| Introduction

North Korea test-fired the Hwasong-po-11Ma-1, a short-range hypersonic missile, on September 20, 2026, and followed with a launch drill of an intermediate-range hypersonic missile on October 3. These two launches, conducted roughly two weeks apart, suggest that North Korea's hypersonic missile program may be advancing beyond confirming the flight performance of individual weapons systems, toward a stage in which technical performance improvements and operational reliability verification are pursued in parallel.

Notably, Kim Jong Un characterized this launch as a "launch drill" rather than a "test," emphasizing the operational proficiency of the launch unit and its readiness for constant mobilization. Kim Yo Jong, for her part, claimed that the missile employed a wave-type flight(skip-glide) trajectory, various methods of trajectory alteration, and artificial intelligence (AI) technology, and stressed that South Korea and Japan have limited capabilities to detect and track it. This is consistent with the recent shift in North Korea's missile development focus, from simple improvements in flight performance toward securing operational capability, survivability, and the ability to penetrate defense networks. It is noteworthy in that it may be tied to an intent to use the irregular maneuverability of hypersonic missiles to increase the burden of detection, tracking, and interception on the ROK, the United States, and Japan, and to showcase the credibility and deterrent value of North Korea's strategic strike capabilities.

However, North Korea has yet to provide sufficient evidence to substantiate its claimed technological achievements, and the information available for independent verification remains limited. It is therefore premature to conclude that North Korea has acquired the advanced defense technologies it claims to possess.

The launch also took place against a complex political backdrop, including the dispute between the two Koreas over the landmine explosion in the Demilitarized Zone, North Korea's reaction to Japan's defense buildup, the possibility of U.S.-North Korea dialogue, and the political calendar ahead of the U.S. midterm elections. The purpose of the launch should therefore be examined not only in terms of technical performance improvement and verification of operational capability, but also as a demonstration of military deterrence and a form of external signaling directed at the ROK, the United States, and Japan. In particular, as North Korea continues to advance its nuclear and missile capabilities amid talk of a possible U.S.-North Korea negotiation, it also warrants examination whether this launch was intended both to showcase North Korea's military capabilities and to influence the shape of future negotiations.

Accordingly, this report examines recent developments in North Korea's hypersonic missile program, which has shown signs of technological progress, as well as the key characteristics of its testing and launch exercises. Drawing on the latest missile launches and North Korea's own claims, the report seeks to assess the possible objectives behind these launches from both technical-military and broader political-strategic perspectives, and to identify their implications.

| Assessment of North Korea's Intermediate-Range Hypersonic Missile Development Trends

Development Trends of the Short-Range Hypersonic Missile, the Hwasong-po-11Ma Series

From September 2021 to January 2022, North Korea pursued the development of hypersonic missiles through three test launches¹⁾ using liquid-propellant launch vehicles. It has also continued to accumulate flight pattern and trajectory data on glide vehicles separated from solid-propellant launch vehicles. Drawing on analysis of the flight data obtained from these launches,²⁾ North Korea has sought to secure the technologies needed to develop trajectory control algorithms for glide vehicles flying at hypersonic speeds, as well as hypersonic aerodynamic design and thermal shielding technologies, by Δ improving the rocket engine performance of the launch vehicle and Δ refining the glide vehicle design.

On October 22, 2025, North Korea subsequently tested two hypersonic vehicles separated from a first-stage solid-propellant launch vehicle in Pyongyang's Ryokpo District (the seventh test, with a range of approximately 400km). North Korea did not disclose the specific missile designation at the time. However, based on the external appearance of the "Hwasong-po-11Ma" that had appeared at the 80th anniversary parade of the founding of the Workers' Party on October 10, shortly before the launch, along with the shape of the glide vehicle, the ROK military and experts assessed the missile to be the Hwasong-po-11Ma (a glide vehicle combined with a KN-23-series launch vehicle).

On January 4, 2026, North Korea conducted a hypersonic vehicle test launch (the eighth). It announced only the fact that a test launch had taken place, without disclosing specific flight parameters, but judging from the missile's configuration, the launch was assessed to be a test of the Hwasong-po-11Ma. In announcing the January 4 launch, North Korea claimed that "the missile struck its target," yet it did not specify the details of the test's success, and Kim Jong Un referred to the "need for continued improvement," stating that "we must continuously upgrade our offensive weapons systems." This suggests that North Korea was still at the stage of analyzing the flight patterns of the hypersonic vehicle, such as long-range glide maneuvers, and integrating the findings into trajectory control technology.

