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[Sejong Focus] The Democratic Landslide: The Beginning of an “Angry Trump”? The 2026 U.S. Midterm Elections and Implications for the Korean Peninsula

Date 2026-11-05 View 82 Writer Bee Yun JO

The U.S. midterm elections held on November 3, 2026 ended in a landslide victory for the Democratic Party. As of November 5, Democrats had flipped seven Republican-held seats in the Senate to secure a total of 54 seats, while Republicans were left with 44.
Sejong Focus Logo The Democratic Landslide: The Beginning of an “Angry Trump”? The 2026 U.S. Midterm Elections and Implications for the Korean Peninsula
November 5, 2026
Bee Yun JO
Research Fellow, Sejong Institute | bjo87@sejong.org
| Introduction
The U.S. midterm elections held on November 3, 2026 ended in a landslide victory for the Democratic Party. As of November 5, Democrats had flipped seven Republican-held seats in the Senate to secure a total of 54 seats, while Republicans were left with 44. In the House as well, Democrats flipped more than 30 Republican seats to reach a total of 237, giving them control of both chambers of the 120th Congress. Although vote counting continues in some districts, the results fully merit being recorded as a “Blue Wave.” Democratic senators were elected in traditionally Republican strongholds such as Texas, Kansas, and South Carolina for the first time in decades, and the first Black woman governor and the first Muslim senator in U.S. history were also elected.
This election goes beyond the ruling party’s routine midterm loss and carries the meaning of a referendum on President Trump’s governance as a whole. Voter discontent over rising prices, the economic burden of tariff policy, and the prolongation and cost of the Iran war translated into the Democratic landslide. Democrats are expected to use this victory as a springboard to strengthen checks on the administration’s policies, budget execution, key personnel appointments, and military operations.
Whether the landslide will weaken President Trump’s political influence and lead to policy compromise, however, is a separate question. During the vote count, President Trump signaled that he would accept the result and was open to working with Democrats,1) but he had earlier declared that, should Democrats take control of Congress, he would become “Mr. Veto” and exercise his veto power actively.2) A midterm defeat is generally expected to weaken a president’s political influence and produce a “lame duck” effect, but a loss this lopsided may instead provoke a political counterattack. In particular, the stronger the congressional checks on legislation, budgets, and personnel become, the more likely it is that an “Angry Trump” foreign policy will emerge, one that expands pressure on allies, summit diplomacy, and the use of military force in the foreign and security domain, where the president retains comparatively greater discretion.
Existing analyses at home and abroad have focused on three issues: the capacity of a Democratic-led Congress to check the president,3) the impact of the shift in congressional power on the Trump administration’s foreign policy,4) and the effect of domestic political variables on the president’s political standing.5) In particular, it has been suggested that, despite congressional checks, the president’s executive authority and diplomatic discretion will largely be preserved, and that the strategic orientation of countering China and expanding allied responsibility is also likely to continue.6) What matters most, however, is that as three factors interlock, namely stronger congressional checks, President Trump’s political counterattack, and the continuity of U.S. foreign strategy, the direction of policy may be maintained while the manner in which it is pursued becomes more aggressive and unstable. This paper therefore examines the reconfiguration of power in the 120th Congress after the midterm elections and its practical capacity to check the executive. It then analyzes the effects that the possible emergence of an “Angry Trump” may have on U.S. strategic competition with China, tariffs and economic security, alliance policy, the Iran and Ukraine wars, and North Korea policy. Finally, it draws out the implications of these changes for the ROK-U.S. alliance and the Korean Peninsula.
| The Reconfiguration of Power in the 120th Congress: The Meaning and Limits of Stronger Checks
Democratic Control of Both Chambers: Expanded Checks on the President within Limits
With Democrats winning by a larger margin than expected and taking control of both the Senate and the House of the 120th Congress, congressional checks on the Trump administration are expected to expand significantly. In particular, because Democrats can now lead not only on legislation and budgets but also on confirmations and oversight of the executive branch, considerable policy constraints are anticipated for the remainder of President Trump’s term. The Democratic landslide does not, however, translate into comprehensive control over the president’s policy decisions. This can be examined in four respects.
