1. The Question: A Replay of 2018, or the Beginning of a New Nuclear Order?

One of the most important variables shaping developments on the Korean Peninsula in the second half of 2026 is President Donald Trump's increasingly explicit public commitment to reviving summit diplomacy with Kim Jong-un, Chairman of North Korea's State Affairs Commission. On August 16, while ordering a substantial reduction in ROK-US combined exercises, Trump referred directly to his "very good relationship" with Kim Jong-un. Three days later, he publicly stated that he intended to meet Kim before the end of the year. These statements go beyond rhetoric: they show that the White House has elevated the prospect of a summit into a concrete diplomatic objective.¹⁾

The circumstances in 2026, however, differ markedly from those of 2018. At that time, North Korea faced stringent international sanctions, Chinese cooperation in enforcing them, and the risk of military confrontation with the United States. It therefore had a pressing need to change its external environment through summit diplomacy. Since then, Pyongyang has expanded military cooperation with Russia, restored its relationship with China, and elevated the legal and institutional status of its nuclear forces. Victor Cha argues that these changes have made Kim Jong-un less desperate for sanctions relief than he was in the past, while preserving his incentive to use a meeting with Trump to entrench the reality that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons.²⁾

In this regard, the South Korean government should not succumb to the optimistic expectation that "if a North Korea-US summit takes place, denuclearization negotiations will naturally resume." Kim Jong-un's statements in 2018 reflected less an unconditional willingness to give up nuclear weapons than a readiness to negotiate denuclearization under certain conditions. Interpreting those statements expansively as evidence of a "commitment to complete denuclearization" was a major weakness of the negotiating strategy at the time.³⁾ North Korea in 2026 possesses far more nuclear material, nuclear warheads, and a much wider range of delivery systems than it did then. The very starting point of negotiations has therefore changed.

The Lee Jae-myung administration hopes to pursue a phased path of "halt → reduction → denuclearization" in addressing North Korea's nuclear development.⁴⁾ The greatest difficulty, however, lies at the first stage—the "halt." Nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches can be detected from outside the country, but verifying a halt to uranium enrichment, plutonium production, and the assembly of new nuclear warheads would require declarations of relevant facilities, on-site access by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other organizations, nuclear material accountancy, and the installation of monitoring equipment. North Korea is highly unlikely to accept such measures at present. It is therefore more realistic to define the first stage not as a production freeze contingent on inspections, but as externally verifiable limits on nuclear and missile testing, and then to link more substantial political and diplomatic rewards to constraints on further nuclear buildup.

On September 1, the National Intelligence Service reportedly told the National Assembly Intelligence Committee that, although no direct contact between Washington and Pyongyang had been confirmed, there were signs that both sides were seeking to resume dialogue and that a summit could materialize at any time.⁵⁾ This lends credence to the possibility of a summit, but it also underscores the need to distinguish between a higher probability of a meeting and agreement on the substance of a negotiating package. South Korea should focus not merely on predicting whether a summit will take place, but on defining in advance what kind of bargaining framework would protect or undermine its security if a summit were suddenly to become reality.

2. Trump's Push for a Summit and the Calculus Behind Scaling Back ROK-US Combined Exercises

Trump's reasons for pursuing a summit with Kim Jong-un cannot be reduced to a single motive. First, there is an incentive to change the domestic political narrative. Amid growing war fatigue as the conflict with Iran drags on, a Reuters/Ipsos poll on August 24 found support for military action against Iran at just 31 percent and Trump's job approval at 33 percent. Still, it would be an exaggeration to regard a North Korea-US summit as a card capable of reversing the trajectory of the November midterm elections, which are shaped more by domestic concerns such as the economy and the cost of living than by foreign policy. More relevant is the opposite scenario: if Republicans lose the House or suffer a major setback, Trump may seek after the elections to redirect public attention from domestic politics through a major diplomatic event. The East Asia Institute likewise identifies as a relevant variable the possibility that, after the midterms, Kim Jong-un will choose a moment favorable to him to pursue a summit.⁶⁾

