| Introduction

Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in February 2022, the atmosphere surrounding economic cooperation among North Korea, China, and Russia in the Russian Far East and Primorsky Krai has begun to change. While trilateral cooperation among the three countries has not yet taken concrete form, bilateral cooperation between North Korea and Russia, Russia and China, and North Korea and China has continued to deepen. These developments suggest that such bilateral cooperation could eventually evolve into a trilateral framework.

These changes are closely linked to broader geopolitical developments. Russia's growing alignment with China following the Ukraine war, the evolution of North Korea-Russia relations into what increasingly resembles a quasi-military alliance after North Korea's troop deployment, and the possibility of Xi Jinping's visit to North Korea have all been shaped by the geopolitical dynamics of the Ukraine war and intensifying U.S.-China strategic competition.

For South Korea, the Russian Far East and Siberia, particularly the Tumen River basin and Primorsky Krai where North Korea, China, and Russia share borders, have long been regarded as a future strategic space that the country must eventually engage in order to secure its long-term prosperity.¹⁾ Although the level of emphasis has varied across administrations, a broad consensus regarding the strategic importance of this region has existed across the political spectrum. This consensus has been evident not only under the Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, and Moon Jae-in administrations but also under conservative governments. Examples include the Lee Myung-bak administration's negotiations with Russia's Gazprom over the import of pipeline natural gas (PNG) through North Korea, which resulted in the signing of an MOU in 2011, and the Park Geun-hye administration's participation in the pilot phase of the Rajin-Khasan logistics project, which involved transporting Russian coal through North Korea's Rajin Port. Participation in the development of the Russian Far East and Primorsky Krai can therefore be considered a bipartisan issue in South Korean policy.

The region²⁾ remains highly significant not only for South Korea's core geoeconomic interests, including energy, logistics, and food security, but also for its geopolitical implications related to North Korea. Against this backdrop, this paper examines recent developments in the region and considers whether an area that has long remained closed to South Korea because of geopolitical realities could, under emerging geopolitical conditions, evolve into a cooperative space in which South Korea may also participate. It further explores the policy directions South Korea should pursue should such opportunities emerge, with particular attention to Primorsky Krai.

| The First Emerging in Primorsky Krai: Strengthening Infrastructure Connectivity

Perhaps the most significant development is the unprecedented expansion of Russia-China cooperation in logistics and transportation infrastructure since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. Prior to the war, cross-border cooperation relied on eight border crossing points connecting the two countries' railways, roads, and ports, including two railway crossings and six road and ferry crossings. Notably, there was not a single permanent bridge connecting the two countries. Following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2022, however, the first permanent river-crossing infrastructure between Russia and China was completed with the opening of the Blagoveshchensk-Heihe Road Bridge in June and the Tongjiang-Nizhneleninskoye Railway Bridge in November. The most recent major example of bilateral infrastructure cooperation was the agreement reached at the Putin-Xi summit in Beijing in May 2026 to sign an intergovernmental agreement on the joint construction of a second 1,435 mm standard-gauge railway line across the Zabaykalsk-Manzhouli border crossing.³⁾ These developments suggest that major Russia-China cooperation projects have advanced in tandem with broader geopolitical developments.⁴⁾

Against this broader backdrop, infrastructure cooperation within Primorsky Krai has also progressed. This trend has been strongly supported by the Russian federal government's determination to treat Primorsky Krai as a flagship project within its broader Far East development strategy.⁵⁾ Major Russia-China infrastructure projects involving Primorsky Krai include: Δ modernization of border checkpoints, including the Suifenhe-Pogranichny and Kraskino-Hunchun crossings, through upgrades to customs facilities and connecting roads; Δ improvements to customs clearance procedures and transportation infrastructure along the Primorye-1 and Primorye-2 International Transport Corridors (The Primorye-1 corridor is designed to connect Heilongjiang Province, via Harbin and Suifenhe, with the ports of Vladivostok, Nakhodka, and Vostochny, providing the shortest route to southern China and Asia-Pacific markets. The Primorye-2 corridor is intended to give Jilin Province the shortest maritime access route through Hunchun and Zarubino Port.); and Δ investment and modernization projects at ports such as Vladivostok, Slavyanka, and Zarubino. As a result of these efforts, cargo traffic between Primorsky Krai and China has increased significantly. A representative example is the modernization of the Suifenhe-Pogranichny border crossing. In 2024, cargo throughput at this crossing exceeded one million tons annually for the first time, making a substantial contribution to expanding the share of China-related trade in Primorsky Krai.

