Seventy-seven years after its founding, the transatlantic alliance (NATO) now stands at a critical juncture. Under the second Trump administration, the U.S. drive to scale back its security role in Europe and its demands for higher defense spending have steadily intensified. Earlier this year, direct diplomatic and military friction between the United States and its European NATO allies over Greenland came into the open. More recently, during the Iran war, NATO states showed only reluctant involvement in the Strait of Hormuz operations and the use of their bases and declined to lend support, and the rift between Washington and Europe now appears to be deepening further. Historically, inherent sources of instability such as divergent threat perceptions, differing regional strategies, and asymmetric burden-sharing have repeatedly generated tension within the alliance, so none of this is entirely new. Yet the discord among NATO members under the second Trump administration warrants attention: it more directly exposes the pre-existing structural fault lines of burden, dependence, and trust, and is entrenching a recalibration of alliance roles and costs at the institutional level.

How does the United States envision the future of NATO? The second Trump administration's message to Europe has been relatively clear and consistent. One of the central tenets of both the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Strategy (NDS) is that Europe should move beyond its inflated threat perceptions and take "primary responsibility for [its own] conventional defense, with critical but more limited U.S. support." As U.S. defense strategy is rebuilt around three core objectives, namely homeland defense, deterring a rising China in the Indo-Pacific, and strengthening the U.S. defense industrial base, Europe appears, in effect, to be relegated to a lower priority in the employment of core U.S. forces. The scaling back of U.S. engagement in the region has ceased to be mere political rhetoric and has taken hold as a strategic orientation, one that is overturning conventional wisdom about NATO's identity and the way it operates. It is this shift that is now taking concrete form under the name "NATO 3.0."

The concept of NATO 3.0 was first put forward this past February by Elbridge Colby, Under Secretary of War for Policy, at the NATO defense ministerial in Brussels. The animating concern behind it is that, in an environment of simultaneous conflicts across multiple theaters, securing homeland defense, U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere, and deterrence by denial in the Western Pacific requires a return to concepts of deterrence and defense grounded in Cold War realism, that is, a reversion to "NATO 1.0." In short, it makes clear that the NATO the United States seeks is an alliance built on "partnership" rather than "dependence." In the immediate aftermath of the Iran war, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth returned to the NATO 3.0 concept in Brussels on June 18. His speech delivered a pointed critique of the inefficiency of European defense policy since the Cold War and of a pattern in which Europe has delegated its security while lacking any substantive military capability of its own, and he stressed that a fundamental redefinition of the relationship between the United States and NATO's member states, along with a redistribution of roles, is now irreversible.

The NATO summit will be held in Ankara, Türkiye, on July 7-8, and the implementation roadmap for NATO 3.0 is likely to be a central item on the agenda. At the June NATO defense ministerial in Brussels, Secretary General Mark Rutte, for his part, countered that NATO 3.0 has already begun through adjustments to contributions under the NATO Force Model and an expansion of allied roles, and that it ultimately means "a stronger Europe in a stronger NATO." This summit deserves particular attention. Held amid the simultaneous Russia-Ukraine and Iran wars, it will go beyond reaffirming familiar goals, namely strengthening Europe's own defense through steps such as delivering on European members' defense-investment pledges and scaling up defense-industrial production, together with continued support for Ukraine, and will instead take stock of how far each ally has actually delivered and followed through on those commitments.

Accordingly, in assessing the implications of the NATO summit, the ROK too must look past the mere question of whether to mechanically expand the IP4 cooperation in which it participates, and focus instead on the form in which the division of roles among allies and the realignment of forces now taking concrete shape through NATO 3.0 are agreed upon and implemented. This will also offer important insights for setting the future direction of the ROK-U.S. alliance and ROK-NATO cooperation. This paper sets out to analyze the evolving trajectory of the transatlantic alliance with a focus on the recently emerging concept of NATO 3.0. It examines the background against which NATO 3.0 arose, its core substance, the current state of its implementation, and its main points of contention, before briefly drawing out the implications for the ROK.

| The Background to NATO 3.0

The significance of NATO 3.0 is hard to overlook, precisely because it fuses the political lens through which the United States views its European NATO allies with its military and strategic interests. Some read the concept as political retaliation by the Trump administration for Europe's uncooperative posture toward U.S.-led out-of-area operations, coupled with a critical view of its chronic, long-entrenched pattern of security dependence. Another reading, by contrast, holds that NATO 3.0 should be assessed not as off-the-cuff rhetoric but as a roadmap for military realignment, one tied to the shift in U.S. defense strategy and set to be pursued consistently.