Second, Trump has long viewed ROK-US combined exercises negatively as costly activities that provoke North Korea. In ordering the latest reductions, he criticized both their cost and the "hostile signal" they send to Pyongyang. More strikingly, in the same message he directly expressed dissatisfaction with South Korea's decision not to join US efforts against Iran. It is therefore reasonable to view the decision as combining a conciliatory signal intended to encourage dialogue with Pyongyang and pressure on Seoul.⁷⁾

Third, Trump may regard managing the North Korean nuclear threat, rather than achieving complete denuclearization, as a realistic short-term objective. On August 19, while referring to North Korea's "57 very powerful nuclear weapons," he reiterated his intention to meet Kim Jong-un before the end of the year. Even if the United States does not formally recognize North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state under international law, actual negotiations could prioritize limits on nuclear and missile testing, military de-escalation, and, over the longer term, caps and reductions in North Korea's nuclear forces rather than the immediate and complete dismantlement of the existing arsenal. If North Korea merely suspended testing while continuing to produce nuclear material and warheads, however, "risk management" could become the de facto consolidation of its nuclear-armed status.⁸⁾

The way the reductions in ROK-US combined exercises were handled also carries an important warning for South Korea. Following Trump's directive, Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) was shortened from eleven days to five, and some field training exercises were scaled back. Relevant officials in Seoul and Washington were reportedly not adequately informed in advance of the president's public directive. Unlike in 2018, when the two allies adjusted exercises through consultations after the Singapore summit, the US president in 2026 used an important bargaining chip before a summit had even taken place.⁹⁾

The reduction of UFS does not, however, amount to a complete suspension of trilateral readiness. South Korea, the United States, and Japan are scheduled to conduct the "Freedom Edge" exercise from September 9 to 11 in international waters south and east of Jeju Island to assess their readiness to respond to North Korea's nuclear and missile threats. This sends a mixed signal: Washington is adjusting some exercises to create incentives for dialogue while seeking to preserve the readiness of the alliance and its partners against those threats.¹⁰⁾

It is understandable that the South Korean government refrained from publicly criticizing the move head-on and instead sought to use it as an opening for renewed dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang. Foreign Minister Cho Hyun and Secretary of State Marco Rubio subsequently reaffirmed close coordination on North Korea policy. Yet treating the reduction simply as an unconditional peace measure could signal that Trump may in the future use further suspension of exercises or even the issue of US Forces Korea as bargaining chips in negotiations with Pyongyang. South Korea should support North Korea-US dialogue while insisting that any change in combined exercises or the posture of US Forces Korea be preceded by ROK-US consultation.¹¹⁾

Moreover, the November 2025 ROK-US Joint Fact Sheet explicitly affirms the continued presence of US Forces Korea, extended deterrence including its nuclear component, the complete denuclearization of North Korea, and close coordination on North Korea policy.¹²⁾ If improvised presidential messages begin to override such commitments, the problem extends beyond the scaling back of a particular exercise to the credibility of the alliance's decision-making process. The new security variable Seoul must watch is therefore not simply US military capability, but the predictability of the US president's alliance policy.

3. North Korea's Response and the Outlook for a 2026 Summit

Pyongyang's initial response was cool, but it did not close the door to dialogue. Kim Yo-jong dismissed the reduction of combined exercises as being of "no interest whatsoever," while emphasizing that the personal relationship between Kim Jong-un and Trump remained excellent.¹³⁾ This can be read as a signal that Washington's first step is insufficient, but that summit diplomacy itself has not been ruled out.

Moreover, on August 31 the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs reaffirmed its intention to continue strengthening its nuclear forces, citing the continued US demand for "complete denuclearization" and ROK-US-Japan military exercises as evidence of Washington's hostile policy toward North Korea.¹⁴⁾ This indicates that a partial reduction in ROK-US combined exercises is unlikely to fundamentally change North Korea's nuclear policy or its negotiating posture toward the United States.