More recently, North Korea announced that "a launch test of the new hypersonic missile 'Hwasong-po-11Ma-1' (the ninth test, with two launches) was conducted on September 20 under the observation of Kim Jong Un." Kim Jong Un stressed that the test was "a demonstration of advanced defense technology and a clear renewal in the modernization of armed forces, and that the acquisition of this technology carries great significance." The flight trajectory screen North Korea released for the second launch displayed figures including a speed of 2,660 meters per second (Mach 8.9) at the point of maximum speed (altitude of 28.3km), a maximum altitude of 68.4km (at 154.4 seconds), a speed of 2,146 meters per second (Mach 6.3) at an altitude of 35.8km in the latter part of the flight (at 7 minutes 26 seconds), and a flight distance of 908.2km. The ROK military, however, detected flight distances of 450km and more than 600km for the two projectiles respectively, which differ from the parameters North Korea disclosed. (Japan's announcement: 440km and 590km.)

Regarding the question of technical progress, the fact that North Korea conducted the test launch under Kim Jong Un's direct observation and released a monitoring screen displaying specific flight speed, altitude, and distance figures can be seen as a measure intended both to showcase the missile's flight performance and to highlight its technical achievements to domestic and international audiences.

Development Trends of the Intermediate-Range Hypersonic Missile

On January 14, 2024, North Korea used a two-stage solid-propellant launch vehicle for the first time in its fourth test launch (North Korea did not disclose flight parameters), and South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) announced at the time that the missile had flown approximately 1,000km with an apogee of 50km. North Korea then used an improved version of the launch vehicle from the fourth launch to conduct its fifth test launch on April 2, 2024, in which a hypersonic glide vehicle was mounted on the new intermediate-to-long-range "Hwasong-po-16Na" missile. The following day, Rodong Sinmun disclosed flight parameters of approximately 1,000km in range and a maximum altitude of 101.1km, and stated that the purpose of the test was "to confirm the overall design and technical characteristics and to verify the reliability of the weapon system." This shows that North Korea was focused not only on confirming the flight performance of its hypersonic missile, but also on raising the overall technical maturity of the weapon system combining the launch vehicle and the glide vehicle.

On January 6, 2025, North Korea conducted its sixth test launch using a two-stage solid-propellant launch vehicle, referring to it as the launch of a "new intermediate-to-long-range hypersonic missile" and announcing a "flight distance of approximately 1,500km and a maximum altitude of 99.8km." Given the increased range compared with earlier tests, improvements may have been made to the launch vehicle's performance or to the design and flight characteristics of the glide vehicle. It is also presumed that North Korea began applying new trajectory control technology, drawing on the flight characteristics of the glide vehicle identified through accumulated test launch data, in order to bring the vehicle down on a target.

On October 3, 2026, North Korea conducted a launch drill of an intermediate-range hypersonic missile³⁾ under Kim Jong Un's observation (the tenth launch), stating that "the flight distance was approximately 1,000km." Kim Jong Un assessed that the drill demonstrated "highly skilled professional qualities in operating important offensive weapons systems and a counterstrike posture that can be mobilized at any moment." He also defined "continuously and repeatedly making the enemy aware of the reliability and lethality of strategic strike means" as a form of exercising deterrence. This indicates that the launch served not only the technical purpose of confirming the missile's flight performance, but also the purpose of showcasing the proficiency of operating personnel and the operational readiness of the weapon system, and of highlighting strategic deterrence.

In particular, Kim Jong Un's description of this launch as a "launch drill" rather than a "test launch" suggests that North Korea may be broadening the focus of its hypersonic missile development to launch procedures, operational proficiency, and verification of weapon system reliability, thereby shifting the direction of development from a "new weapon under testing" toward a stage of operating the missile as an actual force. That said, the fact that the North Korean leadership termed the launch a "drill" is not sufficient to conclude that development of the weapon system has been completed or that it has been operationally deployed. At the present stage, it is reasonable to assess that North Korea has clearly revealed its intent to develop the hypersonic missile into a weapon system that can be employed in actual operations.

Kim Yo Jong, in her statement of October 3, also emphasized Δ a skip-type (wave-type) flight trajectory,⁴⁾ Δ at least four different flight trajectory types, Δ low-altitude trajectory alteration capability and the application of artificial intelligence (AI) technology, and Δ confirmation of the insufficient detection capabilities of South Korea and Japan,⁵⁾ claiming that the two countries' detection capabilities have limits.

