditions for the effective realization of deterrent effects. Iran’s strategy was evolving into an “unofficial nuclear weapons state model,” whereby it benefited from the effects of nuclear possession without a formal declaration, fundamentally unsettling Israel’s security conception.
Furthermore, during the “Operation Swords of Iron” conducted from late 2024 to the first half of 2025, Iran’s proxy forces, including Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthi rebels, were extensively neutralized, which in turn substantially reduced the risk of external retaliation against Israel. These regional conditions lowered Israel’s cost of action, and in the course of its strategic dialogue with the United States, the recognition that “time itself is a strategic asset” emerged as a critical factor pressing for the initiation of the operation. Moreover, the fact that these proxies had suffered severe losses and been effectively incapacitated over the preceding year of the “Operation Swords of Iron” further contributed to lowering Israel’s cost of action. -
“Operation Rising Lion” was a high-intensity, integrated operation jointly executed by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the United States Air Force, involving multi-axis strikes on strategically significant targets. Rather than a conventional bombing raid, the operation was a multidomain campaign combining intelligence, cyber, air, and space capabilities in a coordinated manner.
The operation was carried out in three main phases. Phase One focused on the precise destruction of key facilities. Major uranium enrichment sites located 80 to 120 meters underground, such as Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan, were struck using large bunker-busting munitions like the GBU-57, deployed from U.S. B-2 bombers, while surrounding air defense systems were neutralized in advance by Israeli stealth aircraft and electronic warfare assets. Simultaneously, cyberattacks disrupted power grids and surveillance systems, creating an “electronic blackout” environment.
Phase Two aimed to neutralize Iran’s missile and UAV launch capabilities. Precision strikes were carried out against mobile ballistic missile bases (TELs), UAV control centers, and command and communication nodes located in Iran’s interior, including Dezful, Yazd, Kermanshah, and Mashhad. Suicide drones, stealth aircraft, and high-altitude long-range cruise missiles were deployed in a layered manner, while reconnaissance satellites enabled real-time target acquisition and battlespace awareness.
Phase Three targeted Iran’s leadership, supply infrastructure, and scientific personnel. Strikes were directed at the Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, senior IRGC commanders, the residences and research facilities of nuclear scientists, as well as ammunition depots and military logistics warehouses. Missile maintenance sites, UAV assembly lines, and fuel storage facilities were repeatedly struck even in the later stages of the operation, in conjunction with a “strategic follow-up strike strategy” designed to hinder post-strike recovery efforts.
Over 1,200 targets were struck during the operation, and Israel completed the mission without losing a single fighter jet. In addition to deploying the GBU-57, the United States provided support through ISR assets, cyber warfare capabilities, and communication jamming systems. Notably, the real-time target sharing and strike authority transfer system between the two countries was presented as a future model for joint U.S.-Israel operations.
Israel’s air defense system responded to Iran’s retaliatory attacks immediately after the operation through a three-layered defense. The Iron Dome intercepted short-range rockets, David’s Sling engaged medium-range cruise missiles, and the Arrow system targeted long-range ballistic missiles. All systems operated under an integrated air defense command post, following an automated engagement decision process. Complementing these systems, the demonstration version of the laser interception system “Iron Beam” and electronic warfare jamming systems were jointly employed, bringing the interception rate close to 99 percent.
On the surface, the operation was aimed at destroying nuclear facilities, but in essence, it was a “total deterrence warfare” designed to paralyze Iran’s warfighting capability and strategic will. By organically integrating allied joint operations, multi-domain coordination, and strategic surveillance-strike systems, the operation is likely to stand as a twenty-first century model of preemptive strike doctrine. -
“Operation Rising Lion” was not merely a military campaign, but an event that symbolized a structural shift in strategic deterrence theory. By carrying out an actual preemptive strike against a state on the verge of acquiring nuclear weapons, Israel itself validated the legitimacy of preemptive action within deterrence strategy, and presented a precedent to the world. This represented a practical transition from the classical assumptions of deterrence, such as “mutual assured destruction (MAD)” and “deterrence by punishment,” to “deterrence by denial.”
In particular, Israel carried out the operation even though Iran had not explicitly acquired nuclear weapons, using “nuclear intent and technological imminence” as the criteria for its decision. While this choice deviated from the norms of the traditional international order, it can in practice be seen as a realist option that complements the spirit of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In doing so, the legitimacy and effectiveness of preemptive strikes in preventing nuclear proliferation, as well as a combined deterrence model leveraging alliances, were demonstrated.
This operation is regarded as a new strategic model for deterring a “nuclear threshold state.” Whereas classical deterrence theory assumes mutual deterrence only after the declaration of nuclear possession, “Rising Lion” demonstrated the strategic logic that “deterrence can fail even at the brink of nuclear armament, and in such cases, preemptive physical denial is permissible.” This was, in substance, a new strategic norm and a practical embodiment of the concept of “strategic denial” as a subordinate tactic within deterrence strategy.
The operation also highlighted the possibilities of multinational cooperation and an expanded interpretation of the right of self-defense. Although Israel initiated the operation unilaterally, it was accompanied by selective U.S. support in technology and weaponry, as well as cooperation in space assets and cyber operations. This demonstrated that strategic coordination is possible even without an explicit collective defense treaty, indicating the flexibility and expandability of multilateral security frameworks. In other words, the real foundation of deterrence now lies not in nuclear possession, which was the central element of traditional deterrence, but in “alliance network-based real-time strike and defense capabilities.”
