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The Takaichi Administration and the Future Direction of ROK-Japan Relations |
| October 24, 2025 |
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Chang Soo JinPrincipal Research Fellow, Sejong Institute | jincs@sejong.org
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For the first time in Japan’s constitutional history, Sanae Takaichi, President of the Liberal Democratic Party(LDP), was appointed as the first female prime minister. The fact that a woman has assumed the premiership in a male-centered political sphere carries significant meaning in Japanese politics. In addition, the dissolution of the LDP–Komeito coalition for the first time in twenty-six years and the launch of a coalition government between the LDP and Ishin indicate a shift in Japan’s political landscape.
Japan’s political landscape has moved into a phase where the LDP and Ishin form a coalition yet still fall short of a majority. As a result, Japan now operates under a minority ruling coalition. This shift signals the arrival of a multi-party era in which no single party can govern alone. Much like multi-party systems in Europe, Japan now faces fluid government formation as minority cabinets emerge and coalition arrangements determine who governs. Over the longer term, this environment also leaves open the possibility of a broader political realignment. In the House of Representatives, a majority requires 233 of 465 seats. The current distribution stands at 196 for the LDP, 148 for the Constitutional Democratic Party, 35 for Ishin, and 27 for the Democratic Party for the People. Even if the LDP partners with any party other than the Constitutional Democratic Party, it still cannot secure a parliamentary majority. As a result, it has become difficult to pass proposed legislation in both the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors, and the stability of the administration can no longer be assured. A change of government may occur if the opposition parties form a coalition. Yet the Constitutional Democratic Party and the Democratic Party for the People face significant obstacles in forming a coalition government because they hold different positions on key policies such as nuclear power, security, and the constitution. Japan has entered a multi-party era in which neither the governing parties nor the opposition can secure a majority. In this multi-party era, Japanese politics has moved away from the Liberal Democratic Party–dominant period and now faces a fluid political environment in which stability is difficult to maintain.
The foundation of the Takaichi administration is more fragile than at any time in the past. In the House of Representatives, the LDP holds 196 seats and Ishin holds 35 seats, which leaves them two seats short of a majority. In the House of Councillors, the Liberal Democratic Party holds 100 seats and Ishin holds only 19 seats, which leaves them five seats short of a majority. The Takaichi administration began with a minority-government structure and faces difficulty because it must secure cooperation from the opposition parties to deliberate bills and pass the budget. If the opposition parties unite, the political situation will become even more unstable. The administration may also face a crisis through a vote of no confidence. Even the supplementary budget that must be compiled within the year is unlikely to pass if the opposition parties do not cooperate. If coordination between the ruling and opposition parties takes time, the schedule tightens and other bills become difficult to pass. This can slow policy implementation and create delays. In the latter part of this month, Japan is scheduled to host the Southeast Asia summit, followed by the visit of U.S. President Donald Trump on October 27 and the APEC summit on October 31. These are major diplomatic commitments, yet the complicated domestic situation leaves the government with limited room to focus on foreign affairs.
To break the impasse, the prime minister who has taken power is already considering the option of dissolving the House of Representatives and calling a general election. Within the LDP, some argue that the House should be dissolved and an election held after the budget passes early next year. Yet it remains uncertain whether the LDP can regain a majority after losing public trust due to the issue of “politics and money.” Moreover, its electoral cooperation with Komeito has been severely disrupted, which makes a decline in seats unavoidable. Until now, the LDP and Komeito secured a number of victories in single-member districts through mutual support (mutual recommendation), and this arrangement helped stabilize LDP governments. Going forward, however, the LDP is likely to lose Komeito’s organizational vote base of roughly ten thousand votes per district, which increases the likelihood of further seat losses. The dissolution of the coalition also weakens the existing mobilization capacity of both parties. Even so, Prime Minister Takaichi hopes to regain the conservative voters the party had lost and use that support to increase the LDP’s seats. Whether the LDP can recover its electoral strength through an election remains unclear. With difficult challenges at home and abroad and without a majority in either chamber, the Takaichi administration faces a difficult start. -
With Komeito’s departure from the coalition and the formation of a new coalition between the LDP and Ishin, Japan’s political landscape has been reorganized into clearer conservative, centrist, and left segments. The launch of the LDP–Ishin coalition shows the emergence of a new power structure with a strong conservative orientation. At the same time, cooperation among centrist parties such as the Constitutional Democratic Party and Komeito is also moving toward a more coordinated posture.