First, there are checks on the president through legislative and budgetary powers. With Democrats controlling both chambers, their capacity to review, amend, and negotiate over the Trump administration’s major bills and budget proposals has expanded, but constraints remain on pursuing independent policy changes. This is because the president can exercise a veto.7) In general, a bill must pass both chambers in identical form and receive the president’s signature, and if the president vetoes it, each chamber must override by a vote of at least two-thirds of the members present. In addition, in the Senate the minority party can use the filibuster, continuing debate in order to delay the final vote on a bill. Because ending a filibuster and proceeding to a vote ordinarily requires 60 of the Senate’s 100 votes, it is difficult to pass ordinary legislation without Republican cooperation even when Democrats hold a majority of 54 seats. Certain fiscal legislation can be passed by a simple Senate majority through budget reconciliation, but this too is not free from the president’s veto.8) Defense budgets likewise must pass through the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) process in the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and appropriations review in the Appropriations Committees. Democratic control of both chambers expands congressional influence, but institutional constraints such as the Senate filibuster and the presidential veto remain. Accordingly, the more Democrats try to check administration policy through the budget, the greater the possibility that the president’s veto and Republican filibusters will interlock, intensifying political clashes such as delays in passing appropriations bills or a government shutdown.
Second, Congress’s influence over personnel expands. With control of both chambers, Democrats secure the chairmanships of major standing committees and control over the legislative calendar, and in the Senate in particular they can directly influence the confirmation of senior officials nominated by the president, such as the secretaries of state and defense and ambassadors. Unlike ordinary legislation, confirmations can be processed by a simple Senate majority, so the majority party’s influence is considerable. In particular, the conflict already under way over the fate of Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, on whom blame for the Iran war has fallen, seems to be a prelude to future clashes between the administration and Congress over personnel authority. President Trump indicated on November 4 that he would keep Secretary Hegseth in office, but Democrats are signaling that, after taking control of Congress, they will pursue investigations into his conduct of the war and his management of the Department of War, and even his impeachment.9) However, the president can make use of positions that do not require Senate confirmation or acting arrangements under legal requirements, and the removal of a sitting secretary is also difficult to compel through congressional demands alone. Accordingly, the stronger Democratic checks on personnel become, the greater the possibility that President Trump will protect his existing associates more actively or rely on organizations that report directly to the president, deepening conflict with Congress.
Third, Congress’s oversight of the executive branch is strengthened. Through the major standing committees, Democrats can expand hearings, investigations, and demands for documents on tariff policy, the Iran war, and the execution of the defense budget. For example, committees can demand testimony or the submission of materials through subpoenas.10) In particular, with Democratic control of both chambers, investigation and oversight of the administration’s policy decision-making processes and budget execution can be conducted more systematically. However, the administration may refuse by asserting executive privilege and the like, in which case legal disputes could be prolonged.
Fourth, Congress can check the president directly. Democrats can vote to impeach the president in the House by a simple majority. However, actual removal requires the vote of at least two-thirds of the senators present, so under the current seat distribution the cooperation of Republican senators would be necessary.
The Reconfiguration of Power in the Major Standing Committees
In addition to the change in seat numbers, what deserves attention is the replacement of chairs and ranking members of the major House and Senate standing committees. In the U.S. Congress, the majority party holds the chairmanships and each committee leads legislation and oversight in its area of jurisdiction. Democratic control of both chambers will therefore lead not merely to a change in seat numbers but to a substantive reconfiguration of power in the major decision-making processes on foreign affairs, security, and the defense budget.
To begin with, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had Republican James Risch as chair and Democrat Jeanne Shaheen as ranking member in the 119th Congress, and it has been involved in foreign policy legislation, treaties, and the confirmation of key diplomatic appointees.11) Given the midterm results, Chair Risch could, for the present, step down to become the minority party’s ranking member, and as Senator Shaheen is retiring at the end of 2026, the selection of new chair candidates, including Democrat Chris Coons, is expected to take place. Senator Coons is also being mentioned as chair of the East Asia and Pacific subcommittee, and he has taken a critical position on countering China and managing alliances.12)
The Senate Armed Services Committee exercises influence over the composition of U.S. forces, military posture, major defense programs, and alliance-related policy through the National Defense Authorization Act. In the 119th Congress, Republican Roger Wicker served as chair and Democrat Jack Reed as ranking member. Should Senator Reed return as chair after reelection and the party’s internal selection process, oversight of the defense budget, the legal basis for overseas military operations, and the mission and force employment of U.S. Forces Korea is expected to be strengthened. Senator Reed has emphasized congressional control over the Trump administration’s reductions of U.S. Forces Korea and changes to its command structure, as well as oversight of the legal basis and cost of military operations.13) However, because both Wicker and Reed have prioritized strengthening U.S. defense capabilities and deterring China, a change in chairmanship is not expected to mean a fundamental change in Indo-Pacific military strategy.14)
In the House as well, Gregory Meeks, who served as ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and Adam Smith of the Armed Services Committee, among others, may be selected as chairs. Both have been critical of the Trump administration’s reduction of support for Ukraine and of the Iran war, and have also emphasized the continuity of the ROK-U.S. alliance and combined exercises. As a result, oversight of overseas military operations, foreign assistance, and the mission and force employment of U.S. Forces Korea could be strengthened, but the likelihood that countering China and alliance cooperation themselves would be weakened is limited.