Another notable infrastructure project involving Primorsky Krai is the construction of a new North Korea-Russia road bridge across the Tumen River. The existing Korea-Russia Friendship Bridge, a railway bridge connecting North Korea's Tumangang Station and Russia's Khasan Station, has long served as the only cross-border transportation link in the area. The new road bridge is being built only a few hundred meters away from the existing railway bridge. The project represents the first expansion of land transportation infrastructure in the area in 67 years. By adding a road bridge capable of accommodating automobiles and trucks to infrastructure previously limited to rail transport, the project is expected to become both a symbolic and practical milestone in North Korea-Russia infrastructure cooperation. The project was agreed upon during the North Korea-Russia summit in Pyongyang in June 2024. A groundbreaking ceremony was held in April 2025. Although completion was originally scheduled for December 2026, construction progressed ahead of schedule, and an official deck-connection ceremony was held in April 2026, roughly six months earlier than planned. The Russian Embassy in North Korea has announced that the bridge is expected to be completed on June 19, 2026.⁶⁾

| The Second Trend Shaping Primorsky Krai: Expanding Trade and Investment Cooperation

China has maintained its interest in and investment in Primorsky Krai because the region possesses unique strategic value as: Δ a key hub for the Northeast Revitalization Strategy aimed at revitalizing the economies of China's three northeastern provinces; Δ a gateway restoring access to the East Sea 160 years after the Treaty of Beijing; Δ a source of overseas grain production as well as seafood, timber, and mineral resources and Δ the starting point of the Northern Sea Route.

The statistics illustrate this trend. Following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, Russia-China trade recorded growth of nearly 30 percent in both 2022 and 2023. However, due to Western sanctions, the growth rate slowed sharply to 1.9 percent in 2024. In contrast, trade between Primorsky Krai and China grew by 14 percent in 2024. This can be explained by two factors. Unlike overall Russia-China trade, which is centered on energy and raw materials, trade involving Primorsky Krai covers a wider range of products, including consumer goods and agricultural products, with particularly strong growth in seafood exports and cross-border e-commerce. While the decline in overall Russia-China trade was concentrated in sectors affected by sanctions, such as energy, advanced technology products, and financial channels, trade in Primorsky Krai consists largely of non-sanctioned primary commodities and consumer goods traded through direct cash transactions, meaning that the channels through which sanctions exert their impact are fundamentally different.

Chinese investment in Russia also highlights the distinctive role of Primorsky Krai. Although the total volume of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Russia remains limited, amounting to approximately USD 3 billion in 2022 and accounting for only 0.7 percent of Russia's cumulative FDI stock, more than 40 percent of Chinese investment in Russia is concentrated in Primorsky Krai as of 2026,⁷⁾ with the cumulative amount estimated at roughly USD 80 million to 100 million.

At the same time, it is important to note that official statistics may underestimate the actual influence of Chinese capital in the region. Official FDI data published by the People's Bank of China do not capture investments by small and medium-sized enterprises or informal business activities, and indirect investments routed through offshore structures are not recorded on the basis of the ultimate investor.

Although the full scale of Russia-North Korea cooperation in Primorsky Krai remains unclear because official statistics are rarely disclosed, cooperation appears to have expanded rapidly outside the framework of UN sanctions following the signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty in June 2024. Key indicators include: Δ a 26 percent year-on-year increase in Russian agricultural exports to North Korea during the January-May 2025 period (excluding petroleum products)⁸⁾; Δ joint ventures in plastic manufacturing⁹⁾; the dispatch of North Korean workers¹⁰⁾; and Δ tourism cooperation.¹¹⁾