This hardline stance toward Washington does not, however, amount to a rejection of dialogue itself. In the Work Report of the Party Central Committee delivered at the Ninth Party Congress in February of this year, Kim Jong-un stated: "If the United States respects the present status of our state as stipulated in the Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and withdraws its hostile policy toward the DPRK, there is no reason for us not to get along well with the United States." He added that "the prospects for DPRK-US relations depend entirely on the attitude of the US side."¹⁵⁾ This indicates that North Korea will not enter negotiations premised on denuclearization, but that it leaves open the possibility of returning to summit diplomacy with Trump if the United States effectively acknowledges the reality that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons and demonstrates through actions a change in what Pyongyang calls its "hostile policy toward the DPRK." In other words, Pyongyang's current position is less a rejection of dialogue than a raising of the threshold for dialogue.

Against this background, if Trump were to send a special envoy to Pyongyang with a conditional proposal along the lines of "if a summit takes place and North Korea observes a comprehensive testing moratorium, the scale and duration of ROK-US combined exercises could be adjusted further," the likelihood of Kim Jong-un agreeing to a summit would rise considerably. In May 2018, when Trump announced the cancellation of the Singapore summit, North Korea responded not with hardline retaliation but with a flexible posture, saying that it was prepared to meet "at any time and in any form." If Kim judges that a summit serves his strategic interests, he may prioritize tangible gains over saving face.¹⁶⁾

The concessions Kim Jong-un might offer in return for a summit, however, are likely to be far more limited than a "decision to denuclearize" or a verifiable freeze on nuclear material production. If Trump were to offer further reductions in ROK-US combined exercises and partial sanctions relief, North Korea might put on the table not only a halt to nuclear tests and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test launches, but also a suspension of test launches of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles capable of targeting South Korea and Japan. This is only a projection of the concessions Pyongyang might be prepared to offer on its own initiative. South Korea should press the United States to make a halt to all ballistic missile flight tests, including submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), the minimum condition for a first-stage agreement. Such a testing moratorium can be verified externally, but it would not prevent the production of nuclear material and warheads, the mass production of missiles, or the development of cruise missiles and strategic nuclear-powered submarines. Even if North Korea declared a production freeze, it would likely reject on-site international verification.

As for timing, the period surrounding the APEC summit to be held in Shenzhen, China, on November 18-19 is especially noteworthy.¹⁷⁾ If Trump travels to China to attend the summit, he could meet Kim Jong-un without requiring a separate long-distance trip. Possible venues include another location in China, Panmunjom, Pyongyang, or the Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Area. If Trump were to propose a visit to Pyongyang before or after APEC, the possibility that Kim Jong-un would accept cannot be ruled out. A visit to Pyongyang by a sitting US president would be a major symbolic achievement for North Korea, although it could carry a political cost domestically in the United States.

China has not publicly declared that it intends to mediate a North Korea-US summit, but it has a strategic incentive to support the resumption of dialogue because it favors reductions in ROK-US combined exercises and a change in Washington's "hostile policy" toward Pyongyang. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently reiterated in Seoul that the United States should change its policy toward North Korea. Trump has announced that President Xi Jinping will visit the United States on September 24; if the visit takes place as planned, China's possible role in a North Korea-US summit could become an agenda item in US-China summit talks.¹⁸⁾ Beijing is unlikely to assign the same priority to constraining North Korea's nuclear buildup as Washington and Seoul do, so both the possibilities and the limits of Chinese cooperation must be taken into account.

The core agenda of a summit would likely include North Korea-US relations, a peace regime, ROK-US combined exercises, sanctions, nuclear and missile risk management, and longer-term constraints on North Korea's nuclear buildup. The most dangerous scenario would be one in which North Korea halts only nuclear tests and some missile tests while the United States suspends combined exercises for an extended period and substantially eases sanctions, leaving the issues of nuclear material and warhead production and verification to follow-on negotiations. North Korea could then continue expanding its nuclear forces while also gaining political and economic benefits. A North Korea-US summit does not, in itself, serve South Korea's national interest; it matters to Seoul only if it actually reduces the North Korean military threat.

