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The Prospects of the U.S.-DPRK Talks on the Nuclear Issue |
| June 5, 2025 |
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Andrei LankovVisiting Research Fellow, The Sejong Institute | andreilankov@gmail.com
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Since Donald Trump’s re-election, there have been several instances in which he explicitly and publicly expressed his intention to resume talks with North Korea in the near future. There are also other signs confirming that the Trump Administration is interested in talk.
Immediately after his inauguration, on January 23, President Trump told Fox News that he would “reach out” to Kim Jong Un, whom he described as a “smart guy.” On March 31, Trump stated that he was in “communication” with North Korea and intended to “do something at some point” regarding the country. Some sources in Washington expressed skepticism about Trump’s claims of maintaining communication with North Korea, but opinions are divided. It appears that if communication with Pyongyang is indeed taking place, it is being conducted through some unconventional channels rather than through the regular State Department bureaucracy.
There are indicators of the Trump administration has begun preparations for talks. On April 27, Axios - a prominent news website run by former Politico journalists - reported, citing internal sources: “The Trump administration has quietly been holding discussions and consulting outside experts as it considers options for potentially restarting dialogue with North Korea.” It was also reported that personnel from the State Department and the National Security Council have participated in multiple roundtable discussions with outside experts on North Korea. These claims appear credible, as the present author was informed about such discussions during a trip to Washington, D.C., in early May.
Andreas Bengtsson, the Swedish Ambassador to North Korea visited Washington in mid-April. This is important because Sweden represents U.S. interests in the DPRK. It is also indicative that the Swedish Embassy was among the first Western embassies which was allowed to resume regular work in Pyongyang when the COVID restrictions were eased. According to the Axios report and the author’s own contacts, Ambassador Bengtsson participated in a number of discussions and meetings whose aim was to assess the current situation and prospects for the renewed dialogue between the U.S. and North Korea.
It is noteworthy that Donald Trump appointed to high positions a number of officials who in past were heavily involved in past U.S.–DPRK negotiations. Most notably, Allison Hooker is under consideration for the position of Under Secretary for Political Affairs, the third-highest rank in the State Department, and Kevin Kim currently serves as the State Department’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. For a while Alex Wong was a Deputy National Security Advisor, but in early May he lost his job due to the NSC reshuffle. Their appointments to such key positions may be seen as an indirect indication of Donald Trump’s intention to re-engage in negotiations with North Korea.
All of the above should be seen as an indication of the Trump administration’s intention to resume talks with North Korea. Unofficially, however, observers and the author’s contacts say that such talks are unlikely to begin in the near future, as the administration is currently preoccupied with more urgent and rapidly evolving issues, such as the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East as well as tariff disputes. Most of the insiders the author spoke with in Washington, D.C., in early May do not expect negotiations with North Korea to begin until the end of this year at the earliest. -
The information filtering out of North Korea is necessarily, less certain. However, it seems that the idea of talks is under consideration in Pyongyang as well.
In November 2024, shortly after Donald Trump’s electoral victory, Kim Jong Un delivered a speech on the state of the US-DPRK relations. In the speech, after his customary rounds of anti-Washington rhetoric and bellicosity, he mentioned the possibility of “coexistence” of North Korea with the U.S. “superpower” as the most desirable solution. While he claimed that this approach had previously been rejected by the United States, he implied that such an outcome remained possible.
It is telling that the official North Korean media remained silent when in January Donald Trump made positive comments about Kim Jong Un, whom he described as a “smart guy”. In the past, in July 2024, a similar statement was dismissed as irrelevant and, as the DPRK's official wire agency KCNA said, “buoying a lingering desire for the prospects of the DPRK-U.S. relations”.
Rumours filtering out of North Korea also indicate that North Korean officialdom is interested in talking. In August 2024, Ri Il Gyu, the highest-ranking DPRK diplomat to defect since 2016, said that the North Korean leaders expect to restart negotiations with the US if Donald Trump is elected. The author is aware that, in late April, Soren/Chongryon officials have conveyed to their Japanese counterparts that Pyongyang is interested in restarting dialogue with the United States and hopes that talks will start soon.