Finally, “Rising Lion” also functioned as an effective deterrence model in terms of strategic communication. Immediately after the operation, Israel explained the legitimacy of its actions to the United Nations and the international community on the grounds of self-defense, while at the same time making clear that it would not expand the operation if no further provocations occurred. By combining military shock with diplomatic restraint, this served as a case of “preemptive deterrence communication,” which blocked the adversary’s justification for further retaliation and managed international opinion. -
“Operation Rising Lion” was not merely a military campaign, but a case that demonstrated both the practical applicability and the limitations of strategic deterrence theory through a preemptive strike against a “nuclear threshold state.” However, directly applying this to Korea’s reality is difficult, as the theoretical and strategic conditions differ, particularly since North Korea has already transitioned into a “de facto nuclear state.” Therefore, rather than a simple comparison, the lessons should be reconstructed from the perspective of a transition in Korea’s deterrence strategy.
First, the concept of deterrence needs to be redefined. Israel’s operation was a typical preemptive strike, which is a concept distinct from deterrence. Deterrence is a form of psychological pressure aimed at influencing an adversary’s decision-making, and the physical act itself does not signify the success of deterrence. The preemptive strike carried out by Israel was a measure that emerged after the failure of deterrence, and interpreting it as part of a deterrence strategy requires clearer conditions and boundaries to be established.
Second, North Korea has already formalized its nuclear armament and stands as an “irresponsible nuclear-armed state,” which requires a deterrence structure different from that of Iran. Unlike Israel, which launched its operation based on the assessment of a “nuclear threshold state” threat, South Korea must establish a deterrence system that assumes the actual possibility of nuclear weapons use, and this priority lies not in preemptive strikes but in the development of advanced surveillance, reconnaissance, and retaliatory strike capabilities.
Third, the limitations of the existing Korean active deterrence models, such as KMPR and Kill Chain, must be assessed, and their practical effectiveness must be strengthened. Israel, through independent operational decision-making, maintained cooperation with its ally while at the same time securing strategic autonomy. Likewise, as South Korea prepares for the transfer of wartime operational control, it must establish a structure that enables the independent operation of early detection, warning, and decision systems.
Fourth, at the policy level, the following directions are required:① Securing a rapid decision system and reconnaissance assetsUltimately, the Israeli case can serve as a reference model for South Korea’s strategic transition in national security. However, its application should not be an uncritical adoption but must be grounded in conditional interpretation and systematic supplementation. At present, what is required is a strategic shift from “declared deterrence” to “actionable deterrence,” and from “dependent deterrence” to “autonomous-alliance-based deterrence.”- Establishment of an advanced early warning system: real-time detection based on multi-satellite constellations (combined operation of EO/IR and SAR satellites), and expanding ISR drones and strategic reconnaissance aircraft
- Introduction of AI-based automated targeting systems: minimizing delays between detection, analysis, and decisions
- Acquisition of specialized space and airborne surveillance systems for detecting underground facilities: strengthening reconnaissance assets through multi-sensor platforms such as gravity anomaly detection, Thermal Infrared Radiation detection, and electromagnetic anomaly analysis
- Establishment of procedural coordination between South Korea and the United States in nuclear-use decision-making: South Korea’s capacity to receive prior information and provide input on the actual employment of U.S. strategic assets in a crisis should be formally institutionalized. The Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) should be further developed into a substantive joint decision-making channel
- Institutionalization of combined exercises based on nuclear-use scenarios: incorporating non-nuclear training activities that assume the potential employment of “tactical nuclear weapons” (e.g., nuclear battlefield drills, nuclear evacuation scenarios, transport, deployment, and employment training) into ROK-U.S. combined exercises
- Enhancement of the visibility of extended deterrence assets: pre-announcing the deployment of U.S. strategic assets such as B-52 bombers and SSBNs to the Korean Peninsula, and clearly communicating this to North Korea and the international community through media and diplomatic channels to enhance psychological deterrence effects
- Establishment of a system for sharing warning signs and synchronizing decision sequences: pre-aligning the transition sequence of warning, decision, and response between key ROK-U.S. command structures, and standardizing the process for switching between nuclear and non-nuclear options
- Enhancement of C4ISR self-reliance: building an integrated system based on indigenous platforms to support a Joint Chiefs-led command and control structure, battlespace awareness, and strike decision-making systems, thereby ensuring independent operational control after the transfer of OPCON
- Establishment of a command transition plan following the transfer of wartime operational control: formalizing phased roadmaps and mission responsibility standards to prevent confusion during the mission transition between the current Combined Forces Command and the future Combined Command
- Advancement of autonomous strategic weapons capabilities: indigenizing and operationalizing key assets such as long-range precision strike weapons (e.g., advanced ballistic missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles), strategic reconnaissance assets, and integrated battlespace information systems
- Incorporation of “South Korea’s operational lead” in combined operational plans: defining ROK-led operational areas in existing OPLANs and securing initial response authority
- Institutionalization of mechanisms for the international sharing of threat evidence: establishing multilateral information channels to transparently share reconnaissance imagery, signals intelligence, and thermal infrared data related to North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats
- Strategy for ensuring the legitimacy of military responses: preparing a clear legal basis under the UN Charter and customary international law, and pre-coordinating diplomatic messaging when undertaking preventive military measures or exercising the right of self-defense
- Creation of a dedicated strategic communication organization: establishing a Strategic Communication Center (tentative name) under the Ministry of National Defense or the National Security Office, to coordinate crisis communication with international media and integrate messaging in multilateral consultations
| Preface
| Threat Assessment and Strategic Decision-Making: The Escalation of Iran’s Nuclear Threat
| Operational Execution: Multi-Dimensional Strikes and Integrated Battlefield Operations
| Paradigm Shift in Strategy and the Deterrence Model for Nuclear Threshold States
| Transition of Korea’s Deterrence Strategy - Implications of the Israeli Case and Policy Recommendations
※ The contents published on 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institue