Prime Minister Takaichi is a prominent conservative figure within the LDP and has taken an active stance on security and constitutional revision. She visited the Yasukuni Shrine every year prior to taking office, and this behavior is linked to her views on historical issues. The LDP’s policy line is likely to move further to the right. The moderate faction once called the “mainstream conservatives” has lost influence, and hardline conservatives are filling the gap. The LDP–Ishin coalition agreement includes revision of the three foreign and security policy documents, expansion of defense capabilities, and the pursuit of active fiscal policy. A hardline orientation is evident not only in foreign and security policy but also in policy on foreigners. With Komeito no longer serving as a moderating force, the LDP’s cooperation with Ishin has made the “rightward shift” more pronounced.
Appointments in the cabinet and the party largely reflect figures from the faction led by LDP Vice President Aso Taro (麻生太郎) and the former Motegi (茂木敏充) faction. This trend suggests a return to traditional factional politics. The selections carry a strong sense of rewarding contributions made during the party leadership race and give the impression of a heavy tilt toward conservative figures. Although Takaichi placed the four candidates who competed in the leadership election in key posts to bring them into her fold, it is difficult to view this as the establishment of a “unified party structure.” In her inaugural press conference on the night of the 21st, she presented her administration as one of “decision and progress” and stated that she would “build a strong Japanese economy and protect Japan’s national interests in foreign and security policy.” Since she has shown a cautious stance on the selective separate surname system for married couples, the extent to which gender equality will advance remains uncertain. She declared that she would actively appoint women to cabinet positions, yet the number remained at two.
Prime Minister Takaichi’s first priority is to formulate economic measures and draft the 2025 supplementary budget, including steps to address rising prices. The coalition agreement that the LDP and Ishin concluded on the 20th includes a gasoline tax reduction and a two-year exemption of the consumption tax on food. Market expectations point to a new administration that favors active fiscal spending and moves toward expansionary fiscal policy. Social security policy is also a major task. In line with the Innovation Party’s demands, the government plans to begin reforms that reduce the social insurance burden on the working-age population. It remains uncertain, however, whether the LDP can push ahead in the face of opposition from groups such as the Japan Medical Association.
On the issue of “politics and money,” the LDP–Innovation Party agreement postponed any decision on whether to ban political donations from corporations and organizations. This appears to place the politics-and-money problem outside the “list of priorities.” Delaying political reform will only deepen public distrust.
In foreign affairs, the summit with U.S. President Donald Trump, expected around the 28th of this month, will be the first major test. Japan’s increase in defense spending and its investment in the United States are likely to become central agenda items. How Japan confronts China while anchoring its strategy in its alignment with Trump will be the key question. A reconstruction of Japan’s foreign and security strategy is unavoidable. Revisions to the “three security documents,” including the National Security Strategy established at the end of 2022, and others. Japan intends to reassess the equipment and force deployment needed to defend the country and to make an independent decision on increasing defense spending. Although Prime Minister Takaichi is consolidating right-wing forces within the LDP to strengthen the foundation of her government, this approach also carries the risk of heightened tensions in international relations. -
In forming the coalition government between the Liberal Democratic Party and Nippon Ishin, Ishin adopted the position of “outside-the-cabinet (閣外) cooperation.” This means it does not enter a formal coalition yet agrees to cooperate in the National Diet management, including the vote for the prime minister and responses to no-confidence motions. This arrangement is the first case of outside-the-cabinet cooperation since the second Hashimoto Ryutaro LDP administration in 1997, which governed in coalition with the Social Democratic Party and the New Party Sakigake.
The coalition government that the Liberal Democratic Party and Nippon Ishin launched on the 21st carries clear sources of instability. The issue of reducing the number of National Diet members (number of seats) which Ishin demanded, faces strong objections inside the LDP. The two parties agreed “to aim for the passage of related legislation during the extraordinary National Diet session,” yet failure to do so may stall the administration as Ishin is likely to push back. “If we cannot reduce the number of National Diet members first, reforms such as social security reform or the secondary (副) capital initiative will not be possible.” Hirofumi Yoshimura, leader of Nippon Ishin, stressed this point to reporters at the Osaka Prefectural Government building at noon on the 20th. Ishin has promoted administrative reform in Osaka Prefecture and Osaka City and has actually reduced the number of local assembly members. The view behind this is that unless politicians first pursue “reforms that cut their own bodies (身を切る改革),’the public will not support reforms that divide opinion.
President Sanae Takaichi and others in the LDP accepted the demands of Ishin, yet resistance inside the party remains strong. Because the LDP General Council operates on the principle of unanimous approval, there is an expectation that the proposal may not pass. Even if the LDP reaches an internal consensus, it is uncertain whether related bills can clear the National Diet. The combined total of LDP and Ishin seats in the House of Representatives is 231, which falls short of a majority. Small and medium-sized parties that are heavily affected by proportional representation seat cuts are opposing the LDP–Ishin plan. The National Diet session convened on the 21st is expected to run for fifty-eight days until December 17. There is a possibility that the “conditions of coalition” may collapse from the outset.