On the Senate Appropriations Committee, which has jurisdiction over the defense budget, Senator Patty Murray, who served as Democratic ranking member in the 119th Congress, may return as chair. In that case, Congress’s role in reviewing and adjusting the budget for weapons system acquisitions requested by the Trump administration and for the operation of U.S. forces overseas could expand. However, because the Democratic Party also prioritizes deterring China and North Korea and strengthening U.S. defense capabilities, conflict is expected to center on budget allocation and the priorities of force employment rather than on a fundamental change in defense policy.
The Emergence of an “Angry Trump”
Will Democratic control of Congress, then, weaken President Trump’s influence? Not necessarily. As examined above, institutional constraints such as the Senate filibuster and the presidential veto remain in place. Rather, it deserves attention that the stronger Democratic checks become, the more likely President Trump is to rely on executive authority and on diplomatic and military discretion, which require comparatively less congressional consent.
In particular, having come under heightened political pressure from an electoral defeat larger than expected, President Trump faces a growing need to show visible results in a short period in order to reverse domestic public opinion and rally his base of support. If Democrats check the administration through legislation, budgets, and confirmations, however, securing new achievements in domestic policy may become even more difficult. This could increase the incentive to seek a political breakthrough in the foreign and security domain, where comparatively less congressional consent is needed. In this process, political confrontation rather than compromise between Congress and the administration may deepen, and disruptions in governance, such as delays in passing budget bills and government shutdowns, may recur. In the end, the Democratic landslide could produce the paradoxical result of stimulating more aggressive and unilateral policy choices rather than weakening President Trump’s foreign policy, thereby heightening the uncertainty of U.S. foreign policy.
| The Direction of Second-Term Trump Foreign Policy: The Boundary between Counterattack and Compromise
Should an “Angry Trump” foreign policy materialize, the remainder of the second Trump administration’s foreign policy is expected to show a pattern in which unilateral policy pursuit against congressional checks coexists with strategic continuity grounded in bipartisan consensus. Strategic goals shared by both parties, such as countering China and expanding the role of allies, will be maintained, whereas in summit diplomacy, the use of military force, and pressure on allies, where the president has wide discretion, independent action may be strengthened over compromise with Congress. At this boundary between counterattack and compromise, four directions deserve attention.
Expansion of Selective Engagement
First, the posture of selective engagement is likely to expand. Since voter discontent over rising prices and the cost of the Iran war was confirmed in this midterm election, President Trump has a greater political need to show that he is reducing the financial burden of overseas military support and focusing on the domestic economy. In particular, as congressional checks make it harder to secure additional foreign assistance budgets and the Iran war constrains even military resources, moves to reduce the direct U.S. burden could be strengthened. On November 3, President Trump announced a policy of halting roughly $4 billion in annual military assistance to Israel. Whether and to what extent this will actually be implemented remains unclear, but it shows that even Israel, a core security partner, may not be exempt from reductions in support. There is a possibility that moves will strengthen to reduce the U.S. military and financial burden while selectively adjusting the scope and level of military engagement according to U.S. strategic interests.