Given the current state of relations between the United States and NATO's European members, one cannot draw a definitive causal link, yet it is true that the timing lends itself to reading NATO 3.0 as U.S. political pressure on Europe. This past February, when trust within the alliance was deeply shaken by diplomatic and military friction between Washington and its European allies over Greenland, Under Secretary Colby first introduced NATO 3.0 as a concept under which the United States would shift defense responsibility onto Europe, and he returned to it over the course of the Iran war, in tandem with intense U.S. criticism of Europe. In that war in particular, launched under U.S.-Israeli leadership, European states responded with marked reluctance to U.S. requests to use their military bases and to take part in operations in the Strait of Hormuz. The main justifications Europe offered were the uncertainty of the war's strategic objectives, the absence of prior consultation in preparing and conducting it, and the fact that the operations fell outside the scope of the NATO treaty. Pointing to this reluctance toward the campaign against Iran, President Trump and his inner circle bluntly denounced NATO's impotence, while making clear that they would consider scaling back the U.S. role in Europe and even withdrawing from NATO altogether. Announced alongside this rhetorical pressure, the plan to withdraw more than 5,000 U.S. troops from Germany, together with the cancellation of the Tomahawk cruise missile and hypersonic missile deployments pledged under the Biden administration, reverberated across Europe. The Pentagon explained these steps as part of a broad review of the U.S. force posture in Europe and a realignment reflecting theater-specific requirements and conditions on the ground, but, coinciding as they did with the Iran war, they are widely read as U.S. retaliation against an ally. NATO 3.0, in short, now functions as a powerful signal that U.S. security commitments will no longer be extended unconditionally.

It is true that NATO 3.0 bears the imprint of recurring friction between the United States and its European NATO members, as well as the transactionalism and coercive political rhetoric characteristic of the Trump administration. At the same time, although the concept remains too underdeveloped to be regarded as a fully formed policy package, it also represents an attempt to institutionalize the U.S. Force Posture Review for Europe under the name NATO 3.0. That is, it contains concrete plans for the command structure and force realignment needed to bring about a new division of labor, one of expanded European responsibility for conventional defense paired with selective but decisive U.S. support. In other words, NATO 3.0 displays a clear consistency, in that it is an implementing measure that institutionalizes strategic judgments the NSS and NDS have raised repeatedly: redressing the structural asymmetry in burden- and role-sharing among allies, and deploying limited military resources in a selective, concentrated manner. Indeed, the recent trend toward restructuring forces in Europe that has taken shape since NATO 3.0 was unveiled reveals, beyond mere political discourse, an unmistakable drive to recalibrate the alliance's roles and burden-sharing at the institutional level.

NATO 3.0 thus blends two characters: political pressure, born of the Trump administration's accumulated grievances and its demand that allies expand their roles, and an institutional implementing measure reflecting the force restructuring now taking shape. Because of this composite nature, in both concept and function, it is not easy to pin down exactly what NATO 3.0 means. Not only do the messages the United States directs at Europe, issued piecemeal by its various departments, vary in content and intensity, but there is also no clear agreement between the administration and Congress on the pace and sequencing of implementation. As a result, policy uncertainty remains high, and Europe finds it difficult to mount a systematic response to the concept.

| The Core Elements of NATO 3.0: Burden-Sharing, Command Structure, and Force Posture

So what, exactly, does NATO 3.0 contain? In brief, it can be examined across three dimensions: (1) its direction, (2) its organizational structure, and (3) the disposition of its assets. First, in terms of direction, the essence of NATO 3.0 is a return to what NATO fundamentally was in its early years, namely the sharing of military burdens and roles among allies. The NATO described by Secretary of War Hegseth and Under Secretary Colby has moved through three chronological phases, as summarized below.