It is known that only Prime Minister Takaichi and Chairperson of the Diet Affairs Committee Endo Takashi had maintained a consistent relationship between the LDP and Ishin leadership even before the coalition talks. Former Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide, who had been close to Ishin inside the LDP, has already stepped away from the leadership. Endo is the figure most oftㅂen mentioned as the mediator. Prime Minister Takaichi appointed him as a special adviser to the prime minister. This appears to be a move designed to allow Ishin’s views to reach the prime minister more directly, yet it also shows that the political link between the two parties remains weak. Ishin’s refusal to accept the “in-cabinet cooperation(閣内協力)” requested by Prime Minister Takaichi seems to reflect a calculation to keep some distance from the LDP so that it can easily withdraw from the coalition if discord within the government grows. -
Because the Takaichi administration governs as a minority ruling party, it is essential to first reach a compromise with its coalition partner, the Ishin, in order to establish a stable working relationship. The administration also needs to consider policy cooperation with the opposition if it seeks broader stability. It remains uncertain whether Prime Minister Takaichi can establish a stable government in an era of multiparty politics. If she fails to increase the LDP’s seat share through an election, sustaining a stable administration will be difficult. If she also fails to demonstrate effective leadership in policy negotiations with the opposition, political instability may continue.
If political instability persists in Japan, it limits South Korea’s ability to advance bilateral relations. The Japanese government may become absorbed in domestic politics and respond passively. Prime Minister Takaichi is also widely seen as Abe’s successor, which makes a forward-leaning stance on historical issues that Korea seeks unlikely. She may even take positions that provoke Korea to secure support from conservative groups at home. Yet it will not be easy for her to visit the Yasukuni Shrine, which Korea views with concern. The United States remains firmly opposed and her need to manage relations with the opposition makes a visit highly unlikely for the time being.
Prime Minister Takaichi, like former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe(安倍晋三) is likely to prioritize economic policy over her conservative stance in order to build a stable government. She will regard boosting approval ratings through measures on prices and economic policy as a top priority. In international relations, she is also likely to emphasize ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral cooperation. As with Abe, she will seek to strengthen relations with the United States. This does not mean, however, that risks in bilateral relations with South Korea are absent. Japan is also likely to pursue military expansion and revisions to the “three security-related documents” in response to U.S. demands. Moreover, since Prime Minister Takaichi is proactive on military expansion and constitutional revision, situations of concern for Korea could arise. Of course, a sudden and large-scale increase in Japan’s military spending would be difficult to implement given budgetary constraints. At the same time, according to Prime Minister Takaichi’s usual convictions, there is a possibility that issues such as historical perception and the Dokdo dispute could stir anti-Japanese sentiment in Korea. Unintended incidents could further inflame emotional tensions between the two countries. Japanese politics is becoming increasingly right-leaning, and grievances toward Japan remain among Korean civic groups, leaving seeds of potential conflict. Beyond historical issues, differences in perceptions also exist between the two countries on various matters, including fishery market access, the Taiwan issue, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), and semiconductors.
That does not mean that ROK-Japan relations are entirely bleak. Prime Minister Takaichi undoubtedly adopts a strategic stance aimed at strengthening ROK-Japan cooperation. Moreover, the Japanese political sphere shares a consensus that such cooperation is important, particularly in the context of the Trump administration. President Lee Jae-myung’s pursuit of pragmatic diplomacy in Japan policy, which has maintained stability in bilateral relations, also has a positive effect. Therefore, unlike previous approaches, Takaichi is likely to pursue a strategic stance that minimizes conflict while expanding areas where mutual understanding and interests converge. Moving forward, South Korea will need the wisdom to manage negative situations while strategically expanding cooperation to achieve a win-win outcome.
During the Trump era, South Korea and Japan occupy similar positions in international relations. If the two countries cooperate in response to unilateral demands from the United States or China, they can respond more effectively than if each acts alone. Conversely, if Korea and Japan engage in conflict and confrontation, the likelihood of being exploited by the United States or China increases. Moreover, the benefits of Korea and Japan cooperating for the peace and prosperity of East Asia are significant. To advance bilateral relations, both countries must adopt the perception of a horizontal and equal relationship, a cooperative partnership that allows for win-win outcomes, and a strategic partnership in international affairs. Building on sixty years since the normalization of diplomatic relations, the next sixty years could take a completely different form. In this context, what Korea and Japan require are new perceptions and policies.
| Political Significance of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi
| Characteristics of the Takaichi Cabinet
| Sources of Instability in the LDP·Ishin Coalition
| Changes in Japanese Politics and Implications for ROK-Japan Relations
※ The contents published on 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institue