This change does not, however, mean a weakening of U.S. strategic competition with China. China’s military buildup, competition in advanced technology, supply chains, and the Taiwan Strait issue are medium- to long-term strategic challenges shared by both the Democratic and Republican parties. In fact, in May 2026, Senators Jeanne Shaheen and Chris Coons of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee introduced a bipartisan resolution together with Republican Senator Pete Ricketts and others, emphasizing the strengthening of Indo-Pacific deterrence, the securing of advanced technology competitiveness, peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and alliance cooperation.15) In particular, key Democratic lawmakers such as Senator Jack Reed have criticized some of the Trump administration’s conciliatory approaches toward China, stressing that national security and advanced technology competitiveness must not be compromised in negotiations with China.16) Policy continuity on the strategic goal of countering China is therefore likely to be maintained without any separate political compromise between Congress and the administration. Conversely, if President Trump seeks concessions on tariffs or technology controls through summit diplomacy with China, a paradoxical situation could arise in which a Democratic Congress instead checks him.
Continued Pressure on Allies
Second, pressure on allies is likely to continue or even intensify. In line with the selective engagement posture examined above, President Trump appears set to actively pursue pressure to open markets through tariffs, the attraction of investment into the United States, and greater defense burden-sharing by allies, thereby reducing direct U.S. costs while highlighting domestic economic achievements. In particular, the more difficult it becomes to advance major domestic policies because of congressional checks, the greater the incentive to present allied concessions and investment pledges as his own political achievements.
The problem is that this pressure does not stem solely from President Trump’s personal policy choices. This is because countering China, modernizing U.S. force posture in the Indo-Pacific, and expanding the defense capabilities and roles of allies are strategic tasks shared by both parties. In fact, in 2024, Democratic Senator Jack Reed and Republican Senator Roger Wicker of the Senate Armed Services Committee emphasized in a joint statement the importance of deterring China and North Korea, strengthening U.S. force posture in the region, and alliance cooperation.17) The possibility that Democratic control of Congress will lead to a relaxation of demands for expanded burden-sharing by allies is limited.
Democrats are nonetheless critical of the Trump administration’s unilateral approach to alliance management. In September 2026, Democratic lawmakers including Representative Gregory Meeks of the House Foreign Affairs Committee opposed the decision to suspend ROK-U.S. combined exercises, pointing out that measures taken without prior consultation could weaken military readiness and alliance trust.18) As a result, even if a Democratic Congress emphasizes alliance commitments and the continuity of combined exercises, the Trump administration may continue to press on defense spending and investment in the United States while seeking to selectively adjust military support and force employment.
Expansion of Legacy Diplomacy
Third, President Trump may focus even more on summit diplomacy in order to leave a political legacy in the latter part of his term. Amid confrontation with Congress, he appears likely to pursue visible results through summit diplomacy, where he can exercise relatively independent discretion. The resumption of U.S.-North Korea summits, an end to the Ukraine war through direct negotiations with Russia, and the conclusion of negotiations with Iran could remain continuing options.
Such summit diplomacy does not, however, guarantee that actual agreements will be implemented. In particular, a Democratic Congress appears set to strengthen oversight of President Trump’s unilateral negotiating approach and of the content of agreements. For example, Senator Jack Reed has demanded materials on the cost of the Iran war, munitions expenditure, and military readiness, and Representative Adam Smith has also raised questions about the war’s objectives and termination plan. On Ukraine as well, Representatives Meeks and Smith have criticized the Trump administration’s reduction of support and urged stronger military and economic support.
Similar conflict may emerge on North Korea policy. President Trump may seek to revive a summit with Chairman Kim Jong Un, but a Democratic Congress may strengthen oversight of the easing of sanctions on North Korea, the verification of denuclearization, and consultation with allies. In particular, easing sanctions that are grounded in law, or implementing an agreement, requires cooperation with Congress. There is nonetheless room to pursue changes to military measures at the administration’s discretion without new legislation from Congress. It is worth noting the possibility that, as congressional checks strengthen, President Trump may seek short-term achievements through political declarations between leaders or limited military and diplomatic measures.