The period from NATO's founding through the Cold War, when burden-sharing among allies still functioned as intended, can be labeled "NATO 1.0," while the era after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in which the expansion of the liberal international order was accompanied by a deepening pattern of reduction in European defense capabilities and reliance on the United States, can be termed "NATO 2.0." NATO 2.0 is portrayed as the period when, after the end of the Cold War, NATO expanded out-of-area operations in the form of crisis management and stabilization missions, blurring the focus of European collective defense; as the alliance grew subordinate to the framework of the liberal international order, it took on an increasingly values-based character, and its essential function was eroded. NATO 3.0, by contrast, is put forward as the blueprint for where NATO should head next, envisioned as a cooperative framework in which Europe assumes full primary responsibility for conventional defense while the United States provides limited but decisive support. At the June defense ministerial, Secretary of War Hegseth declared that the era of European free-riding on security was over and that the goal of the NATO 3.0 model is to recover the essence of a military alliance focused on real deterrence, reaffirming his commitment to building a European-led conventional defense.

At the organizational level, on February 6, just before Under Secretary Colby's address, NATO officially announced that agreement had been reached to transfer command authority across its command structure, traditionally held by the United States, to European nations. The main changes included the transfer of Joint Force Command Norfolk (JFC Norfolk) to British command, of Joint Force Command Naples (JFC Naples) to Italian command, and of Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFC Brunssum) to a rotating joint command shared by Germany and Poland. These changes can be read in more than one way, but they are highly significant in that three joint force commands, each a four-star command, have been incorporated into the European command structure. This carries symbolic weight, signaling who would lead the defense of Europe in wartime.

As for the disposition of assets, the U.S. drawdown and repositioning of forces in Europe is proceeding in remarkably concrete terms. On June 12, The New York Times reported in detail on the planned cuts to the forces assigned and allocated to NATO's operational plans and the European theater. According to the report, a document said to have been delivered to allies in writing in early June included a reduction of F-16 and F-15 fighters from 150 to 100, of maritime patrol aircraft from 26 to 15, and the withdrawal of eight aerial refueling tankers, as well as plans to redeploy strategic assets to theaters outside Europe, including one missile-carrying submarine, one carrier strike group with its escort warships, and one strategic bomber group.¹⁾ The Pentagon has refrained from commenting officially on the plan, but given the current trajectory of the European-led defense model now taking shape and its implementation mechanisms, the plan is assessed as one with a considerable likelihood of being carried out.

| Europe's Perception and Response as It Prepares for NATO 3.0

Europe's current security debate is unfolding with the aim of maintaining deterrence against external security threats, operational continuity, and nuclear credibility, on the assumption of a reduced U.S. defense commitment. As the changes in NATO's command structure examined earlier make clear, the purpose of the concept known as "European NATO," and of the accompanying transfer of operational-level command over the three JFCs, is to have the generals of European member states gradually take on a more central role within the previously U.S.-centered command-and-control system and, by supplementing U.S. military assets with their own forces, to gradually fill the security vacuum that a future reduction in the U.S. contribution to regional defense could create. Yet, grounded in its unrivaled capabilities in and access to critical intelligence infrastructure, the United States, as the nation that holds the post of SACEUR, still exercises effective final authority over the mobilization and deployment of forces in wartime—in that respect, as a substantive transfer of operational control going beyond mere symbolism, the change reveals clear limits. In short, the premise underlying the current European debate is less a radical U.S. withdrawal than a plan for a gradual, thoroughly managed and controlled transfer of responsibility over at least a decade, coupled with an expansion of Europe's role.

Beyond the command structure within NATO, Europe has also introduced and begun implementing fiscal policies aimed at strengthening its own defense capabilities and raising the self-sufficiency of its defense-industrial ecosystem. Most notably, in 2025 the EU released the Readiness 2030 white paper and launched the €150 billion SAFE (Security Action for Europe) fund for common borrowing. That national plans were submitted at the end of November 2025 and that all nineteen EU applicant states had secured approval by April 2026, with the process advancing faster than such applications ordinarily would, is highly unusual given Europe's customary bureaucracy. In addition, in 2025 the European Commission introduced the Omnibus V bill, putting forward institutional reforms designed to raise the efficiency of arms production in wartime by streamlining excessive regulation across the defense industry, including in procurement, investment, and permitting. This series of funding measures and regulatory easing can be regarded as encouraging progress toward expanding European arms production. Yet institutional loopholes remain in how the SAFE fund is actually used. There is a possibility that member states, bypassing the EU's joint-procurement rules, will spend the money not as new investment but as a substitute for their existing defense budgets, raising concerns about whether the funds applied for will be used in full to genuinely strengthen defense. Moreover, although SAFE has made low-interest financing available, Europe's limited and aging production base means that the volume and pace of its weapons development and production cannot keep up with the speed at which the funds are being raised.