| Limitations of Cooperation in Primorsky Krai

At the same time, a number of limitations can be observed in Russia-China infrastructure cooperation in Primorsky Krai. Unlike projects such as the Blagoveshchensk-Heihe Highway Bridge, the Tongjiang-Nizhneleninskoye Railway Bridge, and the second railway line at the Zabaykalsk-Manzhouli crossing, cooperation in Primorsky Krai has generally taken the form of: Δ upgrading and modernizing existing infrastructure rather than undertaking large-scale new construction projects and Δ parallel investment, in which each side invests separately within its own territory, rather than establishing joint funds or joint ventures. As a result, connectivity has improved, but mutual commitment remains weak. In practice, delays in customs and road improvements on the Russian side have repeatedly prevented the full utilization of logistics infrastructure that China has developed around Hunchun. A similar pattern can be seen in port development projects. Although Russian investment in ports has increased since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, most projects are being implemented according to Russia's own plans, and despite numerous discussions and memoranda of understanding, very few have been carried out as genuine joint ventures with China. Several explanations have been offered for this asymmetry. One view emphasizes the historical and territorial sensitivities surrounding Primorsky Krai itself, which was ceded to Russia under the Treaty of Beijing in 1860. Another argues that while Russia has consistently sought to attract Chinese investment, China has remained highly reluctant to commit capital directly to infrastructure projects in Primorsky Krai because of cumbersome customs procedures, weak logistics competitiveness, and restrictions on land ownership. The stagnation of China's various efforts to secure access to the East Sea is also noteworthy. Prospects for access through the Tumen River remain uncertain, while operations along the Primorye-1 and Primorye-2 corridors, which effectively serve as alternative routes to the Tumen River, have not improved significantly.

Of particular interest to South Korea is China's long-standing objective of securing access to the East Sea through the Tumen River.¹²⁾ In addition to physical constraints posed by the existing Tumen River railway bridge, which is only seven meters high, and by the river mouth, where water depth is less than one meter, subtle differences in the positions of the relevant countries have continued to emerge. The issue has been under discussion since the Soviet era. In the 1991 Sino-Soviet Border Agreement, the Soviet Union agreed to China's right of free navigation on the Tumen River, but added a provision stating that "specific issues related to navigation shall be resolved through agreement among the parties concerned." Following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the issue reemerged in the Joint Statement of the 28th China-Russia Intergovernmental Commission meeting in December 2023, which stated that the two sides had agreed to "continue constructive exchanges with North Korea on the issue of Chinese vessel navigation in the lower reaches of the Tumen River, including the organization of joint environmental surveys in adjacent areas." Similar language subsequently appeared in leaders' joint statements. In May 2024, during the Putin-Xi summit in Beijing, the two sides stated that "China and Russia will engage in constructive dialogue with North Korea on the issue of navigation by Chinese vessels in the lower reaches of the Tumen River." In the Joint Declaration issued during the celebrations marking the 80th anniversary of Russia's victory in World War II in May 2025, the two countries included language expressing their intention to "consider the possibility of transforming the Greater Tumen Initiative (GTI) into an independent international organization." The Joint Statement issued after the China-Russia summit in May 2026 likewise included language similar to previous formulations, stating that "in accordance with the 1991 agreement on the eastern section of the border, the two sides will continue trilateral consultations with North Korea on the issue of access to the sea through the Tumen River." Taken together, these statements suggest that although China's "East Sea access strategy" has received greater attention since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, Russia's position has remained largely unchanged since 1991. Russian experts continue to express concerns that: Δ allowing Chinese vessels to navigate freely through the Tumen River estuary would undermine the competitiveness of Russian Far Eastern ports and North Korea's Rajin Port and Δ the expansion of China-led special economic zones could erode the territorial sovereignty of both Russia and North Korea. Given these concerns, it remains to be seen how much progress China will be able to make on this long-standing strategic objective.

| Assessment and Outlook

As discussed above, Russia-China cooperation has grown closer in the areas of transportation infrastructure, trade, and investment since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. At the same time, structural sources of tension remain evident in the Russian Far East, particularly in Primorsky Krai. Historical factors cannot be overlooked. As illustrated by the subtle diplomatic friction surrounding China's 2023 official map designations,¹³⁾ Russia appears to view Primorsky Krai as a space closely tied to its sovereignty and national identity, seeking to utilize Chinese capital while maintaining control over it. China, by contrast, appears to regard Primorsky Krai as both a key node in its Northeast Asian logistics strategy and a symbolic space that should be historically reclaimed. While the two countries share the language of economic cooperation, it remains unclear whether their underlying strategic objectives are truly converging.¹⁴⁾