At the same time, North Korean leaders remain cautious about the prospects for talks and the chances of success. In a notable commentary published by KCNA in July 2024, North Korea expressed its skeptical attitude toward any agreement that might be reached through negotiations with the U.S. The commentary acknowledged that Donald Trump wished to improve relations with North Korea but asserted that even the President’s personal vision carried little weight due to the institutional reasons: “Even if any administration takes office in the U.S., the political climate, which is confused by the infighting of the two parties, does not change”. -
The near consensus of observers and media is that the Trump administration would resume negotiations with North Korea from where they were interrupted in February 2019. In other words, the US administration would seek what is often known as a “small deal.” This deal would involve North Korea dismantling its known nuclear R&D and manufacturing facilities in exchange for the UN Security Council lifting - or, at the very least, significantly relaxing - sanctions targeting North Korea's economy.
The “big deal,” which would involve the full denuclearization of North Korea, is no longer part of the Second Trump Administration’s agenda. This shift is partially confirmed by a change in official vocabulary. Since January, President Trump, Secretary of State Rubio, and Secretary of Defense Hashtag have begun systematically referring to North Korea as a “nuclear-armed state” or a “nuclear state.” While these terms are factually accurate, they were previously avoided in official discourse – and their frequent use now appears to be a deliberate choice. This shift in terminology signals that the long-standing CVID mantra (Complete, Verifiable, and Irreversible Denuclearization), which once defined the U.S. position on North Korea, is being quietly abandoned.
For the purposes of diplomatic camouflage, a “small deal” might be depicted as the first step on the path toward the denuclearization of North Korea. However, such a description would be misleading, since the deal would not involve the dismantlement of the few dozen nuclear devices North Korea is presumed to have produced. If anything, such a deal would come very close to a tacit acceptance of North Korea as a de facto nuclear-armed state. Most likely, Donald Trump’s critics will emphasise this, insisting that the “small deal” with North Korea will deliver a blow to the non-proliferation regime worldwide.
As seen from the US point of view, the deal has some advantages and disadvantages.
On one hand, such a deal could significantly slow down - or even temporarily halt - North Korea’s nuclear weapons development program. While it is almost certain that Pyongyang would attempt to cheat, (most likely, by concealing some facilities which will continue to operate secretly), the impact could still be substantial and lasting. Even under these conditions, North Korea’s nuclear weapons program could lose an estimated 70 to 90 percent of its research and production capacity. This would reduce the number of nuclear devices it could manufacture and considerably impede its technological advancement. Supporters of the “small deal” will claim that, without such an agreement, North Korea’s nuclear program will continue advancing at its current pace, while no realistic alternative is available: the chances of North Korea’s denuclearization are very low.
On the other hand, such a deal would amount to a tacit acceptance of North Korea as a de facto nuclear state. While, for all practical purposes, North Korea already is a de facto nuclear power, this kind of quasi-official recognition could send a dangerous signal to other aspiring nuclear states, inflicting further damage on the already struggling global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Moreover, it is likely to be attacked by domestic critics within the United States, who would portray a “small deal” as a “gutless surrender” by the Trump administration. -
The situation of North Korea has changed significantly compared to 2019, when the "small deal" was first discussed. As a recent report from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) correctly observed, North Korea now is in “the strongest strategic position in decades.” There are two major reasons why Pyongyang leaders now are far more confident about their future.
First, the dramatic deterioration in U.S.-China relations, which began in 2018–2019, has led to a complete shift in China’s previously ambivalent approach to North Korea. Now, China views North Korea as a vital buffer state and is prepared to provide it with unconditional—albeit modest—aid for the foreseeable future.
The second reason is the war in Ukraine. The Russian military, suffering from a persistent shortage of heavy artillery shells, has discovered that North Korea is the only country both able and willing to supply this ammunition. This led to a deal that has dramatically improved North Korea’s economic situation, generating revenues estimated at anywhere between $5 billion and $20 billion.
Nonetheless, the "small deal" might still be attractive for Pyongyang. The seemingly good situation North Korea finds itself has some downside and not necessarily going to last.