A practical alternative lies between the two extremes. Neither a "verifiable production freeze" that demands comprehensive inspections from the outset nor a one-shot grand bargain aimed at eliminating all nuclear capabilities in the short term is likely to succeed. Instead, the summit should reach a comprehensive agreement on the overall direction of a long-term grand bargain and the corresponding reciprocal measures, while implementation begins at a lower level and moves gradually toward more stringent nuclear constraints and verification.¹⁹⁾ Concretely, this "comprehensive agreement, phased implementation" approach would proceed through four stages: &circle1; an externally verifiable halt to nuclear tests and ballistic missile flight tests; &circle2; the launch of normalization processes between North Korea and the United States and between North Korea and Japan; &circle3; ceilings on nuclear forces and limits on additional production; and &circle4; declarations, reductions, expanded verification, and the establishment of a peace regime.

This approach is necessary because the strategic environment for negotiations with North Korea has changed profoundly since 2017-2018. At the Ninth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea in 2026, Kim Jong-un reaffirmed his policy of continuing to increase both the number and the types of nuclear weapons, while the IAEA assesses that uranium enrichment activity is expanding at Yongbyon and Kangson. Under these circumstances, it is unrealistic to expect that partial sanctions relief alone would persuade Pyongyang to halt nuclear material production and accept international inspections.²⁰⁾

The key to this roadmap is to avoid assuming that movement from one stage to the next will occur automatically. The testing moratorium and adjustment of ROK-US combined exercises in Stage 1 are not the completion of a fully balanced exchange, but reversible de-escalation measures intended to restart negotiations. Likewise, the establishment of liaison offices and normalization talks in Stage 2 does not automatically move North Korea toward constraints on nuclear production. To prevent Pyongyang from securing the benefits of diplomatic recognition and sanctions relief while merely maintaining a testing moratorium and delaying subsequent nuclear negotiations, rewards that are difficult to reverse should be provided only when North Korea actually enters Stage 3—declaration, production ceilings, and limited verification.

In Japan's case, the 2002 Pyongyang Declaration and the 2014 Stockholm Agreement provide precedents in which improved relations and the issue of Japanese abductees were addressed together.²¹⁾ This time, mechanisms are needed that allow Japan to verify both the investigative process and its results, so that the process does not end with Pyongyang merely announcing the results of its own investigation.

The roles of China and Russia are not identical. China wields considerable political and economic influence over North Korea, and because the Chinese People's Volunteers were a signatory to the 1953 Armistice Agreement, Beijing is bound to play a central role in any discussion of a peace regime. Russia is also an important actor in sanctions adjustment and the durability of any agreement, given the rapid strengthening of Russia-North Korea relations and Moscow's status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council.²²⁾ China's priorities, however, may lie more in stability on the Korean Peninsula, limiting US military influence, and managing relations with Pyongyang than in fully constraining North Korea's nuclear program. Nor can it be assumed that Russia will actively promote nuclear constraints. It is therefore realistic to view China as a key stakeholder capable of encouraging Pyongyang's participation in negotiations, and Russia as an actor whose cooperation should be sought but which could also become a constraint on the negotiating framework.

High-level and working-level contacts ahead of a North Korea-US summit are therefore essential, not optional. The Hanoi summit demonstrated the limits of setting the summit date first and only later rushing working-level negotiations. In 2026, prior coordination will be necessary not only on nuclear and missile issues, but also on North Korea-Japan relations, sanctions adjustment, a peace regime, and the roles of China and Russia. A summit should not be a venue for bargaining over details from scratch; it should be a forum for leaders to endorse the broad framework of a "comprehensive agreement, phased implementation" prepared at the working level. Because Kim Jong-un himself misjudged at Hanoi Trump's willingness to walk away without a deal, neither side's negotiating prowess should be overrated.²³⁾

4. South Korea's Task: Beyond Supporting Dialogue—Defining Its Security Interests in Advance

The South Korean government's top priority is to move beyond simply stating that it "supports" a North Korea-US summit. It should define its core security interests and minimum negotiating conditions in advance and work to have them incorporated as fully as possible into the US negotiating position. South Korea does not, of course, have the authority to co-plan the summit or co-draft a North Korea-US agreement. But neither can it allow another country to define South Korea's security interests on its behalf. Seoul's role is therefore better understood not as a "co-architect" of North Korea-US negotiations themselves, but as a strategic actor that defines and advances its security interests through prior ROK-US coordination and works to ensure that they are incorporated into the negotiations.