Several challenges also remain in the areas of trade and investment, including: Δ asymmetries in trade composition, characterized by an exchange structure centered on raw materials and higher value-added products; Δ issues related to technology transfer; Δ payment and settlement problems, as Chinese banks continue to block transactions involving Russia because of concerns about secondary sanctions, leaving Russian companies unable to receive payments;¹⁵⁾ and Δ logistical frictions, including delays in Russian customs processing, opaque documentation requirements, and inconsistent clearance procedures, all of which discourage Chinese shippers from using routes through Primorsky Krai. The failure to reach an agreement on Power of Siberia 2 during the May 2026 summit further illustrates the limitations of Russia-China cooperation.¹⁶⁾

Meanwhile, the construction of the new North Korea-Russia road bridge across the Tumen River appears likely to generate tangible benefits in the short term. Because road transportation can move larger volumes of cargo more quickly than rail, bilateral trade is expected to increase substantially once the bridge becomes operational. In particular, it will facilitate the rapid transport of smaller quantities of diverse goods and may encourage the expansion of private-sector trade. The new road link could also make it easier for tourists and North Korean workers to travel to Russia. However, compared with Russia-China relations, the structural constraints on Russia-North Korea cooperation are far more substantial. Beyond its symbolic significance and its practical impact on tourism and labor mobility, there are clear structural limits to the extent to which the project can develop into a foundation for large-scale trade.¹⁷⁾

In conclusion, Primorsky Krai is a geographic space where the layers of history have accumulated more deeply than in perhaps any other Russia-China border region. It remains a place where opportunities and constraints coexist, and where cooperation and competition continue to intersect. At the same time, its geopolitical significance continues to grow as a focal point for Russia's Far East and Siberian development strategy, China's East Sea access strategy, and North Korea-Russia cooperation. The unique characteristics of Primorsky Krai suggest that the framework for regional cooperation has not yet been fixed. Rather, it remains open to shifting political circumstances and future change. Consequently, given South Korea's distinctive strategic value to Russia,¹⁸⁾ the region may also present opportunities for South Korea's constructive participation in future cooperative initiatives.

| Policy Implications

The war in Ukraine will eventually come to an end. Change is likely to begin with the end of the war itself. The end of the war will imply a shift in Russia's policy orientation. Russia may seek to recalibrate its relationship with South Korea after the war, as the current intensity of Russia-North Korea cooperation has been shaped in part by wartime exigencies and may naturally undergo some adjustment in the postwar environment. Sanctions on Russia will also evolve within the framework of newly emerging international relationships. Many measures are likely to be revised, eased, or removed, and South Korea-Russia relations may enter a new phase in the process. This would open a new window of opportunity for South Korean diplomacy.

In the long term, South Korea-Russia cooperation in the Russian Far East and Primorsky Krai could also have implications for inter-Korean relations. Given North Korea's doctrine of "two hostile states" and the indefinite suspension of inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation, the Russian Far East and Primorsky Krai could serve as a long-term indirect channel for engaging North Korea. In addition to South Korea-U.S.-Japan and South Korea-China-Japan cooperation, progress in South Korea-China-Russia and South-North Korea-Russia cooperation in Primorsky Krai would in itself expand South Korea's strategic space. If such cooperation could also help draw North Korea into broader regional initiatives, it would contribute to making Primorsky Krai a more cooperative strategic space for the future.

Accordingly, South Korea's task is to manage current geopolitical risks while creating momentum for South Korea-Russia cooperation in Primorsky Krai. For South Korea, Primorsky Krai is virtually the only gateway to the northern region that bypasses North Korea. If South Korea-Russia cooperation advances, it could serve as the foundation for broader minilateral frameworks, including South Korea-China-Russia and South-North Korea-Russia cooperation. In this regard, the end of the war in Ukraine is likely to become the critical turning point for a new phase. South Korea should therefore prepare approaches to Primorsky Krai for each stage of the postwar transition and consider South-North Korea-Russia and South Korea-China-Russia cooperation over the long term.

First, in the short term (before the end of the war), while sanctions remain in place, South Korea should maintain and maximize the use of existing channels while developing additional channels to advance preparations for future engagement. While maintaining a clear two-track approach of implementing sanctions on Russia while pursuing practical cooperation: △ in the private sector, companies in the energy, agriculture, and shipbuilding industries should continue maintaining local networks and gathering information; △ in academia, currently available official and unofficial dialogue channels¹⁹⁾ should be institutionalized and expanded to monitor Russian Far East development policies and generate policy recommendations. These efforts could include designing a South Korea-Primorsky Krai cooperation package that could be launched immediately after the war, including draft MOUs by sector and lists of companies for priority development zones. They could also include: △ examining trade and investment opportunities through joint ventures with third countries such as Kazakhstan and the UAE; and △ conducting preliminary feasibility studies on the long-term import of strategic resources, including LNG and rare earth elements, from the Russian Far East and Siberia beyond Primorsky Krai.