Moreover, the key weapons systems for which demand has grown, especially in the Eastern European states closest to the Russian threat, are still being procured through imports from outside Europe, and are therefore traded beyond the reach of the SAFE fund. In short, with various institutional constraints and gaps in the implementation framework still in place, it is hard to be confident that Europe, through its rearmament plans, can achieve in the short term its goals of expanding European arms production, strengthening the defense-industrial ecosystem, and ultimately breaking free of its defense dependence on the United States.

| Divergent U.S. and European Perceptions of the "Capability-Gap Risk": Pace and Timetable

One of the fundamental questions raised about NATO 3.0 is whether the NATO 3.0 that Europe speaks of and the one the United States speaks of are the same in substance. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte set out his own conception of NATO 3.0 in an interview with the Atlantic Council on June 25. He stressed that Europe would strengthen the conventional forces of its individual member states and take on a greater role within NATO's command-and-control structure, while supporting Ukraine and taking the lead in defending the eastern front, the Baltic Sea, and even the Arctic. At first glance, the United States and Europe appear to share, to a considerable degree, both the animating concerns and the broad direction of NATO 3.0.

Yet with respect to the conditions and timetable for implementing NATO 3.0, a considerable gap exists between the United States and Europe. This past June, U.S. European Command (EUCOM) announced that it would reduce the size of the U.S. forces slated to be committed to NATO in a crisis. It informed European allies that, in the event of a comparable conflict, the numbers of U.S. fighter jets, aerial refueling tankers, and naval vessels committed would be sharply reduced; this step can be read as a continuation of moves under way since last year, namely the cancellation of the deployment of an Army armored brigade combat team to Poland and the withdrawal of a brigade stationed in Romania. The U.S. version of NATO 3.0 has the character of immediate implementing measures required to secure America's ability to conduct operations across multiple fronts. Europe, by contrast, while acknowledging the need for European-led rearmament, does not appear to accept an immediate U.S. drawdown or withdrawal as a precondition. Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans, for example, has stressed that the two sides need a "no surprises" policy, that is, a limit on the pace of the U.S. drawdown. This means that the U.S. drawdown in Europe should proceed in step with the pace and scale of Europe's own buildup. In assessing Europe's current defense posture, the Bruegel Institute has estimated that deterring a Russian invasion in the short term would require roughly 300,000 additional troops and an annual defense-spending increase of at least €250 billion; against this backdrop, Europe is speaking of NATO 3.0 on the assumption of a scenario in which no time lag opens up between the U.S. drawdown and the strengthening of European deterrence.

| Europe's Options: Continued Dependence or a European Model of Its Own

Europe's practical capacity to deliver on NATO 3.0 is plainly limited; at the same time, a shift in perception is under way, driven by an acute sense that it must build a defense model of its own. Consider, first, the medium- to long-term outlook. In the short term, the rearmament that NATO 3.0 calls for has begun, at least in its broad direction, yet by 2030, the timeline the white paper set out, it is unlikely to have matured into an autonomous defense capability that could genuinely substitute for the United States. Should the war prove protracted and U.S. pressure over burden-sharing persist, European rearmament will harden into a structural trend rather than a passing response; in the near term, however, it is more likely to take the form of a "partial rearmament." Debate over higher defense budgets and joint procurement will widen, but the actual pace at which spending is converted into fielded capability is likely to remain slow. Higher spending alone cannot be expected to translate quickly into combat capability, and shortfalls will persist in the ability to plan, command, and control operations independently, in surveillance and reconnaissance, and in the build-out of integrated intelligence networks. Over the longer run, whether NATO 3.0 is carried through will hinge on several interlocking factors. The most important is likely to be the pace at which the United States scales back its involvement in European security, along with any change of course that a new administration might bring; the durability and intensity of the Russian threat will also shape the scale and pace of European rearmament. The fiscal sustainability of individual European states, and the political acceptability of such spending, are further factors to weigh. Even as NATO 3.0 takes clearer shape, then, European states still lack the fiscal and political capacity to act on their own. And with the more capable among them increasingly favoring domestic firms in procurement, the industrial integration needed for a genuine European defense remains heavily constrained.