A "Korean Peninsula Nuclear and Peace Strategy Task Force" should be established immediately under the direct authority of the Office of the President, bringing together specialists on North Korea, the United States, nuclear and missile issues, verification, sanctions, a peace regime, China, Japan, and Russia. The faster the push toward a summit, the more important South Korea's advance preparation becomes. The task force should prepare: a two- to three-page document setting out core negotiating principles for the South Korean president to deliver directly to Trump; key elements of a North Korea-US agreement that reflect South Korea's security interests, together with recommended language; a matrix of Pyongyang's anticipated demands and corresponding reciprocal measures; minimum conditions Seoul should ask Washington to uphold; and scenario-based responses to a collapse of the talks, a partial agreement, or an agreement that damages South Korea's security interests.

Policy objectives should be differentiated according to the level of influence South Korea can actually exercise. Distinguishing among matters Seoul can decide on its own, matters requiring ROK-US agreement, matters on which Seoul can offer input but lacks final decision-making authority, and matters over which it has virtually no control—such as improvised bargaining between the two leaders—will make policy proposals more realistic and implementable.

Eight negotiating principles can be set out. First, a clear distinction must be drawn between the de facto reality that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons and the legal status of a nuclear-weapon state under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Under Article IX, paragraph 3 of the NPT, North Korea cannot qualify as a nuclear-weapon state. Second, the first-stage goal should not be a production freeze requiring inspections inside North Korea, but an externally verifiable halt to nuclear tests and all ballistic missile flight tests. Third, such a halt must not be overstated as an achievement in denuclearization—it should instead be linked to the next stage, which would constrain further increases in nuclear material, warheads, and ICBMs. Fourth, difficult-to-reverse rewards—such as the completion of normalization and broad sanctions relief—should be provided only when North Korea accepts commensurate declarations and verification. A snapback mechanism should provide for the reimposition of sanctions and the reinstatement of military measures that had been eased in the event of a violation.

Fifth, the holding of a summit must not itself be traded for a complete suspension of ROK-US combined exercises. South Korea and the United States may temporarily adjust the scale and duration of large-scale combined field training exercises while North Korea implements the comprehensive testing moratorium in Stage 1, but any such adjustment must be conditional and reversible. Indefinitely suspending combined exercises while North Korea continues to produce nuclear material and warheads would not constitute a balanced exchange. Sixth, Seoul should confirm with Washington in advance the principle that the size and missions of US Forces Korea cannot be negotiated bilaterally between the United States and North Korea and must instead be decided separately at the alliance level. Seventh, South Korea must prevent any agreement that constrains only the ICBM threat to the US homeland while leaving short- and medium-range ballistic missiles targeting South Korea and Japan untouched—all ballistic missile flight tests should be covered from the Stage 1 moratorium onward.

Eighth, to prevent the future security order on the Korean Peninsula from being shaped solely by bilateral US-North Korea negotiations, dialogues between North Korea and Japan and between North Korea and China should proceed in parallel. Establishing DPRK-Japan liaison offices and reopening an investigation into the abduction issue could both bring Japan into the negotiating process and give Pyongyang additional diplomatic and economic incentives. China should be asked to engage constructively in bringing North Korea into negotiations and in discussions of a peace regime, but its role as a guarantor of implementation should not be assumed. Russia should likewise be asked to cooperate in sustaining negotiations and implementing any agreement, while Seoul prepares for the possibility that Russia-North Korea strategic cooperation could make Moscow passive toward or even obstructive of a nuclear restraint framework.