Shifting the Dynamic through the Use of Military Force
Fourth, if diplomatic negotiations reach an impasse or visible results prove difficult to achieve in the short term, the possibility that President Trump will intensify military pressure still cannot be ruled out. The use of military force is an area in which, although Congress holds the power to declare war and the power of the purse, the president as commander in chief can exercise considerable discretion over initial operations. In particular, despite the political goal of an early end to the Iran war, the possibility of a prolonged military operation still exists. Recent reports that the United States has warned Gulf states of the possibility of a short, intensive attack on Iran after the midterm elections, and has begun replenishing munitions and redeploying military assets, also support this concern.19)
This is not a problem confined to the Middle East. The United States’ continued engagement in the Iran and Ukraine wars raises demand for air defense assets, precision-guided munitions, and logistics resources, which may affect military availability in the Indo-Pacific. Even if a Democratic Congress strengthens oversight of the defense budget and military operations, military resources that have already been committed or expended cannot be restored in a short period. Additional military intervention by President Trump may therefore increase the direct U.S. burden while resulting in demands that allies in other regions assume greater defense responsibility.
| Implications for South Korea
The implication of the U.S. midterm results is that Democratic control of Congress will not easily reduce the alliance and economic security burdens that South Korea faces. Rather, the Lee Jae Myung administration may face a dual challenge: while the structural U.S. demands of countering China and expanding the roles of allies persist, it must also respond to unilateral policy decisions by a Trump administration in conflict with Congress. The South Korean government should therefore not be optimistic about U.S. policy change on the strength of Democratic congressional checks alone. It should prepare for President Trump’s independent policy decisions while securing the stability of the ROK-U.S. alliance by drawing on the strategic consensus shared by both parties.
Focusing on Follow-Up Implementation of Wartime Operational Control (OPCON) Transfer and Nuclear-Powered Submarine Cooperation
To begin with in the alliance, South Korea should prepare for the possibility that follow-up implementation of items agreed between the two countries’ leaders, such as OPCON transfer and the introduction of nuclear-powered submarines, will become more difficult. These matters require not only a political decision by the Trump administration but also the strategic priorities of U.S. forces, the defense budget, relevant legislation, and the cooperation of Congress. OPCON transfer in particular presupposes that conditions concerning the operational capability and command structure of the Future Combined Forces Command and the core military support provided by the United States are met, and the introduction of nuclear-powered submarines likewise requires resolving legal and institutional issues related to nuclear fuel supply and nuclear energy.
The problem is that a Democratic-led Congress and the Trump administration may each impose constraints on these tasks, for different reasons. Congress, which places weight on alliance stability, military readiness, and nonproliferation principles, may strengthen oversight of the relevant conditions, whereas the Trump administration may seek more aggressive negotiations by linking them to other issues such as defense spending, investment in the United States, and regional security roles. South Korea needs to prepare in particular for the possibility that President Trump will link leader-level agreements to other policy issues and demand renegotiation or change the conditions for implementation. It is difficult to be optimistic about follow-up implementation on the strength of existing leader-level agreements alone, and South Korea should reduce uncertainty in the implementation process by distinguishing the roles of the administration and Congress and specifying the necessary legal and institutional measures. In particular, rather than fixating on the political timetable for OPCON transfer, it needs to focus on completing actual operational capability and the combined command structure. In addition, consultations with the major standing committees and with U.S. defense and foreign policy officials should be strengthened so that agreements between the two countries are not swayed by political conflict within the United States.
Tariff and Investment Pressure: Pursuing Negotiations Based on Mutual Benefit
In the economic security domain as well, Democratic control of Congress does not guarantee a favorable trade environment for South Korea. Even if Democrats oppose President Trump’s unilateral imposition of tariffs, a consensus exists between the two parties on protecting U.S. manufacturing and expanding domestic production bases in key industries. Demands on South Korea for tariffs, expanded investment in the United States, and supply chain restructuring are therefore likely to continue in altered forms.
In particular, South Korea should prepare for the possibility that President Trump will make additional demands for investment by South Korean companies and expanded purchases of U.S. products in order to highlight domestic economic achievements. It should be noted that the more difficult it becomes to advance domestic policy because of congressional checks, the greater the incentive to use additional concessions from allies as political achievements. Rather than responding to such pressure issue by issue, South Korea needs to negotiate the scope and conditions of additional demands while presenting in a comprehensive manner the results of its already pledged investment in the United States, job creation in the United States, and cooperation in advanced industries. In particular, it should clarify the principles and priorities of negotiation so that different issues such as tariffs, investment, and defense spending are not linked unilaterally. It should also strengthen cooperation with the newly reconfigured House and Senate committees on trade and actively explain that investment by South Korean companies contributes to U.S. industrial competitiveness and supply chain stability. In this way, South Korea should respond to the Trump administration’s short-term political demands while maintaining medium- to long-term economic security cooperation between the two countries.