The practical constraints are undeniable, yet a look at the European debate over NATO 3.0 reveals that long-held perceptions of the United States and of the transatlantic alliance are gradually shifting. At its heart is a recognition that the U.S. security umbrella is not a permanent guarantee, and that strategic autonomy is no longer mere rhetoric but an irreversible defense posture Europe has no choice but to embrace in an era when the alliance itself has been weaponized. For the past several years, the central item on Europe's defense agenda has been "Europe without America," and its core preoccupation has been how, from a position of precarious insufficiency, to keep the United States engaged as fully and for as long as possible. That broad current still holds, but a perception appears to be gaining ground that conducting deterrence in Europe without U.S. support, however enormous the challenge and vast the cost, is ultimately an unavoidable future. Increasingly, and in earnest, the conviction is spreading that Europe must move toward a defense model able to function on its own, even in America's absence.

This shift in perception is equally evident in how Europe now views the United States and the transatlantic alliance. According to a recent survey by the European Council on Foreign Relations (June 2026), only 11 percent of European respondents now regard the United States as an ally, while 25 percent see it as an adversary or a rival.²⁾ In other words, Europeans accept the United States as a necessary partner but no longer as a firm ally. The same analysis finds that, alongside broadening support for higher defense spending, more forward-leaning opinion is taking shape in major European countries even on the once-sensitive question of European nuclear sharing. Taken together, these shifts show that, within an increasingly uncertain alliance, the conviction that Europe must break free of its security dependence on Washington has taken firm hold. Against this backdrop, debate continues over which European states could take the lead in filling and offsetting the void left by the United States amid the current fractures in the transatlantic alliance. In April 2026, Foreign Affairs identified the four states decisive for Europe's defense in the short term as Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Poland.³⁾

America's influence within the NATO system remains preeminent, and its role would be difficult to replace in any practical sense; even so, Europe appears to be moving forward, slowly but with an unmistakable sense of purpose: to reduce its dependence on the United States and to strengthen its self-reliance and its own defense capabilities.

| Two Implications of NATO 3.0 for the ROK: Managing the ROK-U.S. Alliance and Designing ROK-NATO Cooperation

NATO 3.0 is not unrelated to the ROK either, in that it is a process of institutionalizing, beyond rhetoric and into practical implementing mechanisms, the sharing of roles and responsibilities that the Trump administration has thus far demanded of its allies. As the United States' broad review and recalibration of its Indo-Pacific strategy and its alliance relationships in Asia take concrete shape in the period ahead, NATO 3.0 could emerge under a different name. The painful dilemma Europe has revealed in confronting NATO 3.0 is that, while it holds little bargaining leverage sufficient to secure stable U.S. deterrence in the region, it lacks the material, technological, and financial wherewithal, and the time, to strengthen its strategic autonomy within the U.S. drawdown timeline. The ROK, therefore, is called upon to broaden and deepen the cooperative agenda within a Korea-centered vision of "ROK-U.S. alliance modernization" that, amid the current of alliance recalibration, seeks to raise the ROK's initiative in its own defense while maturing it into a trusted ally of the United States. Efforts at self-strengthening and the securing of diversified bargaining power vis-à-vis the United States are essential in order to achieve, simultaneously, a stronger independent defense for deterrence on the Korean Peninsula and the credibility and stability of extended deterrence. Investment and cooperation in the advanced industries and the expansion of defense supply chains that the United States requires, especially in shipbuilding and semiconductors, where the ROK has particular strengths, should be used as substantive leverage that impresses upon the United States the value of a mutually complementary alliance.