To avoid being excluded from the negotiations, South Korea should prioritize prior coordination with Washington over an abstract role as "mediator." North Korea now defines inter-Korean relations as hostile state-to-state relations, giving it a stronger incentive than in the past to bypass Seoul and deal directly with Washington and Tokyo. If South Korea merely waits for inter-Korean channels to be restored, crucial negotiating conditions could be settled first between Washington and Pyongyang.²⁴⁾ Seoul should therefore prepare a dual strategy: before the summit, press for its minimum conditions to be incorporated as fully as possible; after the summit, calibrate the intensity of its response according to the actual content of any agreement.

Three Possible Outcomes of a North Korea-US Agreement and South Korea's Responses

First, an agreement that fully reflects South Korea's core security interests. If North Korea halts all ballistic missile tests, if there is a clear pathway toward constraints on and verification of its nuclear buildup, and if adjustments to combined exercises are designed to be conditional and reversible, South Korea should actively support implementation of the agreement. It could then promote the restoration of inter-Korean dialogue and negotiations on a peace regime, while gradually expanding cooperation in tourism, public health, and the economy in step with North Korea's compliance and adjustments to international sanctions.

Second, an agreement that only partially reflects South Korea's demands. If, for example, limits on ICBMs are included but constraints on short- and medium-range missiles or nuclear material production are deferred, Seoul should seek to supplement the agreement through follow-on negotiations rather than reject it outright. At the same time, it should maintain a strong deterrence and defense posture—including the ROK-US Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), missile defense, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), long-range precision strike capabilities, and the survivability of command-and-control systems—so that gaps in the negotiations do not translate into South Korean military vulnerability.

Third, an agreement that appears to be a political success for Washington and Pyongyang but is a failure for South Korea's security. If a deal effectively permits North Korea's nuclear production to continue while suspending ROK-US combined exercises for an extended period and weakening the posture of US Forces Korea or extended deterrence, Seoul should call for renewed consultations within the alliance and accelerate its own preparedness measures. Even then, rather than respond along a single track by immediately pursuing independent nuclear armament, it would be more realistic to proceed simultaneously with the institutional reinforcement of extended deterrence, stronger independent conventional deterrence capabilities, and the expansion of South Korea's peaceful nuclear potential within the NPT and IAEA framework.

If Trump were effectively to acknowledge the reality that North Korea is nuclear-armed and move toward nuclear arms reduction negotiations while suspending ROK-US combined exercises entirely or for an extended period and substantially easing sanctions, South Korean public opinion would likely react strongly. In the Asan Institute for Policy Studies' 2026 survey, support for South Korea's independent nuclear armament had already reached 80 percent. An East Asia Institute survey found that only 45.4 percent regarded the United States as a trustworthy partner, while favorable views of Trump stood at just 15.8 percent. If the perception spreads that a North Korea-US agreement sacrifices South Korea's security interests, both support for independent nuclear armament and calls for greater strategic self-reliance—the view that "we cannot rely on the United States alone"—are likely to strengthen.²⁵⁾

Even if the Lee Jae-myung administration excludes independent nuclear armament from its policy options, there is no reason for it to forgo strengthening South Korea's peaceful nuclear potential. The 2025 ROK-US Joint Fact Sheet stated that the United States supports a process leading to peaceful civilian uranium enrichment and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing within the scope of the ROK-US Atomic Energy Agreement and US law. It also approved South Korea's construction of a nuclear-powered attack submarine and provided for joint development of nuclear fuel supply pathways.²⁶⁾ This does not confer a right to nuclear armament, but it provides an institutional starting point for legally and transparently expanding fuel-cycle technology, the nuclear workforce, nuclear material management, reactor operations, and naval nuclear propulsion capabilities.