However, the mere claim that South Korea and Japan failed to detect the missile is not enough to establish the missile's varied maneuverability or its ability to penetrate the ROK-U.S.-Japan missile defense network. Even so, by highlighting diverse trajectory alteration technologies and the application of AI, North Korea can be interpreted as emphasizing the missile's survivability and its potential to penetrate defenses, while seeking to create uncertainty about the detection, tracking, and interception capabilities of the ROK, the United States, and Japan.

| Assessing the Purpose of the Intermediate-Range Hypersonic Missile Launch and Its Implications

Verifying Performance Improvements and Operational Reliability as a Weapon System

North Korea has recently shown signs of broadening the focus of its missile development and testing, from showcasing the performance of individual weapons systems to verifying actual operational capability and reliability. In 2026, it has publicized the irregular maneuvering performance of short-range solid-propellant tactical missiles, the mass launch of super-large multiple rocket launchers, cluster warhead tests, and the launch of strategic cruise missiles from a destroyer, emphasizing not only weapons performance but also diversified launch and operating methods and combat viability. This trend suggests that the development goals for hypersonic missiles of various ranges may likewise be expanding toward pursuing performance improvements in parallel with proficiency in launch procedures and verification of the weapon system's actual operational capability.

However, it is necessary to distinguish between the fact that North Korea is emphasizing this development direction and a judgment that it has actually secured the corresponding capabilities. North Korea claims to have employed a skip-type flight trajectory, various methods of trajectory alteration, and AI technology, but concrete materials that would allow objective verification of these claims are limited. The flight speed, altitude, and distance figures released are not sufficient to confirm the glide vehicle's trajectory control capability, its stability in long-range high-speed flight, or its reliability in repeated operation. Accordingly, while the possibility that technical improvements were made in the recent launches should be taken into account, it would be prudent not to immediately assess this as the attainment of technical maturity or of operational capability at the level of actual deployment.

To judge North Korea's future development progress, it will be necessary to look comprehensively at whether flight performance is repeatedly reproduced in additional tests, whether the glide vehicle's trajectory alteration and target guidance capabilities are actually realized, and whether strike accuracy and operational reliability of the weapon system are secured. Whether the training and operating procedures of launch units continue to be publicized and verified, and whether performance tests expand into drills premised on actual operational use, will also serve as key criteria. Ultimately, the recent launch trends suggest that North Korea is pursuing both performance improvement and operational reliability for its hypersonic missiles, but the level of development and actual operational capability remain tasks to be verified further through follow-up tests and related developments.

Demonstrating the Capability to Penetrate ROK-U.S.-Japan Missile Defenses and Increasing Detection Uncertainty

Where a glide vehicle separated from a hypersonic missile maneuvers along an irregular trajectory that differs from that of conventional ballistic missiles, the defending side inevitably faces considerable difficulty in predicting the flight path, continuously detecting and tracking the vehicle, and calculating an intercept point. With these characteristics in mind, North Korea has concentrated in its recent launches on highlighting low-altitude trajectory alteration, a skip-type flight trajectory, multiple flight modes, and the application of artificial intelligence (AI) technology. This can be seen as related to an intent to emphasize the maneuverability and survivability of its hypersonic missiles and to spread the perception that they pose a threat the ROK-U.S.-Japan missile defense architecture would struggle to counter.

In particular, Kim Yo Jong, referring to the flight distance figures announced by the ROK JCS and Japan's Ministry of Defense after the October 3 launch, claimed that South Korea and Japan cannot track the missile after its first skip point when a skip-type flight is applied. This statement can be interpreted as a message intended both to showcase the technical achievements of North Korea's hypersonic missile and to create uncertainty about the defense architecture by casting doubt on the detection, tracking, and interception capabilities of the ROK, the United States, and Japan. Considering also the combined-fires operational test North Korea conducted in May of this year and the development trends of its existing irregularly maneuvering short-range ballistic missiles, it is worth examining the statement in connection with a concept of operating hypersonic missiles in combination with other missile forces in order to increase the response burden on the defending side.

That said, the extent to which the trajectory alteration methods, AI application, and attempts to evade South Korean and Japanese tracking claimed by North Korea have actually been realized requires separate verification. The fact that North Korea released part of the flight data and took issue with South Korean and Japanese detection results is not sufficient to conclude that it has secured the capability to penetrate missile defense networks. Nevertheless, it is self-evident that if North Korea in the future employs hypersonic glide vehicles in combination with its existing irregularly maneuvering short-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and multiple rocket launchers, the interception burden will increase, since the defending side would have to simultaneously identify, track, and respond to multiple targets with differing speeds, flight altitudes, and maneuvering characteristics.