Second, in the medium term (after the end of the war), South Korea should begin substantive sectoral cooperation while monitoring: △ the trajectory of adjustment and normalization in South Korea-Russia relations and △ trends in the easing of Russia-related sanctions by sector. During the first one to three years after the war, cooperation could be resumed through projects that are immediately implementable, including initiatives previously discussed but suspended due to sanctions. Examples include: △ participation in priority development zones; △ the resumption of orders for specialized vessels such as LNG carriers and icebreakers, leveraging the technological advantages of South Korean shipbuilders; and △ the export of smart farming technologies and the establishment of joint ventures in agriculture, linking agricultural development in Primorsky Krai with South Korea's food security needs, given that the Russian Far East accounts for approximately 40 percent of Russia's soybean production and 76 percent of its corn production. These efforts should be accompanied by: △ the resumption of South Korea-Russia business forums led by KOTRA and the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry and △ investment promotion events focused on the Russian Far East and Primorsky Krai.

Third, over the long term, a more structured framework for cooperation could be established covering Primorsky Krai and the broader Russian Far East and Siberian regions. Potential areas of cooperation include: △ long-term contracts in the energy, logistics, and agricultural sectors; △ securing logistics hubs along the Northern Sea Route; △ reactivating the Raj인-Khasan logistics project, including a connection between the Trans-Korean Railway (TKR) and the Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR); and △ developing roadmaps for gas pipeline and electricity grid infrastructure. At the same time, while remaining consistent with South Korea-U.S.-Japan and South Korea-China-Japan cooperation, South Korea could also explore the possibility of trilateral cooperation frameworks such as South-North Korea-Russia and South Korea-China-Russia cooperation.²⁰⁾ Such initiatives would gain additional momentum if accompanied by: △ the comprehensive lifting of sanctions on Russia; △ greater stability on the Korean Peninsula; and △ the acceleration of Russia's economic reconstruction.

Finally, as noted above, although the Russian Far East and Primorsky Krai represent a future strategic space with significant cooperative potential, South Korean companies cannot reasonably be expected to shoulder all the risks of entering the region on their own. Major obstacles include: △ geopolitical risks; △ legal uncertainty; △ inadequate infrastructure; and △ bureaucratic barriers. In this regard, South Korea should consider strategic support measures at the national level, including: △ the establishment of a dedicated Far East Cooperation Fund or a South Korea-Russia Far East Cooperation Fund;²¹⁾ or △ utilizing the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund, which has been budgeted for years but remains largely unused.²²⁾