Key figures in the current Trump administration have, on several occasions, held up the ROK as a "model ally." But once the major international issues on which U.S. attention and assets are currently concentrated, such as the negotiations with Iran and over the Russia-Ukraine war, are wrapped up, a recalibration of alliances in the Indo-Pacific is highly likely to get fully under way, and the contentious issues in the ROK-U.S. alliance that had lain beneath the surface will be taken up in earnest. The core issue in the NATO 3.0 debate is the proactive conduct of deterrence and the formation of an alliance based on a sustainable and horizontal division of roles and functions. On pending issues such as the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON), expanded purchases of U.S.-made weapons, follow-through on industrial investment in the United States, and cooperation in defense and shipbuilding, broad agreement has been reached; but because the level of U.S. demands and the ROK's own calculus do not necessarily coincide, a certain amount of friction over the timing and manner of implementation is, to some extent, unavoidable. In particular, the nuclear-powered submarine agreement now being pursued is a field to which the ROK is devoting its main effort. In negotiations with the United States, it should be framed not merely as Korea unilaterally demanding high-end naval power, but as a strategic means for Korea to take on a more proactive deterrence role on the Korean Peninsula and in its surrounding waters and to strengthen the alliance's military sustainability; a close review should be undertaken to improve the prospects of its acquisition, and a detailed, tailored approach should be made toward the key U.S. decision-making bodies, including the White House, the State Department, the Department of War, the Department of Energy, and Congress.

Second, the current NATO 3.0 debate also carries implications for how the ROK should set the direction of its cooperation with NATO. Over the past several years, discussion of ROK-Europe and ROK-NATO cooperation has expanded rapidly, and its principal drivers have been the rising defense demand generated by the Russia-Ukraine war and a shared threat narrative in the Indo-Pacific. As so-called like-minded partners who share similar positions and dilemmas as well as common aims and interests, the two sides will need to share a certain degree of threat perception. But basing the potential of ROK-Europe and ROK-NATO cooperation on a shared threat perception that is difficult to align perfectly poses clear constraints on its sustainability. At present, the essence of ROK-Europe cooperation lies less in a shared perception of the threats posed by Russia, China, and North Korea, or in the defense of common values, than in strategic complementarity. The ROK's capacity for a leading defense role in deterring Russia is plainly limited, and Europe's deterrence of North Korea and China, likewise, can scarcely move beyond the symbolic.

The reality Europe faced in the Russia-Ukraine war was not simply a shortage of weapons but a wholesale deficiency in arms production, logistics support, equipment capacity, defense supply chains, and technological capability—and the ROK is one of the few reliable partners able to substantially ease the constraints Europe confronts. The ROK's industrial capabilities connect directly to Europe's strategic tasks, and as Europe, amid great-power competition, has come to view the ROK not merely as an export market but as a partner that can guarantee capability and reliability in core industrial domains, the ROK's strategic value has grown greater than ever. For sustainable ROK-Europe security cooperation to mature to a higher level, the moment calls for moving beyond mere arms sales and working to lower the threshold to substantive joint development, through broader access to NATO-standard intelligence and deeper industrial and technological consultation. In this respect, the somewhat stalled relationship between NATO and the IP4 warrants a fresh review. Seoul should seek a cooperative relationship that generates tangible benefits rather than resting on the symbolic ties of a values-based alliance. The ROK needs to approach this with a clear focus on what kind of strategic, substantive, and mutually complementary relationship it will build within NATO's new structure for sharing roles.

Under the implementation of NATO 3.0, the time has come for the ROK to chart the direction of its cooperation not as an actor directly engaged in Europe's collective defense, but as a provider of the roles that enhance the sustainability of deterrence and rearmament. From this perspective, at the upcoming NATO summit the ROK needs to pursue an approach directed less at whether to mechanically expand IP4 cooperation than at working out the following: in what manner and at what point the division of roles between the United States and Europe and the realignment of strategic assets now proceeding within the broad framework of NATO 3.0 are being carried forward and institutionalized; what defense gap Europe faces within that process; how the ROK can turn that gap into strategic value; and what core agenda it can share with NATO to that end.

1. Schuetze, C.F. and Schmitt, E. (2026) 'U.S. Plan Is Said to Pull a Third of Fighter Jets It Provides NATO for Europe', The New York Times, 12 June.
2. Kobzová, J. and Zerka, P. (2026) Home alone: Europeans are ready to defend themselves. Policy Brief. European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), 10 June.
3. Kapstein, E.B. and Caverley, J. (2026) 'Europe's New Defense Core: As America Steps Back, Four Countries Will Shape the Continent's Security', Foreign Affairs, 10 April.

※ The opinions expressed in 'Sejong Focus' are those of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institute.