Whether actual tracking gaps or surveillance blind spots occurred in connection with this launch is difficult to determine from publicly available information alone. It will nonetheless be necessary to separately examine whether target tracking is sustained from the glide phase through the descent and terminal phases, and whether tracking accuracy and the continuity of interception-relevant information are maintained despite trajectory alterations.

Demonstrating Strategic Deterrence and the Possibility of a "Missile Launch Moratorium" as a Bargaining Chip

Kim Jong Un defined the October 3 launch as "a form of exercising deterrence" and stressed that the reliability and lethality of North Korea's strategic strike means must be repeatedly impressed upon its adversaries. This indicates that North Korea regards the launch not as a simple missile development test, but as an act of demonstrating to external audiences its advanced nuclear and missile capabilities and the posture to operate them in practice. In particular, its emphasis on the maneuverability of hypersonic missiles and their ability to evade interception can be interpreted as an intent to highlight the burden placed on U.S. extended deterrence and the ROK-U.S.-Japan missile defense architecture, and to spread the perception that North Korea's strategic deterrent is growing stronger.

The fact that the launch took place amid heightened inter-Korean tensions over the recent landmine explosion in the Demilitarized Zone can also be considered part of the backdrop. North Korea has maintained a hard-line stance, rejecting the South Korean government's calls for accountability and an apology over the incident. In this context, publicizing a hypersonic missile launch drill may be read as a signal intended to deter possible countermeasures by the ROK military and to demonstrate that North Korea has the capability and posture to respond militarily should tensions escalate. However, it is difficult to conclude from the timing alone that the launch was a direct response to the landmine explosion. It is more appropriate to assess that, rather than a show of force aimed at a specific incident, North Korea's hypersonic missile development and operational drill activities coincided with the inter-Korean tensions, and that it also sought the effect of military pressure on South Korea.

In addition, given that the launch came at a time when the possibility of U.S.-North Korea dialogue is being raised ahead of the U.S. midterm elections on November 3, it is also conceivable that North Korea sought to highlight the advancement and operability of its nuclear and missile capabilities with future negotiations with the United States in mind. North Korea has demanded recognition as a nuclear-armed state while firmly rejecting denuclearization negotiations. If this stance continues, it is worth considering the possibility that North Korea may put forward, as one item on the agenda of future U.S.-North Korea talks, not denuclearization itself but a partial limitation of its nuclear and missile capabilities or a halt to tests and launches of specific weapons systems. For example, North Korea could maintain its existing demands, such as the lifting of sanctions, while using a "halt to launches of ICBMs or hypersonic missiles" as a bargaining chip.

In sum, it is possible to posit that the launch carried multiple intentions in combination: enhancing external deterrence by showcasing the performance and operational readiness of North Korea's hypersonic missiles, strengthening pressure on South Korea amid inter-Korean tensions, and securing a bargaining instrument that could be used in future U.S.-North Korea negotiations.

Implications and South Korea's Response Measures

North Korea's launches on September 20 and October 3 show that the focus of its hypersonic missile development is broadening from confirming flight performance toward verifying the operational reliability and practical usability of the weapon system. While showcasing individual performance attributes such as range and maneuverability, North Korea has also used the launch drill to stress the proficiency and operational posture of the unit concerned, and by highlighting low-altitude maneuvering and the possibility of evading interception, it is seeking to create uncertainty about the ROK-U.S.-Japan missile defense architecture. The two launches can be assessed as cases illustrating North Korea's intent to link the demonstration of technical performance, the verification of operational capability, and the display of external deterrence.

Going forward, it will be necessary to evaluate North Korea's hypersonic missiles in terms of how much performance and reliability they can deliver in an actual operational environment. The key criteria are whether the flight trajectory can be controlled as intended during long-range flight and in the descent and terminal phases, whether strike accuracy can be maintained after irregular maneuvering, and whether such technical performance can be reproduced in repeated tests. In particular, if North Korea employs irregularly maneuvering ballistic missiles of the Hwasong-po-11 series in combination with missiles carrying hypersonic glide vehicles, the flight characteristics and penetration axes that the ROK-U.S. missile defense architecture must address will diversify, which could increase the burden of detection, tracking, and interception. It is therefore necessary to analyze not only the performance of individual missiles but also the effect that the combined operation of different weapons systems would have on the defense architecture.