| Currently Available Official and Unofficial Dialogue Channels

1. The following three factors are commonly cited as the principal reasons why Russia's Far East and Primorsky Krai should be viewed as a long-term strategic space for South Korea: (1) a key hub for diversifying supply chains for energy (LNG and rare earth elements) and food resources (soybeans and corn from Primorsky Krai); (2) Vladivostok's potential emergence as a southern gateway and the starting point of the Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR) when the Northern Sea Route becomes operational in the 2030s and 2040s, reducing shipping distances by approximately 40 percent compared with the Suez route and (3) growing concern within Russia over expanding Chinese influence in the Russian Far East, creating structural incentives for Moscow to view South Korea as a neutral balancing partner.
2. In this paper, the term "Russian Far East" primarily refers to the five border regions that maintain the most active trade and investment links with China: Primorsky Krai, Khabarovsk Krai, Amur Oblast, the Jewish Autonomous Oblast (JAO), and Zabaykalsky Krai. In the energy context, Sakhalin is also included. A comprehensive analysis of the entire Russia-China border region would require the inclusion of Siberian regions such as Altai and Tuva, but these areas are generally excluded because their trade volumes are relatively limited.
3. The technical significance of this agreement lies in its effort to address the railway gauge problem. The Zabaykalsk-Manzhouli crossing currently handles more than half of all Russia-China cross-border rail freight and is the largest overland railway gateway between the two countries. However, cargo must be transshipped because Russia uses the 1,520 mm broad gauge while China uses the 1,435 mm standard gauge. The planned second railway line will be built to the Chinese standard gauge, thereby eliminating this long-standing bottleneck. The project has attracted particular attention because it is not merely a capacity expansion project but effectively introduces the Chinese railway standard onto Russian territory.
4. The Blagoveshchensk-Heihe Road Bridge opened 34 years after the two sides first agreed to construct it. Its opening was particularly notable because it occurred while China was still repeatedly tightening border controls under its stringent "Zero-COVID" policy, which was not abandoned until December 2022. Likewise, the Tongjiang-Nizhneleninskoye Railway Bridge was agreed upon in 2008, but construction did not begin until 2014, when Western sanctions intensified following Russia's annexation of Crimea, and the bridge was ultimately opened after the outbreak of the Ukraine war in 2022. Geopolitical considerations were also explicitly acknowledged by Russian officials. At the June opening ceremony, Deputy Prime Minister Yury Trutnev stated that "in today's divided world, the Blagoveshchensk-Heihe Bridge carries special symbolic significance." At the November ceremony, he described the railway bridge as "a key link in Russia-China cooperation that is particularly important under the new challenges posed by unfriendly countries."
5. According to an audit report by the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation (Счетная палата) on the budget execution of the Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East, federal subsidies totaling 10.9 billion rubles were allocated to the Far East and Arctic Development Corporation (KRDV) in 2025 for infrastructure development within Advanced Special Economic Zones (TORs). The funds were distributed across 12 TORs in eight regions. Approximately 45 percent of the total, the largest share, was concentrated in infrastructure projects in Primorsky Krai (reported by EastRussia on May 20, 2026, citing the official Accounts Chamber report).
6. On April 21, the Russian Embassy in North Korea announced through its Telegram channel that the deck-connection ceremony for the Tumen River road bridge had been held and disclosed June 19 as the planned completion date. Russian Minister of Transport Andrey Nikitin and Alexander Kozlov, Minister of Natural Resources and Russia's co-chair of the Russia-North Korea Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic, and Scientific-Technical Cooperation, participated in the ceremony via video link. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated that "Russia attaches special significance to this project, and once completed, it will become a truly important milestone in bilateral relations."
7. Under the framework of the Vladivostok Free Port and the TOR system, cumulative Chinese investment in Primorsky Krai amounts to approximately USD 81.3 million, accounting for 45 percent of total foreign investment in the region. More than 40 Chinese-funded projects are currently underway in the logistics, agriculture, tourism, and industrial sectors (KRX data).
8. According to a joint investigative report published on November 20, 2025, by iStories (an independent Russian investigative media outlet), the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), and the Open Source Centre, Russian customs records obtained by iStories showed petroleum product exports to North Korea via the Khasan-Rajin railway. More than 322,000 barrels were reportedly transported by rail, while approximately 1.3 million barrels were shipped by sea. Total petroleum supplies to North Korea in 2024 were estimated to have exceeded one million barrels.
9. The Vladivostok Russia-North Korea joint plastic manufacturing plant was first reported by NK News on March 6, 2026. A follow-up investigation published on April 2, 2026, further identified the role of a Russian businessman in facilitating North Korean labor recruitment. The factory, located in a residential district north of Vladivostok, was expected to begin producing polyethylene garbage bags, food packaging bags, disposable tableware, and other packaging materials in April 2026, although its current operational status remains unconfirmed. A Russian source reportedly described the facility as the first in a series of Russia-North Korea joint ventures and suggested that cooperation could expand into textiles, labor exports, energy, and other sectors. The project directly violates UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2375, which explicitly prohibits joint ventures with North Korea. The factory is noteworthy because it represents the first confirmed case of direct Russia-North Korea manufacturing investment in Primorsky Krai, moving beyond the traditional use of North Korean labor in construction and agriculture.
10. According to an assessment by Ukrainian intelligence at the end of 2025, more than 15,000 North Korean workers officially arrived in Russia's Far East over the previous year to fill low-wage jobs in construction and logging. Although no region-specific figures are available for Primorsky Krai, this reflects several limitations: first, Russian authorities do not publicly release regional statistics on North Korean workers; second, many enter under student or tourist visas and therefore do not appear in official labor statistics; and third, both Russia and North Korea are reluctant to disclose information related to activities that may violate UN sanctions. The best available estimate is that Primorsky Krai, and particularly Vladivostok, accounts for a substantial share of these workers given its status as the largest city in the Russian Far East and a major center of construction demand.