The weapons trade with Russia is hugely profitable, but it is unlikely to last long after the eventual end of hostilities in Ukraine. Past experience has demonstrated that the Russian and North Korean economies are not compatible, since nearly all goods and commodities that North Korea can sell profitably on international markets are of little or no value to Russian importers. The end of trade in ammunition will probably mean the near complete end of any trade.
If economic exchanges with Russia are frozen, North Korea still can easily return to China. However, among North Korean decision-makers, there has always been a great deal of caution and distrust toward their powerful neighbor. North Koreans would much prefer to return to their favored and time-tested policy of maneuvering between multiple trade partners and aid providers. Yet the existing UN sanctions make this nearly impossible. With the exception of Russia and China—who are willing to violate the sanctions—no other country is prepared to engage with North Korea under the current circumstances.
If a small deal is concluded and UN sanctions eased or cancelled, North Korean leaders will get some advantages.
First, a “small deal” be able to reduce North Korean dependency on China, whom the Pyongyang elite dislikes and distrust.
Second, a “small deal” will also allow North Korea to gain access to the long-promised Japanese compensation for the colonial period – a very substantial sum that cannot be paid as long as UN sanctions remain in place.
Third, the relaxation of sanctions, a part of a “small deal,” will make it possible for North Korea to receive aid and engage in broader economic interaction with South Korea. A progressive administration in Seoul is likely to offer North Korea aid and heavily subsidized economic interaction (aid in disguise, essentially).
All these sources of income, which could be opened up by a small deal, would probably exceed the aid provided by China. A greater autonomy and freedom of diplomatic maneuver will be an added bonus.
On the other hand, there is a price to pay. As part of a “small deal”, the advancement of North Korea’s nuclear weapons development program would significantly slow down or perhaps even come to a complete halt. However, this does not pose any meaningful threat to North Korea’s long-term security. Even after such a deal is concluded, North Korea will still possess dozens of nuclear warheads and a number of delivery systems. This arsenal is sufficient to ensure that no other country would dare to invade North Korea or intervene in its domestic political crises.
However, under current circumstances, compared with 2019, North Korea is under much less pressure to engage in negotiations with the United States. This might mean that the North Korean side will not start where the talks ended in 2019, and will make a few steps back, withdrawing some of their 2019 proposals which might be seen now as excessively generous. For example, it is possible that North Koreans will not discuss the complete dismantlement of all Yongbyon facilities, but will instead suggest partial dismantlement and disabling.
This might mean that the U.S. delegation would have to accept the conditions it rejected in Hanoi in 2019 or accept the collapse of the talks. -
Generally speaking, the possible conclusion of a “small deal” is likely to be beneficial for South Korea. However, it might have undesirable consequences in the longer term.
For a certain period of time, it would slow the advancement of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, including the development of ICBMs and tactical nuclear weapons. There are good reasons to believe that the current shape of North Korea’s nuclear program, with its emphasis on ICBMs and tactical nukes, is intended to eventually create conditions for a possible military strike against South Korea. Therefore, even a temporary halt in the development of such capabilities would provide the Republic of Korea with some breathing space and will reduce risks for a while.
At the same time, there is a risk that the “small deal” could be used by the notoriously isolationist-minded Trump administration as a reason/pretext for a dramatic reduction or even the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula. Such a development would be detrimental to the security of the Republic of Korea and should be firmly opposed.
A key argument that could be used to influence the U.S. position is the essentially tentative nature of the likely agreement. A small deal may reduce tensions temporarily, but, as history has shown, North Korea will sooner or later resume its nuclear program. Therefore, any significant reduction in the U.S. military presence in Korea would be ill-advised.
Alternatively, plans for reduction/withdrawal of the US forces can be used as a good pretext to obtain from Trump administration a tacit approval for the advancement of its own nuclear deterrence capacity, latent or actual.
| Interests in Negotiating with North Korea: Indications on the U.S. Side
| Interests in Negotiating with the U.S.: Indications on the North Korean Side
| Pros and Cons of Negotiations from the U.S. Point of View
| Pros and Cons of Negotiations from the North Korean Point of View
| The “small deal” Prospects and South Korea’s Interest
※ The contents published on 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institue