At the same time, the technical achievements North Korea claims must be distinguished from its actual capabilities. Kim Yo Jong claimed trajectory alteration using artificial intelligence (AI), the use of at least four types of flight trajectory, and low-altitude maneuvering, but the information currently available is insufficient to confirm the level of implementation or the operational effect of these features. Nor does the discrepancy between the flight data released by North Korea and the observations of South Korea and Japan, in itself, prove a tracking failure on the part of the ROK, the United States, and Japan or any technical superiority of North Korea's missiles. While closely monitoring whether North Korea has actually secured the technologies it claims, it will be necessary to distinguish between North Korea's propaganda claims and the actual level of the threat.

South Korea's response should treat hypersonic missiles not merely as a stand-alone threat, but in connection with North Korea's wider missile forces, including irregularly maneuvering ballistic missiles, strategic cruise missiles, and super-large multiple rocket launchers. In the short term, it should strengthen ROK-U.S.-Japan missile warning and tracking information fusion capabilities as well as training for responding to mixed attacks, and in the medium to long term, it should expand its surveillance systems, setting priorities according to urgency, cost, and feasibility. On this basis, it should reinforce the capability to detect and track low-altitude maneuvering targets, fuse in real time the information obtained from radars, satellites, maritime, and other surveillance assets, and develop a multilayered defense architecture tailored to target characteristics. Securing the continuity and accuracy of tracking from the glide phase through the descent and terminal phases is particularly important. It should also examine the potential use of space-based surveillance systems, including low-Earth-orbit satellite constellations, reinforce maritime and high-altitude surveillance assets, and put in place an efficient response architecture that takes into account interceptor expenditure and defense costs in preparation for the mixed operation of multiple missile types.

Ultimately, the key point of this launch is that North Korea is advancing its development toward integrating hypersonic glide vehicle technology with its existing missile systems in order to secure actual operational capability. This cannot, however, be immediately taken as evidence that development has been completed or that the system has been operationally deployed. It will be necessary to continue closely analyzing how far technical performance improvements and operational reliability verification progress going forward.

1. North Korea stated at the Eighth Party Congress in January 2021 that it had "completed research on the development of a hypersonic glide warhead and was preparing to begin trial production." It then conducted its first test launch on September 28, 2021 (launch vehicle: Hwasong-8; glide vehicle: Gaori-type [Gaori means stingray]; liquid-propellant; flight parameters not disclosed). The second launch took place on January 5, 2022. North Korea announced a flight distance of 700km (South Korean and Japanese authorities observed approximately 500km), and did not disclose the name of the launch vehicle (liquid-propellant; glide vehicle: conical). The third launch took place on January 11, 2022. North Korea announced a range of 1,000km (South Korean and U.S. authorities observed a flight distance of 700km), and again did not disclose the name of the launch vehicle (liquid-propellant; glide vehicle: conical).
2. Fourth launch: January 14, 2024, two-stage solid-propellant launch vehicle (glide vehicle: conical). Fifth launch: April 2, 2024, two-stage solid-propellant launch vehicle (glide vehicle: Gaori-type), Hwasong-po-16Na. Sixth launch: January 6, 2025, two-stage solid-propellant launch vehicle (described by North Korea as a new intermediate-to-long-range hypersonic missile; Hwasong-po-16Na; glide vehicle: Gaori-type).
3. North Korea did not announce the designation of this intermediate-range hypersonic missile. However, since it designated the missile "Hwasong-po-16Na" at the sixth launch, when the glide vehicle was Gaori-type, the missile carrying the conical glide vehicle this time is presumed to be the "Hwasong-po-16Ga." Meanwhile, although North Korea used the term "intermediate-range," the test did not demonstrate a maximum range of up to 3,000km, which would be sufficient to reach the U.S. military base on Guam.
4. Skip-type flight: Unlike a typical ballistic missile, which follows a single large parabolic arc, the missile flies in an undulating, wave-like pattern. After reentering the atmosphere, it performs a bounding maneuver and rises again, repeating descent and ascent along a trajectory resembling waves.
5. Kim Yo Jong, Director of the Workers' Party of Korea General Affairs Department, issued a separate statement approximately 12 hours after the launch, disclosing the drill and referring to the figures announced by the JCS (over 700km) and Japan's Ministry of Defense (approximately 680km) as "interesting numbers." She also claimed that "every time the wave-type flight trajectory method was applied, the enemy lost the target after the first skip point," asserting that South Korea and Japan have limited detection capabilities.

※ The opinions expressed in 'Sejong Focus' are those of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institute.