South Korea's strategy of self-reliance should therefore proceed along three axes. First, extended deterrence should be strengthened through the Nuclear Consultative Group and institutionalized through joint planning, exercises, and intelligence sharing. Second, South Korea should strengthen independent conventional deterrence capabilities, including nuclear-powered submarines, ISR, missile defense, long-range precision strike capabilities, and the survivability of command-and-control systems. Third, while strictly complying with the NPT and IAEA safeguards, it should strengthen the peaceful nuclear fuel cycle and the technological and human-resource base of its nuclear sector. Only then can South Korea broaden its range of options even if North Korea-US negotiations succeed, and reduce the security shock if the negotiations fail or US policy shifts.

5. Conclusion

The likelihood that a North Korea-US summit in 2026 will resolve the North Korean nuclear problem in the short term is very low. Pyongyang can draw on its relationships with China and Russia and continues to expand its nuclear forces. The realistic value of a summit therefore lies less in producing a "breakthrough toward denuclearization" than in restraining nuclear and missile testing, reducing the risk of accidental conflict, and opening the door to long-term negotiations on limiting further nuclear buildup. If, however, the price is an extended suspension of ROK-US combined exercises and substantial sanctions relief while North Korea is effectively allowed to continue nuclear production, the outcome could leave South Korea worse off.

Trump seeks quick political gains and places a high value on personal relationships between leaders. Kim Jong-un, for his part, will gauge how much the United States is prepared to concede and seek the greatest possible acceptance of North Korea as a de facto nuclear-armed state. South Korea cannot simply repeat that it "supports North Korea-US dialogue." The central lesson of 2018-2019 is that trust between leaders and political declarations alone cannot guarantee the actual implementation of denuclearization, and that the agenda and reciprocal measures must be sufficiently coordinated before a summit.²⁷⁾

For South Korea, the danger is not limited to a breakdown of the talks. An agreement hailed as a political success in Washington and Pyongyang but judged a failure for South Korea's security could be even more dangerous. Seoul should therefore state its principle clearly: "We support dialogue between the United States and North Korea, but we oppose any agreement that does not actually reduce North Korea's nuclear and missile threats."

The Lee Jae-myung administration should immediately establish a whole-of-government strategy team centered on the Office of the President and including outside experts to flesh out the four-stage roadmap and reciprocal measures set out above. The key is to avoid two mistakes: blocking negotiations by demanding comprehensive inspections that North Korea would find difficult to accept from the outset, and granting major rewards in advance on the basis of unverified promises. The broad direction of a long-term grand bargain should be agreed at the summit, but difficult-to-reverse rewards should be delivered in stages commensurate with the nuclear constraints North Korea accepts and the level of verification it permits. Ultimately, the central question for diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula in 2026 is not "Will a North Korea-US summit take place?" but "What bargaining framework will emerge from it, and to what extent will the Republic of Korea's core security interests be incorporated?" South Korea cannot be a co-architect of negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang, but neither can it allow another country to define its security interests and minimum conditions on its behalf. It must be not merely a passive supporter of dialogue, but a strategic actor that actively shapes the negotiating conditions through prior alliance consultation and prepares for unexpected agreements as well.