11. On February 9, 2024, 100 Russian tourists arrived in Pyongyang aboard an Air Koryo flight from Vladivostok. They were the first foreign tour group to visit North Korea since the COVID-19 border closure, meaning that Pyongyang reopened to Russia before China. Air Koryo currently operates the Vladivostok-Pyongyang route three times a week, and bookings are available only through five authorized Russian travel agencies. Vostok Intur is the principal tour operator on this route. A new Moscow-Pyongyang route was launched in July 2025, but performance fell short of expectations. Although the Russian government allocated 124.4 million rubles in subsidies for the route, only 40.8 million rubles were actually disbursed. Moreover, while operators were required to conduct ten flights between July and November, only five flights were ultimately operated. According to data from the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), Russians visited North Korea approximately 10,000 times in 2025. Of these visits, roughly 5,000 were for tourism, more than 3,000 were related to vehicle maintenance, 1,156 were for business purposes, and 666 were classified as private visits. Approximately 4,000 Russian tourists who visited North Korea in 2025 traveled on Air Koryo flights from Vladivostok through Vostok Intur.
12. Approximately 17 kilometers of territory between Hunchun in China's Jilin Province and the East Sea (Sea of Japan) lies along the North Korea-Russia border. As a result, China cannot secure direct access to the East Sea without the consent of both North Korea and Russia. For this reason, Beijing has consistently sought to persuade Moscow and Pyongyang to grant navigation rights in the lower reaches of the Tumen River.
13. In February 2023, China's Ministry of Natural Resources issued new guidelines for the labeling of place names on official maps. Under the revised standards, Vladivostok is once again labeled as Haishenwai (海參崴), Khabarovsk as Boli (伯力), and Sakhalin Island as Kuye Dao (庫頁島). Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin dismissed the change as "a routine exercise of sovereignty in accordance with the law," while Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova responded that "Russia and China maintain a common position that border issues between the two countries have been definitively resolved."
14. In this context, the Russian federal government's concentrated investment in Primorsky Krai can be interpreted not only as a means of facilitating Russia-China infrastructure cooperation but also as an effort to reaffirm and strengthen sovereign control over its eastern territories and to signal that Russia remains a serious actor in the Asia-Pacific region.
15. As of July 2024, Chinese banks were reportedly rejecting or returning approximately 80 percent of Russia's yuan-denominated payments, often after delays of several weeks and without providing clear explanations (EastRussia). In August 2024, Chinese banks blocked transactions with Russia en masse, leaving deals worth tens of billions of yuan in limbo (PressReader). By early 2025, ten Chinese financial institutions and four state-owned banks had informed Russian clients that payment services would be suspended or subjected to stricter review. Although some payment channels partially resumed in February 2025, they were limited to specific sectors such as agricultural products, pharmaceuticals, textiles, tourism, and education, amounting to roughly USD 30 billion annually (Investing.com).
16. Reportedly, the principal points of contention include pricing, supply volumes, China's energy diversification strategy, and the allocation of construction costs. Many analysts argue, however, that the deadlock reflects more than a disagreement over a pipeline contract. Rather, it illustrates the asymmetrical nature of the Russia-China relationship: China benefits from waiting because it can secure more favorable terms over time, whereas Russia's options diminish the longer negotiations drag on. As one analyst observed, "With Russia bogged down in war and facing economic stagnation, it is Xi Jinping, not Vladimir Putin, who determines the character of the relationship. That is what the so-called 'friendship without limits' actually means" (File Policy, May 22, 2026). Another assessment noted that "negotiations have repeatedly stalled over pricing, construction costs, supply volumes, and Beijing's concern about becoming overly dependent on Russian energy. Although a memorandum signed between Gazprom and Chinese counterparts in September 2025 was described by Russian officials as a major breakthrough, it was not a binding final agreement, and key details remain unresolved" (RFE/RL, May 20, 2026). A separate analysis argued that "Putin traveled to Beijing seeking evidence that Russia still retained major international partners and alternative economic horizons despite Western sanctions and military attrition. Instead, the absence of a final agreement highlighted the limits of Russia's leverage even with its closest geopolitical partner. Even if the pipeline is eventually built, the terms will almost certainly favor China overwhelmingly" (Lviv Herald, May 21, 2026). According to another report, "China is demanding a price of roughly 12-13 cents per cubic meter, comparable to domestic Russian market rates, whereas Russia seeks terms similar to those of Power of Siberia 1, more than twice that level. China's demand for what amounts to a subsidized domestic Russian price is not merely an effort to purchase energy cheaply but a strategy to exploit Russia's weakened bargaining position and override normal market logic" (UPI, May 20, 2026).
17. In summary, the principal structural constraints include: (1) the limited size of the North Korean economy, as official Russia-North Korea trade amounted to only USD 34.4 million in 2023, compared with more than USD 200 billion in Russia-China trade; (2) the much stricter UN sanctions regime imposed on North Korea compared with Russia or China, meaning that while a bridge may facilitate greater cargo flows, it also increases the visibility of sanctions violations; (3) North Korea's inadequate road and rail infrastructure, since transportation networks connecting the border to the country's interior remain outdated and would require substantial additional investment before they could support large-scale freight movement; and (4) the absence of reliable payment and financial channels.
18. Unlike China, South Korea has no territorial disputes with Russia in the Far East and poses no military threat to Russian interests. As a result, Moscow may view South Korea as a relatively neutral partner. South Korea may also benefit from the structural limitations of Russia-Japan relations. The two countries remain divided by the unresolved Kuril Islands (Northern Territories) dispute, which has prevented the conclusion of a peace treaty for more than seventy years and has entrenched a deep level of mutual distrust. Following the outbreak of the Ukraine war in 2022, Japan joined Western sanctions against Russia and became a leading supporter of G7 pressure on Moscow. As a result, Russia-Japan economic cooperation has effectively come to a halt, and Russia has officially designated Japan as an "unfriendly state," effectively excluding it from participation in Far East development projects. By contrast, South Korea is not a member of the G7, and the scope of its obligations regarding sanctions implementation is comparatively less extensive. This creates potential room for cooperation. From Russia's perspective, South Korea offers the advantages of being both a non-Chinese and non-hostile partner that can contribute technology and capital to Far East development. At the same time, the two countries share an interest in diversifying supply chains for energy, food resources, and rare earth minerals.
19. Currently Available Official and Unofficial Dialogue Channels 
    