U.S.-North Korea Dialogue: Preparing Simultaneously for Unilateral Agreements and Heightened Military Tension
On North Korea policy as well, summit diplomacy aimed at President Trump’s political legacy and the oversight authority of a Democratic Congress may work in different directions. President Trump may pursue a summit with Chairman Kim Jong Un or change military measures toward North Korea in pursuit of diplomatic achievements in the latter part of his term. In particular, if he seeks short-term results through summit diplomacy and certain military measures that can be pursued without congressional consent, South Korea should prepare for the possibility that sufficient prior consultation between the two countries will not take place. If U.S.-North Korea dialogue resumes, what South Korea should watch is therefore not whether a summit takes place but the content of the negotiations and the conditions for their implementation. A limited agreement that effectively recognizes North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons, a reduction of combined exercises unrelated to progress on denuclearization, or the easing of sanctions on North Korea, if pursued, could directly affect South Korea’s security interests. Conversely, if negotiations stall and President Trump intensifies military pressure on North Korea, tension and burdens could arise on the Korean Peninsula as well.
South Korea should therefore keep open the possibility of resuming U.S.-North Korea dialogue while examining in advance the conditions for easing sanctions and changing military measures, as well as their impact on ROK-U.S. extended deterrence and the combined defense posture. In particular, it needs to make active use of regional minilateral cooperation frameworks, such as ROK-Japan and ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation, centered on the ROK-U.S. alliance. Deterrence against North Korea and information sharing among South Korea, the United States, and Japan, together with ROK-Japan security cooperation, could increase the linkage between Indo-Pacific-level security cooperation and regional crisis response. In addition, cooperation with the major foreign affairs and armed services committees, as well as with the White House and the Department of War, should be strengthened so that South Korea’s security interests are continuously reflected in the U.S. policy-making process.
Summary: Bipartisan Alliance Diplomacy in Preparation for an “Angry Trump”
In the end, the coexistence of a Democratic-led Congress and a more aggressive Trump administration may produce a more complex negotiating environment for South Korea in dealing with the United States. Even if Democrats support the ROK-U.S. alliance and U.S. security commitments, they will not ease the strategic demands of countering China and expanding the burden on allies, and President Trump, for his part, can retain considerable diplomatic and military discretion as well as trade authority under existing law despite congressional checks.
Accordingly, South Korea’s diplomacy toward the United States needs to focus on three directions. First, South Korea should accurately assess the demands for countering China and for allied burden-sharing that persist regardless of changes in U.S. domestic politics, and concretely coordinate South Korea’s responsibility for conventional defense against North Korea with the scope of U.S. military support. In particular, in preparation for the expansion of U.S. selective engagement and for changes in U.S. force posture in the region, it should clarify the core military capabilities and support conditions required for the defense of the Korean Peninsula.
Second, a multilayered and proactive diplomacy toward the United States is needed that takes the administration and Congress into account at the same time. Through cooperation with the major standing committees, South Korea should reflect its security and economic interests in the legislative, budgetary, and oversight processes, while maintaining a direct consultation channel with the administration on the president’s summit diplomacy and military decisions. In particular, South Korea should not regard a Democratic Congress merely as a means of checking the Trump administration, nor expect that congressional checks will work in South Korea’s favor. It should expand cooperation across the key policymakers of both parties, the administration, military leadership, and industry.
Third, beyond passive responses to U.S. demands or an approach tilted toward a particular party, South Korea should use these midterm elections as an opportunity to further consolidate the bipartisan U.S. support for and cooperation with the ROK-U.S. alliance. Because both the Democratic and Republican parties share the strategic goals of countering China and expanding the role of allies, South Korea needs to take the initiative in presenting a direction for alliance development that is not shaken by changes in U.S. domestic politics. In particular, it should emphasize that South Korea’s security and economic contributions on major issues, such as defense cost-sharing, OPCON transfer, nuclear-powered submarine cooperation, investment in the United States, and supply chain restructuring, are also consistent with U.S. strategic interests, and expand cooperation with key policymakers of both parties. Through these efforts, South Korea should manage the uncertainty arising from the unilateral policy pursuits of an “Angry Trump” while securing the continuity and stability of the ROK-U.S. alliance.

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※ The opinions expressed in Sejong Focus are those of the author and do not represent the official views of the Sejong Institute.
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