1. Costas Pitas, David Lawder and Heejin Kim, "Trump orders Pentagon to cut back military exercises with South Korea," Reuters, August 16, 2026; Steve Holland, Jacob Bogage and David Brunnstrom, "Trump says he plans to meet with North Korea's Kim this year," Reuters, August 19, 2026.
2. Victor Cha, "After Iran: A Scenario for Renewed Trump-Kim Summitry," CSIS, August 13, 2026.
3. CHEONG Seong-Chang, La face cachée de Kim Jong-un: Politique et stratégie du dirigeant nord-coréen (L'Atelier des Cahiers, 2026), pp. 290-303.
4. LEE Sang-hyun, "Inter-Korean Stalemate Persists: Rekindling Dialogue through North Korea-US Talks and a Papal Visit to Pyongyang," Yonhap News, June 19, 2026.
5. Heejin Kim and Joyce Lee, "North Korea and US show signs of resuming dialogue, South Korean lawmaker says," Reuters, September 1, 2026.
6. Jason Lange, "Trump's approval holds at record low as US support for Iran war falls, Reuters/Ipsos poll finds," Reuters, August 24, 2026; CHUN Chaesung and LEE Sang-jun, "Signs of Renewed Trump-Kim Jong-un Dialogue and Directions for South Korea's Response," EAI Current Watch, August 18, 2026.
7. Costas Pitas, David Lawder and Heejin Kim, op. cit.
8. Steve Holland, Jacob Bogage and David Brunnstrom, op. cit.; Kyu-Seok Shim and Jack Kim, "South Korea estimates North Korea has up to 120 nuclear warheads, far above Trump's figure," Reuters, August 20, 2026.
9. Joyce Lee and Heejin Kim, "US, South Korea to cut length, scope of military drills after Trump order," Reuters, August 18, 2026.
10. Jack Kim and Heejin Kim, "South Korea, Japan and US to hold North Korea-focused nuclear missile drill," Reuters, August 28, 2026.
11. David Brunnstrom, "Seoul says South Korea and US vow close cooperation on North Korea," Reuters, August 24, 2026.
12. The White House, "Joint Fact Sheet on President Donald J. Trump's Meeting with President Lee Jae Myung," November 13, 2025.
13. "Press Statement by Kim Yo-jong, Department Director of the WPK Central Committee, on Major International Issues," KCNA, August 19, 2026.
14. "Statement by the Spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," KCNA, August 31, 2026.
15. "Let Us Carry Forward the Great Victory and Glory Won through an Indomitable Pioneering Struggle into Sustained Prosperity and a Leap Forward on a New Journey – Report on the Ninth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea," Rodong Sinmun, February 26, 2026.
16. CHEONG Seong-Chang, op. cit., pp. 202-204.
17. Shenzhen Government Online, "2026 APEC meeting to be held on Nov. 18-19 in China's Shenzhen," December 12, 2025, https://www.sz.gov.cn/en_szgov/BRI/News/content/post_12560182.html; Shenzhen Municipal Government, “APEC会议筹备进程进入冲刺阶段,” August 28, 2026, https://fao.sz.gov.cn/xxgk/tpxw/content/post_1966152.html.
18. Joyce Lee, Heejin Kim, Kyu-seok Shim, Ethan Wang and Liz Lee, "China urges South Korea not to take sides, blames US policy for Korea tensions," Reuters, August 20, 2026; Jacob Bogage and Jasper Ward, "Trump says Xi will visit US on September 24," Reuters, July 23, 2026.
19. CHEONG Seong-Chang, "Conditions for Successful Denuclearization Negotiations on the Korean Peninsula: A Comprehensive Agreement on the Scope, Methods, Timetable, and Reciprocal Measures of Denuclearization," Sejong Commentary No. 2019-22, July 8, 2019.
20. Joyce Lee and Jack Kim, "North Korea's Kim promises more nuclear weapons as Congress closes with military parade," Reuters, February 25, 2026; IAEA, "Application of Safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," GOV/2025/51-GC(69)/13, 2025, para. 45.
21. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration," September 17, 2002; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Press Conference by Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida," May 30, 2014.
22. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, "Xi Jinping Holds Talks with Kim Jong Un," June 8, 2026; United Nations Command, "UNC Statement on UNCMAC Authorities and Procedures," December 16, 2025; Hyeyoon Cho, "North Korea's Kim, Russia's Putin reaffirm ties on Korean Liberation Day," Reuters, August 16, 2026.
23. CHEONG Seong-Chang, op. cit., pp. 216-224.
24. Victor Cha, op. cit.
25. SOHN Yul, "Can't Trust the US, Don't Like China – Is There an Alternative? An Analysis of the 2026 EAI East Asia Perception Survey," EAI Issue Briefing, August 12, 2026; The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, South Koreans and Their Neighbors 2026, 2026, p. 17.
26. The White House, op. cit.
27. CHUN Chaesung and LEE Sang-jun, op. cit.

※ The opinions expressed in 'Sejong Focus' are those of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institute.