20. Potential areas for trilateral cooperation among South Korea, China, and Russia that have been discussed or may be considered include: (1) logistics and transportation infrastructure, such as the development of an integrated logistics hub linked to cross-border bridges over the Amur River (combining South Korean port management expertise, including that of the Busan Port Authority, Russia's Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR), and rail networks in Northeast China), and the development of a Busan-Vladivostok-Harbin route through regular container shipping services connecting the three countries; (2) energy and resource development, including LNG liquefaction and transportation projects (Russian gas and LNG production, ice-class vessel construction by South Korean shipbuilders, and joint procurement by South Korea and China) and joint exploration and development of strategic minerals (combining Russian mining rights, Chinese infrastructure investment, and South Korean refining and processing technologies); (3) agriculture and food supply chains, including agricultural development projects in Primorsky Krai and Khabarovsk (utilizing Russian land resources, Chinese machinery and labor, and South Korean smart-farming, seed, and food-processing technologies), as well as a trilateral grain reserve and supply-chain mechanism (using Chinese logistics networks to transport soybeans and corn produced in the Russian Far East to South Korea, thereby reducing transportation costs and improving supply-chain resilience); and (4) digital and smart infrastructure, such as a Vladivostok smart-city pilot project combining South Korean ICT platforms in transportation, power, and public administration, Chinese telecommunications infrastructure, and Russian urban-development demand.
21. China and Russia are already known to operate joint investment funds. The most prominent example is the Russia-China Investment Fund (RCIF). Established in 2012, the RCIF is a private equity fund jointly capitalized by the China Investment Corporation (CIC), China's sovereign wealth fund, and the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), with each side contributing half of the fund's total capital of USD 2 billion. Its objective is to generate returns by investing in projects that promote economic cooperation between Russia and China.
22. Article 8 of the current Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund Act stipulates that the fund may only be used for projects involving direct inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation. Because Primorsky Krai is Russian territory, projects conducted there do not satisfy this requirement. However, the fund was originally established to promote people-to-people exchanges and economic cooperation aimed at restoring mutual trust and a sense of common identity between North and South Korea. In light of this purpose, one option worth considering would be to amend the Act by adding a provision allowing support for third-country projects undertaken in preparation for future inter-Korean economic cooperation.

※ The opinions expressed in 'Sejong Focus' are those of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institute.